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 This work would never have happened if it were not for Professor Marc Kruman, the 
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 I also benefited from the tremendous support I received from my employer, Dawn Food 
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of popular culture.  While I never had to discuss the “body image war between Khloe and Kim 
Kardashian,” I slept better knowing that I was armed with such information.  Most of all, I am 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
Towne v Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) 
 
 Feeling the oppression of a remote government, a group of farmers, tradesmen, 
merchants, doctors, and lawyers gathered through the summer to draft a constitutional blueprint 
for republican self-governance.  Having had little voice in their distant government, and 
believing that it had ignored their welfare, these settlers boldly declared, “the time has arrived 
when our present political condition ought to cease, and the right of self-government be 
asserted.”  The distant government responded with irritation, denying the settlers the right to self-
government and insisting that agents of the distant government continue to rule.  The year was 
1835 and the place, Detroit, Michigan.
1
 
 In response to what he perceived as the challenges associated with republican governance 
in the later portions of the nineteenth century, Michigan’s Thomas McIntyre Cooley penned his 
treatise concerning constitutional limitations on legislative power.  In it, Cooley offered a vision 
of government where courts would check government power and would raise constitutional 
barriers against the impact of improper influences on legislators.  As a student of history, Cooley 
grounded his beliefs and doctrines in experience, not philosophical reflections.  Believing that 
“the fruits of speculative genius in government are of little value,” Cooley submitted that 
governing structures and law “must be the work of time and circumstances, must grow out of 
                                                 
1
 Preamble, Constitution of Michigan, 1835. 
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actual needs, and have their excellencies tested in the practical wisdom of the people from whose 
aspirations and exigencies they have sprung.”
2
  Accordingly, law and governance must evolve 
along with political, social, and economic circumstances.  This is not to suggest that Cooley 
advocated that constitutional structures yield to political shifts or popular passions.  Rather, he 
proposed that constitutional language should be reinterpreted in order to hold fast to the core of 
American constitutional governance – republican, limited-governance.  With republican limited-
governance as their lodestar, courts were to search for new constitutional understandings to 
safeguard and advance that governance and, as part of that responsibility, to protect individual 
liberties and rights.  To Cooley, courts were flexibly to employ and re-interpret constitutional 
language to further those core constitutional purposes.  This allowed and demanded that courts 
reassess legislative powers in light of new circumstances.  When a legislature had disused or 
misused powers, its authority over that issue would end, particularly when continuing the 
legislative practice would undermine republican governance or its associated promotion of 
individual liberties.  Therefore, what was once constitutional could become unconstitutional as 
social, political, and economic forces dictated.  Informing that decision, and Cooley’s theories, 
was the concern that powerful forces had, and could continue to undermine the legislative 
process in order to grant the wealthy improper privileges and the masses inappropriate succor.  
Because he believed that judges were cut of a finer cloth and not as subject to political forces as 
were legislators, Cooley charged the courts with the responsibility to dispassionately discern 
when legislation exceeded republican bounds.  In doing so, the judiciary would both maintain 
constitutional governance and the rule of law, while pressing the natural advancement of the 
individual in American society.  Through his advocacy of enhanced judicial review, Cooley 
                                                 
2
 Thomas McIntyre Cooley, "Sources of Inspiration in Legal Pursuits," Western Jurist 9(1875): 520-21. 
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tendered both the constitutional language and the means to protect against improper influences 
and majoritarian impulses . . . and judges across the nation cheered.  
 Situated in Michigan, this work explores how the state’s constitutional and governing 
challenges culminated in a Cooley-inspired jurisprudence where courts would systematically 
assert authority to limit legislative power.  Beginning with state courts and migrating to the 
federal bench, Cooley’s advocacy soon captured the nation.  Until Cooley, courts almost without 
exception had deferred to legislative power and largely had ignored, or treated on an ad hoc 
basis, limitations of legislative plenary powers.  As they deferred, judicial roles were shrinking 
as statutory law supplanted the common law.  With Cooley, courts began to reassert themselves 
to limit the perceived excesses of both majoritarian and private-interest protecting enactments, 
and did so armed with Cooley’s newly defined constitutional language and theories.   
 In analyzing his impact, most scholars have focused on Cooley’s elevation of individual 
rights as limits on legislative power.  But that misses the larger dynamic.  In his words, Cooley’s 
underlying goal was to protect against “diseases in the body politic,” and to preserve republican 
institutions.  Individual rights protection was part of that effort, and would be the result of 
properly functioning republican institutions, but the underlying goal was to defend and maintain 
the constitutional principle of limited, republican governance.  Cooley’s story, and this work, is 
the story of judicial review, the rule of law, and republican governance. 
 Cooley scholars place him at the forefront of rights-creating jurisprudence.  In the 
shadow of the New Deal, Benjamin Twiss and Clyde Jacobs narrowly focused on contract and 
property rights, and attributed the rise of laissez-faire jurisprudence to Cooley.  Alan Jacobs 
rehabilitated him, but mistakenly characterized Cooley as largely deferring to legislative 
prerogatives.  Howard Gillman attributed a binary class-legislation test to Cooley; an effort that 
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was too neat and narrowing.  Andrew McLaughlin perhaps best characterized Cooley’s 
contribution by suggesting that, over an extensive period, Cooley’s work was second to the 
Federalist Papers in importance.  Because Cooley’s contributions transcend the limited, albeit 
important, role scholars have attributed to him, his legacy is of considerable historical and legal 
significance.   
 Events, and not philosophical musings, shaped Cooley’s constitutional beliefs.  He was 
neither a constitutional philosopher nor one who culled meaning from dispassionate readings of 
constitutional texts.  He did not glean constitutional meaning by searching for divinely inspired 
principles.  Instead, he was a scholar molded by his experiences and driven to overcome the 
challenges society faced in response to activist state legislation.  History shaped Cooley, but not 
in the way nostalgic recollections favor a return to simpler times.  He was not a man looking 
backward to see the future.  Instead, Cooley consciously considered historical developments as 
they applied to existing community needs to arrive at contemporary legal and constitutional 
understandings.
3
  Accordingly, his efforts to limit legislative power are best understood by a 
discussion of the environment in which he developed his ideas and an understanding of the world 
in which he lived.  Hence, a bottom-up study of the changing nature of government and 
constitutional structures from Michigan’s territorial period through the beginnings of the Cooley 
revolution best captures the motivations and intentions of Cooley’s work.  This study undertakes 
that task. 
 While located in Michigan this is not simply a local story.  Michigan’s nineteenth-century 
experiences culminated in the Cooley-directed jurisprudence that courts across the nation 
captured as they sought to limit plenary legislative power.  Michigan’s experiences were in some 
                                                 
3
 Although Cooley is often thought of as a law professor, jurist, and ICC Chairman, he was also an academic 
historian.  In 1885, Cooley formally took on that role when he became a professor of history at the University of 
Michigan’s Literary College. 
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measure a microcosm of broader local and state efforts to employ government to address the 
oppressive forces of the day and to release social and market energies in order to advance 
general-welfare interests.  Because other states had acted similarly, Cooley’s ideas to limit 
government power gained prompt purchase in courts across the nation.  
 While residents of other states engaged in similar activities, Michigan presents a unique 
study.  It underwent a troubled territorial period, an early state constitutional period requiring 
government activism in commercial development, a second written constitutional period seeking 
to limit state legislative power, and the Cooley period where courts redefined constitutional 
language to limit legislative authority.  In each period, this work studies a force that shaped 
constitutional understandings and governing structures.  In order of treatment, those forces are 
political, economic, social, and philosophical.  This work focuses on particular events during the 
studied periods.  Other events, like banking challenges, the Civil War, and race relations also 
pressed against Michigan’s constitutional structures and probably influenced Cooley’s theories, 
but those forces remain outside the scope of this project.  Based on the forces and events studied, 
it becomes clear that the doctrinal change – the Cooley revolution – proceeded from the earlier 
Michigan periods, and was a reaction to the challenges associated with the legislative activism 
from which Cooley believed Michigan, and the nation, suffered.  In some measure, therefore, 
this work is a study of the road to Cooley. 
The First Constitutional Period – Political Forces and Change 
 Michigan endured a lengthy territorial period from its designation as such in 1805 until 
Congress admitted it as a state in 1837.  Since it set the governing structure for the territory, the 
Northwest Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) acted as a constitutional document for territorial 
Michigan, and this work addresses the governance under the Ordinance as Michigan’s first 
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constitutional period.  The Ordinance provided that a federally appointed group of three judges 
and one governor would act as the earliest phase of government for the territory.  In response to 
their appointment, those leaders answered to the national government, not the residents.  In vying 
for power, Michigan’s governor and judges, for example, would gridlock government by 
engaging in a cycle where the courts nearly automatically would release prisoners that the 
governor’s administration had just arrested.  With court contempt proceedings and gubernatorial 
proclamations demanding disobedience to court orders, Michigan’s governing structure virtually 
collapsed. 
 Resident reactions to the territory’s dysfunction moved from early calls to replace the 
offending officials to later rejections of the colonial nature of territorial governance under the 
Ordinance.  Contrary to popular mythology, those calls were for more government, not less – but 
government subject to the direct control of Michigan’s residents.  As part of their efforts for 
effective and involved governance, municipal governments actively regulated and encouraged 
economic and social development.  They did so recognizing that many of those activities 
encumbered individual rights.  Nevertheless, driven by majority goals to advance the general 
welfare, local legislatures consciously subordinated the individual to the collective.  In doing so, 
they felt primarily constrained by a lack of resources and noted that future tax revenues would 
allow for greater government oversight and participation in general-welfare building. 
 To Michigan residents, the territorial period ended in 1835 when they unilaterally 
declared statehood, created and approved a constitution, and elected their state government 
officials.  Unfortunately, the federal government did not agree.  Congress refused to admit the 
state into the Union and President Jackson threatened to take action should the elected 
government interfere with his territorial appointments.  Michigan now had two governors and a 
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legislature making laws of questionable effect.  The constitutional structure of the Ordinance had 
broken under the pressures of local political forces.   
The Second Constitutional Period – Economic Forces and Change 
 The 1835 constitution required the state government to encourage internal improvements.  
In response, Michigan’s leadership determined the state should build, own, and operate its major 
rail lines, and control and significantly invest in the state’s feeder lines.  That determination was 
of singular importance in Michigan history and in shaping Cooley’s views concerning the 
dangers of legislative activism.  In response to its leadership’s drive for economic progress, the 
state massively borrowed to finance its internal improvement projects.  Envisioning rail service 
across the state’s inhabited peninsula, the legislature authorized multiple projects believing that it 
could mold economic development and provide revenue for future government spending.  Those 
aspirations proved illusory as the Panic of 1837 along with bank fraud undermined an already 
problematic state investment. 
 Lurking political challenges contributed to the economic forces aligned against a 
successful state rail enterprise.  Each legislator sought to maximize rail access for his 
constituents even when economic forces argued to the contrary.  In response to popular passions, 
municipalities took up arms against the state militia and disgruntled citizens sabotaged rail 
equipment.  Unable to raise taxes, the state soon defaulted on its obligations and, with respect to 
foreign creditors, repudiated its debts.  Although the law favored the creditors, they lacked a 
legal forum where they successfully could bring their actions.  Their complaints could only be 
voiced in the political sphere and then only to partial satisfaction. 
 The legislature not only ignored legal obligations under the common law, it consciously 
violated the state’s constitutional requirements.  In 1846, it sold the state’s rail interests and 
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ceased involvement in transportation.  While acknowledging that such action violated the 
constitution, leaders argued that economic forces prohibited compliance or that the divestment 
legislation modified constitutional requirements.  Cooley, in his Michigan, A History of 
Governments, spent considerable ink detailing the era, and concluded that the state’s rail efforts 
left “nothing but the debris of our airy castles.”  It did result in an effort that Cooley applauded.  
The government’s failures resulted in an 1850 constitution that limited state legislative power. 
The Third Constitutional Period – Social Forces and Change 
 Largely as a response to the state’s debts, the embarrassments of defaults, and the 
increased taxation associated with the partial repayments, the citizens approved a new 
constitution in 1850.  That constitution’s governing framework sought to avoid earlier state 
excesses by, among other things, curtailing legislative space.  In part to accomplish that end, 
Michigan pioneered efforts constitutionally to separate its university from legislative oversight or 
control.  Like other states in the wake of Dartmouth College, Michigan had created a state-
owned university.  Because of legislative intrusions, an 1840 Select Committee on the Condition 
of the University warned that the fluctuating politics of the legislature threatened the university’s 
survival.  Armed with that report and a distaste for legislative activism, the framers of the 1850 
constitution invested a voter-elected board of regents with complete control over the university.  
That board was to be independent of the legislature and was to control university funding from 
designated sources.  Cooley later reflected that that the framers had taken the right course, as the 
“popular excitements and prejudices” that animated the legislature would prove dangerous to the 
university.  
 Notwithstanding the framers’ intention to vest exclusive authority in the regents, almost 
immediately after ratification the legislature passed a law seeking to direct the university’s 
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operations and instructions.  Most of the law’s provisions were benign as they merely instructed 
the university to do as it already had done.  One area differed.  The law required that the 
university medical school employ a homeopathic professor.  Homeopathic medicine was 
increasingly popular and the legislature enacted the law in response to public and homeopathic 
pressures.  Ignoring the law, the regents refused to allow the legislature to direct hiring and 
instructional decisions.  The state Supreme Court then refused to require university compliance.  
Nevertheless, the issue remained as homeopaths and allopaths squabbled, the American Medical 
Association threatened to decertify doctors associating with homeopaths, and the public 
demanded its university teach the homeopathic medicine it increasingly accepted. 
 Forces combined after the Civil War, while Cooley sat as the dean of the law school, to 
undermine the university’s constitutional independence.  With the war’s conclusion, the student 
body increased dramatically while inflation required enhanced faculty compensation.  By 1867, 
the university was unable to operate effectively on only the funds previously designated.  
Accordingly, it sought and received an appropriation, but the legislature pressed one condition: 
the medical school had to hire homeopathic faculty.  The regents rejected the condition and 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel release of the funds without condition.  The court declined.  
Soon university construction halted, the university retracted the promised raises, faculty 
resigned, and students, and ultimately the university president, left.  Moreover, medical journals 
almost unanimously called for Michigan’s entire medical faculty to resign if the university hired 
homeopathic instructors.  To follow the legislative demands, the university’s leadership 
exclaimed, would threaten the medical school’s and perhaps the university’s existence.   
 Before he left, the university president quietly negotiated with the legislature.  In 
exchange for multiple appropriations, the regents would create a homeopathic college connected 
15 
 
to the medical school.  This would not end the constitutional issue.  Courts would ultimately rule 
that the legislature could not interfere in the educational decisions of the university.  However, 
the legislature held the purse and, with it, could leverage changes in university policy as 
demanded by the state’s residents.  The constitutional language and the convention debates 
establish that the drafters had intended otherwise.   
 Cooley enjoyed a nearly forty-year tenure at the university and his influence on, and 
involvement in, university affairs dramatically exceeded his role as law professor.  Cooley’s 
writings did not significantly reference the homeopathic controversy, although he was involved 
in it, at least before his tenure on the bench.  During that pre-judicial time, Cooley had served as 
counsel for the regents, as did his associate and future brother justice, John Campbell.  Campbell 
had acted as the counsel to defend the university’s position during the earlier homeopathic 
litigation.  While I have uncovered no specific Cooley advocacy for the university position, there 
are strong indications he agreed with Campbell and the regents.  It is probable that the long crisis 
marked Cooley’s thinking and shaped his concerns about legislative overreaching. 
The Fourth Constitutional Period – Philosophical Forces and Change 
 The 1850 constitution had prohibited state involvement in internal improvements.  
Despite that language, and fearing that economic advancement would bypass Michigan, the 
legislature authorized municipalities to pledge tax dollars to attract rail investment.  Local 
legislatures could pledge funds to railroads subject to a vote of the taxpayers.  That approval was 
almost always forthcoming, resulting in popularly approved but burdensome debt.  This 
majoritarian tendency to employ government in what he deemed inappropriate fashion was the 
“disease in the body politic” that Cooley feared.  Notwithstanding the expanding government and 
personal debts associated with those grants, in the antebellum period courts across the nation 
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uniformly upheld the constitutionality of those laws.  In each case, the court deferred to the 
legislature’s judgment.  When, during the war, one court invalidated its state’s law as violating 
taxpayers’ property rights, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ruling on Commerce Clause 
grounds and castigated the state court for ignoring settled law.   
 All of this changed in response to Cooley’s 1868 publication of Constitutional 
Limitations.  In that treatise, and the cases quickly following, Cooley argued that the legislature 
must use taxes to further a “public purpose,” which he defined as requiring a direct value 
exchange for projects within government’s historical sphere.  Without that public purpose, the 
revenue collection would be “plunder,” not taxes, and therefore was unconstitutional.  In People 
v Township Board of Salem, Cooley argued that grants to railroads did not fit the public purpose 
standard and were unconstitutional.  Scholars suggest that Salem evidences Cooley’s property-
rights position, but that is not how Cooley viewed his opinion.  To him, Salem stood for the 
principle that government spending required a government purpose, which he believed did not 
include supporting privately owned businesses.  The case, and his underlying philosophy, was 
about limiting government.  “The fundamental maxims of a free government” required limited 
legislative power and a respect for advancing individual rights.  While few jurisdictions 
overturned their rail appropriations, courts across the nation adopted Cooley’s public-purpose 
standard to limit other government spending.  Soon courts would overturn grants to business, 
agriculture, public employees, students, the indigent, and the disabled.   
 By redefining constitutional terms, a newly energized judiciary acted to limit majoritarian 
legislation that it believed inappropriately encumbered individual rights.  The impact was most 
keenly felt in the regulatory sphere.  Cooley argued for a modified interpretation of “law of the 
land” and “due process” language to limit legislative power.  Those clauses were linchpins for 
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the protection of limited government and the advancement of individual space.  Using those 
clauses, Cooley advanced that courts should intervene when legislatures unduly deprived 
individuals of property or contract rights.  Through the due process clauses, Cooley sought to 
require that legislators work within “settled maxims” of the common law.  He incorporated those 
common-law standards into his constitutional understandings, and argued that rights protections 
and legislative limitations were constitutional memorializations of long-standing republican 
principles.  Like the common law, constitutional understandings changed to protect those 
underlying limited-governance principles.  By arguing that due process protections changed with 
social and economic changes, Cooley allowed for a continued reassessment of legislative space 
and a weakening of stare decisis principles.  
 While Cooley spoke the language of “rights,” it would be a mistake to focus on the 
protected rights rather than the legislative limits.  Having been steeped in, and written about, 
Michigan history, Cooley understood the challenges of plenary legislative power, especially 
when the legislature employed that power to expand government’s scope.  Rights were but one 
of the tools Cooley submitted as a limit on that power.  Accordingly, those who focus only on the 
rights language miss the underlying philosophy of legislative limitations, judicial review, the rule 
of law, and republican government.  Judicial review was to be the mechanism to assure and 
elevate republican governance.  Because his arguments are much deeper than the protection of 
specific rights, which ebb and flow in acceptance, Cooley’s legacy continued (even as contract 
and property-rights arguments waned).  Cooley’s jurisprudence addressed the tensions between 
republican limits and majoritarian rule; issues with which we continue to struggle. 
 Cooley’s work did not seek to set down binary rules of jurisprudence or to advance 
laissez-faire capitalism.  Instead, he sought to articulate doctrines and traditions to reinsert courts 
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into republican governance in ways that were lost with the rise of statutory law.  In a sense, he 
reinterpreted a role for courts in a new age by advocating robust use of judicial review and 
limited government in response to the negative consequences of plenary legislative power.  
Cooley saw his advocacy not as a rejection of constitutional understandings, but an uncovering 
of constitutional meaning for a time when, to his mind, republican governance was under siege.  
To protect that republican governance and the rule of law, Cooley would capture and manipulate 
threads of antebellum constitutional thought that, in reality, had almost only been employed in 
dicta.  Because that was his purpose and legacy, this work tells an institutional story of changing 
government frameworks and rising judicial power.   
 This work offers a new way of thinking about Cooley and how he led a movement to 
check legislative authority through an aggressive use of judicial review.  Employing his 
doctrines, courts would find new meanings in the word “tax” to imply constitutional restrictions 
on the power to spend.  They would uncover expanded meaning in the term “due process” and 
employ it to limit legislative actions that heretofore had been almost universally accepted.  Those 
changes were not the stuff of revolutionary advancements of personal liberties or the reactionary 
forces responsive to industrial power.  Rather, they were part of an ongoing American effort to 
adjust constitutional frameworks and understandings to address the forces of their time and 
circumstance.  In this work, Thomas McIntyre Cooley was the last piece of that continuing 
effort.  Based upon his experiences in Michigan and his understanding of the larger world, he 
advocated an expanded judicial effort to limit activist legislatures.  In doing so, he offered a new 
constitutional framework to address his era’s needs and to strengthen representative governance.  
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Chapter II:  The Drive for Self-Government 1805-1836 
  
State power and state laws were thus present at all times, touching the citizen 
for his advantage and direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in 
his business; . . . in nearly everything which had for him and those associated 
with him – whether in kinship or socially or in business – an every-day interest. 
 Thomas M. Cooley 




A Framework for Governance:  The Northwest Ordinance 
 
“Detroit is not under government . . .  for this reason there were very few Europeans 
settled there.”  So suggested North-American Governor General Guy Carleton during his 1774 
testimony before the British Parliament.  Without effective government, Carleton argued, the 
Detroit area would never enjoy meaningful population growth, trade, or safety.
5
  When instituted 
decades later, Detroit’s government would lay the foundation for the area’s expansive 
commercial and social growth.  By 1837, when Congress admitted Michigan as a state, 
Michigan’s population and economy had increased tens-of-thousands-fold over its early days 
under the British flag.  During that time, Michigan’s government played an integral and 
welcome, if at times frustrating, role in the social, political, and economic development of 
Territorial Michigan. 
Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Britain legally ceded to the United States all of its 
territories between the Allegheny Mountains and the Mississippi River, south of the lands now 
comprising Canada.  Those lands, which would be known as the Northwest Territories, 
                                                 
4
 Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Michigan: A History of Governments, American Commonwealths (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin, 1888). 223-24.  Cooley first published the book in 1885. 
5
 "Debates of the House of Commons in the Year 1774 on the Bill for Making More Effectual Provision for the 
Government of the Province of Quebec. (Drawn up from the notes of the Henry Cavendish, Member for 
Lostwithiel),"  (London: Ridgway), 142, 146. 
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eventually would be carved into the five and one-half states of Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
Wisconsin, and the eastern portion of Minnesota.  Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress 
enacted the Ordinance of 1787, which provided for the governance of the territory, and the 
standards by which each section of the territory would become a state.
6
  After the adoption of the 
United States Constitution, Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance on August 7, 1789 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Ordinance”).
7
  It did so under the broad powers Art. 
IV, §3 granted to Congress to “make all needful rules and regulations” concerning territories.  In 
enacting the Ordinance, Congress envisioned a transitory status for each territory until 
populations had developed sufficiently for self-governance.  Evidencing its paternalistic cast, 
Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair noted, the “system” of government under the Ordinance “is 
temporary only, suited to your infant situation, and to continue no longer than that state of 
infancy shall last.”
8
   
Because the territories gradually would move from sparse to more sustainable 
populations, the Ordinance allowed for a three-phase progression toward self-governance.  At the 
beginning of the territorial period, the Ordinance provided for one federally appointed governor 
and three federally appointed judges who also would act as legislators to “adopt” “such laws of 
the original states, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of 
the district.”
9
  In appointing the judges and governor as the legislature, in some measure 
Congress tabled the well-accepted belief that divided government shielded against despotism.  
                                                 
6
 An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States North West of the river Ohio, Journals of the 
Continental Congress 1774-1789, ed. Roscoe R. Hill (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936). 32: 
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Perhaps to overcome that challenge, Congress retained the right to veto territory legislation.  To 
access that legislation, the Ordinance provided for a secretary who would transmit laws to 
Congress 
10
 and who also would act as governor in the governor’s absence.  As a further check 
against tyranny, the Ordinance required that the appointed officers reside in the territory and own 
substantial property therein.  The governor’s term was for three years, the secretary’s for four, 
and the judges held office during good behavior.   
When the territory had five-thousand free men, the inhabitants had the authority to elect 
representatives to a general assembly (also called a “house of representatives”) and the President 
would select a legislative council from a slate of candidates submitted by the representatives.  
Those two bodies would make up the territory legislature.  The Ordinance required that voters 
own fifty acres of land, representatives two-hundred, and council members five-hundred.  This 
property requirement was more stringent than that of any of the states save for North Carolina, 
which had a similar fifty-acre requirement for some voters.
11
  This legislature could alter the 
laws adopted by the previously appointed “legislature,” and make new laws as it saw fit.  James 
Monroe defended a similar, earlier draft of the Ordinance as “in effect . . .  a colonial government 
similar to that which prevail’d in these States previous to the revolution.”
12
  When the territory 
reached sixty-thousand free inhabitants, it would enter the third phase and become a state “on 
equal footing with the original states.”  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison explained 
that the fact that “admission to the union is guaranteed” eased the challenge that the territories 
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would initially be subject to colonial-type rule.
 13
 At least that was the intention under the 1787 
legislation. 
While the Ordinance failed to achieve the higher-law status of modern written 
constitutions (a simple legislative majority could amend it), it does share space with modern 
constitutions in at least one important aspect: The Ordinance set forth the architecture within 
which government was to operate.
14
  In this respect, it carries a family relationship with the 
United States Constitution, the state constitutions, and those court decisions addressing the extent 
and limits of government power.  And just as with those constitutional documents and decisions, 
the governing framework established in the Ordinance would suffer erosion, as political, social, 
and commercial changes would wash against its structural edifice.  In turn, this would require 
legislative and judicial modifications to that “constitutional” edifice in order to align previous 
expectations with the new, changed realities.   
In Michigan, this erosion of the Ordinance’s framework would occur most specifically in 
two areas.  The first dealt with the Ordinance’s restrictions on legislative power.  The Ordinance 
provided that territory legislators were to “adopt” the legislation of the original states.  They 
were not to make law.  Underlying that requirement stood a belief that state laws were wholly 
applicable to territory needs.  That assumption would almost immediately come under attack, as 
the territory legislature (the governor and judges) required flexibility in order to address 
Michigan’s specific challenges.  More corrosively, the Ordinance’s imposition of nationally 
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controlled administrators met increasing hostility as those administrators failed to respond to 
local interests.  Onuf argued that the Ordinance assumed a progression from colonial status to 
statehood, ending in “the automatic self-destruction of the temporary government it had called 
into being.”
15
  In Michigan, that progression was toilsome and contentious.  That is the story of 
the Michigan Territory and the occupation of this chapter. 
Many have furnished varying interpretations of the Ordinance, classifying it from a 
sacrosanct anti-slavery and rights-guaranteeing document to a governing structure conceived by 
greedy and corrupt hands.  Although motivations are at issue, most historians view the Ordinance 
as a key element in early nation building.  Its macro impact of ushering territories from 
wilderness to settlements to states largely has been applauded.
16
  But its mark on the individuals 
subject to its rule was not so clear.  As Onuf noted, its “constitutional legacy – the history of its 
specific promises to settlers in the Northwest – was much more ambiguous.”
17
    
One cannot help but be struck by the similarity of political conditions faced by the 
territory’s residents and those complained of in the Declaration of Independence.  For example, 
the Declaration protested that the crown had “forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of 
immediate and pressing Importance,” coerced the people to “relinquish the Rights of 
Representation in the Legislature,” made judges dependent on the distant government’s will, and 
imposed taxes without consent.  All of those situations occurred in the Territories, but 
particularly in Michigan, which endured a lengthy territorial period.  This is not to say that 
Michigan’s settlers suffered similar oppression endured by the original colonies, or that the 
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federal government treated the territory as a colonial subject.  But, as discussed below, the 
parallels existed, and Michiganders increasingly objected to the policies of a distant government 
wherein they lacked representation. 
 Jack Eblen noted that the stages of self-government under the Ordinance mimicked those 
in the American colonial experience: The first stage, with governors and judges as the unelected 
legislature, was akin to the seventeenth-century period, characterized by a strong executive 
appointed by a distant power.  The second phase, with its structure for growing representative 
government, mirrored the first two-thirds of the eighteenth
 
century American experience, with a 
locally elected legislature and an appointed governor.  And the last phase of state creation and 
self-government paralleled the American revolutionary and nation-building period of the later 
eighteenth century.
18
  Although, the structure may have been gleaned from the earlier colonial 
experience, one factor was different:  Unlike their colonial forbearers, settlers under the 
Ordinance had been steeped in the self-governing environment of the revolutionary and early 
national period and now were required to move back to a pre-national era of disenfranchisement.   
Under the Ordinance, settlers no longer elected their national leadership and lost 
influence over the appointment of federal judicial officials.  In the early phases, they also 
relinquished control of their local governments, as now the President appointed the territorial 
leadership.  The Ordinance’s “provision for temporary government authorized the (equally 
temporary) degradation of citizen to stateless subject, but the compact articles guaranteed that the 
process would reverse itself as the territory crossed successive population thresholds.”
19
  In this 
respect, the Ordinance traded an individual’s self-governing interest for future collective 
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benefits.  A settler would forfeit his previously enjoyed political rights so that the national 
government could build a more stable economic and political future.
20
   
The Confederation Congress surely was aware of, and troubled by, the similarity between 
the territory governance and British control over the American colonies.  To address this 
concern, the Congress “in moving from the denunciation of one empire to the implementation of 
their own” legislated “guarantees of eventual partnership in the empire.”
21
  The key guarantee 
was that the territory would be admitted as a state on “an equal footing with the original states, in 
all respects whatever.”  Doing so promised political parity to future generations but ignored 
those settlers residing in the territories before eventual statehood.  While Congress may have 
considered colonial-like governance a practical necessity in the untamed western regions, the 
settlers there (with the exception of the pre-revolutionary French) had been raised with the ethos 
of government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed.  In the short term, their 
consent was considered expendable, or at least shelved. 
To compound matters, the settlers suffered the challenges of leadership ill-informed of 
the settlers’ needs.  Federal appointees seldom hailed from Michigan and answered to a distant 
government for their decisions.
22
  As the territorial period lengthened, Michigan settlers 
increasingly recognized and bristled over their incapacity.  In 1831, even after Michigan elected 
its legislature (but still dealt with an appointed governor and judges), a community of Michigan 
leaders would complain of the essentially colonial status under which they suffered.  Reminding 
Congress that Michigan residents had come from republican states, they protested that, “The 
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mere fact of their having removed hither should not operate as disfranchisement of their 
privileges, or of depriving them, as citizens of the several states.”
23
  This non-representative 
government architecture frustrated settler demands, resulting in growing anger over government 
dysfunction and non-responsiveness.  The period would end as Michigan moved from 
governance under the Ordinance blueprint to one formed by the residents under the Michigan 
1835 Constitution.  Even that move was met with threats between residents and Washington, and 
bullets between Michigan’s militia and Ohio’s. 
Early Territorial Life: A Demand for Government 
 
Before Congress carved out a specific Michigan Territory, the inhabitants of the village 
of Detroit pressed for a degree of self-governance.  Around 1800 nearly all the European-
American inhabitants of the area now known as Michigan lived in Detroit.  Previously, in turn, 
Native-Americans, the French, and the British, had controlled the Detroit area.  Although Britain 
legally ceded the area in 1783, it retained physical control until 1796 when, pursuant to the Jay 
Treaty, it surrendered the area to the Americans.  Being a military outpost, the area contained a 
fort and, below it, a town.  Most of the inhabitants were of French ancestry and spoke French.
24
  
English and Scottish merchants, a few white Americans, some free blacks, and a small 
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contingent of black and Indian slaves, made up the rest of the population.
25
  The Jay Treaty 
permitted the British to keep their slaves.
26
  The treaty also provided that French and British 
residents need not become American citizens nor pledge allegiance to the new government.
27
   
The military presence in the town was not without its challenges, as conflicts between 
military needs and civilian rights occasioned strife.  Military efforts to keep soldiers out of the 
taverns in 1798-99 fomented much excitement.  John and Jane Dodemead’s home on Ste. Anne 
Street housed a tavern and, on the second floor, the town’s court.  That soldiers frequented the 
tavern upset their fort commander, Major David Strong.  Strong felt that soldier drunkenness had 
“been the cause of the desertions which have so frequently taken place” and placed the fault at 
the door of “those evil-minded persons who are constantly selling liquor to the men.”  Strong’s 
demands that Dodemead stop serving his men fell on deaf ears.  In an effort to impede his 
troops’ indulgences, he posted a military guard at the entrance to the Dodemead-owned 
home/tavern/court.  Dodemead and the town’s judges objected to the guard and wrote to 
Governor St. Clair protesting the military’s interference with civilian issues and its obstruction of 
court activities.  Despite Strong’s objection that the protest was “endeavoring to sour the minds 
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 the protest met with success.  St. Clair ordered the guard removed from the 
house, and Strong removed from command.   
It is not surprising that a tavern keeper served alcohol to soldiers, that they drank heartily, 
or that the tavern keeper objected to military efforts to restrict that drinking.  The twist to the 
story is the judges’ protest on behalf of the tavern keeper.  They argued that the guard was 
disruptive of court proceedings.  Since it is improbable that a guard positioned one floor below 
the court would do other than quiet a rowdy crowd, the judges’ protest was not associated with 
an unease over disruptions of court procedure.  After all, one can only assume that drunken 
soldiers would be more disruptive than sober ones.  It is impossible to discern definitively the 
judges’ motivations for siding with the tavern keeper.  Those motivations might have been based 
on friendship, a desire to support the court’s landlord, their personal distain for Strong, or an 
impulse for republican governance and a concern over military interference.  Whatever their 
motivations, the judges sided with civilian authority over the military.  This is not to suggest that 
civilian authorities countenanced intemperate behavior.  Shortly after civilian control took over, 
the town’s Board of Trustees passed restrictive liquor ordinances in response to drunkenness, 
idleness, and profanity.
29
  Dodemead was one of the members of that board. 
The objections to Major Strong’s efforts should not be read as objections to government 
controls.  In 1798-99, the inhabitants of the town petitioned the territory’s “General Court” to 
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incorporate the town and invest it with “full power and Authority to make such, bye-laws and 
Statutes for the better Government of the Town.”
30
  The general court was the three-member 
Supreme Court of the territory that had the power to act upon such petitions.  Unfortunately, the 
court traveled to Detroit only twice in six years and the governor never visited.
31
  Because the 
court rarely sat in Detroit, it did not get around to considering the petition before the United 
States Congress withdrew its authority in December 1799.  In 1800, Congress divided the 
Northwest Territory into two parts: The Indiana Territory, which included current-Michigan’s 
western lower peninsula and its entire upper peninsula, and the Northwest Territory of Ohio, 
which included the Detroit area and much of eastern Michigan.  On January 18, 1802, now Ohio 
Territory Governor St. Clair, signed legislation incorporating Detroit.
32
  St. Clair appointed five 
trustees to lead Detroit until elections could be held, one of whom was tavern owner Dodemead.  
After Ohio became a state in 1802, the eastern portion of Michigan, including Detroit, 
transferred to the Indiana Territory, a change not to the inhabitants’ liking. 
The move from the Ohio Territory to the more distant Indiana Territory threatened 
further to marginalize the inhabited portions of Michigan.  Accordingly, in March 1803, over 
three-hundred Detroit residents undertook a campaign for local territorial governance.  Their first 
petition to Congress respectfully requested the creation of local territory governance to avoid the 
challenges associated with the “immense distance from the settlements upon the waters of the 
Lakes, to the established Seat of Government,” in Indiana.  Local government would help 
resolve “[m]any important commercial questions,” in ways distant government could not.
33
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Hearing no response, in September they reframed their plea, but still treaded gingerly so as not to 
offend their assigned leaders.  “Your Petitioners are induced to make this request, under a full 
conviction of the absolute necessity of the measure, to the promotion of the happiness and 
prosperity of this Country; and to remove the many embarrassments under which it has long 
groaned, and not from any personal dislike to the Officers of the Indiana Government.”
34
  Once 
again, Congress answered with silence.  In frustration, Detroit residents again petitioned 
Congress, in October 1804, but this time with more vigor.  Finding that their “Situation is too 
distressing to justify our Silence upon a subject of Such infinite Consequence to the Government, 
to ourselves and to our posterity,” the petitioners starkly set out the issue: A more local territorial 
government promised “the happiness, good order, and prosperity of the Citizens of this district.”  
A more distant one – like in Indiana – could not “but produce consequences of a Serious and 
alarming nature tending to all the horrors of outlawry, oppression, and anarchy.”
35
  Once again, 
Congressional silence.  It was time for others to plead the case.  In an effort to appeal to party 
loyalty, in December 1804 the “Democratic Republicans” of Wayne County weighed in “for the 
first time.”  Because the residents of Wayne County (wherein Detroit resided) had to “wander 
seven hundred miles, thro’ inhospitable deserts,” for the resolution of legal issues, the population 
appealed for local government to provide for the “regular and moderate exertion of authority 
blended with justice.”
36
   
These four petitions are telling.  Contrary to popular culture’s view of rugged, frontier 
individualism, the people of Detroit advocated for more government structure and law, and did 
so in an increasingly irate fashion.  And they did not stop until Congress granted their wishes.  
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To the citizens, the absence of government threatened commercial success, settlement progress 
and, ultimately, anarchy.   
While waiting for the national government to respond to their calls for a more local 
territorial governance, the Detroit residents continued to forge their own framework for 
municipal governance.  The Detroit Charter created by the distant territory government called for 
a governing assembly of five trustees.  A popular vote of free-holders and renters paying at least 
forty dollars a year elected those trustees.  At each election, the electors would vote on each law 
enacted by the trustees during the previous year.  If not approved, the law would become void.  
The voters also determined the amounts government would spend, and directed how the tax 
assessor could set tax burdens.  
Detroit’s incorporation statute (passed by the Territorial government) made clear 
government’s responsibility to enhance the general welfare.  Detroit’s Board of Trustees was to 
“make, ordain & establish in writing Such laws and ordinances . . . as to them Shall Seem 
necessary and proper, for the health, Safety, cleanliness, Convenience and good government of 
Said Town.”  The statute continued, stating that “it Shall [be] the further and particular duty” of 
the board “to make, adopt and establish regulations for Securing Said Town against injuries from 
fires, to cause the streets, lanes, and alleys of Said town, and the public Commons to be kept 
open & in repairs and free from every Kind of nuisances.”  The board was responsible “to 
regulate markets, and if necessary, to appoint a clerk of the market, to regulate the assize of 
bread, both as to weight & price, and to prevent Swine and other animals from running at large.”  
Voters had the right to reject those efforts toward “good Government and Well being,” but it is 





  By investing Detroit’s government with significant regulatory power 
over health, safety, general welfare, and economic affairs, the territorial government established 
that the board’s core purpose was community development.  
Immediately upon incorporation, Detroit’s Board of Trustees embraced those obligations.  
Its first task was safety and, on February 23, 1802, the board took up the town’s most urgent 
safety concern – fire.  The first ordinance regulated the quality and cleaning of chimneys, set 
standards for stoves and exhaust pipes, obligated each householder to keep barrels of water in 
areas where they would not freeze, to have dedicated ropes, levers, poles, and ladders to fight 
fires, and much more.  Each shopkeeper had similar requirements.  Additionally, the ordinance 
required each male to respond to all fire alarms to assist in dousing the flames.  The ordinance at 
length set forth the inhabitants’ obligations, the penalties for breach, and the government 
investigation and enforcement mechanisms.
38
  
The board acted as both legislature and, at least in part, as judiciary.  Nearly every board 
meeting addressed fines for those individuals violating the fire code, many of whom were town 
officials.  For example, on March 24, 1802, the board fined four of its members and the Wayne 
County jail for fire-code violations.  Included among those fined was John Dodemead who was a 
town trustee, the owner of the tavern housing the early courtroom, and the town treasurer 
assigned to collect the fines.  The board assigned inspectors to engage in house-to-house 
searches to assure inhabitants honored the code but, apparently, their powers were inadequate.  
Frustrated over a lack of compliance, and recognizing the need to “obviate any objection or 
excuse” for non-compliance, the trustees tightened the fire ordinance to require the inspectors to 
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report when the “ladders, buckets, barrels &c” were not “in perfect order.”
39
  Residents sought to 
excuse their non-performance, but nothing indicates that they objected to government searches of 
their private households and businesses.  The record discloses no claims of Fourth Amendment 
rights against government searches.  
The lack of litigation records is not in itself sufficient indication of public acceptance of 
the government’s right to enter homes to search for law evasion.  That voters accepted those 
intrusions is evidenced better by the community’s failure to overturn the invasive regulations.  
The sparse records of the time to do not even indicate that voters made an effort to do so.  To the 
contrary, during times of crisis, they went a step further in subordinating their property and 
privacy interests to community needs.  When bucket-brigade fire-retardation efforts were 
insufficient to quell a fire, the residents would form a battering squad to take up the effort.  
“Taking up a green log as heavy as they could carry, they charged at the burning building at a 
brisk trot and dashing it against the wall with all their might sent the burning timbers down into 
the interior.”
40
  The squad continued until each wall collapsed – hopefully – into a controlled 
bonfire. The issue was not about the homeowners’ property rights.  Burning buildings were 
pathogens to the community’s health.  In that context, individual rights discussions were absent, 
or at least unpersuasive.  The community faced danger and the response was collective. 
One might expect that the board’s next ordinance would focus on safety.  After all, 
Detroit was located in a hostile environment, with the British across the river, Native Americans 
outside the fort, disease a constant threat and its protecting government distantly located.  But 
that was not the board’s next move.  Instead, the trustees focused on market regulations.  On 
February 26, 1802, the board passed an assize of bread, as required by the incorporation 
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authorization act.  The assize regulated the sizes of bread, and required that each baker stamp his 
initials on the bread for the purpose of identification and enforcement.  The board would modify 
that statute in July, adding a required price for bread.
41
  Shortly thereafter, the board complied 
with another of the incorporating requirements – it created a “well regulated” public market.  
Through that legislation, the trustees required that nearly all foodstuffs be sold on Tuesdays and 
Friday at the geographically specified market area.  The market would open at sunlight and close 
at 12 o’clock.  Anyone selling outside the market was subject to a three-dollar fine.
42
  One year 
later, the board amended the ordinance to require that foodstuffs be merchantable, and imposed a 
significant fifty-dollar fine for non-compliance.
43
   
Soon the regulations increasingly took on efforts to enhance quiet enjoyment.  The 
ordinances included horse and traffic regulations (no horse racing allowed in the streets), 
requirements that property owners provide footpaths, and that homeowners regularly sweep and 
remove offensive matter from the streets near their property.
44
  These efforts to keep the town 
clean were not merely advisory.  On July 30, the trustees fined the “Widow Abbot, Robt. & 
James Abbott, Henry Hyman, James fraser, Widow Callahan, Robt Goure & Ths Nowlen” for 
failure to sweep in front of their premises.
45
  In May 1803, the board would declare “dung & 
filth” a “perfect nuisance” and would prohibit deposits of that waste “on the Commons or lanes” 
of the town.  With its intentions well considered, the trustees granted the alternative “liberty to 
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carry & deposit the Same in the dock of the public market.”  The river provided a natural sewer 
for the town and regulations suggested its use.  Protecting the commons not just from filth but 
also from capture, the board imposed heavy fines and the possibility of incarceration for those 
attempting to enclose the town commons.
46
   
Alcohol consumption was a significant challenge, and the board spent much time on 
liquor regulations and enforcement.  From the first days of the town, residents applied for liquor 
licenses, often unsuccessfully.  Even with the board’s stingy grants of licenses, in mid-1803 it 
took notice that “too great encouragement is given to drunkenness, idleness, and profanity on the 
Sabbath day.”  Accordingly, the trustees banned “minors, apprentices, Servants or Negroes” 
from frequenting taverns in the later evenings or on or near the Sabbath.  Other tavern 
regulations included a sliding scale of taxation, depending on the level of decorum exercised by 
patrons.  Liquor regulations would increase in scope and complexity as government tried to 
balance the desire for drink with the desire for a safe environment and for containing public-
assistance expenses associated with alcohol consumption.
47
  The goal was to build a safe, 
commercially vibrant community that was welcoming to settlement.  The board continued to 
regulate, and act as a quasi-court to enforce those regulations.  For example, in 1803, the board 
passed restrictions on swine and required that owners keep their female dog indoors during her 
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  Enforcing its nuisance regulations, the board issued numerous fines and ordered 
removal of offending agents. 
Detroit was not unusual in its commitment to general-welfare legislation, including the 
regulation of markets, setting invasive safety measures, and subordinating individual property 
interests to the community.  Such government economic involvement characterized early 
Michigan governance, as it did in the other areas of the nation.  As Cooley noted of early 
America, local governance was “present at all times, touching the citizens for his advantage and 
direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in his business.”
49
  The individual, 
market, and state were inextricably interwoven.  Public and private, state and industry, and 
individual and market were not discrete, insulated units.
50
  
Government actions were not just about the “selves” that made up the resident 
community.  It was about future – about the residents’ posterity.  In reading their petitions and 
legislation, one is struck with the community’s concern for the welfare not only of its current 
residents, but also for future generations.  In 1803, for example, a group of inhabitants petitioned 
a Congressional representative to assure that land sales of the commons be handled in a manner 
consistent with general population needs to address expected population growth.  The petition 
asked that the national government use the proceeds of sales of the commons “in public 
improvements in the wharves, streets, etc., that it be appropriated to the purpose of schooling and 
education of youths etc.”  Their interest was not lower taxes, or the price of the marketed parcels.  
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With few residents, a mixed French, British, and American culture, and a subsistence 
existence, one may wonder why this sense of community.  Simply put, individual survival was 
tied to community development.  The town suffered the consequences of poor sanitation, 
crowded living conditions, and a geographic proximity to expansive swamplands.  “In late 
summer, residents suffered from ‘bilious fevers’ typhoid epidemics, and ‘milk sickness,’ 
probably caused by lack of refrigeration, unpasteurized milk and contaminated water.  
Diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, mumps, and smallpox were prevalent.”
52
  Its buildings were 
made of wood and most were huddled closely together within or near the walls of the fort.  
Either residents together addressed these conditions or they suffered significant consequences.  It 
is not surprising, therefore, that early Detroit government had actively sought to address these 
conditions and did so without the halting voice of individual rights.   
Changing Historical Understandings 
 
It is significant that Detroit residents did not object to, or overrule their invasive 
government regulatory regime.  By the standards of twenty-first century law, government entry 
into homes to assure compliance with fire-safety standards would be problematic.  It was not so 
in the early nineteenth century, when Detroit government routinely entered private spaces for 
fire-related inspections, without the din of privacy-rights voices.  And yet, the Fourth 
Amendment’s language against search and seizure is the same in both periods, having remained 
the same since its adoption in 1791.  On paper, the “right” is the same.  In practice, it is not.  This 
is best understood by the changing nature of rights.  While a library section unto itself, briefly, 
                                                 
51
 Petititon dated September 20, 1803, in Burton, History of Detroit: 50-51.  
52
 Tim Sherer, "Surviving in Frontier Detroit," The Great Lakes Review 8, no. No. 1 (1982): 13. 
38 
 
claimed “rights” adjust as society elevates and contracts their importance as perceived needs 
change.  Richard Primus, in The American Language of Rights, traced those changes and argued 
that Americans elevate interests into ‘rights’ in response to perceived needs and priorities of the 
time.  He noted that the “practice of calling things ‘rights’ to claim priority and protection 
regardless of the kind of normative ground offered, and indeed regardless of whether any 
underlying norm is articulated, has been characteristic of rights discourse throughout American 
history.”
53
  Primus suggested three periods in American history predominated the shifts in rights 
claims as America struggled with new adversities: The founding, the Civil War, and the Cold 
War.  Others suggest the Great Depression/New Deal era rather than the Cold War.  This paper 
will suggest that the Jacksonian and Cooley periods together created a post-Civil War 
individualistic rights regime, with Jacksonian-era challenges elevating public perceptions and 
Cooley establishing legal standards.  Others may suggest Ronald Reagan introduced a neo-liberal 
rights regime.  Whichever period predominated, rights speech and law shifted to address the then 
current political, economic, social, and philosophical needs and beliefs. 
Increasingly, historians and legal scholars have concluded that rights language employed 
in the colonial and early-American periods dealt more with communal rights than they did with 
private rights.  Gordon Wood argued that American notions of rights evolved from the ongoing 
tension between the Crown’s claimed right to rule and the populations’ claimed liberty and 
property rights.  In that context, British citizens did not consider their liberty and property rights 
“private,” as they had little notion of “public” and “private” spheres.  “Even as late as the eve of 
the Revolution,” Woods submitted, “the modern distinction between public and private rights 
was still not clear.”  He concluded that, “All of this meant that the colonists were able to use a 
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Just as “private” rights did not forestall government activism when dangers like fire 
threatened, notions of private enterprise did not require, or even advocate for, hands-off 
government.  Where today we would protest against a government marketplace (especially if it 
were exclusive) and a requirement that bread be sold at particular weights and prices, those 
government activities were common in the early nineteenth century.  Yet the constitutional 
language employed to argue against such government activity is largely the same.  This is 
because modern notions of private rights had not yet gelled in early America and therefore, had 
not attached themselves to constitutional language.  Instead, society perceived a need for 
government involvement in commerce and social development and protests against that 
involvement were rare and largely unavailing.  As William Novak noted, from the nation’s 
founding “commerce, trade, and economics like health and morals, [were] fundamentally public 
in nature, created, shaped, and regulated by the polity via a public law.”
55
  Where Novak dealt 
with governing entities in established states, his conclusions also apply to territory governments, 
at least Michigan’s.  As Willis Dunbar noted of early Michigan, “There was no holding with the 
economic doctrine of laissez-faire, for several of the regulations were quite exacting.” 
56
   
 Novak and Dunbar’s argument can be taken a step further: Government not only 
regulated the market; it actively participated in the market.  It helped to develop industry, it 
invested in private commerce, and it owned and/or directed internal improvements.  As Oscar 
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and Mary Handlin observed with respect to Massachusetts, government “would make its 
influence felt in every aspect of production, readily adjusting assistance to the needs of changing 
industrial, agricultural, commercial, and communications systems.”
57
  In addition to controlling 
society’s excesses, government fed the machinery of commerce to enhance the general welfare.  
At its core, the lines between government, industry, and society were deeply blurred.  The 
interweaving of industry and governance required that individual interests either be subordinated 
to the public weal or, more fundamentally, that society concur that supporting the common 
welfare, by its nature, advanced individual interests.  Kermit Hall characterized this philosophy 
as serving the “rights of the public.”  He submitted, “This concept meant that the commonwealth, 
the public as a whole, had certain rights that had to be placed above private interest.”
58
  Even 
common-law rules that seemingly advance individual interests had their regulatory aspects.  As 
Jonathan Hughes noted, “The rule of caveat emptor protected the seller from action by the buyer, 
but was never meant to sanction business fraud; in the colonial world direct non market controls 
buoyed up business probity.”
59
  Government priorities were group focused.  With an 
overwhelming amount of evidence of early government involvement in industry, historians now 
largely agree that early-American government prioritized group needs over individual needs, and 
did so consistently with prevailing opinion.   
That is not to say there were no dissenting voices. The Handlins pointed one out in 1819 
Boston.  At that time, the Boston Commercial Gazette heavily critiqued claims of individual 
interest against government commercial activities.  Holding to the prevailing opinion, the 
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Gazette classified individualistic claims as “manifestly erroneous.”  The Gazette was responding 
to claims that individuals should be “the judges of their interests, and consequently should be 
allowed to regulate them unobstructed.”  Such arguments, the Gazette urged, were “subversive to 
the end and aim of all governments; and  . . .  utterly impracticable.”
60
  This was more than 
thirty-five years after the Revolution, indicating that community-rights thoughts were not merely 
the momentary esprit of Revolutionary camaraderie.  Impositions on what today would be 
personal rights were acceptable to, and desired by, the inhabitants of the city that led the call for 
independence and self-government.  On the surface, there were concerns that selfish individual 
interests required moderation in the face of conflicting group needs.  But the issue was not 
merely a decided preference for the group over the individual, as there was no such simple 
dichotomy.  Instead, society embraced a symbiotic model where the individual was advanced 
through community and commercial development.  Government acted believing that community 
development and safety facilitated an environment for individual self-creation. 
Notwithstanding both the historical fact and logic of government involvement in early 
American society, popular belief has promoted an ideology of laissez faire, freewheeling 
individualism and weak, almost nonexistent, governance. This individualistic myth has long-
standing roots.  Writing in 1902, Guy Stevens Callender, a founder of American economic 
history, reflected that to the American public, “as to the rest of the world, America is the land of 
private enterprise par excellence; the place where ‘State interference’ has played the smallest 
part, and individual enterprise has been given the largest scope, in internal affairs; and it is 
commonly assumed that this was always so.”  But, Callender noted, reality was much different.  
America was the one of the first “to extend the activity of the state into industry.”  In doing so, 
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states would create over $200 million of debt purely for commercial development – amounting to 
government activity on a scale that dwarfed other nations.  Rather than a laissez-faire approach, 
American states led the world in state-supported capitalism.
61
  
While Callender as an economic historian analyzed government spending to show 
government involvement in economic affairs, early legal historians relied on court records.  In 
doing so Edward S. Corwin helped popularize the notion that government was legally barred 
from too great an involvement in commercial affairs.  To Corwin and his followers, law and 
constitutions were designed to protect private interests, and did so through a triumvirate of 
judicial review, due process, and vested rights.
62
  In setting vested-rights protection as a linchpin, 
Corwin’s analysis suggested that American constitutions necessarily elevated private rights, most 
specifically property rights, over conflicting societal interests.  In support of that, he and his 
followers presented a sizeable lineup of judicial pronouncements touting the sanctity of property 
and the advantages of limited government.  But court pronouncements and dicta are not 
precedents.  Decisions are, and antebellum courts almost always found on the side of community 
interests over conflicting individual rights.  In those relatively rare cases when they did not, the 
rulings were narrow and, most often, dealt with separation of powers issues – not limitations on 
government.  
Corwin’s judicially focused historical world began to unravel as historians studied the 
interplay and relationships among society, economy, and government.  Starting with the studies 
of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, by Oscar and Mary Handlin and Louis Hartz, historians 
have increasingly accepted that economy, the individual, and government were not distinct 
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entities but, rather, aspects of an organic social whole, with each part influencing and responding 
to the other to facilitate general-welfare improvement.
63
  They found that rather than being a 
rigid protector of established interest, law was an accommodating tool of social development.  In 
that context, Hall related, the “state existed to ensure that the ‘rights of the public’ took 
precedence over any individual or group interest.”  To accomplish that, legislatures “enacted a 
veritable blizzard of economic regulations under the guise of enhancing the rights of the 
public.”
64
  To that, the Handlins would add that government financially supported economic 
development by subsidizing multiple trades.  Massachusetts, for example, gave financial aid to 
its fisheries, agriculture, hemp, silk, twine, glass, cloth, breweries, and salt and sugar trades.  It 
also enacted legal changes to assist commerce, modifying franchise, corporate and inspection 
laws, and provided attractive land grants to business.  The goal was to “create favorable 
conditions for economic activity.”
65
  Hartz added, in respect to antebellum Pennsylvania, that 
government efforts were involved in “virtually every phase of business activity.”  He voiced that 
government accomplished this by active participation in economic development, for example 
through a mixed corporate model, and by regulations to advance the general welfare.
66
  Rather 
than focusing on vested rights, as had Corwin, Hartz argued that government dealt with a “whole 
series” of rights “fathered by the Revolutionary doctrines which it became the duty of the state to 
secure.”  Included in those were blacks’ right to freedom, debtors’ rights to legal modification, 
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children’s rights to education, and laborers’ rights to fair working conditions.  These were the 
rights that government helped secure in order to enhance general and individual welfare.
67
  At 
the same time, the drive to advance commercial development animated even the highest court. 
Marshall and Story historian R. Kent Newmyer noted that “[n]early every one” of Marshall’s and 
the early Supreme Court’s decisions “facilitated market development.”
68
     
To this, Willard Hurst introduced an expanded perspective, studying government, social, 
economic, and legal dynamics in wilderness Wisconsin.  In reviewing the pioneers and early 
settlers, Hurst found that government was not a top-down imposition.  Rather it arose from 
settler efforts to enhance their interest, including in the commercial sphere.  Instead of being an 
impediment, government was organic to an advancing social and economic society.
69
  
Novak and his followers have furthered the historical narrative by explaining that 
government involvement in trade and private lives was extensive and pervasive.  Novak 
disclosed a world where, rather than acting upon each other, government, industry, and 
individuals acted almost as one to advance the general welfare.  He urged, “Law and the state 
were not simply reflectors or instruments or facilitators of natural evolutions in the market or 
civil society.  They were creative and generative forces.”
70
  As the Detroit experience bears out, 
government was not an overseer or laid atop society; it was a part of an organic whole.  In that 
context, resources and not laissez faire attitudes were its limitations.  
It seems too obvious to state, but it is important to note that government involvement, 
while pervasive, was not uniform as local conditions and needs demanded differing 
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governmental responses.  As Hartog noted in his study of New York City, “a public institution 
could define its goals only in response to the dictates of its varying constituencies.”
71
  Municipal 
leaders saw their role as “creating a stable context for private decision making.  That such 
planning would necessarily interfere with private property interests and would involve a 
significant extension of public power was not of concern, for members of the city government 
believed that they were acting under the banner of popular sovereignty.”
72
  Although government 
responses differ from area to area, they also change temporally.  Hall concluded that a number of 
government entities curtailed some regulatory activities, particularly wage and price regulations, 
as economies expanded and capital became more available.
73
  In that sense, government 
withdrew when it was no longer needed.  Although the subject of a later chapter, Cooley would 
argue that once those regulations fell into disfavor, government constitutionally was barred from 
reclaiming that regulatory power.  He offered, “whatever power may once have existed for 
[regulating prices] has been lost or taken away, and that business in general is protected against 
the interference of the state in such matters.”
 74
  Whatever Cooley suggested for the post-Civil 
War era, in the antebellum period regulation and support of industry characterized state and local 
governance.  Those activities were designed to advance commercial and social development and 
were widely accepted as norms of government. 
The challenges faced at the founding were different from those during the opening of the 
west, just as the challenges were different with the advent of the steamship and those faced 
during the development of the railroads.  Primus addressed that dynamic in his discussion of 
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changing rights speech.  This dissertation will argue that Cooley’s arguments concerning new 
constitutional meanings in response to changing societal needs aligns with Primus’s finding that 
rights change through time.  As oppressive forces and opportunities for advancement change, so 
too do our understandings of government and its role in facilitating individual self-creation. 
Ultimately, that is why Corwin and his followers missed the mark.  Government and courts 
cannot hold to an immovable star when the heavens and earth are moving. 
The Michigan Territory: The Ordinance in Action 
 
Perhaps in response to the multiple petitions for local territory governance, on January 
11, 1805, Congress carved the Territory of Michigan out of the Indiana Territory, effective on 
June 30 of that year.  That act provided for “a government in all respects similar” to the 
Ordinance.  Hence, the Michigan Territory would be led by a governor, a secretary, and three 
judges appointed by the President.
75
  Jefferson appointed William Hull governor, Stanley 
Griswold secretary, and Augustus Woodward and Fredrick Bates as judges.  A third judge turned 
down the President’s appointment.  Jefferson appointed his replacement, John Griffin, in late 
1805.  None of these individuals hailed from the Michigan Territory. 
June 1805 would prove to be a pivotal month in the area’s history.  On June 11, a fire 
destroyed all but two buildings in Detroit.  Lore implicates “segar” sparks in baker John Henry’s 
stable for setting the town ablaze.
76
  The fire devastated the community.  Detroit’s first mayor, 
Solomon Sibley would write to his wife, "we are without a single exception, unhoused ... in 
Short the Town of Detroit was . . . in the course of three hours reduced to ashes."
77
  Territory 
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Governor Hull arrived shortly after the fire.  The first acts of his new government were relief 
efforts.  Of course, the interests were humanitarian – all the homes were destroyed – but they 
were commercial too.
78
  From a national perspective, Detroit furnished an American commercial 
alternative to British interests.  Britain was America’s main economic competitor and the young 
nation needed to maintain a commercial town in the area to prevent trade from moving to the 
nearby Canadian territories.  Expressing that concern, a resident wrote: “The loss will prove a 
serious evil, not only to the individual sufferers, but to the interest of the U. States.  Detroit was 
the only commercial Town belonging to our Govt. in this quarter and unless it can be rebuilt 
shortly the whole trade will centre in the towns in the british province opposite.”
79
     
Local government worked to address those needs it could, but as a territory, it had to wait 
for the distant central government to address long-range needs.
80
  This took time.  A personal 
appeal to Congress by Hull and Woodward resulted in Congressional 1806 passage of “An Act 
to Provide for the Adjustment of Title of Land in the Town of Detroit and Territory of Michigan 
and for Other Purposes.”  The act provided for the rebuilding of Detroit.  It created a land board 
to lay out the town and to grant land to each person over seventeen and “not owing allegiance to 
any foreign power,” who owned land or inhabited a house during the fire.  Tenants and mere 
occupiers would now become landowners.
81
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The governor and judges sat as the land board.  In September 1806, they started their 
work, including setting forth an elaborate urban plan for the town, with public squares and 
spaces, wide avenues, and an organized structure of streets and lanes.  With Woodward leading, 
the board based the plan on Pierre Charles L’Enfant’s plan for Washington, D.C.
82
  The federal 
government had allocated significant additional land for the town’s expansion.  At first, the 
board believed it should sell the best lots at auction, and assign other parcels to those suffering 
fire losses.  Those receiving land “donations” (the land granted to those losing their buildings to 
the fire) believed they should get the prime lots.  Gridlock threatened when Hull changed his 
position to accept that prior landholders should receive the prime land, while Woodward held to 
his position that prime land should be sold.  At the same time, Hull would argue that residents 
should be allowed to re-inhabit their previous property.  Unfortunately, doing so would 
undermine Woodward’s grand layout scheme.
83
  An irascible Woodward “resigned” from the 
board in protest, leaving the board without the required membership to continue.  On November 
10, Hull declared that: “no other course but a suspension of our duties under the law seems to 
present itself, however it may impede the progress of the city, whatever inconvenience it may 
produce to the inhabitants, or embarrassment to the government, it seems to be dictated by 
imperious necessity.”
84
  Hull’s declaration threatened to undermine Woodward before President 
Jefferson.  In response, Woodward would eventually moderate his position, and the board would 
compromise.  The board soon would continue its work, but the newfound tranquility would again 
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retreat a few years later, when a Woodward/Hull conflict would again arrest governance.  That 
struggle also appeared intractable, as the parties seemed to have little interest in compromise and 
the public carried insufficient force to require it. 
In order to effect the new town plan, Congress necessarily destroyed previous titles to 
land.  It is not as if those titles were in doubt.  The Jay Treaty had required that the United States 
honor land rights existing under British rule.  In part to accomplish that, in 1804, Congress 
required Detroit area landowners to present their claims, whether they had acquired the land 
through French, British, or American grants.  Before June 1805, an appointed board of 
commissioners had accepted or rejected significantly all those claims.  Hence, at the time of the 
fire, the government had recognized the property rights of many of the inhabitants in the Detroit 
area.  Yet the statute read that the government would grant land to “every person . . . not owning 
or professing allegiance to any foreign power” who inhabited land at the time of the fire.  So, 
what happened to the property rights of those of age but with foreign allegiances?  It appears that 
the board attempted to soften the impact on those individuals by loosely defining “allegiance.”  
This was particularly important as it applied to the French residents, as many carried significant 
influence and wealth.  Accordingly, the governor proposed two things: those persons “born in a 
foreign country, but having resided in this country since the independence,” could petition for a 
donation of land, and that the board would presume allegiance to the United States lacking 
specific proof of allegiance to a foreign power.
85
  The burden had shifted, allowing the board to 
apply the law according to needs, not to its strict letter.  To this, petitioners responded either by 
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proclaiming that they were American citizens or that they had never proclaimed allegiance to a 
foreign government.
86
     
The board’s records offer a glimpse of law in action in early Territorial Michigan.  For 
example, on May 18, 1807, Jean Legard claimed that he was an American citizen, having taken 
an oath of allegiance to the United States in South Carolina.  Unfortunately, Legard had also 
“signed a paper professing himself to be a British subject.”  During the hearing, Legard claimed 
that he had done so in response to British threats to prevent his family from travelling to the 
United States should he not sign the British loyalty papers.  In a split decision, the board 
accepted his United States allegiance and granted him a donation lot.
87
  
On December 18, 1808, the land board granted a donation to the wife of John Harvey (in 
whose stable the 1805 fire started).  Harvey was born in England, traveled to the United States in 
1792, and did not take an oath of allegiance to become a citizen until late September 1807, 
arguably to help obtain a land donation.  An after-the-fire shift of allegiance could raise 
eyebrows so Harvey argued that he was active in municipal affairs, had served on the grand jury, 
and had “offered his house free of cost for the use of the court.”
88
  Harvey’s contributions moved 
the board and they were the focus of the proceedings.  Probably in an effort to skirt the loyalty 
restrictions, the board granted the donation to his wife instead of Harvey.  As it turned out, 
Harvey’s new allegiance claims may have been insincere.  Harvey soon sold a portion of the 
granted land and, in short order, started to return to his home country, England.  Mrs. Harvey put 
a stop to that plan when they reached New York.  She refused to travel the ocean.  They then 
turned around, and settled in Indiana.
89
  This is not to say that the board had been duped.  
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Instead, its interests were community development and not esoteric issues surrounding 
allegiance.  Detroit’s leaders had advanced social and economic concerns over legal niceties.  
Detroit was a small, diverse community that could ill-afford alienating or displacing its foreign-
born residents.   
That government was reallocating property did not seem to trouble the residents, but 
when they deemed those allocations unfair, residents voiced their discontent.  Their objections 
took several forms including challenges over the proofs necessary to establish claims, complaints 
over limitations on the size of replacement parcels, and the available uses of abutting property 
(such as claims for wood and/or grazing rights).
90
  Fairness was not the only grievance.  The 
greatest dissatisfaction concerned the slow pace at which government acted.  Five years after the 
fire, in 1810, a grand jury presented “that the poor of the territory are, and have been for the 
greatest part of the present year, unprovided for; and that the roads bridges and public high-ways, 
are almost impassable, with imminent danger to the lives of the good Citizens.”  It also accused 
the territory government of a “wanton violation and breach” of its duty to replace the jail and 
courthouse lost in the fire.
91
  To the grand jury, government had failed because it had failed to 
act. 
As mentioned, Detroit government had settled the real estate ownership issues before the 
fire.  The fire did not destroy those interests: it destroyed buildings – the land survived.  
Accordingly, government could have done nothing with respect to specific property ownership, 
just as it would do today if fire destroyed a home or business.  But Congress and the 
Detroit/Territory governments did act – and massively changed property interests.  Government 
destroyed owners’ rights in distinct parcels and granted them rights in alternative parcels.  It 
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created property rights by granting ownership to those who merely had inhabited a house, it gave 
property to organizations that had neither owned nor rented property – such as churches, 
nunneries, and religious schools, and it even granted and/or changed property rights to those who 
did not fit within the text of the law.  During the long process of reallocation, government 
prohibited landowners from building on their (pre-fire) property.  “The inhabitants who remained 
were actually obliged to live the whole of 1806 in bark shanties, tents, or other shelter, and the 
next year there were only nineteen deeds issued and less than half as many houses built.”
92
   
One might legitimately ask from whence the government derived the power to take 
property and to change property interests. Thomas Cooley, the great advocate for limited 
legislative power celebrated the fire as “providential” for allowing government to set up a 
“suitable plan” for land use,
93
 but the Michigan Supreme Court in 1858 was not quite certain.  In 
People v Jones, the court would attempt to reconcile private property rights with the government 
alteration of those rights
94
.  It did so facing the world where Detroit was a very different place 
than fifty years before.  Much of the city’s foundation now rested on the earlier reallocation of 
property and any change would be extraordinarily disruptive.  On the other hand, the court was 
troubled by the prospect “that rights existed, both individual and public” that the land board had 
destroyed.
95
  The court escaped that eventuality by creating a fiction – it assumed individual 
consent.  It found, 1) that land claimants voluntarily exchanged their property for the newly 
granted real estate, and 2) that the governor and judges would not act in arbitrary and tyrannical 
fashions in accepting and rejecting claims.  The facts in the case were consistent with those 
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assumptions, so the court avoided sacrificing justice in the case to the practicality of social and 
economic needs.  In the end, crisis conditions eclipsed (at least later understood) limitations on 
government power.
 96
   
As a consequence of the fire, the territory governor and judges took control of Detroit’s 
government and the previous town trustees relinquished their posts.  Not all were satisfied by this 
imposition of national control.  As late-nineteenth-century Detroit historiographer Silas Farmer 
related, the rule of the governor and judges “designates a form of government unlike anything 
afforded by the history of any other place in the United States.”  To him, the territory governance 
was both despotic and corrupt.  “An irresponsible and uncontrolled autocracy fastened itself 
upon the people and for a long series of years this anomalous government, a strange compound 
of legality and assumption, held absolute sway over the lands and laws, the persons and 
properties of the town.”
97
  Residents accustomed to controlling their local government now 
complained that the territory government voided prior law and replaced it with newly 
promulgated statutes and the common law.
98
   
The governor and judges tightened their control of the area when, in September 1806, 
they passed an act incorporating Detroit as a city.  Under that law, the governor appointed a 
mayor to a one-year term.  That mayor had veto power over legislation of the popularly elected 
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city council and the council had no power to override that veto.  With the short-termed mayor 
appointed by the governor and judges, and exercising a strict veto over the popularly elected 
council, democratic governance in Detroit effectively ended.  In response to the autocratic nature 
of this new municipal governance, “the residents of Detroit refused to vote in the first elections 
under the statute,” and the first few appointed mayors promptly resigned, believing Detroit’s 
government powerless in relation to the territory governance.
99
  This pretense of democratic 
governance would continue until February 24, 1809 when the judges and governor repealed the 
statute framing Detroit governance.
100
  At that point, the governor and judges would take direct 
control of the city.   
In response to the governor and judges’ high-handed treatment of the Detroiters, about 
300 inhabitants (a sizeable percentage of the population) in 1807 signed a petition to President 
Jefferson, claiming that “the history of William Hull, and Augustus B. Woodward since they 
took upon themselves the Government of this Territory is a history of repeated injuries, abuses, 
and deceptions.”  Central to their complaint was the “slow and novel mode” of adopting laws, 
and their failure to address the pressing needs of the territory.  Included in that concern was the 
slow process of awarding land tracks in the wake of the fire, which “prevent[ed] those naked and 
houseless sufferers by the conflagration, from accommodating themselves with buildings.”  They 
sought responsive governance and found it lacking.
101
  Hull’s response demonstrated that his 
audience was the President and not the people over whom he ruled.  Grousing that most signers 
knew nothing of the petition’s content, Hull protested that he had “perhaps done more than 
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candor itself would require, to preserve harmony and that it has been met only by base artifice 
and mean deception.”
102
  Neither the petition nor Hull’s response addressed the governmental 
structure that had given rise to, or at least encouraged, the residents’ protest.  One might have 
expected the residents to object to the autocratic mechanisms of governance, particularly as the 
recently enfeebled city council seemingly had piloted the petition.  Instead, the residents asked 
the President to remove Hull and Woodward, and replace them with “men of honest and upright 
principles.”
 
 Perhaps the council and residents were resigned to the Ordinance’s structure, or 
perhaps they accepted the structure but rejected its application.  In either case, they did not seek 
to change the government blueprint.  They only sought to change those responsible for affecting 
its aims. 
Although controlled by the governor and judges, Detroit’s municipal government prior to 
the territory takeover in February 1809, had the task to regulate in support of the general welfare.  
The council was “to prevent and remove nuisances,” “to provide for the health of the city,” and 
“to establish and regulate markets.”  Those powers included regulating transportation, building 
codes, weights and measures, fire codes, building materials, standards for weighing coal, hay, 
and wood, inspecting food, tobacco, and potash, and controlling the public wharfs.
103
  Local 
government structure had changed, and would consistently change, but the goal of local 
government continued.  It was to regulate and spend to enhance the general welfare. 
All governmental power in Territorial Michigan ultimately devolved from the 
Ordinance’s blueprint.  As such, the territorial government could adopt the laws of the states but 
could not make laws.  The question soon became whether and how the territory government 
could parse state laws to adapt them to Michigan’s conditions.  The judges advocated a loose 
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construction of the Ordinance to allow them to adopt portions of laws from various states, while 
Hull, to his regret, felt the Ordinance required a nearly word-for-word adoption of a state’s 
law.
104
  In a report to the President, Hull and Woodward bemoaned the problems a strict 
construction of the Ordinance’s “adopt” provision would cause and asked for relief from its 
restrictive language.  They explained that even if Michigan had access to all state legislation 
from which to draw its laws, (which it did not, due to inadequate communications, reporting, and 
publishing of laws), many of those state laws did not fit Michigan’s needs.  Claiming that, “a 
strict precedent will be searched for in vain,” Hall and Woodward argued that they would be 
hard pressed to handle even the simplest business of government, like regulating ferries, erecting 
public buildings, or establishing schools.
105
  Legislation needed to fit Michigan’s specific needs, 
and judicial interpretation had to fit the particularities of local conditions, not that of distant 
states.
106
   
The issue of territorial legislative power garnered serious discussion, and those 
discussions offer an insight into government and society’s response to legislation that was set 
down by colonial governance.  Not accepting that the governor and judges as a legislature had 
any power beyond wholesale adoption of particular state statutes (they could not parse language), 
Detroit inhabitant John Gentle protested: 
They parade the laws of the original states before them, on the table, 
and cull letters from the laws of Maryland, syllables from the laws of Virginia, 
words from the laws of New York, sentences from the laws of Pennsylvania, 
verses from the laws of Kentucky, and chapters from the laws of Connecticut – 
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jumble the whole into such form as they conceive the most suitable to facilitate 




Gentle’s ire may have been animated by Woodward’s and the land board’s refusal to grant 
Gentle citizenship so that he might enjoy a land grant under the Detroit fire-relief legislation. 
Gentle was born in Scotland, immigrated to Montreal in 1783, and moved to Detroit in 1790.  
The land board had denied his application for a land donation, with Woodward voicing the 
board’s opinion.  Feeling spurned by the Territory government, Gentle moved to Canada and 
fought on behalf of the British in the War of 1812.
108
   
Despite his motivations, Gentle’s point was well taken.  If the governor and judges could 
dissect and reconfigure statutory language as they saw fit, they were making law, not merely 
adopting it.  The legislation may have fit the territory’s needs but the Ordinance forbad the 
territory’s appointed leadership from legislating.  Congress believed this task should only be 
performed by democratically elected legislatures, which were found in the states.  As an 
unelected legislature, the governor and judges lacked the legal authority and republican 
credentials to make law.  Hence Gentle’s point: Legislatures are the people’s representatives and 
speak for them.  The people did not select Michigan’s governor and judges and, accordingly, 
they lacked the democratic legitimacy with which to make law. 
 Under normal circumstances, courts would hear matters addressing the limitation on 
legislative power.  But under the Ordinance, asking the Michigan judges to rule on their power as 
legislators would be a fool’s errand.  The surviving court decisions disclose no effort to take on 
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that task.  The issue did arise in New York in a case concerning the enforceability of a 
promissory note to the Bank of Michigan, an entity created by the governor and judges.  In 
incorporating the bank, they had taken portions of state laws and adopted them to Michigan’s 
particularities.  The New York Supreme Court, recognizing that Michigan had no laws “which 
[were] a literal transcript from the laws of any State,” ruled that the Ordinance only required that 
territories retain the “substance” of a state’s law and convey the phraseology of that law “in all 
essential respects.”
109
  At least one member of the affirming higher court had “serious 
objections” to that reading of the Ordinance.  Nevertheless, he declined to vote to invalidate the 
Michigan law, stating that “we cannot shut our eyes upon the fact that [the law] has been in 
operation within the Territory nearly 14 years, without it having been annulled or disproved by 
Congress,” (which, as mentioned, the Ordinance allowed).
110
  The judge presumed that 
Congressional inaction constituted tacit approval of the statute.  Of course, invalidating the 
actions of a bank in operation for 14 years would have resulted in serious financial upheaval, 
especially if the court applied its ruling beyond the four corners of the case.  Other territories had 
similarly parsed language, so the upheaval may have affected other jurisdictions. 
Only after Michigan became a state would the Michigan Supreme Court consider the 
issue.  The court would offer that, “The governor and judges were, by the ordinance of 1787, 
invested with the authority to adopt laws of the original states, but were not clothed with 
legislative powers.”  Having bowed to the statute’s language, the court then expanded.  The 
governor and judges could “make such changes in the language [of state statutes] as their taste 
might suggest.  The authority to adopt a law does not necessarily imply that precise words of that 
                                                 
109
 Bank of Michigan v Williams, 5 Wend. 480 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.)  486-87 (1830). 
110
 Bank of Michigan v Williams, 7 Wend. 539 (Court for the Correction of Errors N.Y.) 545 (1831). 
59 
 
law are to be adopted.”
111
  Hence, to the Michigan court, adopting laws meant adopting the spirit 
of a state’s (or multiple states’) legislation.   
Well after all the Ordinance states, including Michigan, had moved from territory to state, 
the federal courts considered a territory’s right to modify state statutes through parsed language.  
In Peck v Pease, the circuit court determined that the Ordinance granted, “no legislative power 
[to the governor and judges] consequently they had no power to modify or alter the laws they 
adopted.”
112
  By that logic the governor and judges must adopt laws wholly, and any alteration 
would render the statute unlawful.  The court, and an affirming Supreme Court, did not address 
whether the law, taken from Vermont, violated the “original state” provision.  (Vermont became 
a state after the founding.)  But these mid-century courts had the luxury of legal purity without a 
concern over the impact of invalidating a significant body of legislation.  The ruling occurred 
well after the first-stage period and after subsequent legislatures adopted, modified, or rejected 
the law in question.  In the end, the governors and judges had modified the state laws in probable 
violation of the Ordinance’s language but did so to address local needs.  The courts demurred to 
that governing need at least for as long as general-welfare concerns dictated. 
Under the Ordinance, the governor held expansive authority.  Classifying that power as 
“staggering,” Eblen concluded that the governor, through the first two stages of territorial 
governance, held nearly unchecked powers, even in relation to the judges.
113
  Michigan’s 
situation was different, either because of the personalities involved, or because Eblen considered 
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statutory power, not on-the-ground activities that could undermine planned governance.  An 
example of those dynamic limits on the governor’s power occurred starting in 1808, as the 
judges and the governor struggled over the control of Michigan law.  The earliest of the statutes 
“enacted” to address Michigan’s needs were referred to as the Woodward Codes.  Woodward 
was a brilliant but somewhat odd character, considered by many as caustic and unsuitable for 
leadership.
114
  His earlier threat to resign from the land board, and thereby halt progress on 
assigning land to fire victims, was an indication of his temperament.  With time, he and Hull 
again became antagonistic rivals.  Trouble was brewing in 1808 when Woodward determined to 
travel east.  Before leaving to spend the winter in New York and Washington, Woodward, a bit 
ungraciously and certainly unwisely, publicly put forward a series of resolutions to the remaining 
judges and governor, many of which were deeply critical of Hull.  He also urged that it would be 
“expedient to revise all the laws which have successively been in force in the Territory.”
115
  
Woodward then left town and, more importantly, left the legislature without a balance of votes in 
his favor.  
The governor and remaining judges appointed Hull to lead a committee to respond to 
Woodward’s departing “proposals,” including the accusations against Hull.  The committee 
accepted a few of Woodward’s proposals, most notably that the legislature re-write the legal 
code.
116
  It then returned Woodward’s antagonistic attitude in kind, observing that the committee 
would be happy to consider the bulk of Woodward’s resolutions if they would “produce the least 
possible benefit.”  It insisted that his proposals were “unfounded in principle or in truth, 
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irrelevant to the duties or powers of this legislature, calculated to destroy the energy of the 
government, to insult the patriotism of the people, excite insubordination in the militia, and to 
deprive families of those comforts which flow from the dearest of all connections.”
117
  In other 
words, they heartily disagreed. 
The governor and judges (without Woodward), then took action on Woodward’s proposal 
that the laws be re-codified, but did so in a manner Woodward would not sanction.  They voided 
much of the Woodward Codes and introduced an interpretation of the Ordinance that would give 
the governor veto powers.
118
  They then significantly rewrote the laws.  The replacement statutes 
are commonly referred to as the Witherell Codes.
119
  One of those acts changed the method of 
appealing from the district court to the Supreme Court.  Shortly thereafter, the “legislature” 
passed an act declaring “that all acts or laws” passed before the Witherell Codes shall “cease to 
have any force or operation within this Territory.”
120
   
Woodward reacted with profound displeasure.  With Woodward back, all legislating 
ceased.  By October, the mechanics of justice jammed when Woodward and Justice Griffin, in 
their judicial capacity, joined in voiding the Witherell statutes.  The Court invalidated the statutes 
in several cases, most notably in an appeal from James McGarvin against a judgment for James 
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Wilson on a promissory note.  In appealing his district court loss, McGarvin followed the 
procedure set forth in Witherell’s February 21, 1809 statute.  Woodward, writing for the court, 
dismissed McGarvin’s appeal because his pleadings did not conform to the recently voided 
Woodward Code procedures.
121
  The record indicates that Witherell dissented.  If he left an 
opinion, it does not survive.   
A mêlée ensued.  On October 19, 1809, an incensed Governor Hull quilled a 
proclamation in English and French challenging the court’s authority to void laws.
122
  He 
rejected that the court’s word was final.  Accordingly he “require[d] on this more than 
extraordinary occasion all civil and military officials to be vigilant in enforcing the laws of the 
Territory and he urge[d] all good citizens to strictly and uniformly observe them.”
 123
  The laws 
to be enforced were the voided Witherell Codes.  Pursuant to the governor’s instructions, the 
magistrates then enforced those laws, and arrested inhabitants according to the Witherell Code’s 
procedures.  The Supreme Court (the judges) responded, releasing those prisoners under writs of 
habeas corpus because the Witherell Codes were invalid.  The ruling affected other areas, as 
courts attempted to operate without accepted procedures and standards.  Tensions heightened and 
invectives flew.  Meanwhile, the public floundered between two different legal codes – one 
invalidated by the court, the other invalidated by the legislature. 
The problem remained unresolved for some time.  Perhaps frustrated with the gridlock, a 
party in the case of re Solomon Sibley and Christian Hoffman, Executors of the Last Will and 
Testament of George Hoffman, asked the court to put in writing its reason for denying that party 
a writ of mandamus.  In that, and in succeeding matters, Woodward would offer the reasons 
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behind invalidating the Witherell Codes.  In the Hoffman Estate case, Woodward opined that the 
Witherell Codes violated the Ordinance because they were adopted and signed in violation of the 
Ordinance’s requirement that “the governor and judges, or a majority of them” shall adopt the 
laws of the states.
124
  To Woodward, a majority of a quorum of three must adopt and sign all new 
laws.  Woodward further clarified why that was important in In the Matter of Andre Colhoun.  In 
that case, the court released Andre Colhoun from prison pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.  
The disagreement ultimately concerned the placement of a comma in the Ordinance.  That 
placement affected the governor’s powers and the makeup of a quorum.  Nevertheless, the court 
consisted of three judges and two of them disfavored the new laws.  Since Calhoun had been 
arrested under the invalid Witherell Codes, he was released from imprisonment.  In separate 
actions, the court also released prisoners Isaac Burnett, Jacob Smith, William Biggelow, John 
Connelly, and perhaps more.
125
  On July 23, 1810, Woodward sent a letter to Hull explaining 
why the new statute violated the Ordinance’s requirements.  Never wasting an opportunity to 
give offense, Woodward attacked Hull, accusing him of engaging in a “storm of indignation” and 
classifying Hull’s October 1809 proclamation as “calumnious and inflammatory.”
126
 
The controversy went beyond statutory interpretation.  It also concerned the respect 
required of the territory highest court’s pronouncements.  Woodward argued that neither the 
executive nor the legislature had the power to reverse an erroneous or even corrupt court 
decision.  The legislature could change the law, but it could not act retrospectively.  Since “the 
Validity of this Section of the Said bill, and of forty four other bills [the Witherell Codes] has 
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been impeached in the Supreme Court of the territory of Michigan,” the law was settled – the 
Witherell Codes were void, and Hull’s pronouncement that the rulings be ignored was improper.  
Not all agreed.  Jacob Visger, the chief judge of the lower court, took great exception to 
Woodward’s voiding the Witherell Codes.  So serious was his distress that “he would prefer 
death” before complying with the higher court’s order.
127
  Of course, Woodward believed that 
the enhanced court fees under the Witherell codes motivated the lower court judges siding with 
Hull.
128
  Witherell classified Woodward’s opinions overturning the laws as “the most 
extraordinary and unwarrantable stretch of power ever attempted to be exercised by the judiciary 
over a legislature and free government.”
129
  
While the governor and justices clashed, the population became increasingly frustrated, 
not just with the gridlock but also with what they perceived as corrupt governance.  An 1809 
grand jury commented that Hull abused his authority and acted in his self-interest.  It chastised 
Hull for releasing John Whipple “illegally and without any colour of authority” from his court-
imposed sanctions.  The court had imposed those sanctions because Whipple called Woodward 
“a damn’d rascal.”  Siding with the Woodward, the grand jury expressed “confident hope that the 
Supreme Court will carry into effect their own Judgments.”  This same grand jury also accused 
Witherell of actions unbecoming a judge for introducing legislation to fund a road-surveying 
venture in which Witherell financially participated.  Further, it declared an act of Congress 
“unnecessary, nugatory, and a nuisance” as well as “unconstitutional, and a gross violation and 
infringement of the unalienable rights of the Citizens of this Territory.”  It then grieved that 
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members of the Supreme Court were often absent from their tasks.
130
  Both sides used the grand 
jury for their ends, with Woodward going so far as to badger grand jury members about their 
votes relating to his nemesis, Hull.
131
  The territory’s commercial center and capital city no 
longer had its own city government and the territory government was dysfunctional.  Frustration 
abounded.  As Michigan historian William Jenks noted, “virtual anarchy existed.”
132
 
The judges and governor would enact no legislation until September 1, 1810, having 
gone more than 16 months without agreement.  On that day they passed An Act declaring any 
and all bills, acts, laws, enactments, or regulations whatever, heretofore existing, or supposed to 
exist, relating to the manner of authenticating the legislative acts of this government, to be null 
as to future operation.
133
  Jenks provided a nice history of the negotiations, describing the 
“general spirit of pugnacity manifest” at their meetings.  In the end reason prevailed and a hybrid 
of the Woodward and Witherell Codes would pass.
134
  With that, this crisis passed.   
In his Outlines of the Political History of Michigan, future Supreme Court Justice, and 
member of the Cooley Court, James Campbell would chasten Woodward for his disruptive 
judicial activism.  Mocking his judicial forbearer, Campbell voiced, “His personal habits were 
slovenly, and his room was conspicuous for disorder.”  If that were not enough to indict the man, 
Campbell continued, “His worst habit, however, was that sort of audacious impudence which, 
under the name of eccentricity, has sometimes characterized men of mark, and even made them 
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to be imagined greater than if they had behaved themselves with more civility.”
135
  All that being 
said, given today’s understanding of court authority, Woodward was correct.  The court had 
determined laws in violation of the Ordinance’s requirements.  It was then incumbent on Hull to 
challenge that opinion in federal court or, in the alternative, to honor it and press for new 
legislation.     
The story of the gridlock over the Witherell Codes offers more than a whimsical look at 
government foolishness.  As the residents of the territory recognized, dysfunctional governance 
encumbered commercial and social development.  About a week after Hull’s proclamation 
calling for public dismissal of Supreme Court rulings, a citizen’s committee, with Woodward 
attending, petitioned Congress: “That it is expedient to alter the present form of government of 
this Territory, and to adopt a form of government by which two bodies, elected annually by the 
people should make the laws, instead of the executive and three judicial magistrates, appointed 
by the general government, adopting them.”
136
  The committee believed that a government 
institutionally subservient to the national government and relying on distant legislatures, could 
not be, and was not, responsive to the people.  The residents had experienced a government that 
governed least, but, to their minds, had not governed best. 
That call for change entered the nation’s capital as Washington increasingly focused on 
the challenges that would lead to the War of 1812.  Accordingly, Congress did not respond to the 
Detroiters’ petition.  That war was a disaster for Michigan.  Governor Hull became General Hull, 
a task for which he was ill suited.  Hull may have been the worst general of the war.  Without a 
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shot being fired, he surrendered Detroit while holding a fortified position and enjoying an over 
three-to-one manpower advantage over British forces.
137
  With the surrender, American 
governance ended, only to return after the war.  When returning to the city, government officials 
found the buildings torched by the British and the surrounding farms and their animals destroyed 
by Indians.  Few crops were available, as the war interrupted plantings.  Woodward wrote to 
Secretary of State James Monroe, “The desolation of this territory is beyond all conception.  No 
kind of flour or meal is to be procured, and nothing for the subsistence of the cattle.  No animals 
for slaughter, and more than half the population destitute of any for domestic or agricultural 
purposes.”
138
  The situation was desperate.  “Food for humans and livestock was lacking, fences 
had been destroyed, clothing plundered and River Raisin inhabitants were eating boiled hay; 
there was little prospect for the future since seed grain was lacking.”
139
   
The national government soon responded.  President Madison reported to Congress that 
“the inhabitants [of Michigan] were left in so destitute and distressed a condition as to require 
from public stores certain supplies essential to their subsistence.”  He advised Congress that the 
War Department would request aid to support the Michiganders.
140
  The federal government 
authorized the governor to “issue to the indigent and distressed people of the Territory such relief 
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of provisions from the public stores as their necessities may require.”  The letter approving the 
assistance cautioned, however, that “improper persons not receive relief.”
141
  While federal relief 
was slow, it was forthcoming.  Detroit historian David Poremba suggested the aid included not 
only food, but also seeds and livestock.
142
  Congress also expressed an intention to compensate 
some war victims, passing legislation in 1816, 1817, and 1825.
143
  Those acts were limited and 
the required proofs were, at times, difficult.  When that compensation proved inadequate or slow 
to materialize, Michigan leadership called for congressional assistance.
144
  As late as 1834, the 
Michigan Legislative Council sent a memorial to Congress, complaining that many had in vain 
sought relief under the statutes.  “Justice and equity” required that Congress give “equable 
compensation” for wartime injuries.
145
   
The bitterness residents felt over slow or cumbersome government was part of a growing 
agitation.  After the 1805 fire, residents complained not about their loss of democratic rights, but 
the government’s delay in responding to their needs.  After the War of 1812, the complaint 
similarly was that government did not sufficiently address the injuries suffered.  That complaint 
would continue in various forms and over various issues through the remainder of the territorial 
period.  The residents’ discontent, therefore, was not about government action or presence – it 
                                                 
141
 Militia General Orders, Adjutant Generals Office of Militia Headquarters, Detroit, September 23, 1815  in 
Farmer, History of Detroit and Wayne County and Early Michigan: 288.  
142
 Poremba, Detroit, A Motor City History: 63.  
143
 An Act to Authorize the payment for property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy, while in the military 
service of the United States, and for other purposes. 1816,  3 Stats.: 261; An Act to amend the act "An Act to 
authorize the payment for property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy while in the military service of the 
United States," passed the nineteenth of April, one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, 1817, 3 ibid., 397; An Act 
further to amend the act authorizing payment for property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy, while in the 
military service of the United States, and for other purposes, 4 ibid., 123. 
144
 In 1826, Cass reflected on the slow pace of assistance promised by the national government for the devastation 
from the war.  He voiced that, “It is deeply to be regretted, however, that justice is so tardily administered,” and that 
he “hoped the time is not remote, when public obligation will be felt and acknowledged.”  Governor Mason would 
later reiterate that position in 1832.  Cass, November 6, 1826; Mason, May 2, 1832, Messages of the Governors of 
Michigan, ed. George N. Fuller (Lansing: The Michigan Historical Commission, 1925). I: 30-31, 75. 
145
 Memorial to Congress by the Legislative Council, February 22, 1834, The Territorial Papers of the United 
States: XII: 745-47. 
69 
 
was about government inaction and absence.  In that context, it is a bit surprising that about sixty 
years later, courts would find prompt government responses to crises exceeded legislative power, 
for example when legislatures provided seed-aid to farmers and loans to businesses destroyed by 
fire.  In that later period, constitutional interpretation of the blueprints of government, demanded 
a more restricted government framework, where courts acted to preclude government from 
offering the assistance that, in the earlier period, the people required and the government 
provided.  That is the concern of later chapters.  Before the courts would seek to limit 
government, Michiganders would demand greater government. 
The Move toward Increased Democratization 
 
Lewis Cass became Michigan’s governor in the aftermath of the war.  William 
Woodbridge became the secretary (and Collector of Customs in Detroit), and Woodward, 
Griffin, and Witherell remained the judges.  At the time, about eight hundred fifty people resided 
in Detroit, with the Michigan Territory housing less than five thousand.  In 1816, the then 
territory laws were compiled and published as the Cass Codes.  In addition to setting out the 
organs and powers of government, those laws regulated and spent to support the general welfare.  
The territory laws provided for schools, illegitimate children, internal police, and roads and 
bridges, as well as set rules of trespass and enclosures.  They protected and regulated the poor, 
and set rules for the common and private areas of Detroit.  They also regulated, among other 
things, ferries, taverns, and auctioneers.   
All of those laws were adapted from state laws.  Of course, laws on the books and law in 
action often diverge, and they did so in Michigan.  Courts interpreted statutes in relation to 
Michigan conditions, and introduced English common and statutory law as they determined 
appropriate.  Such “[f]reedom on the part of the court to adopt, adapt, or reject common law rules 
70 
 
and decisions (including British statutes) made it possible for the court to mould the non-
statutory decisional law into a system suited to frontier conditions.”
146
  That interpretive 
flexibility afforded another opportunity to shape pre-existing state law to fit territorial needs.  In 
doing so, the judges were able to effectuate Woodward’s early claimed goals: to adjust state laws 
“in order to render it, in any respect, suited to the circumstances of the district.”
147
  
Under Cass’s leadership, in October 1815, Detroit recovered its home-rule authority from 
the governor and judges.  The city’s new charter largely reenacting the government structure of 
the 1802 Charter.  The voters would again approve or disapprove of legislation passed by the 
city’s Board of Trustees.  There was no mayor.  The electors also set the budget.  Not 
insignificantly, the territory’s first newspaper, the Detroit Gazette would start publication in July 
1817.  Around the same time, steamboats began to travel the Great Lakes and Woodward laid the 
cornerstone of the University of Michigan in Detroit.  The first bank was organized in 1818 and 
started operations on January 1, 1819.  The national government sold more land to the public, 
allowing for population expansion.  Burton, in his History of Detroit, reflected on the values land 
provided.  “A turkey was worth one acre of land; two pigs equaled an acre; two geese equaled 
one acre, two bushels of potatoes equaled one acre; four bushels of turnips or two bushels of 
beets equaled one acre.”
148
  Land was cheap and opportunities abundant.  To be sure, Detroit was 
a small city.  Its 1819 census showed 1,110 people lived in the city, exclusive of the fort; 1,040 
were white – 596 men and 444 women – and 70 were “colored” – with no sex given.
149
  Despite 
its small numbers, the population was moving toward self-governance and growth.  So too, the 
Michigan Territory moved toward increased representative governance. 
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As noted, before the War of 1812, Detroiters had petitioned Congress for enhanced self-
government.  The war had interrupted that call, but it did not end it.  The Detroit Gazette would 
take up the drive.
150
  In 1817, it advocated for more local, democratic governance with the goal 
of “encouraging immigration, inducing settlement, and developing the resources of the 
Territory.”
151
  The Detroit citizens’ address to President Monroe upon his 1817 visit similarly 
called for representative government: “But, accustomed to the exercise of their elective 
franchise, the American People will rarely select a country as their residence, in the government 
of which they have neither voice or participation – in the form of which they have neither will or 
control.”  They then called for both representation and government activism, arguing that, “A 
law of Congress, empowering the citizens of our territory to enter upon the representative grade 
of government, contemplated by the ordinance of ’87, the establishment of permanent national 
roads, and an exposure of our valuable public lands in the market would be productive of 
immediate and beneficial results to our territory.”
152
  The residents had adopted the position 
articulated by Governor General Carleton in 1774, but with an important twist.  Government 
alone was not sufficient for commercial and social development.  In the United States, that 
government must be representative of the interest of the people it governed. 
In 1818, Cass proposed that Michigan enter the next phase toward self-governance under 
the Ordinance, and called for an election to determine public support to move to an elected 
legislature.  Entering that phase would have required residents to bear increased financial 
burdens for their governance.  His proposal failed as many voters believed that a government 
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largely paid for by the federal government was preferable to a legislature paid for by the 
territory’s inhabitants.  Those voting against taking on the burdens of representative governance 
were thought to have come from French backgrounds where they had not been infused with 
American ideals of self-governance.
153
  The issue, however, may have gone beyond taxpayer 
frugality.  Michigan residents no longer felt the press of distant governance as they had under the 
Hull/Judges regime.  Cass governed according to Michigan’s needs and seemed unconcerned 
about courting Washington’s favor.
154
  With no kindling for change, voters were loathe to take 
on additional governance and financial responsibilities.  But Michigan already was the slowest of 
all the territories in moving to the second stage of territory governance, having gone fourteen 
years since its creation as a separate territory in 1805.  In some measure disregarding the vote, in 
1819, Congress gave Michigan a non-voting seat in the House.  Electors for that seat were white 
male residents who had paid a county or territorial tax.
155
 
Notwithstanding 1818 voter sentiment, the central government control inherent in the 
Ordinance would increasingly clash with rising calls for democracy and representative local 
governance.
156
  A paramount concern was the “vacillating policy” inherent in the laws created by 
the governor and judges system.  Accordingly, a January 1820 Grand Jury Presentment declared 
that the “Grand Jurys are aware that nothing but a legislature constituted by the people, can be a 
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radical cure for the evils complained of.”
157
  In 1822, a committee of inhabitants petitioned 
Congress to separate the legislative from the judicial.  In January 1823, they sent Congress a 
statement setting forth their concerns over the Territorial legislature’s actions.  The statement 
complained of the secretive and almost despotic nature of law creation under the Ordinance.  The 
committee urged that they had “no guarantee by the ordinance of 87” that the governor and 
judges could be responsive to the needs of the people.  Given their “distant and ineffectual 
Responsibility,” the committee feared the abuses would not abate.
 158
   
These pleas were different from the petitions and grand jury reports of the first decade of 
the century.  Whereas before, residents had complained of persons, they now complained of 
systems.  Now, the form of government did not fit their needs.  In response, Congress, in 1823 
created a legislative council to assume the territory’s lawmaking authority.
159
   Michigan had 
taken nineteen years to get to this stage.  This compares to a total of eleven years for Ohio (the 
first territory to move to statehood), five for Indiana, and three for Illinois and, under related 
laws, four for Tennessee, two for Mississippi, and eight for Louisiana.
160
  The President 
appointed its nine members of the council from a slate of eighteen popularly elected candidates.  
Through this act, Congress also separated Michigan’s legislative and judicial spheres, and 
changed the judges’ terms from the Ordinance’s “during good behavior” to four-year terms.
161
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A distant federal hand still largely steered the territory’s governance, but now the 
legislature germinated in Michigan soil and was chosen from those elected by Michigan voters.  
Under the 1823 law, the President appointed the governor, secretary, and the judges, although the 
judges were no longer both lawgivers and deciders.  In a further effort to cleanse the governance 
of its overly autocratic past, the President did not reappoint Woodward or Griffin, but he did 
reappoint Witherell.
162
  The legislative council first sat on June 7, 1824 and quickly reorganized 
the court system, limiting the Supreme Court largely to appellate issues.  The justices sat on 
circuit courts but did so as appellate judges.
163
  
With population growth, in 1825 Congress increased the council to thirteen members and 
authorized the governor and council to divide the territory into townships.  All township officials 
except for court personnel and sheriffs were popularly elected.
164
  Governor Cass went a step 
further by appointing those “unelected” officials according to the results of local advisory 
elections.  Government was now institutionally more sympathetic to local concerns.  This 
governance facilitated a “more mature and stable society [that] helped attract a wave of 
immigrants.”  In response to that stability, Michigan’s population increased from twenty-eight 
thousand to over two-hundred thousand between 1830 and 1840.
165
  This is not to suggest that 
government alone facilitated that growth.  The land was rich and the climate conducive to 
agriculture, and transportation mechanisms, particularly the Erie Canal, made Michigan more 
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  Nevertheless, government was instrumental in unlocking the area’s 
potential by addressing the security, capital scarcity, transportation, and environmental 
challenges that encumbered development. 
Representative governance grew in Detroit as well.  In 1824, Detroit adopted a city 
charter providing for a mayor and five council members.  The council quickly took up its task of 
regulation in pursuit of general-welfare concerns.   It ordered the marshal to examine the bread in 
the city’s bakeries “tomorrow morning” to assure that all bread matched the “weight last 
prescribed by the Common Council.”  It passed a new assize of bread, appointed fire safety 
inspectors, and set fees and fines concerning the sale of foodstuffs.  The detail of the council’s 
involvement in the market is notable.  For example, on December 13, the council considered 
whether the “Clerk of the market [should] be directed to procure four convenient chains to fix 
and suspend four staples at the four corners of the market, of convenient length and strength, for 
the purpose of” weighing large quantities of provisions.  That same day, it considered whether 
James Woodward could move his grocery shop and whether Edward White could trade as a 




The council would soon take up regulations concerning the measuring of wood, and the 
“manner of using the sidewalks,” the transportation and storage of gun powder, and the rules on 
“shows, plays, games, theatrical and all other exhibitions.”  The council considered and passed 
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ordinances controlling nuisances, prohibited swine and stud and wild horses from running at 
large, and regulated dogs.  Finding it the duty of the city to improve the public grounds, the 
council provided for planting trees in the public yard.
168
  As new challenges arose, the council 
enacted new ordinances, or modified established ones.  It routinely reconsidered the assizes of 
bread.  It legislated against “the firing of rockets or other fireworks,” and it regulated the 
cleaning of fish.  It also punished vendors of “unwholesome liquors and provisions,” modified its 
theatrical regulations, and it set fees of ferriage.
169
  In short, local government was both part, and 
a regulator of the relations of its population.  As Cooley noted, government was involved in “all 
that infinite variety of rules and regulations known as laws of police, which are ever present and 
all about the citizen, his business and his property, prescribing limitations and setting bounds to 
the use and enjoyment even in respect to that which is unquestionably his own.”
170
  Local 
government regulation intertwined with the day-to-day in an effort to organize and control 
individuals, property, and commerce.  That was the norm. 
It is important to note that government activity was not just about regulation.  City 
government also became involved in advancing commercial development.  In March 1827, the 
council determined that the “erection of a steam mill is among the most important improvements 
projects in the City.”  Being “apprehensive that it will not be effected by enterprise and 
individuals only,” it proposed to later consider whether community aid was appropriate.  In 
reality, the question was not whether, but how government would help develop the mill.  Council 
agreed that the city would “furnish such aid, either in a site for building, or in stock, or in both, 
as circumstances may render proper.”  It explained that it was government’s role to further 
projects that would “contribute to the health and comfort of our citizens . . .  give activity to 
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business and enhance the value of property . . . and to furnish employment.”  The council 
believed this obligation extended not just to current residents but to future generations as well.  
By properly employing its limited resources, it could help build a community where “in a few 
years our population and wealth will enable us to meet any public demands which may be 
necessary.”
171
  This was government dedicated to advancing the public welfare by regulating 
behavior and spending to advance commercial development.  It took this role not as an external 
marionette-master pulling strings.  Instead, government was an integral part of the society and 
economy, working as an aid as much as a regulator.  It keenly felt the responsibility to fill that 
role, as the city’s population was growing, having more than doubled in the five years between 
1830 and 1834.
172
  Government was no night watchman.  Rather, it fancied itself a social 
watchmaker, and acted accordingly. 
Municipalities, like Detroit, were the government entities most involved in the regulation 
of the community and the support of commercial development.  In large measure, this reflected 
the local nature of life.
173
  This does not mean, however, that the territory government did not 
regulate or support commercial development.  It did so when local regulation or expenditures 
would prove insufficient.  (The most telling example of this related to the support of internal-
improvement, infrastructure programs, discussed in the next chapter.)  Of course, the decision as 
to when to regulate at the territory level and when to defer, was left to the discretion of the 
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territory legislature and governor.  For example in 1827, Cass vetoed a bill to allow 
municipalities to regulate through licensing billiard tables, because billiards was “injurious to the 
habits and morals of the community.”  To Cass, this form of gaming was beyond municipal 
discretion and such decisions should be territorial.  On the same day, Cass vetoed legislation 
requiring state inspections of provisions, fish, and whiskey.  He did so because he felt that local 
government should regulate such matters.
174
  It is hard to discern a difference between the 
regulation of snooker and scrod but, notably, the issue was not whether to regulate.  It was who 
should do so. 
James Willard Hurst helped usher in historian efforts to debunk the popular 
characterization of an early American governance premised on laissez-faire principles.  He 
argued that where “regulation or compulsion might promote the greater release of individual or 
group energies, we had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of the law.”
175
  Detroit proved no 
exception to Hurst’s perception and, as importantly, it consciously subordinated private to public 
interests when regulating.  Detroit’s 1834 efforts to regulate liquor provide a telling example, 
particularly because those efforts were led by the then Territory Secretary (and Detroit 
Alderman-at-Large) Stevens Mason.
176
  (As governor, Mason would later lead Michigan’s 
efforts for infrastructure and commerce building efforts – a story for the next chapter.)  At 
twenty-two years old, Mason, as secretary and city alderman, pushed city council to tighten 
Detroit’s liquor ordinances.  Mason argued that, “the drinking of ardent spirits . . . leads to form 
intemperate habits and appetites, and . . . it causes a great portion of pauperism, crimes and 
wretchedness of the community; increases the number and violence of diseases, fills our prisons 
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with convicts and malefactors; deprives man of reason and brings thousands to an untimely 
grave.”  He recognized that his call to restrict alcohol sales ran against the philosophy of “let 
every man think for himself,” but rejected that in the face of overarching community interests.  
To Mason, good citizenship required individuals “to sacrifice present private interest to the 
public good.”  In so arguing, Mason took on powerful economic and freedom interests.  Detroit 
had one liquor-selling grocery store for every thirteen families in the city.  Those stores existed 
because Detroiters consumed their products, and Mason proposed to limit those businesses.
177
  
Council agreed and passed the restrictive law.
178
  The city would limit the individual discretion 
and economic interests of much of its population in order to advance collective needs. 
The number and breadth of the regulations and the efforts to develop commerce tell only 
part of the story.  Law-in-action was the daily business of municipal governance and Detroit’s 
Common Council routinely worked to shape its municipal world.  Reviewing its activities on any 
number of days demonstrates that philosophy but, for the sake of brevity, I here list the council’s 
proceedings for only one day – May 9, 1832.  On that day the mayor and four alderman 
considered, 1) a claim of A. M. Hurd for $34.71, 2) James Young’s application to keep a bakery 
at the corner of Randolph and Woodbridge, 3) James Fraser’s request to keep a grocery at 
Strykie and Taylor, 4) whether to request that the Secretary of War further open Cass Street, 5) a 
proposal to sell city lots from the former military reservation, 6) leasing the “public or steam mill 
wharf” but reserving a portion for a potential public market, 7) determining whether a public 
market would be closed if fees were not forthcoming, and 8) establishing a committee to set 
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  Most importantly, this was not an unusual day – the record is replete with 
council deliberations that blended day-to-day commercial and social practicalities with legal 
enactments.  No laissez-faire sentiment arrested government efforts to enhance the general 
welfare.  As Novak noted, “on the contrary, the fundamental social and economic relations of the 
nineteenth century – the market, the city and the countryside, the family, the laborer, the 
proprietor, the good neighbor, the good citizen – were formed and transformed in this period as 
the constant objects of governance and regulation.”
180
   
This is not to say that all Detroit residents agreed with the scope of government 
involvement in their lives, or that all council action met with universal applause.  Concerns over 
local regulation of the central market increasingly percolated among the populous.  In 1835, 
some protested not only the wisdom of the market ordinance, but common council’s power to 
regulate market hours.  A letter to the editor of the Democratic Free Press asked “what right the 
common council possesses” to limit market hours so that he and other laborers could not attend 
the market?  He argued that council assumed powers “not delegated to them.”  The editor of the 
newspaper agreed, stating, “We know not what right the common council possesses to pass such 
an ordinance.”  Perhaps in response to public dissatisfaction over market availability, by 1837, 
the city had established three markets, one of which was on the first floor of City Hall.  By 
advertising in its official Directory that the city markets “are kept in good order by the inspector 
of provisions, and well supplied with everything that can be desired at similar places,” the city 
suggested that trade was not restricted to city-owned markets, but city markets still thrived.  
Further, government had not forsaken control where its leaders believed that government best 
enhanced welfare.  In that same Directory, the city boasted that it had acquired the previously 
                                                 
179
 Journal of the Common Council of the City of Detroit; from the Time of its First Organization: 139. 
180
 Novak, The Peoples Welfare: 236. 
81 
 




Advancing to Statehood 
 
Cass’s drive to support local government had quelled many of the hostilities and 
problems associated with distant governance.  Those concerns would re-emerge as Andrew 
Jackson’s spoils system would use Michigan government positions to reward his political 
supporters.
182
  With the exception of Cass, those beneficiaries resided outside the territory.  As 
soon as the judges’ four-year terms ended, Jackson appointed judges from outside the territory.  
Similarly, when Cass left to become Jackson’s Secretary of War
183
, Jackson appointed an 
outsider as governor.  In response, resentment “was widespread and general; for the first time the 
Territory became keenly aware of the dependent character of its government.”  A local paper 
claimed that Jackson’s appointments left “no identity of interest nor community of feeling which 
should inspire confidence.”
184
  The fervor over the loss of local control, however, did not 
immediately translate into action.  An 1832 election on the statehood question garnered only 
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3007 total votes, with a small majority in favor of statehood.  Residents remained reticent about 
bearing the cost of governing a large area with relatively few taxpayers.  With that lack of 
enthusiasm, Congress failed to take up Michigan statehood and territory leaders dropped the 
issue for a short time.   
From 1831 to 1836, the office of the governor changed hands in interesting fashions.  
Jackson appointed George Bryan Porter to serve as governor in 1831.  Porter was from 
Pennsylvania and hailed from a political family.  One brother would become Pennsylvania’s 
governor, and another the Secretary of War.  Before his appointment, Porter served as a 
Democratic Representative in the Pennsylvania House.  Porter was often absent from Michigan 
and, during those times, Stevens Mason was acting governor.  Porter’s tenure as governor was 
shortened when, in 1834, he succumbed to cholera and died in office.
185
  Territory Secretary 
Mason again became acting governor.  Mason’s earlier appointment to the secretary’s position 
created concerns in large measure because this Kentucky resident was nineteen years old at the 
time of his appointment and, hence, lacked both knowledge of Michigan and the experience 
typically beneficial for higher office.  His appointment as governor at the age of 22 created even 
greater anxiety.  A meeting of concerned Detroit citizens characterized his appointment as “in 
every point of view, so injudicious and objectionable as to make it improbable, if not 
impossible.”
186
  That he was a political appointee without grounding proved troubling.  That he 
barely shaved proved infuriating. 
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Mason soon won the residents’ support and would eventually become Michigan’s first 
elected governor.  Before he could be elected, however, Jackson fired Mason for supporting 
Michigan’s territorial claims on land that is now part of Ohio.
187
  Ohioans could vote in national 
elections and its representatives could vote in Congress.
188
  Michigan’s could not, so political 
forces drove Mason out.  In his place, the President named John Scott Horner of Virginia to the 
governor’s seat.  (Jackson had first appointed Pennsylvanian Charles Shaler, but he declined the 
appointment.)  Horner followed Jackson’s lead in offering a conciliatory position toward what 
Michigan residents considered an Ohio land grab. 
It was their militancy over Ohio’s perceived arrogance that drove Michiganders’ desires 
for statehood.  So intense were those feelings that Michigan tried to shorten the traditional route 
to statehood.  Most territories seeking admission received Congressional enabling legislation at 
the beginning of the process of state formation.  Congress did not respond to Michigan’s request 
for that legislation, so state advocates took the task upon themselves.  In 1834, the Territorial 
Council enacted legislation calling for a census to determine if the territory had surpassed the 
60,000 population required for statehood under the Ordinance.  That census showed the territory 
held 87,273 people.  In January 1835, the council called for an election of delegates to a 
constitutional convention, and on May 11, those delegates met in Detroit.   
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The delegates promptly set forth their goal in the preamble to the eventual constitution: 
“the time has arrived when our present political condition ought to cease, and the right of self-
government be asserted.”
189
  The delegates were largely former residents of New York and New 
England.  (The Erie Canal success would animate their governmental vision.)  They represented 
a cross-section of residents, with delegates coming from rural and urban areas.  They were 
tradesmen, timber men, farmers, merchants, educators, doctors, and lawyers.  This group had 
little constitutional law or drafting experience and “were little concerned in the proposed 
constitution beyond the bill of rights and the suffrage provisions.”  In the end, however, they left 
the legislature largely free from restraints, as “the delegates evinced no distrust of legislative 
assemblies.”
190
  The constitution went to the people for approval.  Although few voted (7,658), 
this time the residents overwhelmingly approved the constitution (6,299 – yes, 1,359 – no) 
The militancy that animated the drive to statehood also helped drive Horner from office.  
Almost immediately following his appointment, residents vocally expressed dissatisfaction with 
his Ohio position and proposed that Horner “return to the land of his nativity.”
  
Mason was their 
man as he had “an open, fearless” policy against the marauding Ohioans.
191
  Distaste with 
Horner ran deep and soon a group of residents welcomed Horner to a local tavern by throwing 
rocks through the tavern’s windows.  To avoid the projectiles, Horner slept on the floor of the 
tavern, as it afforded the safest location.  Apparently unsympathetic with his guest’s plight, the 
tavern owner then charged Horner for the damage done to his building.
192
  Future State Supreme 
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Court Justice Campbell classified Horner as “rather more preemptory and assuming than the 
people were accustomed to find their public officers, and more dictatorial than they were 
disposed to submit to.”  Accordingly, government officials granted him little respect.
193
  Horner 
stayed in Michigan until May 1836, when Jackson reassigned him to act as governor of 
Wisconsin.
194
   
While an interesting vignette, the episode casts light on the underlying settler drive to 
gain republican self-government under the Ordinance.  In 1835, Horner wrote to Secretary of 
State John Forsyth to express relief over the settlement of the Ohio/Michigan border issue. 
Horner suggested Michigan’s concerns were part of “strenuous efforts to embarras [sic] the 
Administration . . .  and also to drive from the Territory any Executive who designed to carry out 
the only salutary and tranquilizing measures the Government could prescribe.”  His focus was on 
national priorities, applauding the “increasing popularity” of the national administration’s 
efforts.
195
  Horner wrote this letter on November 25.  Interestingly, three weeks earlier, on 
November 3, Mason had sent a letter to the Secretary of State informing him that earlier that day 
he had “taken the oath of office as Governor of the State of Michigan.”
196
  Michigan had two 
governors. 
Michigan voters had approved the state’s constitution in 1835.  Acting as a state, 
Michigan then held elections under that constitution even though Congress had not yet accepted 
it into the Union or released it from its territorial status.  Accordingly, Mason and Horner both 
were acting as governor, one popularly elected the other appointed, one claiming to govern a 
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state the other a territory.  If one construed the Ordinance as a constitutional document, then 
Michigan should automatically have become a state equal to all other states.  After all, the 
Ordinance provided that when a contemplated state “shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants 
therein” it would be admitted on “an equal footing with the original states, in all respects 
whatever.”  Those accepting the election results, and Mason’s authority, believed that the 
Ordinance required that the nation accept Michigan as a state as soon as it had fulfilled the 
requirements of the Ordinance.
197
  Having achieved that, they would argue, Michigan was like 
all other states.  Classifying this legal position as a collective political right, the elected state 
legislature offered that it had,  
acquired rights, of which no human power could divest them, and in full and 
ample authority to form and establish for themselves, a Constitution; and 
having performed that act, they became a State, from that moment; and if a 
State, then the Territorial government must necessarily cease, and the people 
assume and exercise all the rights, privileges and immunities, that belong to the 




Believing Michigan had the full powers of a state, the Michigan Legislature passed laws 
dismantling the Ordinance’s structure and erecting a locally elected government blueprint, 
according to the terms of the new constitution.
 199
  Michigan had entered uncharted space, as 
Congress had almost automatically admitted the other states of the Northwest Territories.  Not so 
with Michigan.  Because Michigan and Ohio claimed common land, Congress refused to admit 
Michigan pending resolution of that dispute. 
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In Washington, national government actions evidenced a belief that congressional power, 
and not the Ordinance’s language, determined when and if a territory were admitted into the 
union.  Accordingly, at the same time Michigan acted as a state, the national government treated 
it as a mere territory.  An irate President Jackson warned that Michigan’s elected leadership 
should exercise caution when interfering with his appointed government.  He had his Secretary 
of State write that the President would not interfere with the newly elected government “so long 
as such proceedings do not interfere with the due administration of the laws of the United States 
for the establishment and Government of that territory, and with the rightful exercise of the 
functions of the officers appointed under their authority.”  In other words, if the elected 
government refrained from governing, all would be fine.  To Jackson’s mind, territorial 
appointments ran the legitimate government “until it is terminated by Congress.”
200
  Federal law 
prevailed and any actions that undermined that law were invalid.  Not surprisingly, Michigan’s 
pro-state leadership was deaf to Jackson’s counsel.  The Territorial Council had disbanded, at 
least with respect to the territory now comprising Michigan.  In what must have been perceived 
in Washington as a bold move, the state legislature severed from its jurisdiction the territory west 
of Lake Michigan.  It also enacted laws not applicable to the severed territory – the area now 
constituting Wisconsin and part of Minnesota.
201
  All this was done ignoring governmental 
responsibilities and power under the Ordinance.
202
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Michigan had organized a government, which appointed senators, elected representatives, 
passed laws, and adjudicated disputes.  It elected a governor, lieutenant governor, and legislature, 
and set up a court system.  It had acted much like a state before becoming one and did so, 
arguably, without legal authority.
203
  The leadership of the constitutional government knew that 
others disputed their authority.  Accordingly, the state legislature and executive started slowly, 
hoping that Congress would soon admit Michigan into the Union.  As time passed, the state 
government increasingly addressed the administrative and substantive needs of governance, but 
did so in a cautious fashion.  It incorporated entities, set rules for elections, and organized towns.  
In doing so, territory and state government, at times, conflicted.  Somewhat akin to the 
challenges presented when Woodward and Hull battled over the Witherell Codes, government 
became dysfunctional.  Unlike that earlier challenge, between 1835-37 the leaders were not at 
loggerheads.  Nevertheless, Michigan’s government inhabited a mesophase; neither admitted 
state nor functioning territory.  That situation would only stabilize when Horner left for 
Wisconsin and, in January 1837, when Congress admitted Michigan into the Union.
204
  Politics 
had clarified the situations, but legal issues would remain. 
The courts would consider whether laws passed by the “state” legislature were 
enforceable in the case of Scott v Detroit Young Men’s Society’s Lessee.  In March 1836, (after 
the constitution but before admission) the state legislature (sitting under the constitution) 
incorporated the Detroit Young Men’s Society.  Several months later, the territory judges (sitting 
under the Ordinance) granted land to the Society pursuant to their responsibility to allocate land 
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after the Detroit fire of 1805.
205
  When a dispute arose over the Society’s right to lease the land, 
the courts were presented with issues concerning 1) the legitimacy of laws enacted by a 
legislature that, without Congressional approval, had supplanted the territory council, and 2) the 
legitimacy of a body acting under the Ordinance where the existence of a “state” seemingly 
would dissolve territorial governance.  The dispute raised issues of sovereignty, state creation, 
and congressional power.  Perhaps more importantly, it threatened to unravel the multiple court, 
executive, and legislative decisions Michigan entered into over a fifteen-month period, which 
would then result in a significant disruption of numerous activities and lives. 
Seemingly, the challenge could only be resolved if the courts found the state and 
territorial government could simultaneously rule, and that was the course it took.  It found that 
the territorial government retained authority over issues concerning congressional legislation 
(here, land grants under the fire-relief statute), whereas state government held jurisdiction over 
state activities (here, incorporation statutes).  After all, the court reasoned, “The change, from a 
territorial to a state government, was not, and from necessity could not be, instantaneous.”
206
 
Unsatisfied, the plaintiff then filed for a writ of error with the United States Supreme 
Court, claiming that the court held jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act.  That act provided that 
the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction over actions of states.  With a sleight-of-hand, the 
court dismissed the claim.  If Michigan was defined as a state, then the state had authority to take 
the action it did.  If it was a territory, as the court believed, then the Supreme Court had no 
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act.  In dicta, the court questioned whether a political entity 
could turn itself into a state through mere self-declaration – hence its belief that Michigan was a 
territory.  The court was off the hook in either case.  If a state – the act was appropriate; if it was 
                                                 
205
 Campbell wrote that this was the last official act of the governor and judges of the territory. Campbell, Political 
History of Michigan: 478-79. 
206
 Scott v Detroit Young Men's Society's Lessee, 143. 
90 
 
a territory – no jurisdiction.  Employing another jurisdiction-limiting tool, the court declined to 
hear the matter because the case presented problems that should “be discussed before the proper 
political tribunals.”
207
  The Court had ducked, and in doing so took the practical course of not 
invalidating about fifteen month’s worth of Michigan’s governance.  It had also avoided 
addressing the relationships of states to the national government – an issue that could raise 
unsettling nullification issues. 
Justice McLean, in dissent, was perhaps more intellectually honest but practically 
deficient.  He reasoned that, “No act of the people of a Territory, without the sanction of 
Congress, can change the territorial into a state government.”  That was exactly what Michigan 
had done.  It had operated as a state in violation of the practice of awaiting Congressional 
approval.  By exercising sovereignty outside the scope of national laws, pre-admission 
Michigan’s legislative acts were “repugnant to the constitution” and to the acts of Congress.
208
 
Certainly, to McLean, and perhaps to the others, the Ordinance was a mere statute, and its 
automatic statehood provisions were not binding on later congresses. 
The Court’s refusal to take jurisdiction and instead to leave the issue to the political 
process, in significant measure, was a recognition of the bind courts found themselves when 
governance rules and public needs clashed.  A rejection of state legislative power would have 
forced the unraveling of the multiple acts and transactions upon which society now relied.  
Further, a rejection of state legislative power would have required a declaration that Michigan 
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citizens could not act to create democratic governance without the approval of a distant 
government in which they had no voice and little power – perhaps not a legally based concern 
but, nonetheless, real.  Those residents, upset over the governance imposed under the Ordinance, 
had forced out an appointed governor, enacted a constitution, elected a legislature, and sought 
national government approval.  The people had employed law to undermine the governmental 
structure designed in the Ordinance.  The Michigan Supreme Court’s finding of dual sovereignty 
and the United States Supreme Court’s refusal accept jurisdiction amounted to tacit recognitions 
that when structure clashes with need, structure will, or at least can, yield.  Now Michigan had a 
new structure, designed to accomplish needs as perceived in 1835.  That structure too would be 




Chapter III: Infrastructure and Economic Development 1837-1850 
 
Individual effort alone is not adequate to so great purposes; it is to man in his 
social capacity – to communities of men – to governments, to whom only the 
power and the high privilege is given of effecting them, and thus of ameliorating 
the condition and augmenting the happiness of men. 
Report of the Michigan Senate Committee on State Affairs, Relative to Donations of Land by 
Congress for Works of Internal Improvements 
March 2, 1838 
From such [corrupting] influences, unsafe in a free government, dangerous to 
the purity of our institutions – destructive to civil liberty – a sale of our public 
works would set us free.  
Report of the Michigan Senate Finance Committee 
January 23, 1846 
 
The Drive for Internal Improvements 
 
Michigan was still a territory when, in 1825, New York opened the largely state-financed 
Erie Canal, which transversed 350 miles from the Hudson River to Lake Erie.  The Canal not 
only fulfilled the dream of cheap, effective transportation, it furnished a means to deliver the 
interior’s surplus crops to the population centers of the east.
209
  It also promised to aid 
immigration into the nation’s interior, as potential settlers could now travel to Michigan by water 
rather than by the relatively impassible roads of the day.  As New York built the Canal, 
Michigan Territory Governor Lewis Cass hailed, “That great artificial river, which is about to 
unite the Lakes with the Ocean . . .  has brought us almost in contact with the Atlantic border, 
and furnishes a communication with the commercial metropolis of the nation, with an economy, 
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safety and facility which have almost annihilated the intervening distance.”
210
  This early 
celebration of the Canal’s potential would open a chapter of government spending that would 
transform political and legal positions concerning government’s general-welfare responsibilities, 
individual-property rights, and majoritarian-democratic principles.  
Cass’s dream was not unique, as the Canal opened vast commercial and social 
opportunities to the areas making up the Northwest Territories.  In 1825, the United States was 
largely a seacoast-focused nation, with a developing but commercially limited interior.
211
  
Effective internal improvements (the common phrase for nineteenth century efforts to build a 
transportation network) were required for commercial and social progress, particularly as the 
nation moved from its seaboard beginnings.  Nineteenth-century British historian William 
Barrows noted that “grains, meats, hides, ores, coals, timber, and wool [had] practically been 
waiting for their opportunity in the great North American West a thousand years,” for the ability 
to effectively bring them to market.
212
  Canals, and soon rail, allowed for that opportunity by 
providing cheap and rapid transportation and by enhancing property values in an expansive 
swath of interior lands. 
Prior to those transportation improvements, the early nineteenth-century landscape was 
characterized by vast territories and, at least in the non-seaboard portion of the nation, widely 
dispersed populations.  Since roads were often little more than paths, commercial expansion 
hugged natural water routes.
213
  Efforts to trade outside those routes were lengthy and expensive.  
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Even within those routes, travel times were uncertain as currents and weather strongly affected 
voyages.  Accordingly, internal trade primarily was regional.
214
  Canals and, more significantly, 
railroads would extinguish the natural barriers to economic growth, and open the west to 
population and commercial expansion.  That expansion required government, as government 
could raise capital in ways the then-infant private markets could not.  Rather than focusing on 
limiting government involvement in industry, as Hurst noted, early Americans “had no hesitancy 
in making affirmative use of law” to advance commercial opportunities. Hurst classified this 
affirmative use of law as a means to “enlarge men’s range of choices.”
215
  By employing its tax 
and spending powers, government shaped the commercial environment and released individual 
energies to conquer scarcity.  It invested in developing infrastructure, allowing commerce to 
move from local to regional, and ultimately to national and international.  With the Canal and its 
progeny, residents of the Northwest Territories now were but a week away from the population 
bases of the east.  The transportation revolution would change those residents from self-sufficient 
pioneers into settlers fully integrated into the national economy. 
The term “internal improvements” is telling.  To the nineteenth century American, 
internal improvements were much larger than transportation developments.  Internal 
improvements promised social, economic, and political progress.  As Carter Goodrich noted, 
they were integral to “the exercise of pubic spirit.”  The drive involved significantly more than 
individual prosperity.  The promise of the improvements introduced a new responsibility for 
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action.  Goodrich continued, “To improve the country’s natural advantages by development in 
transportation was, in the eyes of Washington and many others, a duty incumbent both on 
governments and individual citizens.”
216
  Given the individualistic traditions upon which much 
of our neo-liberal philosophy relies, it may seem surprising that nineteenth-century internal 
improvements depended on government largess and direction (and, at times, control).  Yet, 
Americans turned to government to effect the political, economic, and social progress 
transportation promised.  They did so employing whatever model of government/industry 
relations would best suit that end.  Most of those efforts took place on the state and local levels. 
Because rail was not limited to connecting water routes, it soon eclipsed canals as central 
to the nation’s transportation fabric.  To put rail’s importance in perspective, before the Erie 
Canal, moving a barrel of flour from Buffalo to New York City would cost $10.  With the Canal, 
that cost had dropped to $2.  With rail, it dropped to $0.35.
217
  Rail provided an additional benefit 
not enjoyed by canals or other forms of overland transportation: it extended the selling season 
through the winter months.  Prior to rail, farmers could not ship late-harvested crops until spring, 
reducing their value and increasing storage costs.  Rail helped overcome the obstacles of space 
and time by narrowing the gap between producer and consumer, but it only did so for those 
connected to the transport network.
218
  It threatened to marginalize those not connected, and to 
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The benefits went far beyond transportation efficiencies.  As Daniel Walker Howe noted,  
 
If the railroads did not initiate the industrial revolution, they certainly speeded 
it up.  They stimulated the mining, processing, and importing of iron and steel 
(and, after the eventual switch in fuel, coal).  They created vast primary 
industries in the manufacture of rails, locomotives, and rolling stock.  They 
encouraged the workforce to continue to leave agriculture and move into other 
occupations.  They multiplied new jobs as engineers, firemen, brakemen, 
switchmen, conductors and roundhouse mechanics.   
 
The impact was not merely economic.  Howe submitted that rail changed the nation’s landscape. 
Because “public subsidies so often took the form of land grants, railroads became large-scale 
land speculators, promoting settlement along their routes and urban development at major 
railheads.”
 220
  Commerce moved from local to interstate, and mobility and communication 
exploded.  If progress was a central idea of the nineteenth century, then railroads provided the 
path to that goal. 
Along with opening a new world, the Erie Canal posed a dangerous temptation.  While 
New York had anticipated paying for its canal though increased auction fees and salt taxes, as 
well as taxes on lands along the route, the state found that revenues from the Canal completely 
serviced the debt and, as a bonus, New York was able to suspend the state property tax in the 
later 1820s.
221
  That realization gave rise to a general (but not universal) expectation that internal 
improvement projects could be self-funding.
222
  As Larson noted, “it was hard to resist the 
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conclusion throughout the rest of the country that wealth and power flowed to those who seized 
that kind of initiative.”
223
  That possibility, along with optimism associated with growing 
populations, commerce, and wealth, and a recent history of federal budget surpluses, combined 
to promise a self-funding, fiscal nirvana.
224
   
To enjoy that progress, state and local governments aggressively embarked on internal 
improvement projects and, in doing so, exploded public debt.  For example, Pennsylvania’s debt 
rose from $6.3 million in 1830 to $24.33 million in 1837 and Ohio moved $0.4 million in 1825 
to $5.5 million in 1836.
225
  In all, aggregate state debt more than tripled from $60 million in 1835 
to $183 million in 1839.  (By way of comparison, total annual federal spending averaged a bit 
less than $27 million in the 1830s.
226
)  About sixty percent of that debt was for canals and 
railroads with about thirty percent for banks.  (Northern states focused on internal improvement 
projects and Southern states focused on banks.)
227
  The debt was public, not private, because 
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government largely drove early rail and canal development.
228
  This was not odd, as before 1840 
there was “no prejudice toward state activity of this nature.”
229
 
A Call for Government Aid 
 
As in other states and territories, Michigan’s early leaders wanted to engage in 
infrastructure building.  However, the territory suffered the disadvantage of a modest population 
base and meager government revenues.  Even with the most cost effective transportation system, 
without people or commercial development, a rail project would not be self-funding.  Without 
the promise of a self-funding system, and given its low tax base, Governor Cass sought federal 
financing to achieve Michigan’s development goals (and to keep up with its more advanced 
neighbors).  Realizing that the national government had rejected requests to fund the Canal, Cass 
framed his argument in terms of national security.  British North America remained a threat and, 
“In a state of war,” a Michigan rail system would preserve “the necessary intercourse between 
Lake Erie and the country upon the Upper Lakes . . . without incurring the danger of passing 
under the guns of a hostile shore for many miles.”
230
  Cass’s pitch failed, as the federal 
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government was loath to support internal improvement projects.  Within a few weeks after 
Cass’s request, Jackson would veto the Maysville Road bill as an unconstitutional extension of 
federal power.  On policy grounds, he planned to use government surpluses to bring down the 
national debt, not to invest in infrastructure.  Moreover, concerns over slavery lurked.  As 
Virginia Congressman John Randolph warned in 1824, the government that could build 
highways could free slaves.
231
 
Notwithstanding Cass’s failed pitch, local officials and citizens petitioned Congress in 
1831 for assistance for a canal or railroad between Detroit and Chicago.  Acting as chair for the 
citizen group, Detroit Mayor Marshal Chapin framed the project as a national concern, and not 
merely a Michigan Territory issue.  The petition argued that transportation improvements would 
raise land values, “accelerating the sale of public lands,” owned by the federal government, and 
would “inure to the benefit of trade and manufactures of our Great Atlantic markets.”  
Accordingly, the group requested 1) a survey of the coasts of the Great Lakes, 2) a canal between 
each of those lakes, 3) the completion of a road between Detroit and Chicago, 4) improvements 
on the St. Joseph River, and 5) surveys for canal and rail development.
232
  This early request for 
government assistance is telling.  Michigan’s population originated with residents of states 
determining to resettle in what, in the day, was the far west wilderness.  Rather than reveling in 
their independence from government, the people of Michigan were petitioning government to 
actively support their commercial development. 
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The petitions are telling in another respect.  Self-interest underlay each of the petitions, 
but the mechanism to address those interests was communal.  No individual or gathering of 
individuals had the resources to build a road, canal, or railroad upon which they could take 
product to market.  Only collective participation would accomplish that end, and that collection 
could either take the form of a business venture or a government program or both.  Particularly in 
times of capital scarcity and underdeveloped corporate entities, government necessarily became 
involved in the answer.  Even if a corporate entity could form, the probable return on early rail 
investments was so small or so far in the future that sustained private efforts were unlikely (as 
would later be the case in Michigan’s early private rail experience).  So, even as the petitioners 
were motivated by individual interests, those interests required collective action.  Government 
was to be the chosen and necessary vehicle for individual self-creation.   
Michigan’s government was not by itself able to respond to its residents’ petitions.  
Accordingly, it too continued to press the national government for aid.  Wishing a different 
answer than his predecessor received, Territory Governor George B. Porter changed the official 
approach.  Porter proposed that federal land sales in Michigan fund the development of rail lines 
connecting the eastern seaboard with the Mississippi.  Porter was candid.  The goal was 
economic development.  A railroad would boost land values, sales, and “numerous other 
advantages that would result as well to government and individuals.”
233
   
To the federal government the issue went beyond Michigan’s needs.  It involved that 
government’s constitutional authority.  Many (including President Jackson) believed that 
Congress’s spending power, as delineated in Art. I, § 8, prohibited spending to advance local 
infrastructure projects.  Proponents of federal aid sought constitutional authority elsewhere. 
Some sought to aid local infrastructure by exercising federal power under Art. IV, §3 “to dispose 
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of . . . the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”  Congress attempted to 
exercise that power in the 1833 Distribution Bill by earmarking proceeds from the sale of public 
lands to support “internal improvement and education projects.”  Jackson vetoed the bill, arguing 
that Congressional involvement in local projects exceeded its constitutional authority.  Jackson 
believed that the constitution required vigilant protections against federal incursions into state 
prerogatives.  To Jackson, even disbursing federal funds to the states was fraught with danger, as 
state governments “would lose all their independence and dignity” at the trough of federal 
largess.
234
  Jackson’s position was consistent with his Maysville Road veto and the long-standing 
argument that the federal government could not, and should not, spend on local projects.  To 
him, the national government enjoyed limited powers and Congress could only employ federal 
resources, – be it tax revenue or federal land – for national purposes and pursuant to Art. I, §8 
limited powers.
235
   
That view of federal power limited but did not completely forestall early federal internal 
improvement efforts.  If direct involvement raised constitutional and political barriers, indirect 
efforts seemed more palatable, and Congress increasingly found ways to employ them.  In the 
early period of rail development, the federal government worked around the barriers in two 
ways.  First, it provided surveying assistance to the states and territories, to the tune of about 
$75,000 (about $1.5 million today).  That assistance demanded engineering knowledge as it 
applied to rail-required topography.  The federal government justified that aid by referring to its 
authority under the navigable waters, post office, or war powers clauses.
236
  While that amount 
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may seem trivial, rail-engineering skills were sparse and in high demand.  A snippet from the 
103 page engineering report sent to the 1838 Michigan Internal Improvement Commissioners 
gives an indication of the type of expertise surveyors provided.  The report suggested that, when 
choosing an appropriate rail route, the legislature and commission needed  
to consider an increase of the rate of inclination on a mile of road, from twenty 
to forty feet per mile, equal to reducing the rate of curvature from two 
thousand to five hundred feet radius on a level grade, and a decrease of radius 
would be equal to an addition of one mile to the whole distance; the additional 
mile on an inclination of twenty feet grade, and either the increase of grade or 
decrease of radius, or increase of distance, would be equal to an extra 
expenditure in the cost of grading of twenty thousand dollars.
237
   
 
In the 1830s, such analysis was critically valuable.  Federal expenditures may have been small 
but were significant.
238
  In providing that assistance, at least with respect to its efforts in 
Michigan, the federal government bypassed Article I §8, and supported internal improvements 
notwithstanding the concerns voiced by Jackson and those similarly inclined.  
Congress also employed its power to regulate tariffs as a means to support internal 
improvements.  Between 1830 and 1842, the federal government maintained low tariffs on 
British bar iron, the product used for iron rails.  British manufacturers produced low cost, but 
low quality, iron.  American rail developers preferred this iron because they were interested in 
initial costs and deferred concerns over maintenance.
239
  Congress implemented the low tariff in 
                                                                                                                                                             
military point of view, or necessary for the transportation of the public mail.”  The statute provided for making the 
canals “capable of sloop navigation,” presumably to employ Congress’s authority over navigable waters. 
 4 Stats.: 22, (1824).  
237
 Report of Joseph S. Dutton, Engineer of the Southern Line, Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of 
Internal Improvements, January 22, 1838.  "Documents Accompanying the Journal of the Senate,"  176. 
238
 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860, Economic History of the United States (New 
York: Rinehart, 1951). 95. 
239
 Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth-Century America, An Economic Inquiry M.I.T. Monographs in 
Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964). 21-22.  Temin relates the 1867 comments of Abram Hewitt, an 
owner of the Trenton Iron Company, that the British iron used in American railroads was “the vilest trash which 
could be dignified by the name of iron.”  Contrary to Hewitt’s wishes, the railroads used that iron, as tariffs allowed, 
because American iron, while superior, was significantly more costly.  
103 
 
an effort to support rail development (and against the protest of Pennsylvania’s iron industry).
240
 
This reduced the cost of rail by about $6 million during that period.
241
  While not a direct 
subsidy, that tax relief significantly contributed to the period’s drive for internal improvements.  
By keeping the tariffs low, Congress had employed its taxing power to accomplish ends it could 
not achieve employing its spending powers.
242
 
The limited federal involvement assisted, but did not drive Michigan’s efforts.  The 
territorial, and later state, government would now take on the work, and would do so in an 
intensive fashion.  A letter published in the Carrier, dated November 13, 1833, furnished among 
the first recorded calls for government rail ownership.  The writer advocated building a 175-mile 
line from Detroit, in eastern Michigan, to Berrien County, in the west of the territory.  He 
proposed, “there would be 10,000 farmers reached by such a road” who would each have a 
bounty of pork, wheat and other grains to transport, thereby enriching the territory.  The 
government could sell land on each side of the tracks to pay for construction.  In the end “the 
railroad would become the property of the territory and the tolls could be made very low.”
243
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Government was to support industry by building infrastructure and then operating the business at 
low cost to the consumers.  The territory’s entire population at the time was around 32,000 so the 
author seemed to expect the rail development would facilitate a sizeable population increase. In 
addition to presuming dramatic population expansion, the plan promised a self-funding 
enterprise.  Residents would pay nothing while enjoying substantial economic benefits.   
Soon, petitions for government action intensified.  While the arguments varied according 
to the interests of the listener and speaker, underlying under each petition sat a concern that rail 
not bypass Michigan.  Should that happen, Michigan would remain commercially and politically 
disadvantaged.  For example, a December 1833 petition to Congress noted the advantage of 
including Detroit in a proposed route connecting the eastern United States to Chicago and St. 
Louis.  To accomplish that, the petitioners appealed for both direct and indirect aid.  An 
“enlightened bounty of Congress in aid of important works of internal improvements,” along 
with land grants, would move the project forward.
244
  They couched much of the petition in 
terms of interstate commerce and mail delivery, but their interest went beyond mail delivery to St 
Louis.  With a rail line came communication, commerce, population, influence, and a place in 
the nation.  Without rail, progress would stop – or at least slow.  The drive for widespread 
commercial development – and the fear of being left behind – drove this demand for robust 
government involvement. 
Another request for rail assistance was more narrowly motivated.  A group of residents 
located in the western agricultural region petitioned the government to help them find “an out-let 
to our abundant harvest.”
245
  They enjoyed fertile land and abundant crops, but produced inland 
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from the lakes.  Accordingly, they lacked a means to market, and government was the answer.  
The national government could own the rail, invest in the rail, or establish a private rail 
company.  The means were secondary to the goal of facilitating transportation infrastructure.  
Similarly, in 1835, a group of petitioners argued that the federal government, as owners of nine-
tenths of the territory’s lands, would profit from the income generated by higher land values 
associated with transportation access – and subtly argued that the government owed Michigan 
residents an obligation because of the amount of federal land in the territory.  The petition 
recognized that although the route these settlers requested was longer, it would support the 
commercial and social interest of the territory as well as the military needs of the nation.
246
  In 
each of these petitions, and the several more reviewed, settlers commonly looked to government 
as the mechanism through which to develop commerce, increase land values, and incorporate 
Michigan residents into the larger nation. 
Parallel Private Efforts 
 
While ideas of self-funding and federal projects percolated, private parties attempted to 
develop rail enterprises.  By the time Congress admitted Michigan as a state on January 26, 
1837, the legislative council had chartered twenty-five railroad corporations, although only seven 
to nine actually had begun construction.
247
  Even as private, fledgling entities, these corporations 
carried significant burdens to benefit public interests.  Most of the incorporation statutes required 
exclusively local stock ownership and capped the profits the corporations could enjoy.  Excess 
profits would revert to the government.  Typically, the charters provided that government 
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retained the right to purchase these railroads at a set formula over cost.  Through such legislation, 
the government sought to employ corporations to encourage economic development while 
simultaneously attempting to minimize concerns over monopoly control of infrastructure.
 248
  
The legislative council granted the first of those special-corporation rail charters to the 
Pontiac and Detroit Railway Company in 1830.  This was also the first rail charter in the 
Northwest Territory.
249
  The owners never started construction and that charter lapsed.
250
  The 
legislature next chartered the Detroit and St. Joseph, which would run along the Huron River two 
miles west of Ann Arbor.  It granted the railroad a strip of land and gave it eminent-domain 
privileges to condemn property.
251
  The rail investors held to a grand vision.  They sought $1.5 
million in capital for a line traversing the territory.  Based upon federal surveys suggesting an 
appropriate route, they first solicited funds for the Detroit to Ann Arbor portion.  At first blush, 
their efforts were successful, with Michigan inhabitants committing to nearly all the outstanding 
shares of stock.  Unfortunately, few honored their commitments, and few dollars came in.  The 
investors then solicited subscriptions from those residing along the proposed route.  Those efforts 
proved insufficient.  Ineffective in the private sphere, the investors turned to government.  At 
first they requested federal financial assistance; a request the federal government declined.
252
  
They soon turned to the city of Detroit.  In 1836, the Detroit Common Council subscribed 
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$10,000 to the effort.  When that proved insufficient, the investors asked for and were granted 
another $40,000.   
The territory legislative council intervened to address the insufficient capital challenges 
faced by the Detroit and St. Joseph, as well as that of the other embryonic lines.  In 1835, the 
legislature amended several rail corporate charters to encourage those entities to enter banking.  
Some did so, but those efforts extended little benefit and, at times, created greater financial 
difficulties.
253
  Not reading those financial difficulties as a portent of rail’s economic instability, 
Michigan’s government would soon move to a more involved rail platform, and would do so 
believing the projects self funding.   
The Threat of Corporate Power 
 
In 1834, Michigan entertained the strong government rail-support of two governors.  
Porter, an enthusiastic advocate of agricultural development, could conceive no “subject more 
worthy” of the territory’s attention than building a railroad.  He envisioned a system initially 
financed by the sale of public lands.  Any “small expense” the government would incur would be 
reimbursed by increased land sales and “the numerous other advantages that would result as well 
to the government as to individuals.”
254
  To realize that ambition, government would build a 
railroad from Detroit to Lake Michigan.  The land, and most of the funds, would come from the 
national government. Succumbing to cholera in July 1834, Porter was unable to effect his dream.  
Jackson then appointed his Territory Secretary, 22-year old Stevens Mason, as governor of the 
Michigan Territory.
255
  Almost immediately, Mason unleashed surveyors to map the landscape 
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for rail.  Although authorized by the Secretary of War, to Mason the project’s object was the 
general prosperity of the territory.
256
  Mason called for subscriptions to defray non-subsidized 
survey expenses.  In doing so, he invited business to participate in the infant stages of rail 
development.  This view of the private sector soon would change.  Within a year, Mason would 
display his disinclination to involve private corporations in internal improvement projects.   
With his first annual address before the legislative council, Mason revealed that aversion 
to private involvement.  To Mason, corporate power threatened democratic governance.  
Michigan would be better off relying on “individual effort and capital” to accomplish its 
commercial goals.  For that reason, he “would with diffidence, but with a conviction of the 
importance of the subject,” call to the legislature’s “attention to the impolicy of granting acts of 
private incorporation.”  Mason believed that private corporate charters had “been already carried 
to such an extent, that if persevered in, it cannot fail to fill our territory with an innumerable 
multitude of irresponsible companies.”
257
  He was speaking of special corporations – entities 
created by legislative acts that typically granted monopoly rights in exchange for services and 
restrictions deemed to be in the public interest.  His concern was common in its day.  Hendrik 
Hartog explained, “many American lawyers and legislators viewed corporations with distrust 
even as they relied on them as instrumentalities of public initiatives.”  They were unavoidable, 
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Mason’s address was a warning shot for actions that soon followed.  On February 11, 
1835, Mason began to execute his emerging vision of a state-controlled infrastructure system.
259
  
The legislature had sent him a bill granting corporate status to the River Raisin Steam Boat 
Company and the St. Joseph and Chicago Steam Boat Company.  This was not unusual because, 
as mentioned, since 1830 the territory had granted corporate charters for twenty-five railroads.  
Arguably, the governor would welcome the companies, as financiers had been shying away from 
investing in Michigan because its infrastructure projects were financial losers.
260
  Nevertheless, 
Mason vetoed the measure, vigorously objecting to the exclusive privileges taken by 
corporations: 
   The creation of innumerable incorporated companies in the midst of 
society is a departure from the principles of republican government.  
Government is intended for the benefit of the many not the few, and where the 
people are the original of government, legislation should be adopted with a 
regard to their welfare.  Acts of incorporation are aristocratic in their 
tendencies.  They give exclusive privileges to a few, bestow partial benefits 





Mason continued his passionate objection by claiming corporations “if not checked, must soon 
entail upon the territory the curse of monied monopolies, which will ultimately impoverish and 
then control the wants of the great body of people.”
262
  The veto presaged his soon to be 
announced system of almost exclusively state-controlled infrastructure.  Unlike many of its sister 
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states, Michigan would shy away from involving corporations in its major internal improvement 
projects.  In espousing that position, Mason would advance a classically republican critique of 
capitalism’s corrosive influences.  
Corporations during this period were significantly different from those today.  With a few 
exceptions, in the first half of the nineteenth century state legislatures specifically incorporated 
each of those entities.  In Michigan, their creation required a two-thirds majority of the 
legislature.
263
  Special corporations enjoyed the new concept of limited liability and indefinite 
lives, unlike the other business entities of the time.  They also received legislatively granted 
monopolies, where others could not compete in their fields or along their routes, and with respect 
to railroads, often also enjoyed eminent domain powers.  Hall noted, “Antebellum legislatures 
embraced eminent domain because it was a means to protecting venturing capitalists who could 
achieve a public purpose through private profit.”
 264
  Harry Scheiber reported that government 
granted eminent-domain power to private transport companies “in every state.”
265
  While 
eminent domain grants and the other powers induced investors to risk significant capital, the 
grants themselves often were considered anti-democratic receipts of privilege that were 
aristocratic in nature.  Because of their special treatment, popular opinion held corporations in 
low regard.  Daniel Raymond, one of America’s first political economists, perhaps best reflected 
that opinion in 1823: 
The very object then of the act of incorporation is to produce inequality, either 
in rights, or in the division of property. . . .  Every money corporation, 
therefore, is prima facie, injurious to national wealth, and ought to be looked 
upon by those who have no money, with jealousy and suspicion.  They are, and 
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ought to be considered, as artificial engines of power, contrived by the rich, for 
the purpose of increasing their already too great ascendency, and calculated to 
destroy that natural equality among men, which no government ought to lend 
its power in destroying.
266
 
   
Those beliefs continued through much of the mid century.  John D. Pierce, a father of 
Michigan’s educational system concluded:   
The spirit of aggregated capital is aggressive.  It has no limit, no bounds.  
Controlling the legislation of the world, it has been resistless in its sway.  It 
never tires, it never sleeps.  Soulless, heartless, remorseless, conscienceless, it 
presses onward, regardless of the dying or the dead.  It produces nothing, but 
watches with an eagle-eye all the products of labor.  It taxes all classes.  It 
watches the wheat grower, the wool grower, the cotton grower, the laborer, the 
spinner and the washer-woman, and is never satisfied except with the lion’s 
portion.  Robbing labor of its reward, it reduces to, and leaves the man and his 





Hartz captured the era’s tenor.  “An anti-charter philosophy emerged which became one of the 
most powerful, repetitious, and exaggerated themes in the popular literature.”
268
  Nevertheless, in 
a capital-poor nation at the beginning of its market-economy experiences, those special 
corporations presented the ability to accumulate capital to advance commerce.   
To facilitate that in the rail sphere, the Michigan legislature at times granted those entities 
not only monopoly power, but extraordinary protections of corporate property.  For example, the 
1837 statute incorporating the Detroit & Shiawassee Railroad provided that anyone impairing the 
road’s property or impeding the work of the engineers was liable to the company for treble 
damages.
269
  Damages to an individual’s or unincorporated business’s property carried only 
ordinary damage remedies.  By granting treble damages to railroads, the legislature not only 
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created extra-normal disincentives to lawbreakers, it granted a windfall to railroads in the event 
of damage to their property.   
Because these corporations enjoyed special powers, the state sought public benefits from 
them, and imposed obligations to curtail their monopolistic tendencies.  It would do so by 
retaining the power to set rates, providing for limited life spans, requiring personal liability of 
corporate officers, and by providing that the government could purchase the corporation after a 
set period.  So important was this requirement that Territory Governor Porter repeatedly vetoed 
special incorporation statutes that failed to include the governmental purchase option.  In 1832 
he asked, “whether in all grants of this kind, there ought to be a proviso by which the Territory or 
county may, at any time, become entitled to” the corporation (in this case a bridge proposed to be 
built and operated over the St. Joseph River.)
270
  Those clauses were common in legislation 
creating private rail corporations,
271
 and not just in Michigan.  Hurst noted that “[w]ith little 
question or exception, in the very act of providing franchises for private capital development, 
state constitution makers and legislators developed the practice of including in their grants the 
standard reservation of legislative authority to amend or repeal what they gave.”  This 
reservation was not simply to maintain legislative prerogatives in the aftermath of Dartmouth 
College.  As Hurst continued, the reservations allowed the states to “provide a framework within 
which many may venture, rather than a favored few, and it must take care that future release of 
creative energy is not barred by the rigidity of old concessions.”
272
  Embedded in Michigan’s 
grants sat a philosophy of governance.  In order to release the residents’ commercial energies, 
government would retain the right to take over private infrastructure if that would enhance the 
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general welfare.  It was about public gain, not private, but more fundamentally, the state believed 
that it should participate in, and even dominate, its transportation industry. 
The reservation of power over corporations evidences a concern that accumulated wealth 
could undermine American governance.  Michigan Justice Charles Whipple took notice of that 
concern in Green v Graves, a case dealing with the constitutionality of banking entities created 
with less than the two-thirds majority required by the state constitution.  He reflected, “The 
community were alarmed at the vast increase of corporations.  They feared the power that such 
institutions were capable of wielding.  The belief was entertained that this power had actually 
been wielded for bad purposes.  It was argued that all corporations were, in a greater or less 
degree, monopolies, and hence the prejudices of the community were arrayed against them.”
273
  
In invalidating Michigan’s law allowing for the creation of bank corporations without the two-
thirds vote, the Court cited Justice McLean of the U.S. Supreme Court in Beaty v Knowler:  the 
“exercise of the corporate franchise is restrictive of individual rights.”
274
  Those opinions voiced 
the same concerns Mason had regarding corporations; corporations threatened individual rights 
and republican governance and were, therefore, to be employed only where necessary, and then 
with due caution.
275
   
Underlying much of this unease was a concern that private ends could overwhelm pubic 
goals.  Many feared that the baser, selfish nature of man would eventually undercut American 
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freedoms.  To Mason, only the state, as the embodiment of the people, could guard against the 
dangers of individual self-interest.  He warned, “there is yet an insidious and secret foe the 
American people should guard against.”  That foe was the self-concerned individual.  Mason 
predicted that the “imperceptible but all absorbing desire lurking in the heart of man to 
aggrandize self and promote private ends; which is too apt to forget country, and which, if 
indulged and encouraged, must prove the undoubted cause of a premature national 
degeneracy.”
276
  Given those concerns, placing economic power in the hands of the 
democratically elected government seemed the answer.  To Mason, doing so assured a 
continuation of American democratic principles, the protection of the sovereign people from 
themselves, and the development of the coveted rail system.   
The Promise of Robust Governance 
 
With a palpable fear of corporations and a trust in democratic governance, Michigan 
citizens began drafting the state’s first constitution.  The lessons gleaned from the Erie Canal’s 
success were so strong that, in framing their constitution, they “took pains to impose upon the 
legislature the duty of following the example of New York.”
 277
  Accordingly, Michigan’s first 
constitution obligated the state to facilitate internal improvements.  To accomplish this, the 
constitution provided in Article XII, §3 that:  
Internal improvements shall be encouraged by the government of this State: 
and it shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as may be, to make provision 
by law for ascertaining the proper objects of improvement, in relation to roads, 
canals and navigable waters; and it shall also be their duty to provide by law 
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for an equal, systematic, economical application of the funds which may be 
appropriated to these objects.
278
  
The language was not merely empowering; it was demanding.
279
  The constitution placed on the 
legislature the affirmative obligation to act – and time was of the essence.  The federal 
government’s continuing sales of land in the territory threatened to undermine the state’s ability 
to lay out appropriate routes.  The territory’s delegate to Congress, John Biddle, fretted that those 
sales were often for “lands lying in the direction of the proposed railroad.”  Accordingly, “the 
time has arrived, when a long cherished scheme of internal improvements may be 
commenced.”
280
   
It is worth briefly laying out the structure of Michigan’s early state government.  The 
constitution provided for a strong governor with significant appointment powers.  It called for a 
bicameral legislature.  Elections were to be held annually for representatives and biannually for 
senators.  The governor was to be elected every two years.  The constitution called for an 
energized government that supported industry, agriculture, and education by providing that the 
“legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific and 
agricultural improvements.”  It set specific educational funding sources and limited the 
legislature’s ability to divert funds from the educational mission.  It called for libraries in each 
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township and for the support of a state university.
 281
   The framers had advanced an activist 
government model, designed to facilitate societal development and welfare.  Voters 
overwhelmingly approved this constitution by a six-to-one margin.  This is not surprising.  As 
Hurst noted, governments of the time were “dominated by the virtue of overcoming scarcity,” 
and Michigan’s government planned to do so by aggressively educating its people and by 




 Historians often associate government support of rail as the consequence of scarce private 
capital.  For example, Goodrich suggested that in most of the nation, “popular desire for internal 
improvements was so strong and the inability of private business to raise sufficient funds for the 
major projects was so manifest that methods of mixed enterprise and public work” were strongly 
encouraged.
283
  At least insofar as Michigan was concerned, that correlation is incomplete.  
Michigan’s leadership visualized internal improvements as the very essence of government’s 
mission, even to the point of disdaining privately capitalized projects as at odds with democratic 
needs.  Railroads in Michigan, as in other areas of the nation, were viewed as a means to a more 
democratic and egalitarian society.  It was believed that, “There is no truer, more honest, 
unterrified democrat ‘than the railroad, for the moment steam entered, aristocracy was doomed 
and the final enfranchisement of society, from artificial distinctions, absolutely and effectively 
secured.’”
284
  This new transportation system offered Michigan residents not only routes to 
commercial markets, it promised to raze the walls of aristocracy. 
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With a history of failed private rail-enterprises and a concern over the threat successful 
corporations posed to governance, the state’s leadership proposed a state-focused rail system 
where Michigan would own its major lines and exercise significant control over its feeder lines.  
An 1838 Senate Committee on State Affairs report voiced that republican ideology.  It started by 
suggesting that it was government’s role to supplement private capital, but then quickly shifted 
to a vision of robust democratic government.  “[I]ndividual effort alone is not adequate to so 
great purposes; it is to man in his social capacity – to communities of men – to governments, to 
whom only the power and the high privilege is given of effecting them, and thus of ameliorating 
the condition and augmenting the happiness of men.”  Rail was a community need – a public 
utility over which government must exercise control.  The committee proposed that it was “the 
appropriate duty then, and the natural province of government, and it is therefore fit and proper 
that government should be armed with adequate power, so to control and, in just proportion, so 
to apply, all the wealth and latent resources of the country over which it obtains . .  those high 
purposes.”
285
  Developing the infrastructure for community advancement was a core incident of 
governance, and doing so democratized state commerce.   
Michigan was not an outlier.  Nationally, the early nineteenth century calls for 
government economic activism responded to the anti-charter philosophy of the time.  Those fears 
of corporate monopolies led to the widespread belief that, where expedient, the state should 
influence major infrastructure and banking enterprises as part of the nation’s concept of the 
community.  This notion is contrary to popularly held beliefs regarding early American 
government and industry relations.  As Hartz posited, the anti-corporate doctrine of the period 
“assumes a role which is in many respects the precise antithesis of that in which the ‘laissez-fire’ 
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interpretation has traditionally cast it.”
 286
  And that responsibility went beyond internal 
improvements.  In Michigan, Mason told the legislature that it was their responsibility to develop 
“a prudent and judicious system of legislation for the development” of agriculture and 
commerce.
287
  Anything less was an abdication of the responsibilities of democratic governance. 
 Mason called the legislature to action during the 1835-1837 period, when Michigan was 
neither fully a territory nor a state.  As part of his advocacy for admission to the Union, Mason 
requested that the federal government “extend a liberal and fostering hand” to Michigan as it had 
with all the other newly admitted states.  That assistance should include “large donations of land 
. . . for the purpose of effecting their systems of education and internal improvements.”
288
  As 
part of its submission for statehood, the Michigan legislature requested the federal government 
appropriate land for schools, state buildings, salt springs, and five-hundred thousand acres 
specifically for internal improvements.  The proposal also requested that the state retain 5% of 
the proceeds generated from the sale of federal lands, 40% of which would be earmarked for 
internal improvements.  Michigan proposed to embark on the internal improvement projects once 
Congress approved statehood.  It believed it could do so in an equal, systematic, and economical 
way. 
The fact that Michigan was not yet admitted only slowed implementation.  After 
bemoaning that thus far Michigan’s “application remains without final action of congress,” 
Mason advised the legislature that, “among the first subjects which will naturally occupy your 
attention  . . . will be that of internal improvements.”  He proposed that government’s job was 
more than facilitating private initiatives.  It was to drive that development through “liberal 
legislation” that “should embrace within its range” rail and canal development in “every section 
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of the state.”  Along with his belief that government was actively to develop infrastructure, 
Mason pressed that there was little space for privately controlled infrastructure projects. Where 
private industry developed internal improvements, he proposed private projects “should never be 
beyond at least, the partial control of the state.”
289
  He proposed, “So important is [infrastructure] 
construction to the permanent interest and prosperity of the state, that I would recommend the 
passage of a law, authorizing a subscription in behalf of the state, to a large amount of the capital 
stock vested in the companies which have these roads in progress of completion.”
290
   
 On July 12, 1836, Mason crystallized his message.  Expressing the state’s obligation to 
advance the general welfare and his fear of monopoly power, Mason vetoed a bill to incorporate 
the St. Clair and Grand River Railroad Company.  In an almost frenetic attack on private rail 
development, he argued that the state should construct and own the main railroads.   
A grant of corporate powers to private companies for the construction of 
railroads through the unsettled and unsold lands of the state, struck me as a 
doubtful policy; the wants of the public could not absolutely demand the 
measure; and the time was not distant when the state could with greater 
security to the interest of the people, take the improvements into its own 
hands.
291
   
 
Accordingly, the state should predominate the railroad business.  Private companies, with state 
stock ownership, could develop only feeder lines.  Even then, corporate charters should severely 
restrict their latitude.   
Mason explained why the state should be loath to employ the mixed corporate model that 
other governments had employed – private corporations were hostile to the people’s interests. 
Using what today would be considered startling language, Mason opined, “These profits from 
the lands of the company, must be taken from the pockets of the people, who are the actual 
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settlers of the country.  . . .  [E]xperience teaches us, that the interest of all incorporated 
companies, are generally at war with the interest of the people.”
292
  Mason’s stated concern was 
that the profits would go into private hands rather than state coffers.  He believed that citizens 
needed protection from the high fares charged by monopoly railroads.  Moreover, high freight 
costs would encumber commercial development and stifle population growth.  Mason’s position 
was rooted in a belief that democratic government could better advance and protect the people’s 
interest than private industry.  Underlying his thought was a belief in taxless finance.  
Government would develop infrastructure, offer low fares, avoid threat of accumulated wealth, 
and do so without taxation. 
The goals did not stop there.  Mason thought government ownership of rail would also 
fund government itself.  His dream of state-owned businesses financing government extended to 
the legislature.  In 1837, Michigan’s House Committee on Ways and Means recommended, “it 
would seem desirable to invest” future surplus revenue as well as the 5% proceeds Michigan 
enjoyed upon the sale of federal lands in the state, “in such a manner as to produce the greatest 
possible revenue.”  As an investor in business, the state would be able to “greatly lessen, if not 
entirely relieve, the people from the burden of direct taxation.”
293
  Government ownership of 
industry not only protected democracy, it promised the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine 
– one able to provide governance at no cost.
294
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 Mason also voiced an underlying belief that all who enjoyed the benefits of rail should 
pay for it, and only government could make that so.  He took an expansive view, positing that 
benefits were societal, not just to those employing rail services.  Rail’s benefits included 
improved property values, commercial development, and communications.  With private 
ownership, those indirect but real beneficiaries would enjoy an economic free ride while only 
those directly employing rail services, most typically farmers, would pay for that development.  
Mason thought this unjust: “I would respectfully ask then, if even a direct tax, levied for the 
construction of the road, would not be more equal and less oppressive than this tax upon the 
settlers on the line of the contemplated railroad.”
295
  That tax on settlers was the transportation 
fees farmers paid.  Public rail ownership allowed for equal enjoyment of, and equal burdens for, 
the blessings of prosperity.  Four days later, the legislature joined Mason’s crusade.  To set the 
legal framework for future internal-improvement legislation, on July 16, 1836, the Senate 
assigned the Committee on State Affairs “to inquire into the expediency of adopting such 




The House soon weighed in.  Such a system was, to the House Committee on Internal 
Improvements “the great lever which [was] opening the sealed up fountains of national wealth 
and civilization.”
297
  Through state control, Michigan could parry the efforts of competing states, 
like Ohio, to take away Michigan’s rightful commercial space.  In the event a private corporation 
operated a rail line, the state must maintain controlling influence.  Simple stock ownership was 
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not enough to maintain control because of the ability of corporations to issue additional stock.  
Accordingly, legislation required that corporate charters must contain language restricting the 
share dilution.
298
  It also required that charters oblige private rail to operate in the public 
interest.
299
  Both the executive and legislature still preferred direct state ownership, at least over 
the major rail lines, but where private lines could enhance the public interest they were welcome 
to do so, subject to continuing state control.
300
  
Up to this point, most state government action was anticipatory.  Michigan had not been 
admitted into the Union and the legislature was reluctant to commence work before the state’s 
status was clear.  As soon as that admission seemed imminent, Mason requested legislation 
creating state ownership of the major lines and state control over privately owned lines where 
they existed or might become necessary.
301
  He would not approve private lines where they 
would compete with public lines.  Most significantly, he sought to borrow five-million dollars to 
construct a state owned rail and canal system.
302
  The legislature seemed ready. The House 
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committee responsible for the bills framed future spending as an “investment” and “not an 
expenditure.”
303
   
Immediately after Congress accepted Michigan into the Union in late-January 1837, the 
legislature went to work.  The Michigan House Committee on Internal Improvements reported 
that internal improvements would attract settlers, industry, and wealth.  In rejecting the prior 
generation’s Jeffersonian ideals, the committee looked forward:  “It has ceased to be a question, 
whether the calm and peaceable occupations of a pastoral and agricultural life, are more 
conducive to human happiness than the excitement and activity of commerce and manufactures.”  
Michigan’s “future prosperity” would be “inseparably interwoven with the progress of internal 
improvements,” and it would become the link between the Mississippi and the Atlantic.
304
  The 
choice was simple and obvious.  The state could energetically build her infrastructure as “vast 
viaducts of wealth and prosperity” or stand by and watch as internal improvements “swell[ed] 
the power and abundance of her wiser neighbors.”  Moreover, all of this could be achieved using 
the income from the rail lines, without any tax contributions.  Rail would bring a 10% return and, 
with 5% bonds, would add $250,000 annually to government coffers.  Personal taxes would then 
go down.  Lest one think that government alone was caught up in this frenzy, the Detroit 
Advertiser suggested that the state raid the education fund for seed money to develop railroads 
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and canals.  The infrastructure improvements, according to the article, would net between 10% 
and 20% annually.
305
   
In one sense, the committee had diverged a bit from the governor.  It proposed employing 
private corporations to help complete the infrastructure network.  Its reasoning was practical: 
Michigan could not undertake all aspects of the project.  Speaking almost regretfully, the 
committee submitted that an “attempt by the state to grasp the entire control of all such works, 
[would] of necessity impede the progress of the whole.”
306
  Accordingly, the committee 
suggested allowing private industry to construct and operate local feeder lines to the state’s 
major lines.  This does not mean that the committee eagerly embraced private corporations.  Had 
the state the wherewithal, government ownership was preferred.  Maximizing state ownership 
not only would allow Michigan to fulfill its vision of becoming the throughway to the 
Mississippi, but it promised the panacea of low tax rates.   
The legislature answered the call by authorizing the governor to borrow $5 million for the 
purpose of constructing a state owned and led internal improvement system.  It pledged the 
state’s credit to buy the bond loans, and authorized the governor to contract on behalf of the 
state.  It provided for a sinking fund, financed by the proceeds from the state’s rail and canal 
operations and dividends from bank stocks to pay off the interest and principal on the 
indebtedness.
307
  The committee reflected that the state’s internal improvement project was “an 
investment which will afford an ample profit; and that profit, instead of swelling the wealth of 
individuals and companies, will be equally divided among the whole mass of our population, by 
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creating and maintaining public revenue, which in the process of time, will materially lesson the 
public burden.”
308
  The committee report, and the passage of the $5 million loan authorization, 
demonstrated that the legislature and Mason carried the same anti-corporate, pro-state ownership 
philosophy.  
“It might be imagined,” Carter Adams commented, “from the proceedings of her early 
legislature, that the purpose for which [Michigan] sought the privileges of a state was to build 
canals, railroads, and turnpikes, and to improve rivers and harbors.”
309
  Whigs and Democrats, 
legislators and the governor all agreed: public ownership of the rails was optimal and, where that 
did not occur, strict public controls of private rail companies were required.  As Robert Parks 
noted in his study of Michigan’s early rail experience: “the major difference between opponents 
[in the legislature] was not over the desirability of roads, but in their number [and] location.”
310
  
Legislators resolved those differences by giving something to everybody.  Mason had proposed a 
sizeable but limited rail and canal program.  By the time all sectional interests were heard, the 
internal improvement project significantly exceeded the governor’s proposal.  This project 
expansion met with nearly universal acclaim.  As the Detroit Advertiser noted in 1842, “the 
system was the embodied wish of the people.  It was their wish and met their undivided support.  
True some thought we were acting too rapidly, but still they acquiesced.  The system was not the 
offspring of party but of the whole people.”
311
  At that moment, Michigan’s constitution, its 
                                                 
308
"Report of the Committee on Internal Improvements," January 24, 1837,  "Journal of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Michigan,"  122.  
309
 Adams, Public Debts: 325. 
310
 Parks, Democracy's Railroads: 80.  
311
 Detroit Advertiser, April 30, 1842, quoted in Keith, "An Historical Sketch of Internal Improvements in Michigan, 
1836-1846," 15.  Nearly universal acclamation was not the norm in other areas of the nation.  Hartz reflected that the 
State of Pennsylvania eschewed large state involvement in rail development because of interstate rivalries over the 
placement of rail lines.  Given the high cost of rail construction, the state could not respond to each municipality’s 
claimed needs.  Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: 87-8.   
126 
 
executive, legislature, and people aspired to the same end.  The state would develop the internal 
improvement system. 
Troubled Implementation and Broken Promises 
 
At first, the project’s finances seemed promising.  The state would enjoy $382,000 of 
federal assistance, when the state received funds in 1837 as part of the distribution of $28 million 
of national surplus funds.  (Michigan’s share was so low because of its small population).
312
  
Having witnessed the Canal’s success, the Michigan Legislature believed (or at least hoped) that 
the project would be self-funding, and taxation would never be required.  Accordingly, they 
legislated that the revenues earned would service the debt.  The Internal Improvement Act called 
for three trans-peninsula rail lines.  The Southern rail line would extend from Monroe to New 
Buffalo, the Central line from Detroit to St. Joseph, and the Northern line from Port Huron 
through Grand Rapids to Lake Michigan.  The legislation also financed three sizeable canal 
projects, loans to four private railroads, six river-improvement projects, and two salt facilities.  
Knowing that it had granted monopoly rights to a number of private rail companies, the 
legislature also provided that the newly formed Board of Commissioners could buy those lines 
should the state lines “materially injure” the private lines’ rights.
313
  Michigan sought to 
undertake these expensive projects despite its small, economically undeveloped population of 
only 175,000 inhabitants and total assessed values of less than $43 million.
314
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Advancing the general welfare in this fashion assumed the state had or would develop the 
resources to implement its design.  It also assumed it could build an effective system without the 
corrosive force of sectional influences.  Those assumptions would quickly prove misguided.  
Sectional differences would soon arise and would eventually weigh heavily on public support for 
Michigan’s state-owned system.
315
  Notwithstanding that significant difficulty, finances would 
present the biggest challenge:  by the time Michigan could start selling its internal-improvement 
bonds, the Panic of 1837 had set in, European investors had balked, and Michigan’s population 
growth had slowed.  In the meantime, the legislature had set about spending the money, 
purchasing existing rail lines, and authorizing expenditures on newly planned lines.  Justice 
Campbell later would characterize the young state’s efforts as “like an heir just emancipated, 
[launching] into the most lavish display of her new freedom, and fancied opulence.”
316
  The 
constitution’s design for a robust governance would soon begin to fray. 
Almost from the beginning, sales of the bonds proved difficult.  Mason soon learned that 
the authorized 5% interest rate and the statute’s limited payment locations effectively thwarted 
efforts to sell the bonds.  In response, the legislature raised the interest rate to 6% and allowed 
payment in Europe (but set the exchange rate at $4.44 to the Pound).  As European financers 
balked at those enhanced terms and Mason caught wind of proposed side dealings, Mason 
negotiated an agreement with Edward Biddle of the Morris Canal and Banking Company.
317
  The 
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company agreed to act as agent to sell the bonds for the state and to pay $250,000 upon 
execution of the contract, $1,050,000 as Michigan required for construction, and quarterly 
$250,000 installments starting in mid 1839.  The agreement provided for a two and one-half 
percent commission, meaning that Michigan would receive less than par value – a probable 
violation of the legislation.  Initially, Michigan would turn over bonds as they were sold.  That 
soon changed.  Morris Bank and Mason would soon agree to involve the United States Bank of 
Pennsylvania.  (That bank was the successor to the non-renewed Bank of the United States.)  The 
terms largely were the same, with one exception: Michigan would turn over the remaining 
$3,700,000 worth of bonds, and received no collateral in exchange.
318
 In doing so, the state 
became dependent on both the banks’ continuing, solvency, integrity, and their ability to sell the 
bonds for cash.  
That reliance soon proved unfortunate.  As a consequence of the Panic of 1837, the 
nation and Michigan suffered from collapsing land prices, reduced tax revenues, multiple bank 
failures, agricultural price declines, and currency collapses.
319
  “Bank notes became so valueless 
that in grim humor some investors who but a little while before were supposedly rich used them 
for wall paper.”
320
  In 1839, Alexander Trotter, of the London Stock Exchange, warned investors 
that state internal improvement projects would not be able “to produce a revenue sufficient to 
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keep them in repair and to pay the interest on the cost of their construction.”
321
  Despite Trotter’s 
warnings, some British banks continued to lend, in part based upon America’s history of 
repaying its national debt and in part based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between 
federal and state governments.  A Baring Brothers’ circular issued during the depressed 1839 
actually encouraged loans for American internal improvement projects.  Believing that the states 
would “faithfully meet their engagements with their creditors,” Baring expressed “confidence 
[that] the resources and the national honor of the United States remain undiminished in this 
country, as well as the conviction that by such investments England employs her annual surplus 
of capital both safely and profitably, encourages her best customers, and binds more closely the 
ties of mutual interest between the two countries.”
322
  Several British banks were excited to lend 
capital to American states.  The investments tendered high returns along with, many believed, 
little risk. 
As British banks saw security in loans for state internal improvement projects, 
Michigan’s financial condition (and that of other states) continued to deteriorate.  So serious was 
the crisis that Mason began to slide on his commitment to a self-financing system.  While, in 
1838, he had commented, “It will never answer to think of relying upon direct taxation for means 
to meet these obligations,” by the end of 1839, Mason grumbled, “It will require the most 
prudent and careful legislation, to prevent an ultimate appeal to direct taxation.”
323
  The 
challenge would transcend an ability to sell bonds or a shortfall on projected rail revenues.  The 
banks would soon suffer financial distress and default on their obligations to pay the state.  In 
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response, Mason suggested that the legislature look for new sources of revenue, request aid from 
the federal government, and consider modifying the breadth of railroad programs.   
The election season of 1839 introduced caustic criticism of Michigan’s rail efforts.  The 
state’s Whig convention denounced the Democratic administration’s rail efforts, declaring that 
“the history of our state government, brief as it is, has been one of official stupidity, fraud, and 
corruption.”
324
  With politics in the air, the legislature looked for scapegoats.  In 1839, the House 
formed a committee to investigate corruption in rail construction and payments.  In what the 
committee classified as a “somewhat exciting investigation,” it uncovered numerous allegations 
of fraud and misdeeds.  After finding that an early leader of the Central rail line squandered “two 
to three thousand dollars!!,” in a “profuse and profligate system of expenditure of the public 
funds”, the committee outed a real culprit, John Beech, a disbursing agent for the Central line.  
The committee accused the Central’s leadership of hiring a man “advertised as a public defaulter, 
or fugitive from justice from the state of New York,” who, in his three months on the job, used 
his skills to embezzle $8,405.14 (about $160,000 today).
325
  The committee also accused both 
acting commissioner Colonial James B. Hunt (the man who hired Beech) and General L. S. 
Humphries of “a desire to subserve his own interests” and “intending to deceive the board of 
internal improvements.”  The committee’s tone suggested that political posturing tinted its report 
with an unfairly dark hue.  Most claims of impropriety, when investigated, seemed unfounded.  
Nevertheless, when combined with the state’s financial difficulties, the committee’s allegations 
undermined public confidence in government control of rail.
326
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It is worth stepping back a moment to reflect on why the leadership had been blind to the 
challenges associated with the massive internal improvement project.  To inhabitants of 1830 and 
1840s Michigan, rail progress opened new and exciting worlds.  The completion of lines thrilled 
residents of newly served areas and opened possibilities heretofore only imagined.  The opening 
of Detroit (and the lakes) to Ann Arbor is one such example.  With construction of the line 
between Detroit and Ann Arbor significantly behind schedule in early 1839, tensions frayed and 
recriminations flared.
327
  Those feelings quickly evaporated when, in October, Ann Arbor 
received rail service.  There was a “party feeling” associated with the completion of the line to 
Ann Arbor.  “All was gaiety and delight.”  Pageantry abounded and toasts to the state’s and 
communities’ success were the rule of the day.  Cheering residents toasted to “The State of 
Michigan – Internal improvements necessary to the development of her abundant natural 
resources,” and to “Railroads and Canals – The business of months is now done in a day; if they 
do not lengthen our years, they enable us to live in the same time.”  Taken by the celebration, 
one toast boosted, “Railroads and Steam Power – A Yankee’s notion of the Utile cum Dulce,” 
(the practical with the sweet).
328
  On the day before the rail line opened, it took farmers thirty-six 
hours to move their crops the thirty-eight miles to the Detroit market.  With the opening, it now 
took two and one-half hours.
329
  These were exciting times of economic and social advance. 
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But not all were excited.  Earlier that year, a farmer had set fire to a rail bridge, 
seemingly to protest the state’s failure to compensate him for livestock lost to oncoming 
locomotives.  The destroyed bridge had delayed the connection between Detroit and Ann Arbor 
and an incensed lieutenant governor extended a $1,000 reward for the arrest of the culprit.  Judge 
Cyrus Howard, having learned the name of the culprit, perhaps at a trial of an accessory, helped 
facilitate the arrest of Nelson Cochrane.  The judge then sought the reward, only to be frustrated 
by the Senate Committee of the Judiciary.  The committee, fearing the “charge of corruption” 
determined that “the dignity of the bench” would suffer if the state paid bounties rewarding “a 
judge of the conviction of a person who may be tried before him.”
330
  The story offers more than 
a peek into earlier judicial temperaments.  It suggests a bubbling discontent associated with the 
introduction of industrialized risks into a pre-industrial world.  There were few barriers between 
livestock’s historic grazing lands and the rail lines.  As a result, livestock perished and farmers 
financially suffered.  The state would pay for lost livestock (and endure claims that perhaps 
exceeded real losses) but, as rail increasingly became privately held, those private entities would 
be more reticent to pay for livestock losses.  In response, violence would erupt between rail lines 
and farming communities.  As those issues flared, society, government, and law would struggle 
to reconcile long-standing farming traditions with the dangers of industrialization.  That struggle 
is discussed later in this work. 
 Ann Arbor’s celebration of rail access was also a celebration of government:  
Government had brought the rail, and all its benefits.  Across the nation, state governments acted 
to advance rail development.  To varying degrees, every state chartered rail entities with 
monopoly and other powers.  Contrary to the laissez-faire myth, each of those states facilitated 
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and participated in the accumulation of capital to advance general-welfare interests.  In addition, 
they became significant investors in those entities.  These were not de minimis efforts.  “In the 
years 1836-38 alone, states accrued more debts than they had over the previous fifty years.” 




Government contributions to internal improvements took various forms, with most 
adopting models different from Michigan’s pure ownership.  In most cases, government assisted 
private corporations by granting eminent domain powers so that routes effectively could be laid, 
by offering land grants, tax exemptions, and banking privileges and, in many cases, by investing 
in those corporations.
332
  The rail corporations would then give stock in exchange for those 
government cash investments.  The government as an investor presented interesting legal 
questions, as sovereign states have rights and responsibilities different from those of private 
corporations.  To reconcile those challenges, investor-states would not be clothed as sovereign 
entities even though they might hold a majority interest in a corporation.
333
  At least under 
Michigan law, when the state outright owned and operated its railroads, those roads were akin to 
auxiliaries of government, functioning as government itself; but if the state was a mere investor, 
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  More importantly than the legal rules, public expectations 
differed between state-owned and state-invested lines.  Outright ownership lengthened the touch 
points for resident critique, and opened the legislature and executive to intensified pressures that 
would have been more muted under the government-as-investor model.  Dissatisfaction over 
routes, construction timetables, and resource allocations would translate into a distaste for 
government itself.  As importantly, an owner-state did not enjoy the same ability to walk away 
from a failed investment as it would with a more limited private investment.  That state 
ownership carried a deeper, long-term commitment.   
By mid-1839, Michigan was constructing a financially burdensome, government-owned 
rail system.  Almost immediately, costs outstripped revenues, construction proved more 
expensive than expected and, as explained below, receipts on the bonds woefully missed 
expectations.  Recriminations were rampant, as politicians sought to distance themselves from 
prior positions.  In response to Whig arguments that Michigan’s internal improvement challenges 
were the “evil effect of bad legislation,” the Democratic Free Press reminded its readers that all 
had agreed to the system.  The sole issue had been the details of the system, not its wisdom or 
scope.
335
  The newspaper’s point was well taken: during the debates over the legislation, Whigs 
had expressed concern over the placement of the rail lines, not the prudence of the projects.
336
  
Rather than debating the enterprise itself, legislative logrolling presented the challenge.
337
 
Legislators advanced projects to support purely local interests, and compromises tended to offer 
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something to all, including offering loans to private rail lines.
338
  The legislation had passed with 
only one dissenting vote. 
The poisonous political atmosphere led to Mason’s decision not to again run for office.  
In his last address as governor, Mason reflected, “after months of warfare, between conflicting 
local interests, a conference between the two houses of the legislature, result[ed] in the 
unanimous adoption of the present system of internal improvements.”  Rather than assigning 
responsibility to one party, he blamed “that false spirit of the age” where Michigan had 
“overtasked her energies and resources.”
339
  The Senate Committee on Finance disagreed: It was 
Mason’s fault.  The committee insinuated that “matters, dark and mysterious” characterized 
Mason’s handling of the railroad loans and that private interests swayed his dealings.  It then 
proposed a stinging resolution: “That we do hereby solemnly protest against the powers 
assumed, and the acts committed by our agent and declare them to have been, not merely 
unauthorized by law, and in violation of constitutional and legal provisions, but also of the 
obligations imposed by honor, and moral honesty.”
340
  Mason did not testify before the 
committee.  The new Whig legislature had refused even to receive Mason’s final message before 
he left office.  Mason shortly would leave the state.  He died three years later at the age of 31 
years.   
An Eroding Constitutional Mandate 
 
Soon the state was unable to meet its obligations to its contractors, and stopped work on 
all but the Southern and Central lines, two canals, and one river project.  Even then, those non-
rail projects would halt with the exhaustion of previously allocated funds.  Next, the battle turned 
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to apportioning resources between the Central and Southern.  The projects were woefully 
underfunded and the economics demanded that only one line proceed at a time.  However, the 
constitution demanded an “equal” application of state funds, resulting in a clash between 
constitutional mandates and economic realities.  As the Committee on Internal Improvements 
noted in 1843, despite the “mandate of the constitution” and “the purest motives of patriotism 
and an ardent desire early to provide for every portion of the state . . . time and experience has 
conclusively proved to us that their anticipations were too sanguine, and the resources . . . too 
inadequate” to achieve government’s aspirations.
341
  Just a few years before, the governor, the 
legislature, and the constitution promised railroads in every section of the state.  Now, the 
government recognized that it did not have the resources to honor those commitments.   
The state’s second governor, the Whig William Woodbridge entered office in 1840 
facing enormous budgetary challenges.  Before assuming office, Woodbridge approached 
advisors for their thoughts on the railroads.  Woodbridge was considering shutting down or 
stopping expansion of some or all of the lines.  H. B. Lathrop, an official of the Central Railroad 
agreed with Woodbridge, and proposed the best vehicle to financial stability required a focus on 
the his rail line.  He asked if it was prudent to abandon or suspend the most lucrative of the state 
lines.  “Shall over $1,000,000 be lost to the state when a further expenditure of $250,000 will put 
the works in such a state that they will pay interest on the whole sum in addition to the great 
convenience it would be not only to this county but to the two counties west of us?”
342
  To 
Woodbridge’s request for advice from the state’s auditor general, E. P. Hastings responded that 
the state should focus on one line.  He then addressed the mothballed remainder.  “To the 
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question what shall be done with the works which it is proposed to abandon?  I would suggest for 
the present a recommendation only to suspend their present construction.”  Selling the other lines 
was ill advised.  “The reasons for this must be apparent to everyone. . . .  It might save the State 
from a present cost to sell the works to companies to be incorporated – but should the other 
works be completed, they would come into competition with the State works and materially 
effect the income of the State.”
343
   
Woodbridge’s search for advice had uncovered two issues but, interestingly, neither 
advisor had challenged the state-ownership model.  Both advisors suggested focusing the state’s 
efforts on particular lines.  In that sense, practical economic considerations had overwhelmed the 
constitutional mandate of even construction to benefit all.  Hasting’s advice suggested an 
additional concern – a shifting threat associated with corporations.  In advocating a state-owned 
system, Mason and the legislature had voiced concerns that corporations would exercise their 
monopoly power to overcharge customers.  To Hastings, that was no longer the problem.  
Instead, it was that those corporations would compete with the state’s monopoly and thereby 
diminish the government’s assets.  Hasting’s approach was that the government must be 
protected from competition: a significant departure from some of the anti-monopoly reasoning of 
a few years earlier. 
  In 1840, rail problems provoked a governmental financial crisis.  Rail expenses continued 
to exceed the underwriters’ bond payments, work slowed, and needed repairs were absent.  In his 
first message to the legislature, Woodbridge observed, “This scheme, so bold in its conception, 
so splendid in its design, so captivating to a fervid imagination, but yet so disproportioned to our 
present local wants, and so utterly beyond our present means, must, I fear, as a whole at least, be 
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given up.”  One challenge was that the national government owned four-fifths of the land the rail 
line covered.  As idle lands, they presented no freight possibilities; as national lands they 
furnished no tax income.  Woodbridge proposed that the state limit its efforts to nearly finished 
projects whose costs of completion would be repaid through tolls.  With respect to canals (and 
perhaps with a nod toward rail) he proposed that private industry might better complete the 
projects, “as the avidity of private gain leads to a more scrupulous and sharp sighted economy 
than is found ordinarily to flow from the colder dictates of public duty.”
344
   
The legislature responded with politics rather than solutions.  It attacked the efforts of the 
former administration, and was unwilling to follow Woodbridge’s advice on privatizing canals.  
It prohibited new work contracts including repair efforts needed for existing operations, while 
allowing existing operations to continue notwithstanding the need to focus resources.
345
  The 
legislature expressed concerns that the rail projects suffered from inefficiencies and, perhaps, 
corruption.  In response to those concerns, it now required monthly contractor reports, fines for 
delayed work, procedural impediments to fraud, and surety bonds to protect against 
impropriety.
346
  In that sense, the legislature addressed waste but not the core challenge of a 
vision that exceeded practical economics.  Meanwhile, state residents continued to press for state 
internal improvement efforts affecting their municipalities, and government officials faced a 
choice between realistic spending and constituent satisfaction.
347
  It was at about this time that 
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the Morris Canal and Bank Company again defaulted on its quarterly principle and interest 
payments. 
The state’s options were becoming increasingly limited.  Taxation of the state’s few 
residents seemed untenable.  Woodbridge bemoaned that the rail efforts resulted “in the 
exhaustion – alas, of our means; – in the prostration failure of our hopes; – in the humiliating 
failure of this undertaking!”
 348
  Without the ability to spread the tax burden to the state’s largest 
landholder – the federal government – the rail program’s dream of lowering taxes and raising 
land values evaporated.  It was replaced by a reality of looming default, state bankruptcy, or 
heavy taxation. 
 A year after he had taken office, Woodbridge formally declared the railroad projects to be 
a failure.  
   And in truth, the plan originally devised, was altogether disproportionate to 
our means; it was gigantic and visionary.  I suppose it to be part of wisdom, in 
private life to do one thing first.  It cannot be otherwise with states.  It can 
never be either expedient or wise, to undertake more than can be fitly and 
within a reasonable time, accomplished.  But with us in Michigan, we have 




Woodbridge continued by suggesting that, had the project been undertaken in a systematic way, 
it would have been successful.  He proposed to become more systematized by focusing on the 
Central route as the most likely to bring the return necessary to continue state internal-
improvement efforts.  Meanwhile, the legislature continued to struggle with the political 
challenges associated with limiting rail development to profitable ends.  The Whigs and 
Democrats, the state’s residents, and newspapers agreed that the vast internal improvement 
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efforts were unsustainable.  The problem was that they each advocated a plan that would work to 
their favored benefit.  Lost in the discussion was Article XII, §3’s constitutional requirement that 
the projects be “equal [and] systematic.”  Financial realities had drowned out constitutional 
requirements. 
  In 1841, local interest clashed, almost violently, with state efforts to allocate resources to 
their best statewide advantage.  The flare-up occurred in response to an internal improvement 
commissioner’s determination to divert rail iron from the Southern line to the Central.  There 
should not have been a problem moving the iron from Monroe, Michigan to the Central as that 
iron was surplus and was rusting away.  The commission believed that the use of the iron would 
increase the Central’s revenue by 20%, a much-needed infusion of cash, and would do nothing 
for the Southern.
350
  Indeed, under the legislature’s restrictions on new contracts, there was no 
planned (legal) use for the Monroe-located iron, except for its use to complete the Central line’s 
contracts.   
 John Van Fossen, a newly appointed internal improvement commissioner, gave the 
instructions for a removal crew to travel to Monroe to remove the iron (this was after several 
unanswered request to the Monroe authorities).  That decision excited residents’ fears that the 
state would abandon their favored Southern line in favor of the Central.  Monroe Mayor Dan 
Miller signed the handbills posted around the city warning of “evil disposed persons and 
depredators on public property, actuated by the devil and [the commissioner] are prowling about 
the streets preparing to steal the iron rail and spikes.”
351
  With the courthouse bell ringing its 
warning, the removal crew arrived in Monroe.  There they faced a crowd ready to defeat their 
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intentions.  Outnumbered, the removal crew backed away and contacted the rail authorities, who 
called up the militia.   
 Having won the first round, Monroe’s residents planned their next steps, as troops 
gathered so that they might enter the city the next morning.  Determined to forestall those efforts, 
residents gathered in the dark of night and loaded the iron onto freight cars for removal.  After 
attempting to pull the car with horses and men, residents convinced a rail engineer to hook up a 
locomotive to move the heavily loaded car outside of town.  After going about 4 miles, the 
residents dumped the iron into a nearby ditch and covered it with wood.  The next morning, the 
removal crew and the militia searched in vain for the iron.  They left town, their plans defeated. 
The city then employed its political power to discharge Commissioner Van Fossen, and to hire a 
commissioner more sympathetic to the Southern line.
352
  
It might be worth here considering the challenges associated with state ownership of rail 
that would not be faced in private or mixed-ownership models of corporate governance.  
Corruption charges were rampant and each decision to invest in one location met with 
disapprobation in the other areas of the state.  The results combined an unhappy citizenry with a 
government seeking to invest according to popular will rather than economic need.
353
  Almost 
immediately after approving a state rail project, the legislature had become involved in setting 
rates.  In 1838, it reviewed how rates should differ between movements of tools for agricultural 
uses, versus rates for iron, slat, and roofing materials, versus stone and wood, versus liquor and 
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  In other words, public officials ill versed in the economics of profitable 
enterprise were making decisions based upon political and social needs.     
Bleak state finances, the poor return on the bonds and slow, unprofitable rail 
development mixed to require hard decisions on future rail work.  In a private corporate model, 
whether mixed or purely private, management would make asset allocation decisions according 
to expected returns on those investments.  Public ownership, on the other hand, invited political 
involvement down to the smallest detail.  A portion of the 1843 law regarding state rail 
expenditures demonstrates a difficulty of public ownership.   
 The board of commissioners of internal improvements are hereby 
authorized to purchase for the use of the state, a sufficient quantity of railroad 
iron and spike, to iron the central railroad to the village of Marshall, and the 
southern railroad to the village of Hillsdale; and the said board of 
commissioners are hereby authorized to pledge for the payment of said iron 




If circumstances changed, the rail management would require further enactments to address the 
changing reality from a legislature that may not be sitting when time-sensitive decisions were 
required.  More importantly, each decision the legislature made carried the flavor of local 
political interests.  
One solution mentioned, but not yet widely supported, was to privatize the lines. To the 
contrary, leadership still believed state ownership preferable.  Even as the financial picture 
dimmed, the state advertised that rail “Built by the State of Michigan” was safer than the 
alternatives.  The government took “great care . . . in keeping this Road in good repair, thereby 
avoiding accidents similar to those occurring upon other roads almost daily, jeopardizing ‘life 
and limb.’”  One might consider this the hyperbole of marketing were it undertaken by one 
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private company over another.  But this is the state elevating its safety record over private 
industry largely owned by Michigan citizens.  It was not the message of a government seeking to 
exit in favor of that private industry.
356
  With this notion of the state protecting the public 
interest, it is not surprising that Woodbridge’s solution to the debt crisis did not include the 
possible sale of the projects to private or mixed corporations.  He was not alone.  Even facing 
financial disasters, the members of the legislature believed support of industry was a government 
obligation.  In suggesting bounties for the sheep and wool industry, the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture stated, “The encouragement of home industry by the fostering care of government, is 
a duty of the first magnitude; and more especially does it appear to your committee, that such 




With the rail project a recognized financial failure, and the state unable to pay for 
contracted work, in January 1841 Senator Benjamin Witherell proposed legislation “to inquire 
whether it is not for the interest of the state  . . . to lease, under proper restrictions, the railroads 
of the state.”
358
  It was not surprising that the Senate rejected his request, given the faith still held 
in the efficacy of government commercial enterprises.  Senators viewed state government both as 
a facilitator of the people’s interest and as the people’s protector.  Suspicion of corporations still 
haunted the citizenry.  In 1842, the Michigan Supreme Court voiced that common sentiment.  “A 
corporation is an artificial being, created by law with limited powers, and for specified purposes; 
and there is a tacit condition annexed to its charter, that it shall exercise its franchises in the 
manner and for the purposes, and in no other manner; and every abuse of its powers is a violation 
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of the law of its being, and a forfeiture of its franchises.”
359
  Two years later, the court would 
offer, “The demand of us, and of all concerned in the administration of the law, the greatest 
vigilance in detecting, and punishing in the most exemplary manner, those who can and do wield 
so much power, when that power is so exerted as to be productive of evil instead of good.”
360
  
American governance required a relative equality of voice, and concentrated wealth threatened to 
undermine that governing principle.  Accordingly, Michigan simply could not trust private 
corporations with so urgent a program as its rail-transportation network, nor could it allow 
private hands to wield excessive influence over political, social, or economic issues.  But, as 
government efforts failed, the anti-corporate position began to lose its grip.  As Larson noted, the 
failure of public rail programs in the aftermath of the 1837 Panic, along with the ability of 
private lines to take advantage of opportunities, set the stage “for a marked shift in the popular 
conception of railroads, from public works (internal improvements) to private business 
ventures.”
361
  Soon that position would more effectively enter the Michigan discussion. 
The notion of privatizing Michigan’s rail had not yet ripened, leaving Woodbridge to 
weigh his two options – raising taxes or declaring bankruptcy.  “The sad alternatives then have 
presented themselves, of a course of heavy taxation to pay the semi-annual interest upon the 
public loan, on the one hand, or a decayed credit, a forfeited faith and a blackened reputation on 
the other.”  Holding to the notion of state ownership, Woodbridge relied on hope.  He again 
proposed completing the line most able to pay the interest, and suspending work on the other.  
Recognizing that focusing on one line violated the commitment made to benefit all citizens 
equally and, perhaps more importantly, threatened local interests, Woodbridge called upon the 
“intelligence and sound judgment and patriotism” of the citizens to accept the need for such 
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  He thereupon proposed a tax increase to pay for the one line and he called on the 
federal government for assistance.  The Whig Woodbridge asked Democratic Secretary of the 
Treasury Levi Woodbury for financial assistance.  He premised his request on the increased 
value the transportation system brought to the national government’s large land holdings in 
Michigan.
363
  The record discloses no response.  
As the federal government remained silent, the state legislature began to respond.  It 
converted the Northern line into a wagon road (the Northern had never been pursued with vigor).  
Work would continue only on the Southern and Central lines.  While that lacked the depth of 
action the governor suggested, the legislature did defeat numerous efforts to support local pet 
projects. To restrict the state’s liability, however, the legislature directed the Commissioners of 
Internal Improvement to make all contracts subject to payment by the Morris Canal Bank.  If the 
supplier did not accept those terms, “the commissioners [were] hereby directed to make no 
contracts.”
364
 Public reaction to the contraction of the undertaking was mixed, with residents in 
underserved areas loudly objecting to potential tax liabilities for projects that now would bypass 
them.
365
   
 The numbers surrounding the state’s predicament speak loudly of the impending financial 
crisis.  The 1841 Report of the Board of Internal Improvements showed that Michigan had 
expended $669,000 on the Southern line and, in that year, had earned only $2,300.  The annual 
debt for the line, at 6% was $40,150.  As for the Central line, the board expressed confidence that 
it would soon bring more passengers and profit.  Although the Central appeared to be the only 
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internal improvement project likely to show a suitable future return, that confidence may have 
been optimistic.  The state had spent $1,065,000 on the Central and earnings in 1841 were 
$25,660.  Interest alone would equal $63,800.  The following year, the board again expressed 
confidence in the Central, calling it, “the only work from which the state can reasonably expect 
to derive a large revenue immediately.”  By that time, it had spent $1,175,000, with an income of 
$72,100, an amount that would just cover interest, with no reserve for repairs, expansion, 
improvements, capital purchases, or servicing the principle that the state would owe.
366
  In 1843, 
the Committee on Internal Improvements recommended extension of the Central, with the 
expectation that when completed, it would bring a 7% return.
367
  Given the 6% notes, at first 
blush a 7% return seems advantageous.  However, the Central was an element of an entire 
project and carried a return barely enough to pay interest on its capital.  The total internal 
improvement principle amounted to $5,200,000, with an annual interest charge of $312,000.
368
  
With its profits from the Southern and Central consumed by the expenses and interest charges of 
the entire internal improvement debt, Michigan could not service its interest obligations.
369
 And, 
of course, improvements and repair costs threatened to increase as the rails, locomotives, and 
cars aged and technology improved.  Looming in the background was Michigan’s distant but 
Substantial obligation to repay the principle. 
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With his election to the United States Senate, Woodbridge entrusted this financial 
predicament to his lieutenant governor, James Wright Gordon.  Gordon served from February 
1841 until January 1842.  On April 10, 1841, Gordon reported that the United States Bank had 
failed to pay its April installment.  He warned of “disastrous effects” to the state and its citizens 
should a cure not be found.  In July 1841, the state delayed making some interest payments, as it 
had run out of cash.  The legislature issued state treasury notes (script) in an amount not 
exceeding the amounts due on the banks’ next four installment payments.  (In an interesting 
twist, the Board of Internal Improvements later sought to deny passengers and shippers use of 
that script to pay for rail services.  The Michigan Attorney General forced the board to accept it, 
as the legislation provided that paper was good for all state debts.)   
On October 1, 1841, the second shoe dropped as the United States Bank completely 
defaulted, owing Michigan $1,087,500.  It made no further payments.
370
  With both underwriting 
banks in default, Michigan had received only $2.6 million of the $5 million it now owed.
 371
  (As 
noted below, the banks had pledged the notes as collateral for their credit.) Moreover, in 1842, a 
new $25/ton tariff on railroad iron increased the cost of construction.  Congress had increased the 
tariff in response to protectionist complaints associated with depressed sales of domestic railroad 
iron.  The Board of Internal Improvements classified the new tariff as “a serious obstacle” to 
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making the lines financially viable.
372
  The drumbeat for change grew louder, as members of the 
legislature began to question the soundness of government ownership of industry.   
When considering a proposal by State Senator Benjamin Witherell to lease the Central to 
private industry, a senate committee recognized that “It is a well established fact, that cannot be 
controverted, that a state government can never compete, (either with honor or profit,) with 
individual enterprise.”  The committee claimed that, 
The state must employ more, many more agents, with higher salaries, with 
more restricted powers, governed as it were by the square and rule, compelled 
to follow in the precise line of duty and action marked out by the law, never 
permitted to swerve therefrom, whatever may be the result, and, consequently, 
totally unable to conform to ever varying circumstances.  
 
It then reflected on the beauty of self-interest that drives industry to curtail expenses; a drive 
missing in the public sphere.
373
  Accordingly, that committee recommended leasing the road to 
private enterprise, subject to state oversight and controls. Not all agreed, including the influential 
Senate Committee on Internal Improvements.  After recognizing that “a slight glance at the 
downward progress, and present condition of our affairs, will satisfy the most superficial 
observer, that we live in evil times,” the committee recommended the state continue its course 
and press forward with the Central and Southern lines.
374
  With leasing and privatization not yet 
palatable or politically acceptable, the legislature adopted the Internal Improvement Committee’s 
recommendation.  The state would continue to own the main lines and control the feeder lines.  
After all the efforts and all the special incorporations, only five railroads operated in Michigan 
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and construction had stopped on all but the Central and Southern.
375
  As the clouds darkened 
over the state’s internal improvement project, bondholders looked to Michigan for full payment.   
 With this as their legacy, the Whigs lost the gubernatorial election to Democrat John 
Barry.
376
  Barry proposed that the nearly finished projects be completed if funds could be found.  
The state should abandon the rest.
377
  Barry’s motivation was primarily financial and not 
premised on a notion that government should avoid financing commercial development.
378
 He 
believed that government could only assist industry in minor ways, as major financial support 
required government beyond appropriate levels.  He bemoaned the state’s inability to subsidize 
smaller projects.  For example, the governor lamented “that our present financial difficulties” 
impeded the state’s ability to significantly financially support agriculture.  Even with limited 
resources, the state should enact “some appropriate legislation . . . to put into the reach of the 
husbandman the improvements and discoveries made in his art by the researches of science.”
379
  
The legislature followed his lead by authorizing counties to require minor taxes in support of 
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  Government was the answer, but sadly lacked the resources fully 
to fulfill its mission. 
Pushing Legal Boundaries: Partial Repudiation  
 
Not opting for privatization, Barry put forward the pragmatic – a partial repudiation of 
the debt.  The notes were in excess of $5 million but the state had received only about $2.6 
million.  Barry wished to protect the residents’ “rights and interests . . . against impositions and 
unjust extractions.”  Accordingly, he proposed that the state pay the “just claims” against it, 
which he defined as those claims for which the state had received funds.  If the banks had not 
forwarded funds on a particular bond, the state would not pay.
381
  The House soon followed, with 
legislators arguing that the limited repudiation honored the state’s legal and moral contract 
obligations.  Still, they were reticent to enact mechanisms to fund payments, as that might 
require taxation. The legislators merely resolved that all “just demands” would be paid at “as 
early a date as possible.”
382
  On February 17, 1842, the senate followed, again with no 
mechanism for funding enacted.   
The state had succumbed to what it perceived as the lesser of two evils: it chose partial 
repudiation over heavy taxation.  In paying only according to the amount received from those 
first holding the instruments, the legislature disregarded whether a holder was bona fide without 
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  The only just demands were those upon which the state had been paid.  Most of the 
repudiated bona fide holders were British and had purchased the bonds as part of the lending 
programs promoted by banks like the Baring Brothers. The proceeds of those bonds were lost 
when the underwriting banks failed. 
Publications in New York and London promptly denounced Michigan’s actions, with the 
New York American protesting that “to borrow money and then refuse to acknowledge the debt is 
sheer robbery; and for that the laws of the State and the United States will furnish redress.”  The 
state was denying liability rather than insolvency, and that was immoral.
384
  Whatever the 
morality underlying the state’s action, the New York American incorrectly promised a legal 
remedy.  As would soon become clear, injured bondholders held legal rights without legal 
remedies. 
  Unlike several other states, and despite constituent pressures, Michigan did not simply 
repudiate the loans.  Instead, its leadership based their decision on arguable, albeit weak, legal 
grounds.  The Morris Bank, as its agent, probably had breached its fiduciary obligations to the 
state.  It and the United States Bank had improperly pledged the bonds as collateral in violation 
of their understanding with the state, and the bond agreements provided the payment would be 
from the revenues generated by the internal improvements.  None of those arguments likely 
would hold legal water against bona fide holders without notice, but they were colorable 
arguments.  With the belief the state had been swindled (and perhaps because of political 
pressures), on April 27, 1842 Barry declared that the state would issue $2,342,960 of new bonds 
to replace the non-repudiated notes and would cancel $2,857,040 worth of bonds for which the 
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state had received no consideration.  He also offered ownership of the railroads to bondholders in 
payment of their debt.
385
   
The issue was not one of debt evasion, as the alternative of heavy taxation probably was 
unworkable.  An 1843 Congressional report on state debts classified Michigan as one of the 
states “most embarrassed with debt” and unable to raise taxes to service that debt.  An increase in 
taxes would make land ownership “a burden rather than a blessing,” resulting in emigration from 
the state and a reduction in tax revenues.
386
  Hence, increased tax burdens would not help finance 
debt repayment.  With a lack of practical alternatives, Michigan’s government suffered the moral 
indignity of default and repudiation.  It had received about one-half of the expected funds for a 
project that was underfinanced from its inception.  A dearth of rail profits had resulted in the 
state’s inability to pay even interest on its loan obligations and threatened the state’s ability to 
“keep in motion the wheels of government.”
387
 
 As the state was buffeted by the challenge of poor investment returns, it suffered another 
blow to its rail hopes – the winter of 1843.  Northern winters can challenge even the most 
advanced transportation systems.  They particularly stressed early rail systems, and the winter of 
1843 (starting in 1842) resulted in significant financial losses for Michigan’s rail.  The winter 
that year was particularly harsh, culminating in a bitter March 1843.  That month has been 
classified as “the most anomalous month in recorded history” with temperatures in the central 
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and eastern United States “more than 25F (14C) below normal,” a situation not expected to 
return for thousands of years.
388
  The cold was so deep and long lasting in Michigan that lake 
navigation proved impossible for almost five months.  Trains could not move during much of 
that time, as snow and ice blocked the roads.  Michigan was isolated.  In January through April 
1843, rail receipts were down on the Central line about 43% over the previous year’s period, yet 
expenses increased as time and dollars were spent to free the rails.  Of course, the calendar drove 
interest expenses, and those obligations continued to mount.  Spring came and, along with it, 
warmer weather that freed rail and water travel.  Unfortunately, there was little freight backlog 
for the rail lines, as during the winter agricultural commodities went to market by either sleigh or 
rotted for lack of market access.
389
  To make things more critical, the partially completed rail 
lines were in need of upgrade and repair.  Revenues were already insufficient to service the debt 
and, if improvements and line extensions lagged, the revenues would not increase as hoped.  
Meanwhile, bondholders shuddered, and not just over Michigan’s plight.  A number of 
other states had borrowed heavily and the prospects of their default and repudiation rumbled 
through the infant financial markets.  Fearing the impending crisis, in 1840, the British Barring 
Brothers Bank urged Congress to guarantee the states’ debts.  Congressional support was 
particularly important, as the Eleventh Amendment barred the banks from filing suit in federal 
courts against defaulting states.
390
  By 1842, the Florida Territory and the states of Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana joined Michigan in full or 
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 with other states teetering on the financial edge.
392
  Politics, anti-Semitism, and 
xenophobia led some politicians to advocate repudiation.  Mississippi Governor Alexander 
McNutt attacked foreign creditors, in particular the Rothschilds.  “The blood of Judas and 
Shylock flows” in their veins, he proclaimed, and warned of a Rothschild conspiracy to 
“mortgage our cotton fields and make serfs of our children.”
393
  Foreign capital had funded 
significant portions of the debt, and those foreign lenders and their political leaders did not 
understand the difference between state and national debt.  Accordingly, state repudiation 
undermined national borrowing and standing, as well as the creditworthiness of all states.
394
   
In response to state defaults, threatened repudiations, and political hard-line positions, a 
member of the Rothschild family advocated ceasing loans in the United States.  He declared “let 
us get rid of that blasted country . . . it is the most blasted & the most stinking country in the 
world.”
395
  British romantic poet, William Wordsworth’s, family had invested in Pennsylvania’s 
now threatened $36 million worth of bonds.  In 1840, he scolded Pennsylvanian’s for betraying 
their commitments: 
          All who revere the memory of Penn 
          Grieve for the land on whose wild woods his name             
          Was fondly grafted with a virtuous aim, 
          Renounced, abandoned by degenerate Men 
          For state-dishonour black as ever came 
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          To upper air from Mammon's loathsome den.
396
  
State defaults and the threat of repudiation promised relief to the states, but presented the specter 
of financial ruin to wealthy and ordinary investors alike. 
Even those the state promised to repay faced the prospect of financial difficulties.  
Although the state had acknowledged its debt to this group, it provided nothing but a vague 
promise of repayment.  To protect the interests of those largely economically and politically elite 
bondholders, a series of American investors in Michigan’s bonds hired Charles Butler, a 
politically linked attorney, financier, and bond expert from New York, to represent their 
interests.
397
  His task was to turn the promise of future payment into a tangible reality.  To 
accomplish that, Butler proceeded to Detroit, and did so in the difficult winter of 1843 that had 
shut down all but sleigh transportation in Michigan.  
 Butler’s travails during his journey underscore both the seriousness of the creditors’ 
concerns and the need for enhanced rail facilities.  After one false start, he travelled from New 
York to “Boston, about twenty-four hours’ journey, and thence going to Albany by rail.  Beyond 
Albany it was rail to Rochester; then to Niagara by stage; then across the river on the ice, and so 
on by stage and cart through Canada to Detroit.”  Butler traveled those last two-hundred miles in 
an open wagon.  One night that wagon broke down at 2 am, forcing Butler to walk in the dark to 
a one-room log-house tavern.  He then took a dirt cart into Detroit.  With the dust of arduous 
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travel on his shoulders, Butler began to plead the bondholders’ case to the governor and the 
legislature.
398
   
Butler faced a sympathetic but determined audience and, as he related in a letter to his 
wife, his coming “all the way from New York, through the mud, on purpose” allowed him to say 
things that others could not “without being charged with treason.”
399
  To Butler’s mind, the 
“simple truth” was that “sound principles of democracy” required “payment of the public debt.”  
Framing debt payment as a moral imperative, he urged that, “whereas a good citizen should be 
ready always to lay down his life in defence of his country against an invading foe, so he should 




Butler’s arguments persuasively moved legislators away from the lingering temptation of 
complete repudiation and inspired the legislature to finance paying the just claims.  The Report 
of the Joint Committee reviewing bond payments recommended that the state pay those bonds 
“for which we have received consideration.”
401
  The amount was $2,518,699, which included 
unpaid interest.  The legislature determined which bonds were due and which were not.  Further, 
the committee recommended that a future legislature consider raising taxes in the event rail 
revenues were insufficient to service the chosen bondholders.  This almost created a stumbling 
block as some protested that only rail assets and revenues should be employed.  Nevertheless, the 
legislature enacted a bill calling for taxes in the event of a revenue shortfall.  The governor then 
threatened to veto the bill, objecting to the tax provisions.  Recognizing that the lack of the tax 
provision could cripple his clients’ interests, Butler protested that the provision “was the only 
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feature of the bill worth saving.”
402
  So persuasive were Butler’s arguments (he drafted the 
legislation), that the legislation was referred to as the Butler Act and the committee posted his 
comments along with their report.
403
  The governor signed the act.
404
 
With the Butler Act signed, the issue moved to those bonds Michigan chose to repudiate.  
Future United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis, at the secret behest of British 
bankers, argued there was no lawful basis upon which the state could distinguish between any 
bona fide purchasers.  He protested that it was, “universally admitted, that, whenever a purchaser 
of property acquires a title from the seller, which he can transmit, although that title be tainted 
with fraud, if he sells to a bona fide purchaser, who parts with his money, or any other thing of 
value, on the faith of the property, such purchaser obtains a valid title, purged of the fraud.”  
Claiming that, “society could hardly get along without” such a rule, Curtis continued, “It would 
be monstrous to say, that, because property bought on credit has not be paid for, the holder 
cannot give good title to it.”
405
  He “entertained little doubt” that Michigan would treat all 
bondholders “in the same just and honorable” fashion, notwithstanding whether the state had 
received funds for the particular bond.  The law was on Curtis’s side, at least insofar as one 
defines law as the rules written in statutes, treatises, and court opinions.  However, the foreign 
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bondholders could not sue Michigan in federal court (the Eleventh Amendment precluded such 
suits), and state court remedies were unlikely.  Under those circumstances, “law” provided 
inadequate shelter.  Meanwhile, the public protested for repudiation, for fear of ruinous taxes, 
while bondholders clamored for payment, for fear of extensive losses. 
Morality was a larger issue than legality, and Curtis believed that morality also required 
reduced government and smaller debt loads.  Curtis would protest in the Christian Review that 
the “universal effort to carry a railroad or a canal to every town, and almost every man’s door 
was destructive to the nation’s wealth and, because of the risk of default, destructive to its moral 
center.”  To Curtis, the nation was deeply in debt to the houses of Europe, but could not default 
for fear of driving Europeans “to beggary by the misfortune” and causing the credit of the United 
States to become “shivered to atoms.”  He continued that “as men of integrity and honor and 
above all, as Christians,” taxpayers must practice self-denial and take on every burden in order to 
pay the debts.
406
  It mattered little that Europeans had few legal remedies.  Prudence and 
Christian values required taxation, self-denial, and repayment, notwithstanding the belief that 
such repayment would cripple several states.   
 Despite the protests, the Michigan legislature specifically repudiated those primarily 
foreign bondholder notes in 1842 and 1843, and did so expressing indignation over the 
underwriting bank’s defaults on their obligations to the state.  Debate continued and those 
advocating partial repudiation knew they stood on tenuous legal and moral grounds.  In 1846, the 
legislature proposed to settle a portion of the European notes.  The London Times admonished 
British bondholders to refrain.  “It is hoped,” the Times declared, “that European creditors will 
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have firmness to refuse any terms short of their payment of their entire principle.”
407
  Ultimately, 
in 1859 the state paid a portion of the foreign debt and left the bondholders to look to the 
defaulting banks for the remainder.  When finally forced to surrender their bonds for reduced 
compensation, George Peabody, the noted philanthropist and founder of the banking firm, 
George Peabody & Co, of London, voiced the frustration of those bondholders.  We “do hereby 
Solemnly protest and declare that we” surrender our bonds at “such reduced rates . . .  only 
because, under the laws of said state, we have no other means of obtaining any payment or 
satisfaction in part or in whole.”
408
  With legal rights but no legal remedies, Europeans had 
turned to the political sphere to press their rights.
409




Notably, the courts were absent in resolving these matters.  Given established legal 
doctrine, bondholders were in equal positions regardless of the underwriters’ payments to the 
state.  Despite a legal right to payment, bondholders had no recourse to the federal courts, as the 
states could not be sued there, and Michigan state-court actions most likely would have proven 
futile.  Bondholders turned to the political sphere, where legal rules merely influenced, but did 
not control, the outcome.  Instead, pragmatic considerations controlled, with some bondholders 
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satisfied and others less so.
411




Federal Aid Efforts 
 
With all the challenges associated with government financial support of rail, internal 
improvements remained a central component of the drive for progress and general-welfare 
enhancements.  To further those ends, Congress again attempted to assist several states, 
including Michigan, to overcome the financial burdens of their internal improvement projects.  
In 1841, Congress passed another distribution act, commonly referred to as the Preemption Act.  
That legislation sought to relieve the states’ burdens in several ways.  First, it granted each of 
eight states 500,000 acres of federal land, which they could sell with the proceeds earmarked for 
internal improvements.  (The act was called the Preemption Act because it gave existing 
squatters the right to buy 160 acres before the land went up for public sale.)  Second, it provided 
the eight states with 10% of the sale price of federal land sold in their boundaries.  It then paid all 
states a share of federal land sales according to population.
413
  Congress placed no restrictions on 
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the use of those funds.  President Tyler signed the law, believing the legislation would relieve a 
significant portion of the debts incurred by states attempting to develop commerce.
414
   
The grant was controversial, even in the receiving states.  Michigan’s Governor Barry 
complained that federal land in Michigan ought to, and did, belong to the state so it should 
receive all sale proceeds.  He also argued that Congressional grants tended “to make the 
sovereign states pensioners” to federal largess.  This was not unlike Jackson’s argument in 
vetoing the 1833 Distribution Bill, in which he believed that state receipts of federal funds would 
cause a loss of independence and dignity.  Despite Barry’s concerns, the sums provided some 
relief.  Accordingly, the legislature accepted the land and funds, and directed the governor to 
employ the land according to the congressionally mandated requirements.
415
  
While those grants did not last long, they evidenced continued federal legislative 
determination to advance social and commercial goals in the face of constitutional impediments 
to the contrary.  To be sure, the shared dollars were not earmarked.  Earmarking those funds 
arguably would have run into the constitutional barriers that animated Jackson’s Maysville Road 
and 1833 Distribution Bill vetoes, as well as Madison’s 1817 veto of the Public Works Bill, and 
Monroe’s 1822 veto of the Cumberland Road Bill.  Tyler took a different tack.  In approving the 
legislation, he advanced that Article IV, §3 gave Congress unlimited power over the federal 
lands themselves and, therefore, the act was constitutionally secure, or at least defensible.
416
  
While that position was not universally accepted, it opened the door to later legislative action.  
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Congress’s use of the public domain in the Preemption Act to advance rail development in some 
measure foreshadowed later legislative efforts to grant land and/or funds directly to the 
railroads.
417
  For the time being, however, Congressional action was constitutionally suspect.  
Believing the act unconstitutional, James Polk, the next President, killed future disbursements 
altogether. 
Building Toward a New Constitutional Model 
 
The Preemption Act, while helpful, “aided more in saving past investments than in future 
expenditures.”
418
  To newly elected Barry, fiscal responsibility required a different approach.  He 
classified the state’s internal improvement projects the result of a “general delusion” and 
questioned both the wisdom of government ownership of rails and of its anti-business 
philosophy.  With those concerns animating his policies, in his first annual address, Barry spoke 
of the limits inherent in republican governance.  “The true aim, indeed, of a republican 
magistrate,” he argued, “is to refrain from the exercise of power not delegated; to abstain from 
all interference with the pursuits of the private citizen, and to give full scope to the inexhaustible 
energies of a free people.”  Government was to set the framework to facilitate individual 
enterprise.  He voiced that, “[t]he main design of a republican government is to protect the 
citizen in the enjoyment of his liberty and the property his own industry has acquired.”  In the 
end, Barry argued, “the people will take care of themselves.”
419
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As Barry advanced that vision, the Board of Internal Improvements continued to express 
optimism that time, improved economics, and line enhancements and extensions “will for the 
future, give an income that, it is believed, will relieve the state from the liabilities incurred for 
construction.”  To the board, the answer to the economic challenge was to continue building, 
particularly on the Central line.  If the state did that, rail receipts would pay the interest due in 
January 1846 (of course that interest was on the now lower, non-repudiated bonds).  The 
requested construction required further financing and, while the board favored further 
development on the other multiple projects, it suggested waiting “until our resources are more 
ample.”
420
  Neither the governor nor the legislature agreed, and no appropriation passed to 
expand the Central. 
Instead, Michigan’s government moved to erecting constitutional barriers to curb future 
state financial support for internal improvements.  Barry sought to change the government 
blueprint though a requirement that voters approve government borrowing.  His proposal of a 
majority vote for government spending was short of his philosophical goal, however.  To Barry, 
internal improvements were not “connected with the legitimate wants of government.”
421
  
One month later, a joint resolution of the legislature called for the Barry-proposed 
constitutional amendment to require voter approval of state borrowing or pledging the state’s 
credit.  In doing so, the legislature and governor tendered an interesting flip to the logic of 
republican governance.  The proposed amendment offered that government required the public’s 
steadying hand to retard overzealous legislative spending.  The people would now check the 
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passions of government – a notion at odds with theories of republican governance.  In 1843, a 
joint resolution proposed sending the amendment to a vote of the people.
422
  The required two-
thirds of the legislators agreed to the amendment, and the voters ratified it in November 1844.
423
  
By the time the amendment passed, the legislature had dramatically curtailed construction on the 
Southern line and cut the proposed length of the Central.
424
  Even with the cutbacks, by 1845 the 
rail interest charges were three times the highest tax level ever paid, and rail incomes 
increasingly were inadequate to pay those debts.
425
  
The state had invested in rail in accordance with the positive governance ideologies 
reflected in its founding constitution.  That 1835 constitution had required the legislature to make 
provision for an “equal, systematic, economical application” of funds to support internal 
improvements.  The constitution did not require state ownership or particular levels of 
involvement but, given the intentions and beliefs of the time, it assumed significant state 
participation.  As that ideologically driven program proved too significant for state resources, the 
legislature became increasingly pragmatic.  It trimmed active state participation in rail, and 
focused on particular lines in violation of constitutionally required equal building requirements.  
Constitutional and statutory law diverged, as aspirations of governance conflicted with pragmatic 
realities.  The erosion of the constitutional requirement of equal support required a choice 
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between ignoring and changing the blueprint.  Through the 1844 amendment, the state stepped in 
the direction of governmental restructuring but, as will be seen, did not go far enough to gain 
state fiscal order.  Meanwhile, Barry’s beliefs of government’s appropriate sphere were gaining 
purchase.  Those beliefs would further push against the 1835 Constitution’s activist blueprint and 
again require constitutional choices. 
This is not to suggest that practical realities uniformly or completely supplanted 
aspirational goals to drive commerce through public spending.  In the period between Barry’s 
proposed amendment and the ratification of that amendment, the legislature remained busy.  A 
partial list of its spending tells the story.  Between 1842 and 1844, inclusive, the legislature 
appropriated money from the defaulting internal improvement fund to support the state’s salt 
springs.  It required the state-owned Central line to run on Sundays, thereby increasing 
operational costs.  It provided for the purchase of iron and spikes to expand the Central and 
Southern lines and it paid expenses on the Clinton and Kalamazoo Canal.  It required that public 
officials exercise responsibility over repairing the Detroit and Saginaw Railroad from “Detroit to 
John Davis’s tavern in the Town of Royal Oak.”  It passed a joint resolution seeking expert 
guidance on building a branch of the Central Railroad to connect to the Detroit River.  It 
authorized communities to tax to support agricultural societies and it allocated land to be used 
for the clearing of the Flint River or, in the alternative, to be used to improve a canal there. And 
in multiple acts, it provided for the building and maintenance of roads.
426
  In boxing parlance, 
                                                 
426
  An Act Making an Appropriation for the Improvement of the State Salt Springs, 1842, No. 10, 11; A Joint 
Resolution Relative to Running Cars on the Central Rail Road on the First Day of the Week, 1842, No 34, 170; An 
Act Making Appropriations on the Central and Southern Rail-roads for the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Forty-three, and for other Purposes, 1843, No. 25, 27; An Act to Provide for the Completion and 
Preservation of that Portion of the Clinton and Kalamazoo Canal between the Villages of Rochester and Frederick, 
No 32, 35; An Act to Authorized the Erection of a Toll Gate and for Keeping in Repair the Detroit and Saginaw 
Road, and for other Purposes, 1843, No. 77, 161; Joint Resolution Concerning the Construction of Lateral Branch of 
the Central Railroad, 1843, No. 14, 227; An Act to Improve the Navigation of the Flint River, 1844, No. 30, 28. 
"Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan." 
166 
 
state efforts were knocked down but not out.  Lacking funds, the legislature curtailed state efforts 
but it did not abandon its aspirations of advancing public welfare through public spending and 
leadership. 
Proposals to sell the roads and remove government from internal improvements initially 
fell short.  While a bill to privatize the railroads cleared one house, the legislature was unable to 
gather the two-thirds vote to create a private rail corporation.  Barry put forward a compromise, 
advocating that “associations of individuals” complete the state’s unfinished rail lines, and that 
the legislature could later buy those railroads back.
427
  This seeming caveat was in reality a 
restatement of the railroad incorporation acts already in place, for each of those acts provided 
that the state could purchase the corporation.  Of course, given Barry’s belief that government 
space did not include rail ownership, the buyback proposal was likely politically, rather than 
philosophically, inspired. 
 The state’s debt challenge provided the crisis through which Barry communicated his 
new vision, but that vision of a separation between public and private spheres stood on its own 
philosophical legs.  In his last formal speech to the legislature during the first of two Barry 
administrations, Barry elaborated on the limited-governance model he had urged at the beginning 
of his administration.  “In extraordinary cases only,” he advised, “and when public good clearly 
demands it, should a state undertake the construction of public works, and then only when such 
works, from their magnitude, cannot well be undertaken by individuals.”
428
  Government was to 
act only when needs demanded and private vehicles were unavailing.  The governor’s office had 
travelled far since Mason’s declaration ten years earlier that corporations were at “war with the 
interest of the people.” 
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Barry’s thinking was part of a growing national trend.  Larson suggested that by this time 
political thought had moved away from energized governance toward a reliance on the “natural 
laws” of the market.  Larson wrote that, “Habitually distrustful of their representatives, tutored 
constantly on the dangers of big government and public power, and unable to perfect a system of 
democratic politics they truly believed in, Americans reached for the doctrine of liberal political 
economy to revise their own hopes for liberty and equality.”
429
  Economic historian John Joseph 
Wallis agreed, arguing that the debt associated with state internal improvement efforts led to 
widespread constitutional reforms that changed the nature of corporations and the nature of 
government-industry relations.
430
  That rebuilding of constitutional structures to remove states 
from active commercial involvement started in 1842, with Rhode Island’s constitutional 
restrictions on public borrowing.  Soon states across the nation began to amend earlier 
constitutional encouragements of state commercial involvement.
431
   
Divestment, Legislative Limits, and Corporate Ascendancy 
 
 Detroit-area newspapers soon advocated a sale of the railroads.
432
  Eastern financers 
expressed interest in purchasing the Central Railroad, and hired Detroiter James Joy (the future 
president of the Central) to lobby that private management of railroads was the superior 
option.
433
  In that environment, Alpheus Felch was elected governor.  Despite Barry’s frugality, 
Felch inherited a $4.1 million debt, and a minimally profitable, but increasingly antiquated rail 
system.  His inaugural message set the tone that the state would soon follow: the state should sell 
                                                 
429
  Larson, Internal Improvements: 6.  
430
 Wallis, "Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption," 212. 
431
 Secrist, An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions upon Public Indebtedness in the United States: 
32-41. 
432







  Felch stated, “The first [object of the sales] is to separate the government from a 
business which has usually been the subject of individual enterprise.”
435
  Felch’s history lesson 
was mistaken, as government everywhere had played a role in rail development.  Nevertheless, 
his politics were increasingly accepted.  Felch preferred that government not be involved in 
business when private industry could better manage the enterprise.  Notwithstanding his 
privatization beliefs, Felch held to (or at least voiced) earlier beliefs that corporate ownership of 
rail remained vexing.  He reflected, “The reluctance of many of our citizens to see these 
important works fall into the hands of corporate bodies, has occasioned some opposition to the 
proposed sale, and it must be admitted that this objection is not without weight.”
436
  Because 
corporations were entities with special rights, their unregulated existence violated the equality 
notions of democratic government.  Even to Felch, failure to regulate would “violate one of the 
plainest principles of that form of government which seeks the independence and the equality of 
all who are subject to its laws.”
437
  Government needed to be present to control the perceived 
excesses of capitalism.  Nevertheless, government ownership went too far.  It occasioned 
partisan rancor, absorbed the legislature’s agenda, and was ineffective. 
By 1846, the state’s rail finances were desperate.  After all the effort, money, and time, 
only 279 miles of track were complete.
438
  Even that limited system was in poor shape.  
Maintenance suffered, the iron rails needed replacement, and bridges needed rebuilding.  Interest 
payments were in arrears and the state owed $4.1 million.  Despite predications to the contrary, 
the rail revenues “yielded no surplus to be applied in discharge of the interest” on even the bonds 
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  Growing interest obligations again threatened state bankruptcy.
440
  The 
alternative – taxation – was unpalatable.  Servicing the debt though taxation would have required 
a 93% tax increase.
441




The state owed $4,121,720.79 in principle and interests as of July 1845.  Claiming that 
the Board of Internal Improvements had camouflaged the financial crisis, a minority report of the 
Senate Finance Committee expressed shock that all profits had been absorbed in operations, 
construction, and repairs.  There was no surplus with which to pay creditors, leaving the 
government with a serious political challenge.  From the beginning, it had reported that the 
state’s rail ventures were a success and that future profits would sustain and improve the lines.  
That was not the case and trouble loomed.  Exasperated, a member of the committee protested,  
there are no nett proceeds, and when in the revolution of one short year, they 
are officially informed that their roads, reported in good order at the 
commencement, have not only swallowed up the nett proceeds, but have 
become entirely inadequate for the transaction of business, and are in great 
measure useless and worthless to the state, unless speedily and entirely rebuilt, 
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On this issue, the committee majority agreed:  the roads were “in a dilapidated and almost ruined 
condition,” and any excess revenue would be swallowed by repairs and required 
improvements.
444
   
 After speaking of the financial concerns, the Senate Finance Committee submitted that 
the “corruption, intrigue and deception” of “half starved political hacks” had run rampant in 
massive public enterprises like rail.  The committee then urged the opposite view of political 
freedom that had animated Mason and the 1837 legislature. “From such [corrupting] influences, 
unsafe in a free government, dangerous to the purity of our institutions – destructive to civil 
liberty – a sale of our public works would set us free.”  Government was corrupt, inefficient, and 
incompetent.
445
  Most importantly, it was out of money.  As the committee noted in a connected 
report, “It has ceased to be a question of policy, and has become one of absolute necessity.  The 
financial condition of the state present and prospective, leave us no option in the matter.”  That 
financial challenge occasioned a reconsideration of corporate appeal and the place of free 
government.
446
  The committee was “satisfied that the best interest of the people in every point 
of view, political, social as well as pecuniary, demand an early and entire separation of the state 
from works and pursuits more legitimately belonging to individual, or corporate enterprise.”
447
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It was time to privatize, perhaps because there was little alternative.  In early 1846, the 
legislature authorized the sale of its best road – the Central, for about $2,000,000.  It had spent 
$2,238,920 on that road.
448
  The newly formed corporation was private but, like the other special 
corporations of its day, the entity carried significant obligations and grants of power.
449
  The sale 
was accompanied by twenty-eight pages of legislatively required commitments, including 
construction requirements, rate structures, tax obligations, and corporate governance rules.  The 
state even retained the right to repurchase the line after 1867.
450
  Shortly thereafter, the state sold 
the Southern line, for $500,000, under similar conditions.
451
  It had spent $1,125,591 on that line.  
In short order, the legislature would abolish the office of Acting Commissioner of Internal 
Improvements.  Before ending his tenure, the Acting Commissioner was to largely “dispose of 
all the personal property appertaining to the business of internal improvements.”
452
  Cooley 
quotes “one familiar with the whole history” as expressing the belief “nothing but the debris of 
our airy castles remained, and that only to plague our recollection.”
453
  Cooley neglected to 
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mention, however, that the sale of the roads and ceasing support of internal improvements 
probably violated the state constitution.  (However, as discussed below, he would have 
responded that such actions were consistent with protecting the core constitutional principle of 
republican governance.)  The 1844 amendment modified but did not eliminate the requirement of 
state support for internal improvements.  But, in a very practical sense, public opinion and 
financial challenges either changed constitutional understandings or made them irrelevant.
454
  
Article XII, §3’s requirement of state action was inconsistent with changed understandings and 
practical realities.  
In 1849, Governor Epaphroditus Ransom suggested just that in his veto of legislation 
seeking to modify the payment schedule for the purchase of the Southern.  He advanced that 
through their “singular unanimity” in favor of the sale, the public had demanded “an entire and 
lasting separation of the state from all schemes of internal improvement.”  Believing that 
withdrawal had “its origin in the spontaneous movements of the people themselves,” Ransom 
suggested an almost constitutional barrier to further state rail support, notwithstanding the 
unamended constitutional language to the contrary.
455
  The legislature disagreed with Ransom’s 
approach and overrode his veto, thereby granting relief to the Southern.
456
  The difference from 
earlier action was that government now was subsidizing a private entity without seeking to 
control its activities. 
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Non-financial Public Assistance 
 
With the exception of episodes like the payment extension, the state had discontinued its 
practice of direct financial support of rail, and moved away from involvement in internal 
improvement projects.  Nevertheless, its efforts continued in a subtler and less public fashion.  In 
its sale of the Central, the legislature bestowed state-like eminent domain powers to the private 
corporation.  As in earlier special rail corporation statutes, the legislature granted that power not 
just over real estate but for “the obtaining of stone, sand, and gravel,” of entering private 
property “to fell and cut down timber” or to obtain “any articles whatsoever, which may be 
wanted in the construction or repair” of the line.  The statute set forth the process required to 
value the property but, even on the sale of personal property, the unwillingness of the seller was 
not a barrier.  These extensive powers were in many but not all acts of special rail incorporation.  
Moreover, the legislature passed, and the governor approved, taxes to support subsidies to 
agricultural, manufacturing, and mechanical arts societies.
457
  Governors Barry and Felch had 
advocated a private/public wall.  Their administrations, however, displayed a facility for ignoring 
that barrier when commercial needs dictated.   
One might legitimately argue that rail development required corporate use of eminent 
domain powers.  Railroads need efficient routes or they, and the public benefits they brought, 
would suffer.  Nevertheless, grants of that power to private entities were akin to assigning public 
power, which is controlled by the democratic process, to private individuals, with little or no 
public control.  Landholders would object to this private taking, and took their complaints to 
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court.  In 1852, the Supreme Court would consider the propriety of those takings in Swan v 
Williams.
458
  That case would set Michigan’s early legal standard on the public versus private 
nature of corporations. 
The case arose from powers granted early in Michigan’s rail history.  In 1834, the 
territorial legislature incorporated the Detroit and Pontiac Railroad, granting the rail line the 
territory’s eminent domain power.
459
  Landholders objected, arguing that any taking under the 
legislation was for private, not public, benefit.  The court disagreed, but did so by classifying 
corporations not by ownership, but by public benefit.  In rejecting the landholders’ claim, the 
court declared that railroads “might with far more propriety be styled public than private 
corporations,” that they were “essentially the trustee of the government,” and “a mere agent, to 
which authority is delegated to work out the public interest.”
 460
  In answer to the landholders’ 
complaint that the control and profits of the railroad were exclusively private, the court answered 
that “it is obvious, that the object which determines the character of a corporation is that 
designed by the legislature, rather than that sought by the company.”
461
  The public was the 
primary beneficiary of rail development and private industry’s gain was only secondary.  The 
court essentially measured utility – with the public deriving most of the gain.  Accordingly, the 
delegation of eminent domain power was valid.  This should not surprise.  Railroads required 
effective routes and society required railroads.  Rather than foregoing the welfare-enhancing 
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activities of rail, society’s leaders, including its courts, shaped doctrine to make the private 
public.  To grant public power to private entities, the courts reclassified those entities as public. 
Republican Government and Private Space 
 
In 1847, Felch proclaimed that the state should recognize a stronger barrier between 
private rights and government action.  Direct government involvement in industry breeched that 
line in unacceptable, antidemocratic ways.  Felch voiced his opinion on the “genius and design 
of a republic government.”  “To avoid being governed too much, is one of the objects of a 
representative form of government, and to secure the good of community in this regard, all 
authority in matters not immediately connected with the public weal, and indispensable to the 
welfare of the body politic, should be withheld.”  He then set forth his vision of a liberal 
republic.  “It is among the encouraging signs of the present time, that the public mind is 
demanding a more definite limitation to the powers and duties of government, and a 
relinquishment of all unnecessary interferences with the free actions of the individual citizen.”
462
  
Felch had urged a vision very different than that which characterized the early State of Michigan 
or, for that matter, the nation during its first six decades.  Rather than as an aid to individual 
enterprise, he viewed government as an impediment to personal freedom. 
The challenge was in the interpretation of Felch’s vision: What constituted “unnecessary 
interferences,” and who should decide?  Several months before his above-referenced defense of 
individual liberty, Felch signed legislation enhancing Detroit’s ability to regulate hours, wages, 
and working conditions of the city’s “porters, cartmen and draymen, owners and keepers of 
livery stables, hackney coaches, carts, dray and carriages of every description.”
463
  While Felch 
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apparently did not consider those restrictions improper, later courts would find otherwise.  
Felch’s and, I would argue, the nation’s wall between public and private was permeable.  As was 
the case throughout American history, government did not withdraw from commerce and 
industry.  Instead, it adjusted and tempered its philosophy with new understandings concerning 
the challenges of government involvement in business.   
 In the wake of its rail experience, Michigan was moving toward and demanding a 
structure of government that would exercise a lighter touch on commerce.  State senator and 
future lieutenant governor William Fenton expressed that goal in a colorful, if somewhat peculiar 
fashion:  “The wheels of government which should roll quietly on in an unimpeded track in their 
onward course towards civil, social and political improvements – will be clogged by the crash of 
locomotives, and the strife of aspirants for the loaves and fishes which fall from the tables of 
those in power.”
464
  Mason had argued that private wealth could subvert republican governance 
by holding and exerting extensive power. His solution was government control of the state’s 
most important industry.  The challenge, however, was that government faced institutional and 
political impediments to effective control of internal improvements.  This led to public distrust of 
government as well as to a poorly constructed business.  That failure and the associated distrust, 
threatened to subvert the political process and, accordingly, established that industry 
development was an inappropriate space for the state.  Perhaps the practicalities of economic 
realities drove the changing political philosophies, but those realities animated deeper reflections 
about the role of government and the dangers of subverted republican governance. 
 This is not to suggest that all aligned on government’s role.  Many legislators still 
believed that, but for the want of resources, government was the appropriate vehicle for internal 
improvement development and ownership.  In 1848, the House Committee on Internal 
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Improvements bemoaned the state’s inability to press forward with a trans-state canal that would 
have “become to our growing State, what the Erie Canal had proved to New York.”  That 
inability did not descend from changed philosophies of government or the growth of private 
corporations.  Instead, it came from a lack of funds.  That lack, according to the committee, 
undermined commercial development and population growth.  The committee reported that the 
legislature “would willingly listen to the cry for help, and cheerfully come to the rescue, did 
circumstances permit or reason approve the attempt.”  The state’s financial condition prohibited 
construction, thereby undermining efforts to help inland farmers bring their products to market. 
The answer to the problem, the committee agreed, was government in the form of federal aid.
 465
   
It was not about private versus public spheres or the withdrawal of government.  Rather, to the 
committee, the issue concerned which government could, and should, act. 
Two months after voicing his bold reassessment of government, business, and freedom, 
Felch became a United States Senator.  Epaphroditus Ransom, Felch’s successor, almost 
immediately displayed an antagonism to overactive governance.  Declaring, “Excessive and 
hasty legislation are the most serious evils we have felt under our present system,” Ransom 
proposed to shorten the legislature’s term by two-thirds and to render legislation passed after a 
certain number of days in session automatically invalid.
466
  He wanted smaller government, and 
rejected calls for loaning money or pledging credit to railroads.  Ransom believed that the state 
had appropriately adopted a policy of liquidating and ending all involvement with the railroads 
and that the people had insisted that government severe all financial ties with rail.
467
  He rejected 
not just government-owned railroads, but railroads run by mixed corporations.  Loans and 
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subscriptions had “almost universally proved disastrous,” and this was the case broadly across 
the nation.  Ransom reasoned that if the projects for which the railroads requested state financial 
support were so important, private markets would provide the necessary capital.
468
  If private 
markets found the project too speculative, then the state should not risk its capital.   
The governor did not advocate complete abandonment of a state role in internal 
improvements.  He supported construction of plank roads, with indirect government funding.  
Instead of direct capital insertions, government would offer land grants to private plank road 
companies that they could then sell to raise capital.  The legislature passed a general plank-road 
incorporation statute, allowing corporate creation without specific approval by the legislature, 
and without corporate responsibilities to the state.   
 Michigan was not alone in its growing disquiet over government ownership of rail or in 
the mixed corporate model.  Failing enterprises and rising public obligations strongly contributed 
to a shifting view of government and private spaces.  Henry Carter Adams explained, “as the 
people had driven their representatives to enter upon internal improvements without caution, so, 
when taxes began to press, they censured them without justice, and disowned the policy.”
469
  
Larson noted that in the wake of the financial crisis, “American’s faith in government itself –
never high –collapsed.”  Perhaps nostalgic for what might have been, and despairing of the 
results, Larson wrote, “the founders’ hope of wielding power for the common good receded into 
memory: a distant possibility once (perhaps?) within the grasp of revolutionary statesmen, but 
unlikely (if not unimaginable) in the hands of their shortsighted, self-serving offspring.”
470
  
Whether appropriate or not, public desire for and trust in government was shifting, both in 
Michigan and around the nation.  
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Corporate Success and Rising Individualism 
 
In government’s place stood private corporations.  As John Barry, reelected governor in 
1849, advanced: “Associations of individuals with corporate powers, in many cases, possess 
advantages that materially aid in the prosecution of some legitimate enterprise, which, without 
such powers, could not be undertaken with prospect of success.”
471
 By 1855, a treatise on 
corporate law commented, “There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our 
community, who is not a member of at least one private company or society which is 
incorporated.”
472
  By mid-century, the American population was moving toward an increasing 
dependence not only on the leadership of private economic development but also on the 
acceptability of corporations as an integral part of the economic landscape.  Those corporations 
then, would provide the means to construct the infrastructure required by an advancing American 
economy.  The state and society that had earlier viewed corporations as “at war with the interest 
of the people,”
473
 now viewed corporations as desirable, tax-paying contributors to the state.   
In that shift, hero status soon replaced corporations’ earlier villainous image.  As early as 
1839, the English Civil Engineering Journal had been arguing that government simply was ill 
suited to control the rail industry.  The journal proposed that only private control of rail created 
incentives for creativity and competitive advances, and public ownership stifled those traits.  
Picking up on that theme, the American Railroad Journal pronounced that ‘“all the canals and 
railroads of this country would have been . . . better executed by private enterprise,” that “all 
such matters should be left” to private enterprise “which alone possesses the means, skill and 
integrity indispensable to success”’ and, finally, that “all we require in this country, to secure the 
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construction of all really useful works is to be ‘let alone.”’
474
  It is not clear whether the 
American Railroad Journal’s distaste for government control extended to an aversion to 
government funding, eminent domain assistance, or land grants, or as Horwitz noted, common-
law modifications to facilitate rail development.
475
  Certainly, railroads continued to take 
advantage of government largess and in that sense the term “private” requires a bold asterisk.  
Notwithstanding their demand for government favor, supporters of private industry continued to 
employ laissez-faire language.  But, in truth, they fell far short of that standard.   
Whether “purely private” or not, privately held corporations succeeded in furthering 
Michigan rail projects.  The eastern investors who purchased the Southern and Central lines 
invested private funds in the lines’ upgrade and expansion.
476
  British interests financed the 
previous Northern line, and incorporated a faltering Detroit & Pontiac line into the system in 
order to include a Detroit terminus.
477
  The purchasers of the Central immediately began 
upgrading and expanding the rail system.   
[O]ld oak and iron strap rails were torn up and replaced with new “T” rails 
made entirely of iron, roadbeds were surveyed and cleared, new track was laid, 
new engines and freight and passenger cars were ordered, and, after an active 
lobbying effort in Lansing [the new state capital], the legislature issued 
variances enabling the two lines to build farther southwest and eventually forge 
a rail link with the growing city of Chicago by 1852.
478
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The re-invigorated railroads spurred economic development, driving the growth of commercial 
farming. 
 Using the Michigan rail system as a metaphor for the benefits commerce and wealth 
could bring to the developing nation, Ralph Waldo Emerson exclaimed in his essay Wealth that,  
A clever fellow was acquainted with the expansive force of steam; he also saw 
the wealth of wheat and grass rotting in Michigan.  Then he cunningly screws 
on the steam pipe to the wheat crop.  Puff now, O Steam! The steam puffs and 
expands as before but this time it is dragging all Michigan at its back to hungry 
New York and hungry England.  
 
Emerson’s applause should not be taken as a comment on the benefits of private rail ownership 
as there are indications that he wrote early versions of the essay in 1844, and some suggest 1841, 
before the sale of the rail to private ownership.  Instead, Emerson advanced wealth as a vehicle 
to move humanity to an elevated plane.  He explained the “bread he eats is the first strength and 
animal spirits; it becomes, in higher laboratories, imagery and thought; and in still higher results, 
courage and endurance.”
  
Emerson concluded the essay extolling the use of wealth to expand the 
moral and philosophical nature of man.  “The true thrift is always to spend on the higher plane; 
to invest and invest, with keener avarice, that he may spend in spiritual creation and not in 
augmenting animal existence.”
479
  Accordingly, wealth for its own sake accomplished little.  Its 
higher use was to advance the individual and his society spiritually, intellectually, democratically 
as well as materially.  
 In itself, Emerson’s views on wealth and society bear no special discussion in this paper.  
Most probably, they did not reflect the thinking of the time and those listening to Emerson’s 
lectures on wealth heard them to propound a material-seeking life rather than the spiritual 
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  Even with that as the individual goal however, Emerson would 
argue, capitalism creates social benefit without regard to, and in spite of, the intentions of the 
captains of industry.  In his essay Considerations by the Way, Emerson recognized that the 
benefit of the western railroads,  
is inestimable, and vastly exceeding any intentional philanthropy on record.  
What is the benefit done by a good King Alfred, or by a Howard, or Pestalozzi, 
or Elizabeth Fry, or Florence Nightingale, or any lover, less or larger, 
compared with the involuntary blessing wrought on nations by the selfish 
capitalist who built the Illinois, Michigan and the network of the Mississippi 
Valley roads; which have evoked not only all the wealth of the soil, but the 
energy of millions of men.   
 
Perhaps recognizing the irony of great gain through selfish motives, Emerson concluded with “a 
sentence of ancient wisdom that ‘God hangs the greatest weights on the smallest wires.’”
481
   
 Musing, writing, and speaking on the new industrial society, during the 1840s and 1850s 
and publishing in 1860, Emerson tendered a vision of a society driven by individual capitalist 
impulses, but improved by the changes those impulses wrought.  The individual was central, and 
government posed a risk to individual self-creation.  He wrote:  
The only safe rule is found in the self-adjusting meter of demand and supply.  
Do not legislate.  Meddle, and you snap the sinews with your sumptuary laws.  
Give no bounties, make equal laws, secure life and property, and you need not 
give alms.  Open the doors of opportunity to talent and virtue and they will do 
themselves justice, and property will not be in bad hands.  In a free and just 
Commonwealth, property rushes from the idle and imbecile to the industrious, 
brave and persevering.
482
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This acceptance of the value of the individual, working his self-gaining plan, would animate 
legal thought in the later portion of the nineteenth century.  New constitutions and judicial 
doctrines would soon enshrine those ideas into a changing governmental framework. 
 Private industry was successful in completing Michigan’s rail lines where state 
ownership was not.  The cause may have been economic – Michigan’s entry into rail 
development coincided with a dramatic economic downturn; it may have been political – states 
have multiple priorities and constituencies requiring non-economic decision-making; and it may 
have been managerial – states lack the singular profit-motive that drives private industry 
efficiencies.  Whatever the cause of failure, selling the railroads to private industry changed the 
economic and legal atmosphere of the state.   
Corporate Growth and Public Dissatisfaction 
 
Rail brought more to Michigan residents than transportation, communication, and land 
value.  It also brought dangers to livestock and the threat of ember-induced fires.  The previous 
chapter touched on some of those injuries as free-grazing livestock fared poorly against 
oncoming rail cars.  Resident dissatisfaction occasionally triggered a violent response. One such 
flair up in 1839 resulted in farmers burning bridges, derailing trains, and threatening physical 
violence.
483
  Largely, state government’s willingness to compensate farmers for their losses 
would mute the anger and calm those situations.  That would change as the state exited the rail 
business.  Private rail owners were not as charitable – offering only partial compensation.
484
  
Private rail leaders claimed that farmers placed their infirm livestock on the tracks in order to 
win compensation while farmers claimed that the railroad destroyed prized stock, causing 
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grievous financial loss.  Lawlessness resulted, with farmers destroying tracks, greasing inclines, 
and derailing engines.  In one incident, arsonists struck and largely destroyed the Michigan 
Central’s new freight depot in Detroit.  In 1850, an insurrection broke out with arson, undercover 
operatives, and conspirators.  The antagonism included differing characterizations of private 
corporations with both sides claiming divine support.  Whether or not God took sides, the 
transfer of rail from public to private entities had consequences beyond the economic.  One 
celebrated event led to the controversial convictions of farmers for rioting and destroying rail 
property.  Townsend Gidley, the 1851 Whig candidate for governor, pledged that he would 
pardon those convicted.  State senator, Free Soil governor candidate, and future Michigan 




The underlying dispute concerned residents’ grazing privileges.  Farmers claimed 
traditional open-range rights over the lands the lines travelled.  If the railroads wished to limit 
grazing on their lines, the railroad should fence the land.  John D. Pierce, the intellectual force 
behind Michigan’s innovative public school and university system, agreed: “No heathen altar 
ever smoked more continually with the blood of its victims” than did the roads of the Michigan 
Central.  He continued, protesting that the rail lines “force their way through our farms, leaving 
our fields, meadows and pastures all open as commons, and yet we are the trespassers if our 
stock pass over the road from their high-mightiness, and liable to them for damages.  The road 
must be fenced, in the meantime, something near the value of the property destroyed must be 
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  On the other hand, rail owners thought their land private, and not a public common or 
highway.  Accordingly, the cattle and horses grazing on the tracks were trespassers against which 
the railroad owed no duty.  Traditions were changing rapidly; so rapidly in fact that by 1851, the 
Michigan Supreme Court would declare the idea that horses and cattle could graze on lands now 
owned by the railroad as “absurd – preposterous in the extreme.”  Private industry owned the 
property surrounding the line and was entitled to protection from customs that had been a central 
understanding of the earlier agricultural world.
487
 
Feelings of helplessness in the face of absentee owners fueled resident dissatisfaction.  
With state ownership, residents held a voice.  With absentee owners, they carried little sway.  
Even as late as 1877, inhabitants complained about the futility of dealing with agents rather than 
owners of rail lines. The editor of the Osceola Outline expressed his community’s frustration 
with distant rail owners who, “having no interest whatever in the State’s welfare further than will 
put money in their pockets, the people somehow have got the idea that a nest of tarantulas in the 
shape of eastern capitalists have spun their iron webs across the country in all directions and then 
slipped back into their holes in the Eastern cities to lie in wait for the flies to come in.”
488
  
Popular response spanned from resignation to violence.  Rail was changing their lives in 
wonderful but often frustrating ways. 
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  A footnote to the rail story is the chronicle of Michigan’s entry into and withdrawal from 
the salt processing industry.  As part of its petition for statehood, the drafting convention 
requested ownership of the territory’s salt springs.  Congress awarded the state six salt springs 
along with attached lands.
489
  As mentioned, the Internal Improvements Act of 1837 provided for 
government development of a portion of the state’s salt resources, and starting in 1838, Michigan 
began developing those resources.
490
  After much legislation and numerous efforts to 
commercially extract and commercialize the salt, Governor Barry in 1844, threw up his hands, 
declaring that the “immediate prospect of manufacturing salt extensively and with a profit is by 
no means flattering.”  Accordingly, he suggested, “that no further expenditures be made on the 
state owned and operated salt project.”
491
  The legislature soon passed a resolution requesting 
that Michigan’s congressional delegation seek federal approval for the sale of the lands granted 
upon the admission of the state into the Union.
492
 
Government efforts did not stop when ownership ended.  After selling off the assets and 
getting out of the business, in 1859 the legislature decided to encourage the salt industry.  It 
determined that the state should pay a 10 cents per bushel bounty for extracted salt, and to forego 
taxation on the associated manufacturing property.
493
  At first, the legislation called for a bounty 
of 10 cent per barrel (a larger unit of measure.  There are 3 bushels to the barrel).  A senator 
thought the bounty idea so outrageous that he suggested that the state pay by the smaller measure 
of a bushel.  To his surprise, his sarcastically drawn proposal passed and was signed into law.   
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A few years later, in 1861, believing that the “appropriate encouragement [of salt 
manufacturing] is wise,” Governor Blair expressed concern that the bounty covered 100% of all 
manufacturing costs and was therefore excessive.
494
  In response, the legislature cut the bounty 
by two-thirds.  The state then paid the salt companies according to the lower rate, even for the 
period between the first statute and the statute reducing the payment.  Litigation ensued.  In a 
one-sentence ruling, the court found that the East Saginaw Salt Manufacturing Company had a 
vested right in the higher bounty for the period before the legislative adjustment and that the state 
could not retroactively divest that right.
495
  The court discussed no constitutional concern over 
the legislature’s power to offer a bounty.  In itself, the state salt efforts and the case concerning 
vested rights to state payments are not particularly novel.  However, the issue would rise again 
when the Michigan courts would modify understandings of the constitutional blueprint.  In that 
later period, courts would deem similar bounties beyond legislative power, and would declare 
unconstitutional previous traditional government activities. 
Thomas Cooley led those redrafting efforts, and he was joined by his judicial brother, 
James Campbell.  When authoring his Outlines of the Political History of Michigan, Campbell 
declared that these types of investments, in the form of “bounties and loans to encourage new 
branches of industry were not extravagant,” and were “probably well invested, even where the 
object did not succeed.”  He discussed two of those investments, silk manufacturing, and private 
poor houses.  The state had invested in silk raising and the associated mulberry tree 
development.
496
  (It was one of at least nine states that did so in the 1830s and 40s.)
497
  That 
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investment failed.  The state also donated moneys to Reverend Martin Kundig to support his 
ministrations to cholera sufferers.  With the funds, he “made a poor-house a charming place of 
resort for visitors.”
498
  Campbell did not object to those expenditures, in large measure because 
they provided seed money for the introduction of new industries and methods.  His objection, at 
least as reflected in his Political History, concerned the pragmatic challenges associated only 
with extensive government investments.  Massive railroad assistance was objectionable.  
Silkworm-raising grants, salt and sugar bounties, and indigent relief were not.  But, as will be 
discussed in Chapter VI, the stated constitutional principles espoused by those advancing a 
negative governance model did not allow for pragmatic lines between effective experimentation 
and significant government involvement.
499
  However, a deeper consideration reveals that such 
experimentation may have been permissible, at least to Cooley. 
Judicial Responses to Regulation and Government Spending.  
 
Up until 1850, the Michigan Supreme Court’s record is largely silent about the legality of 
employing public resources to develop private industry and the nature and breadth of the 
constitution’s requirements concerning internal improvements.  To some extent, that silence may 
have been the result of an incomplete historical record, as the court did not publish its opinions 
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  The court’s probable position, however, can be gleaned from its later related 
holdings, which suggest that the court would have sustained legislative initiatives and rejected 
challenges to energetic governance and the reallocation of tax dollars to support private or public 
industry. 
Most of the cases coming before the early Supreme Court were of minor legal 
significance and, in those cases of larger significance, the court conservatively followed the 
precedent of other jurisdictions.
501
  It is unlikely that the court would have taken issue with 
continued government support and regulation of industry, as that was the historic norm.  There 
were some exceptions, however.  At times, the court would eschew the mechanical application of 
law to fact in order to advance perceived community and commercial-development needs. 
In facilitating community, the surviving court opinions suggest a court inclined to support 
regulations and to limit what it considered the corrosive influences of individual rights claims 
when those claims threatened to undermine the community.  Some of the controversies 
concerned regulations born of the land-planning efforts associated with the 1805 fire.  In 
response to the fire, the city drew up plans for roads, highways, and buildings.  Over the years, it 
modified those plans but never abandoned the object to regulate the city’s design.
502
  In early 
1844, William Carpenter constructed stairs adjoining his building on Woodward Avenue in 
Detroit.  The city claimed those stairs infringed on the public highway and were a nuisance.  
Much of the Supreme Court’s review of the case concerned legal nuisance standards but the 
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court’s dicta in People v Carpenter opened a window into its interpretation of rights in mid-
nineteenth century Michigan.  Writing for the court, Chief Justice Charles Whipple submitted 
that both individuals and the community held rights with which government could not interfere.  
He then took a further step, arguing that the legislature was “to some extent the guardian of those 
rights,” and that it had an affirmative “duty to employ all the powers” to protect them. In this 
case, however, individual and community rights clashed.  In response, Whipple argued 
government must protect the community against individual intrusions.  It was government’s 
obligation to “remedy the mischiefs that have grown up under a course of legislation by which 
the rights of the public have been made subservient to the convenience or cupidity of 
individuals.”
503
  While individual rights were important, they should not defeat community 
rights.  Accordingly, it was government’s affirmative obligation to protect the collective interest 
from the individual.
504
  The court’s fear that individual rights claims would eclipse collective 
needs was very similar to Mason’s 1838 concern that there was an “all absorbing desire lurking 
in the heart of man to aggrandize self and promote private ends; which is too apt to forget 
country, and which, if indulged and encouraged, must prove the undoubted cause of a premature 
national degeneracy.”
505
  Voicing thoughts that are foreign to today’s neo-liberal, individualistic 
philosophy, mid-nineteenth century leaders often held to notions of collective rights and needs, 
protected and fostered by government action. 
Whipple applied his rights theory beyond public spaces.  As mentioned in Chapter II, one 
of the first regulations promulgated by Detroit’s legislature involved the creation of a central 
market.  The 1839 case of Henretty v Detroit addressed the city’s right to punish meat sellers that 
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did not lease stalls from the market.  Unfortunately, the majority opinion in the case is lost, but 
Whipple’s dissent survives.  His dissent makes clear that the majority had affirmed Henretty’s 
conviction for violating the central market law.  Whipple dissented, arguing that Henretty should 
not be liable for the violations because the ordinance was void for being unreasonable and in 
restraint of trade.  He acknowledged the public’s health and convenience interests associated 
with the public market, but believed the regulation gave too much power to city government, 
created a monopoly, and divested choices from buyers.  In sum, the central-market ordinance 
unreasonably “puts the whole community in the power of the few.”  While his opinion focused 
on individual rights, Whipple’s logic was not about hampering an individual’s trade-related 
property or contract rights.  Instead, it was about impeding consumer choice and convenience.  
Accordingly, the ordinance was “manifestly unreasonable and not for the common benefit: It 
being essential to the validity of a by law that it should be reasonable, and for the common 
benefit – not for the benefit of the few.”
506
  Whipple would force traders to operate in the market, 
but would not require they rent a stall from the city.  It is hard to draw too great a conclusion 
here, as Whipple’s opinion was in dissent and we do not know the basis of the court’s argument. 
Notwithstanding that, it is interesting that Whipple would invalidate legislation based not on the 
encumbrances to the individual but rather on how those encumbrances undermined public rights.  
Simply put, democracy required that government provide equal access to all and that the best 
way to protect the public interest was for government to provide an open marketplace not 
restrained by monopolizing influences. 
In speaking for the court a few years later, Whipple expanded on that philosophy in 
Godfroy v Brooks.  In that case, the court rejected common-law dower standards that would have 
required a surviving spouse to maintain wooded land as she had received it.  To the common 
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law, clearing woodlands was “waste,” and that was something forbidden during a life estate.  To 
the court, that rule made no sense in Michigan because, “Here the hand of industry has been at 
work leveling the forest and reclaiming the wilderness.”  “By clearing the land of its surplus 
timber and converting it into a beautiful farm,” the surviving spouse enhanced the estate and 
helped drive commercial development.
507
  General welfare needs – society’s interest in 
advancing commerce – resulted in an elevation of the current owner’s rights over that of future 
owners.
508
  Public needs had changed the balance from the common-law standard that 
maintained the rights of future heirs to one where law supported current owners and immediate 
economic development.  When established law encumbered commercial development, as it did 
here, the court adjusted its reading of that law.   
To Whipple law should promote economic energy.  The legislature could not exclude 
people from the market, time-honored waste and dower principles could not forestall economic 
development, and individuals could not stand in the way of community development.  
Underlying all three cases was a drive to enhance the public interest.  Whipple either spent little 
ink on private rights or warned that those rights could not be used to defeat public needs.  
Development interests drove the court’s thinking and it changed the law to facilitate current use 
and community development.  The focus was on group progress.  And this was the drive of the 
courts, the legislature, and the executive.  In short, it was a governing philosophy.  
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Considerations of group needs predominated in early Michigan but they did not drown 
out considerations of individual rights, particularly when government threatened those rights 
employing criminal law.  In two cases, again written by Whipple, the Supreme Court voided 
sections of Detroit’s ordinance for improperly restricting individual rights.  Both cases, Slaughter 
v People and Welch v Stowell, dealt with Detroit’s efforts to suppress houses of ill fame.
509
  The 
only surviving record of Slaughter is its republication as a footnote in Welch.  From it we learn 
that the Detroit Mayor’s Court convicted John Slaughter for keeping a house of ill fame in 
violation of a Detroit ordinance.  Violation of that ordinance subjected the offender to fines or 
imprisonment.  The city brought the matter by complaint, not by presentment to a grand jury.  
The court found that the action against John Slaughter was criminal in nature and required a 
constitutionally guaranteed grand jury process.  Accordingly, it struck down Slaughter’s 
conviction on procedural grounds.  However, its dicta went further, offering a glimpse perhaps of 
the increasing importance of individual liberties.  In discussing the 1835 mindset of the framers 
of the Michigan constitution, Whipple offered, “In the most modern of the Constitutions of the 
states of the Union, there is a manifest inclination, not merely to enlarge but to guard with great 
strictness the liberty of the citizen.”  In sympathy with that policy, Whipple declared that the 
Detroit ordinance was “repugnant to all notions which we have formed of the nature of 
institutions under which we live.”  To Whipple and his brethren, procedural guarantees of 
individual rights and freedoms must be honored, and the courts were to actively protect those 
rights. 
Whereas Slaughter dealt with the rights of the individual’s body, Welch dealt with the 
individual’s property.  In that case, Whipple considered the limitation on the Detroit City 
Council’s power to “pull down or remove” the bawdy house itself.  To further its efforts to limit 
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red-light district challenges, the council provided that the city could destroy the involved 
property in addition to criminally prosecuting offending individuals.  Their target was Elizabeth 
“Peggy” Welch, a “notorious character and an offense to the neighborhood in which she 
resided.”
510
  The court was uncomfortable with this “new and unusual remedy” of property 
destruction and, accordingly, sought to interpret narrowly the ordinance and the state’s 
empowering legislation.  “We think the act of the legislature,” Whipple wrote, “should receive a 
more reasonable construction – a construction which will protect, as well the public against the 
evil complained of, as the rights of property, which should be held sacred.”  One might double 
take at the court’s characterization of a bawdy house as “sacred” but there is more here than an 
unfortunate use of terms.  The court’s language is emblematic of a growing attention to the rights 
of property.  Because of the concern for private property rights, Detroit could fine and imprison 
those engaged in prostitution (subject to guaranteed procedural protections) but the house itself – 
the property – could not be destroyed, at least given the summary proceedings set forth in the 
statute.  If the house were a nuisance threatening immediate and continuing harm (as with a 
house containing cholera, for example), the summary proceedings, and the property’s 
destruction, would be appropriate.  Without that danger, the protection of individual property 
rights required more significant judicial process.  Peggy Welch’s house of ill repute should 
remain untouched.  
The tension between the government’s obligation to regulate in support of public welfare 
and the individual’s right to property again presented itself in 1863 in Brady v Northwest 
Insurance.  In its effort to protect against fire, the Detroit City Council restricted the construction 
of wood buildings in certain areas of the city.  As part of that restriction, it forbade the repair of 
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“any wooden building partially destroyed by fire.”  Samuel Brady, the owner of a warehouse 
affected by the ordinance, sought recovery on his insurance policy for the full value of his 
building after extensive fire damage.  His insurer, Northwestern Insurance, sought to pay a lesser 
amount, based upon the cost of repairing the building to its previous state.  To do so would 
require rebuilding a wood structure, in violation of the ordinance.  The majority of the court 
considered the insurance contract in light of the regulation and determined that Northwestern 
must compensate Brady for the larger amount.   
Justice Campbell disagreed.  Campbell asserted the city had no power to require owners 
(or insurance carriers) of wood buildings to repair those buildings in forms safer than they were 
before the ordinance.  The city could regulate the construction of future buildings but it could not 
do so with existing structures “without violating the rights of private property.”  Campbell 
employed the underlying property-protecting principles of Welch v Stowell (the house of ill-
repute case) and Williams v Michigan Central (cattle on the tracks) to support his legal 
position.
511
  To Campbell, those cases emphasized the importance of protecting property against 
intrusion – governmental or otherwise.  Cooley, who would soon join Campbell on the Court, 
would cite Brady’s majority opinion as reflecting the state of the law, but he did so a bit 
sardonically.  Cooley wrote, “The establishment of limits within the denser portions of cities and 
villages, within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or 
repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but 
regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result.”
512
  Campbell’s 
opinion was contrary to the then legal standards although, perhaps, not against the coming wave 
of property-protecting jurisprudence. 
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It should not surprise that mid-nineteenth century Michigan law both argued for the 
protection of the public interest as against the individual and for the individual interest against 
the public.  The Panic of 1837 undermined a faith in government.  On the national side, President 
Martin Van Buren furnished no relief.  Instead, he explained that the public could expect a “strict 
economy and frugality” and, in a statement that would be equally at home in the gilded age, he 
cautioned not “to substitute for republican simplicity and economical habits a sticky appetite for 
effeminate indulgence.”
513
  While such a message might seem quite harsh to those Michigan 
inhabitants who lost dearly from a spate of bank defaults, collapsed farm prices, and a failed 
internal-improvements program, government intervention may not have seemed a panacea.  The 
state had defaulted on loans and repudiated some principle obligations.  By mid-century, political 
forces differed, with one group arguing for an expanded market economy while the other 
envisioned a more cooperative social structure.  As Martin Hershock noted in his study of 
nineteenth century Michigan, Michiganians were frightened and began to strike out “at the 
potential threat of unbridled economic and social change. . .  For some, the pace of change was 
too fast; for others it was not fast enough.  Yet in the early 1850s, most state residents agreed that 
their freedom was imperiled.”
514
  The political and economic climate was uncertain, and 
individuals in part looked to government as both the cause and the cure of their distress. 
Perhaps because of its constitutional requirement to support industry or because of the 
Michigan’s system of state ownership, legal challenges to the use of an individual’s tax dollars to 
support infrastructure were not considered (or at least there is no record of such consideration) 
by the Michigan Supreme Court.  Other state Supreme Courts, however, were beginning to hear 
complaints that the legislature could not mandate transfers from taxpayers to private 
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infrastructure companies.  Early court decisions on this issue rejected those complaints.  Such 
transfers were within the legislature’s mission to enhance the general welfare.  Similarly, 
legislatures could extensively regulate, to the same end.  After all, the decision as to what 
constituted support of the general welfare resided in the people’s representatives – the 
legislature.  As government involvement in industry increased, and tax burdens and regulations 
threatened to proliferate, courts increasingly considered the “rights” of individuals to be free of 
such majority-approved burdens.  That argument is the story of Chapter V.  Before we turn to 
those issues, however, this work addresses how Michigan’s residents attempted to reign in 
legislative excesses while maintaining a faith in representative democracy.  The challenges those 




Chapter IV:  Refocusing and Shifting Governmental Responsibilities 
“Constitutions and laws, usually placed as permanent landmarks on the civil 
estate, appear and disappear like species in the organic world.  Even our 
constitutions of government prove the law of evolution.” 
Francis Newton Thorpe, (1898) 
 “A Constitutional History of the American People,” 
1898 
  
In the summer of 1850, one hundred delegates from across Michigan travelled to 
Lansing, the new state capital, to draft an entirely new state constitution.  This dedicated group 
travelled on paths more akin to Indian trails than to developed roads.  Lansing was not yet a city 
(that happened in 1859), but was a town carved out of the wilderness.  Three years before, the 
town – then called the “Village of Michigan,” – was a sparsely inhabited woodland.  In 1847, 
lumbermen and construction workers started burning trees and brush to make way for the capitol.  
Visitors knew they were approaching the area when they saw the smoke from the fires during the 
day and the glow of the bonfires at night.
515
   
The construction efforts were emblematic of the state’s drive for constitutional change.  
The 1849 House Select Committee recommending a constitutional convention did so in 
celebration of the state’s march to social progress.  It listed the state’s goals as “a continual 
tendency to improvement in every land, to better systems of government; to better practice under 
those systems, to increase in physical well being, to more enlightenment in morals, more 
cultivation of intellect, to improved and therefore more beneficial social arrangement, effecting a 
more equitable distribution of labor, possession and enjoyment.”
516
  To the committee, 
government was to facilitate social and individual progress, and when that required that the 
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system of government change, constitutional change was appropriate.  Importantly, the 
committee did not perceive government as an impediment to individual progress.  Instead, 
government and the individual shared a symbiotic relationship, whereby government was to 
release Hurst’s energy to facilitate individual and social advancement.  It was all about progress. 
The delegates represented a cross section of Michigan’s population.  Almost half (48) 
were farmers, with the rest including lawyers, merchants, doctors, and millers.  Only one was a 
native Michigander, with most originating from New York (43) and New England (38).  By 
August 15, they had agreed upon a new constitution that diffused governmental power by 
stripping the state’s executive and legislature of much of their authority and placing that power 
with local government and directly elected special-purpose bodies.  Some, including many who 
attended, argued that their proposed constitution limited government and curtailed tax burdens.  
This was an often-voiced intention.  Despite that purpose, those characterizations missed the 
mark as the delegates shifted powers but did not diminish “government.”  Their new 
constitutional blueprint curtailed some activity, expanded others, and repositioned much.  In the 
end, it allowed for, and even facilitated, active government.   
In its aftermath, local governments assumed activities previously directed by the state, 
and the state moved its focus from the economic to the social.  As Francis Newton Thorpe noted, 
“The experience of fifteen years had proved that power might be safely exercised by the people 
in local government and it was now proposed to leave a large share of power in the counties and 
townships.”
517
  To accomplish that, the constitution was the first in the nation to require 
township governance.  It required a township supervisor, highway commissioner, treasurer, 
school inspector, and constables.  Even as the framers stripped the legislature of oversight and 
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appointment powers, they granted many of those powers to directly elected officials.  Instead of 
government withdrawing, it restructured, refocused, and reassessed areas of concern and 
responsibility.  Even then, in practice, the legislature refused to yield reallocated powers and the 
people’s representatives would work around constitutional barriers to press the public’s agenda. 
It would be a mistake to understate the delegates’ spirit for limiting government and 
government spending.  Delegate William Norton MacLeod of Mackinac County captured the 
concerns over the needed government changes: “The inhibitions of the [1835] constitution were 
so scant, general and easy to be avoided that they served for no other purpose than as so many 
beacon-lights to warn of the quicksand and the shoals, without imposing a single restraint upon 
the free-roaming sea.”
518
  The convention was a response to the challenges associated with 
majoritarian legislation, most significantly the state’s rail experiences.  The delegates worked 
under the belief that the 1835 constitution had failed to check excessive public and legislative 
exuberance.  The resulting debt and embarrassments were legacies against which the delegates 
sought to protect. 
 Even minor concerns over spending animated convention debates.  The convention’s 
first dispute concerned hiring a doorkeeper to help clean the meeting room and the convention’s 
authority to buy stationery and pens.  With the opening of the convention, Delegate Henry 
Fralick argued that he and his fellow delegates “had been elected here because taxes are too 
high,” and that the convention could only spend according to specific authority, which certainly 
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did not allow for custodial services or pens and paper.
519
  The delegates rejected his position on 
those minor expenditures, but did not reject his message.
520
  To control taxation and to forestall 
profligate spending, the delegates would draft a constitution that, among other things, would 
provide for biennial legislative sessions, protect against earmarks, forbid special corporations, 
dramatically reduce allowed state debt, and prohibit state internal improvement expenditures and 
pledges of the state’s credit.  It constitutionally created township governance and separated 
control of the state university from the legislature and governor.
521
  The constitution removed 
much of the legislature’s power to spend to advance economic development.  With its previous 
major focus diverted, the state legislature turned its sights on social concerns, and did so in ways 
that would challenge the state’s new constitutional structure. 
This chapter focuses on one of the legislature’s social efforts – education.  Particularly in 
the area of university education, Michigan pioneered state efforts.  Cooley participated in the 
controversy over the implementation of the state’s higher education policy and participated in the 
struggle over legislative activism in a realm seeming carved from legislative control.  The 
development of education policy thus was an important chapter in the development of Cooley’s 
legislative-limiting philosophy.  By focusing on education, I do not mean to argue that other 
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social concerns were unimportant or that they did not influence Cooley.  To the contrary, areas 
such as temperance, capital punishment, and race relations were also important and deserve 
attention in future works, but only temperance is addressed in this work, and then only in limited 
measure.  That discussion is in Chapter V.  
The delegates at the 1850 convention believed that free public education advanced not 
only individual interests, but also provided a bedrock for democratic governance, economic 
development, and social peace.  To the delegates, free education both advanced and was a 
symbol of equality, where the “barefoot urchin” and the “most fortunate heir” could stand as 
equals.
522
  State controlled university education would elevate those of applied merit (as opposed 
to inherited position) and promised to advance the entire state economically and socially.  To do 
that, the new constitution sought to wrest control of the University of Michigan (“the 
University”), one of the nation’s first public universities, from the politics-infused state 
legislature, and place it under the control of a directly elected board of regents.  Michigan was 
the first state to place constitutional authority over higher education in a board free from 
legislative control – essentially establishing the University as a fourth branch of government.  As 
it would turn out, however, the legislature refused to leave the field, and tried to push its agenda 
against a resistant faculty and board of regents.  The legislature was responding to public 
pressures, something against which the constitutional framework sought to protect.  After years 
of struggle between the branches, the constitutional framework would buckle in response to 
legislative power and popular demands. 
                                                 
522
 E. S. Moore, Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of 




Limiting the Legislature – Michigan’s 1850 Constitution 
 
James Bryce, in his The American Commonwealth, noted that American state 
constitutions, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century, did more than create governing 
frameworks.  They pursued “topics into a minute detail hardly to be looked for in a fundamental 
document.”
523
  Constitutions took on this legislation-like characteristic in an effort to avoid the 
earlier challenges associated with government support of commerce, and internal improvements 
in particular.  Michigan’s 1850 constitutional convention was part of this multi-state trend to 
restrict the perceived legislative overreaching of the 1830s and 40s.  As Larson noted, even in 
New York, the state with the highly successful Erie Canal, the state began “sliding steadily away 
from its public works tradition toward a liberal separation of government power and private 
enterprise.”
524
  Hurst noted, “Soon repenting the broad authority given the legislative branch in 
our earliest state constitutions, substantial interests pressed successfully for limitations written 
into constitutional form.”
525
  An Ohio constitutional delegate encapsulated the feelings of the 
period:  “I wish to see the State government brought back to its simple and appropriate functions, 
[leaving] railroad, canal, turnpike and other corporate associations, to get along upon their own 
credit without any connection or partnership with the State whatever.”
526
  Where earlier 
constitutional structures granted legislators broad discretion, in mid-century the “peoples of the 
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States have come to distrust their respective legislatures.”  Hence mid-century framers across the 
states would not chance future legislative excess and decided “to narrow as far as they 
conveniently can (and sometimes farther) the sphere of the legislature.”
527
   
Michigan’s 1850 constitution would adopt the same narrowing focus as did that of its 
sister states.  Michigan Justice Campbell (during whose tenure the 1850 Constitution applied) 
critiqued the constitution by offering “The most unpleasant features were a too great attention to 
details in grants and limitations of power, which have on some occasions endangered the public 
welfare for lack of discretionary authority in the Legislature.”  Almost incongruently given his 
later legislative-limiting judicial philosophy, Campbell continued, “But a thing which struck 
many persons unpleasantly was the number of provisions which seem to indicate that it was 
supposed the people could not trust their agents and representatives.”
528
  The agents and 
representatives to whom he referred were the legislators and governor.  It was not that the 
delegates rejected representative governance.  To the contrary, they attempted to reframe it to 
avoid what they believed was self-interest, greed, and the challenges of more distant and 
unconnected legislators.  In their efforts to facilitate representative governance, they increased 
the number of elected representatives, as judges, regents, and departmental leaders now were 
directly elected.  So far had the convention’s direct-election philosophy been pushed that one 
delegate sarcastically moved that the constitution require direct election of university faculty.
529
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Limiting the Michigan legislatures’ authority decidedly flowed from the challenges 
associated with government rail ownership.  Governor Ransom suggested that a quasi-
constitutional limitation on legislative authority had occurred in 1846 with the privatization of 
the rail lines.  In response to legislation that would, in effect, grant further credit to the privatized 
Southern railroad, Ransom protested that such acts were “entirely at war with the policy adopted 
in 1846, when our public works were sold, which received the undivided approval of the 
people.”
530
  The legislature, governor, and most importantly, “the people” had instituted a new 
governing policy.  Ransom argued for limiting legislative authority to aid infrastructure, 
notwithstanding then applicable constitutional language requiring that the state develop internal 
improvements.  To Ransom, circumstances and public acclaim had both supplanted 
constitutional requirements and placed implied limitations on legislative power.  Whether he felt 
those forces changed the constitution itself, or were extra-constitutional limitations, is unclear.  
To Ransom, however, the experiences associated with the state’s rail failure resulted in a 
limitation on legislative power. 
Ransom’s successor, John S. Barry, felt the same way about activist legislatures.  A few 
months prior to the delegates’ 1850 journey to Lansing, Barry set the tone for the upcoming 
convention by chastising the legislature.  “Excessive and unwise legislation has, perhaps more 
than any other cause, retarded the prosperity of the State; and protracted sessions of the 
legislature have caused a great and wasteful expenditure of public money.”  Claiming a 
“progress made in the science of legislation,” Barry furnished his solution – constitutionally 
limiting legislative power.  He then ended his address by telling the legislators that the state 
required “only a short sacrifice” of their time, as Michigan required little new legislation.  Pass a 
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few pieces of legislation and go home.  Barry was expressing what many felt: the legislature 
threatened state advancement.  In Michigan’s short history, its professed governing philosophy 
had traveled from a desire “to meet any public demands which may be necessary”
531
 to a feeling 
that government hindered progress.   
The formal change of constitutional structures had begun on March 12, 1849 with a 
legislative joint resolution supporting a vote to approve a constitutional convention.  With the 
electorate’s overwhelming approval (33,193 yeas and 4,095 nays), the convention met in July 
1850.  Its records evidence an overwhelming distrust of the legislature and a commitment to 
avoid the perceived mistakes associated with government involvement in the economy (internal 
improvements, special corporate charters, and lending of credit, for example).  According to 
Cooley, the 1848 European Revolutions also contributed to the distrust of the legislature.
532
  He 
offered that, “radicalism was in the air the world over, and discontent with existing institutions 
was rife in every civilized country.”  He noted that, “everywhere the aspiration of the people was 
for greater liberty and more privileges to the individual and less power to the rulers.”
533
  In some 
measure, Cooley’s statement evidenced a belief that power was a zero-sum game:  Grant power 
to the government and thereby take it from the people.     
The infectious ideas about American state excesses and European revolutionary liberty 
animated Americans’ thoughts about their government.  In response to historic domestic 
challenges and the seeping ideas of individualism, the Michigan drafters proposed, and the voters 
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approved (by a margin of 26,736), among other things, biennial legislative sessions, limits on 
legislator pay, limits on bill introductions, prohibitions on special corporate creation, limits on 
state debt, prohibitions on state internal improvement participation and, as discussed below, 
revamping the state’s educational system. 
A spirit of liberty and equality underlay much of the discussion and many of the 
provisions of the constitution.  The goal in limiting the legislature was to expand and protect 
liberty and equal opportunity by averting short-sighted and self-serving legislation.”
534
  The 
delegates were products of their time and, accordingly, they focused on the liberty and equality 
interests of adult white males.  They failed to afford the same level of concern to African 
Americans and women (although they expanded married women’s property rights).
535
  That 
equality concern played a significant role in the state’s education efforts, particularly with 
respect to primary school education.  As later chapters will address, those equality concerns 
would join with bubbling liberty and rights concerns to help forge judicial doctrines that sought 
to limit what the courts construed as legislative overreaching.  
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The Rise of Public Education in Michigan  
 
The previous chapter discussed early Michigan efforts to develop and support the state’s 
internal improvement system.  As noted, at first the executive, legislature, and residents felt the 
transportation system was too important to be left to the hands of private industry.  That 
experiment in government economic control did not pass the test of experience.  Notwithstanding 
that failure, Michigan’s government pressed for government control of one other major sector, 
and did so with great success – education.  Particularly with respect to higher education, 
Michigan was a national leader in providing education opportunities to its residents.  Its 
successes were not a foregone conclusion.  The private sector could provide, and had provided, 
effective common and higher education in other states.  Moreover, Michigan’s politics and 
economic scarcity erected roadblocks to education advancement.  Notwithstanding those early 
challenges, Michigan would develop a publicly funded and controlled education system, 
spanning from common school to university.
536
  Where the notion of public funding and control 
had died with respect to internal improvements, it thrived in the education sector, as legislators 
and constitutional framers toiled to advance the general welfare and equality interests of 
Michigan’s citizens. 
Early Education Efforts 
 
Modern general education significantly predated Michigan.  As Lee Soltow and Edward 
Stevens noted in their The Rise of Literacy and the Common Schools in the United States, 
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religious concerns and the associated drives for social control drove early-modern education 
efforts.  In the early American republic “as in Great Britain, the most notable examples” of the 
rise of literacy for social control “occurred as part of the sweeping missionary activities of 
evangelical Protestantism.”  To those religiously motivated educators, literacy promoted respect 
for property rights, social stability, crime prevention, and moral development.  In the 1820s, the 
Sunday school situs of instruction began to move to government-supported schools, open to all 
children in the community; and the central focus of education began to change from religion and 




 Universities and common schools are connected.  If students are not provided appropriate 
basic education, few will develop the intellectual basis upon which to address the substance of 
higher education.  That does not mean, however, that public support for these two educational 
phases aligned, as the argument for public financing differs between common schools and 
universities.  As one delegate at the 1850 convention described it, primary education concerned 
equality of all people while university education concerned elites.
538
  Both systems are addressed 
here, but particular focus is placed on the University, as Michigan was the leader in public 
university education.  More importantly, the state’s efforts to develop the University exposed the 
challenges faced when majority will and constitutional structure collide.    
In 1850, Michigan took a unique step in developing its educational system.  It gave 
constitutional grounding and independence to its university.  While its mechanism of 
constitutional separation was innovative, the idea that higher education should be separate from 
political forces was longstanding, going back to the ninth century.  According to Lyman Glenny 
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and Thomas Dalglish, in most matters medieval universities were left to govern themselves.  
That space between the university and the governing powers – the church and the state – was a 
“social fact” premised on the nature of the university, but was not a structural separation.  That 
de facto separation, however, often suffered as church and/or state pressured for control, 
particularly when they struggled against each other for governing control of their followers.
539
  
Notwithstanding the social fact of separation, both the state and church provided support for the 
development and operation of universities, with great universities in such places as Bologna, 
Cambridge, Leyden, Oxford, Pavia, and Paris all receiving considerable government and/or 
church patronage.  
During the American colonial period, religiously focused private interests most 
frequently created and ran the universities.  The first, Harvard College, trained Congregationalist 
and Unitarian clergy as its earliest priorities.  Despite its private nature, the college was 
dependent on public funds.  From Harvard’s beginning in 1636, the Massachusetts legislature 
taxed residents to support the college.  The first appropriation of £800 required a tax of one-half 
dollar on the 4000 Massachusetts inhabitants.  The legislature also earmarked ferry incomes to 
provide funds to the college.
540
  Dartmouth College, the subject of John Marshall’s landmark 
opinion in Dartmouth College v Woodward, also enjoyed extensive public support.
541
  Despite 
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that support, Marshall expressed a concern that with further influence, politics could corrode the 
higher education mission of universities.  He protested that the legislature had reorganized the 
university’s governance “in such a manner, as to convert a literary institution moulded according 
to the will of its founders . . . into a machine entirely subservient to the will of the 
government.”
542  
  With that decision, state efforts to democratize existing private universities 
ended.  In response to that inability, states began to create public universities.  In the wake of 
Dartmouth, the states soon created the Universities of North Carolina, Vermont, Indiana, 
Alabama, and Michigan.  The University of Virginia was created the same year as Dartmouth.
543
   
Even as Marshall suggested that public control could undermine higher education, 
governments were pressing forward to support education on multiple levels.  With its first efforts 
at national governance, the Confederation Congress advanced government support of education.  
The 1785 “Ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing of lands in the western country” set 
aside lot number 16 in every township in the Northwest Territories to support schools.
544
  The 
Northwest Ordinance provided “Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged,” a phrase inscribed on a central building at the University.
545
  Ten days after 
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passage of the Ordinance, Congress provided that lot 16 “be given perpetually for the purpose 
and maintenance of the public schools within the township.”  Washington’s Farewell Address 
urged the people to promote “as an object of common importance, Institutions for the general 
diffusion of knowledge.”  He then tied education to an enlightened electorate, required for 
democratic governance.  Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, sought “to provide an 
education adapted to the years, to the capacity, and to the condition of everyone, and directed to 
their freedom and happiness.”  He proposed public education from grammar school to the 
university as a requirement of democratic governance.
546
  He later voiced, “If a nation expects to 
be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.”
547
  
To early leaders, education was both a requirement for and of American democratic governance.  
Aspirations and achievement often diverge, and they did with respect to public education.  
On the collegiate level, interest group politics were the primary barrier.  Strong church-focused 
organizations controlled higher education in the East.  Unable to finance colleges in the South, 
churches worked to inhibit the development of secular state institutions.  Governments in the 
areas of the Northwest Territories lacked the controls, sophistication, and funding to overcome 
church concerns over secular institutions of higher learning.  “Thus, almost everywhere, active 
sectarian opposition proved for many years the most effective factor preventing any great degree 
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of college and university support by the states.”
548
  Even when government could support 
universities, throughout most of the Northwest Territories, religious interests pushed those 
universities to adopt a religious cast.  Sectarian pressures certainly played a role in the muted 
beginnings of the University (and the constitutional decisions of 1850) but Michigan’s early 
focus on a state-controlled, secular university forestalled many of the denominational challenges 
that elsewhere undermined the government efforts.
549
  As it turned out, Michigan’s biggest 
encumbrance was funding.  Educational plans exceeded financial means. 
In 1817, the year the University claims as its founding, Woodward proposed and the 
governor and judges adopted, “An Act to establish the Catholepistemiad, or University of 
Michigania.”
550
  The act was impractically grand; calling for an educational system led by a 
university fed by public schools (those schools were referred to as “common schools”).
551
  The 
system conceived of a centralized educational system directed by a few appointed officials that 
was to be paid for by a 15% tax increase.  Another act in 1821 established the University of 
Michigan, supplanting the 1817 act.  All of the judges and the governor signed the act, except for 
Woodward.  He perhaps preferred the more aristocratic requirements of the Catholepistemiad 
act.  An appointed board of trusties was to control the University.  Government had few 
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resources, the territory had few people, and little was done to implement the statutes.
552
  The 
“actions by the territorial government were, as a matter of fact, little more than stage settings for 
future educational developments in Michigan.”
553
  But they, and a series of territory and national 
laws that granted lands to endow the University and common schools, led to the first, completely 
non-sectarian, state-educational system in the nation.
554
 
Recognizing that the “wealthy will provide for their own children,” Territory Governor 
Cass petitioned the legislature in 1826 to develop a publically supported common-school system 
that would serve “all who require instruction, and who have not the means of obtaining it.”  To 
Cass, free governance required such public action.
555
  In 1827, the legislative council responded.  
It provided that townships of a particular size should provide for common schools, teach certain 
subjects, and employ instructors of a determined quality and morality.  The legislature authorized 
residents to vote for taxes to build and maintain schoolhouses.  Parents of students were to 
provide wood (called a “fuel tax”) as their fee for attending, although inability to pay would not 
prohibit a child from attending.  The act, however, provided only the structure and rules around 
education.  Its last clause provided “nothing in this act contained shall be construed as to make it 
obligatory” for a township to construct and operate a school.
556
  The law, like many of the time, 
was grand in design but short in practical application, and it is unclear whether any school was 
created under it.   
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A revised law was passed in 1829, but it was unsatisfactory – at least to Cass. Believing 
that the education law was “too complicated for practical operation,” Cass proposed statewide 
taxes to support common schools.  To him, the “preservation of morals and religion,” and the 
“cultivation of the heart and intellect” required government action.  He believed that informed 
public opinion and democratic governance relied on universal education.
557
  In 1833, the 
legislature replaced the 1829 law with a more modest common education requirement.
558
  Even 
then, public common schools developed slowly.  In Detroit, the state’s then capital, the first fully 
public school was organized in 1838, and then in only one ward.  Until 1841, the other wards 
refused to tax themselves to provide for schools.  At that time, about two-thirds of Detroit’s 
school age children went without any formal education.
559
  Even then, the schools most often 
still charged tuition to families attending the schools.  Buley explained that collecting financial 
tuition often was difficult.  Accordingly, “Three or four raccoon skins, a calf, a barrel of 
whiskey, or a half-dozen well cured hams were, directly or indirectly, currency of the realm in 
the marts of Latin and moral philosophy as well as at the general store.”
560
    
In practical effect, Michigan started its long-lasting efforts to establish public education 
with its 1835 constitution.  The state faced significant impediments to developing a coordinated 
education system.  Michigan’s deep wilderness made an integrated, or even standard, public 
education system difficult.  As John Pierce, one of the founders of Michigan’s education system, 
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recalled, “We had no canals, no railroads; even the old slow coach was scarcely to be found.  We 
had the lumber wagon and the Indian trail.  We forded rivers, waded marshes, and when night 
came, if we found a shanty with a piece of old carpet for a door we turned in for the night, and all 
were satisfied.”  Nevertheless, the thirst for education was palpable.  Pierce continued, “But, 
notwithstanding all this, the people then here came mostly from the region of school-houses, and 
were anxious for schools.”  And, he suggested, as these schools developed, Michigan became 
more attractive to settlers.
561
   
Given the population’s drive for education, Pierce and Isaac Crary (the convention’s 
chairman of the committee on education, Michigan’s first representative to Congress, and 
founder of Michigan’s educational system with Pierce) proposed, and the drafters of the 1835 
constitution accepted, an education system premised on the Prussian system – with a central 
authority coordinating educational policy from the primary levels through the university.
562
  To 
accomplish that, the constitution provided for a superintendent of public instruction (the first 
constitutionally created education leader in the nation), and instructed that the legislature shall 
promote “intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvements.”  It provided for a “system of 
common schools,” funded by the revenue from the sale of federally granted lands.  The 
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University similarly was to be funded by interest on the proceeds from the sale of lands granted 
for the University’s support.
563
  That meant the funds would go to the one state university rather 
than be parsed among multiple institutions of higher learning.  Further, by calling for a state-
controlled system, the constitution infixed a secular direction on Michigan’s educational future.  
In consequence, instruction would move away from moral and biblical studies.
564
 
In establishing a state fund for common school education (the “Primary School Fund”),
565
 
Michigan through its constitution and through the federal legislation admitting it into the union, 
had done something unique.  Other state admission statutes provided that townships control the 
proceeds from the education-dedicated land in their borders.  As a state, Michigan controlled 
those funds, which derived from a donation of over one million acres.  This presented several 
distinct opportunities.  First, centralized decision-making allowed for greater control on the sale 
of land, allowing Michigan to enjoy greater financial returns from those sales than did its sister 
states.
566
  Second, funds could be disbursed based on need.  As noted by Francis Shearman, the 
superintendent of public instruction from 1849-54: “In taking the grant to the State, there was a 
higher principle of equity involved in relation to the whole people” than would have been the 
case if the funds had been distributed to townships in relation to the amounts received from land 
sales therein.
567
  Moreover, the system allowed for “a state school system rather than a series of 
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local systems of schools.”
568
  Those results were to prove important as Michigan could strive to 
provide equal educational opportunity to a disparate population. 
In his first annual address as an elected governor, Mason in 1836, set the tone for the 
state’s future educational philosophy and, with time, efforts.  Education was about democracy 
and equality.  He urged, “Here the right of all are equal, and the people themselves are the 
primary source of all power,” and continued, “Public opinion directs the course which our 
government pursues; and, so long as the people are enlightened, that direction will never be 
misgiven.”  Accordingly, Mason proposed development of a “uniform and liberal system of 
common schools . . . open to all classes, as the surest basis of public happiness and prosperity.” 
As with his efforts on internal improvements, the answer was a statewide, government directed 
program – and like the internal improvement projects, Mason believed that the young state had 
resources “ample for all our [education] purposes.”
569
 
With its admission in 1837, the legislature accelerated the state’s involvement in 
education.  In March, it authorized the superintendent of public instruction to sell the land 
designated for schools and to allocate the proceeds to the townships to build and operate schools.  
The legislation set forth the roles and obligations of primary school officials and those of 
township officials.  The Primary School Fund was apportioned based upon the number of 
students in each district (not the revenue received, as in other states).  The legislature also 
authorized the University regents to begin construction of the University in Ann Arbor, and 
granted the University a $100,000 loan for that building.
570
  University operations were to be 
funded from the interest on the proceeds from the sale of the donated lands (the “University 
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Fund”), which would finance nearly all university functions until 1869.  The legislature also 
enacted an organic law to create and operate the University.  The constitution had left complete 
power in the legislature to create and operate the University, and the legislature pursued that 
effort.
571
  At its core, the legislation demonstrated the state’s interest in educational opportunity.  
Section 12 read, “The fee of admission to the university shall never exceed ten dollars; and it 
shall be open to all persons resident in this state, who may wish to avail themselves of its 
advantages, without charge of tuition.”
 572
  The school largely was non-sectarian, as the 
legislature had forbidden any exclusion of administrators, faculty, or students on religious 
grounds.
573
  The act created a board of regents, with a chancellor who would be the board’s ex 
officio president.  Those regents, nominated by the governor, would strive to build a first class 
university.  However, the appointees largely were political and lacked the knowledge, or the 
focus, to achieve that objective.
574
   
The regents held their first meeting in 1837 and, envisioning multiple branches, they 
authorized eight university sites. (The University was the only body that could grant college 
degrees).  Funding challenges eventually forced the closure of the branches save for the Ann 
Arbor facilities.  The regents appointed Asa Gray as the University’s first faculty member.  
Lacking buildings or students, Gray left for Europe to collect books for the not yet built 
university library.  After he had collected about 3,700 books, Gray returned to a destitute 
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university and state.  Soon, Governor Woodbridge proposed that Gray accept a one-year 
suspension of salary.  Gray declined the offer and left for Harvard, having taught no classes.
575
  
In some measure, Gray was a casualty of a state that had financially overextended itself, 
particularly because of its internal improvement projects.  But he was also a victim of a 
geographically distant and inattentive board of regents.  Their priorities lay elsewhere. 
In 1840, Woodbridge entered office and, in his first message to the legislature, warned of 
“the startling fact, that, from the period of its commencement, our expenditures for the ordinary 
operations of the government have far exceeded its fixed and ordinary income.”
576
  In aligning 
expenditures with revenue, one-month later Woodbridge proposed to cut education expenses by, 
among other things, offering “that the salary of the Superintendent of Public Instruction should 
be greatly reduced,” and transferring the collection of the University and Primary School Funds 
to the state auditor general and the state treasurer.
577
  Like Gray, the superintendent of public 
instruction resigned. Whether motivated by the need for fiscal retrenchment or by the desire for 
political control over education, Woodbridge’s actions accomplished both goals.  The governor 
now had effective control over education policy and spending. 
Construction of the University continued and in 1841, the University opened its doors.  It 
did so without much fanfare or enthusiasm.  As Governor Barry (Woodbridge had become a U.S. 
Senator), declared “Well, we’ve got buildings . . . I don’t think they’re good for anything else, so 
we might as well declare the University open.”
578
  Not surprisingly, a select committee of the 
legislature found government support for education lacking.  Its report, especially concerning the 
University, set the foundation for later constitutional changes designed to free the University 
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from political influences.  That 1840 report’s conclusion, submitted before the first student 
attended class, was startling: Political interference undermined university development and 
threatened the very possibility of effective public higher education.  Starting with the board of 
regents, they submitted: 
A new board of trustees not knowing well what to do, generally begins 
by undoing and disorganizing all that has been done before.  At first they dig 
up the seed a few times, to see that it is going to come up, and after it appears 
above the surface, they must pull it up to see that the roots are sound, and they 
pull it up again to see if there is sufficient root to support so vigorous branches, 
and then pull it up again to see why it looks so sickly and pining, and finally to 




The committee suggested something more nefarious than an uninitiated board.  It warned that 
those “many who would hope to profit from despoiling the University of its lands, and its funds,” 
posed a threat to public higher education.  This could not be allowed as “the university is a trust 
too sacred to be made the foot-ball of party” and accordingly needed to “be cut loose from all 
connection with politics.”
580
  It then proposed that the University be run by a “permanent board 
of well known individuals [given] the entire responsibility” of running the University.
581
  The 
dissenting report accepted nearly all the conclusions save for the committee-recommended life 
tenure for regents.  All agreed, politics and higher education poorly mix. 
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 As noted, most of the Northeast’s institutions of higher learning were founded by or in 
support of religious organizations.  This was not the case in Michigan.  As Pierce advocated in 
1838, Michigan’s leaders designed the University “be such as to secure the confidence of the 
liberal minded of all denominations, and then it might be expected that they will give it 
countenance and support.”
582
  That support was not commonly forthcoming, as advocates of 
secular higher education protested that non-affiliation would undermine needed enthusiasm for 
the school.  Not with the hoped-for applause, clergy responded with disdain to a secular 
university.  Protesting that the governor had failed to appoint clergy to the board of regents, “the 
university was accused by church people of being ungodly.”
583
  In response, the University set 
up a faculty house for each of four denominations – Baptists, Episcopalians, Methodist, and 
Presbyterians – and frequently hired with an eye to distributing faculty seats to each 
denomination.  In turn, each denomination would have a member sit for a one-year term as 
university chancellor.  Inevitably, this effort to appease (and to avoid the domination by one sect) 
resulted in discontinuous leadership. 
With challenges rising, the superintendent of public instruction convened a board of 
visitors to review the state of the University.  Its 1847 report suggested changes in governance in 
order to reach the highest level of achievement (it used Yale as that benchmark).  The committee 
urged that the government “must in no case allow political considerations to make merchandize 
of the interest of the University.”  That its focus distilled to the financial is no surprise.  In 1847, 
Michigan remained in its financial crisis.  It had just sold the railroads, and with the battle over 
bond default and repudiation still ripe, the state was searching for revenue sources.  With this in 
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mind, the committee warned against government invasion of the University Fund.  “Let the hand 
that for sinister purposes would lay hold of that or any other fund set apart to the education of 
our youth, be palsied in the touch; let the tongue of him who would thus betray his trust and his 
country, cleave to the roof of his mouth.”
584
  With the legislature responsible for the funds, 
University education faced the risk of differing legislative priorities.
585
 
At about this time, the University faced an internally grown crisis that would pit student 
calls for liberty against traditional faculty prerogatives.  That crisis – commonly called the 
“fraternity war” – began largely in consequence of faculty’s belief that its responsibility included 
assuring student morals and values.  With that mission in mind, one day in 1846 Andrew Ten 
Brook, Professor of Morals and Intellectual Philosophy, covertly followed students living with 
him into the woods surrounding Ann Arbor.  (Some faculty members supplemented their income 
by boarding students.)  The students were sneaking away to a cabin hidden in those woods.  Ten 
Brook and others questioned the students about their activities.  At first, the students refused to 
disclose what they were doing but it soon came out that they belonged to fraternities that, to the 
faculty’s mind, violated University Rule 20.  That rule required faculty approval of all student 
organizations.  Faculty did not approve of fraternities as they believed that fraternities threatened 
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the University by employing “the despotic power of disorder and savagism” that could bring a 
plague of “debauchery, drunkenness, pugilism and dueling” to the University.
586
  
 The University demanded that the students withdraw from fraternity membership and 
activity, but without strong University leadership, (the chancellorship shifted every year), the 
faculty was unable to force compliance.
587
  Instead, it demanded that the fraternities admit no 
new members, thinking that by force of matriculation, the threat would subside in the coming 
four years.  Upon learning that underclassmen continued to join these societies, the faculty on 
December 19, 1849 issued an ultimatum – either renounce fraternity membership or stay home 
after the Christmas break.  The students regarded the ultimatum with some disfavor, a mood 
sensed by the faculty.  As Ten Brook noted, “the occasion, it must be admitted was not marked 
by quiet and respectful attention.”
588
  Students noisily protested, setting outhouses and 
woodshops ablaze.  The faculty responded by expelling those who failed to renounce 
membership.  Soon students and their families expanded the conversation by publicly protesting 
that the University had violated their speech and assembly rights.    
 Faculty disagreed, believing that the University should be a sacred space for learning and 
that students, by their presence, had agreed to the school rules. Ten Brook argued that the 
students had been stirred up by “influences especially, coming from abroad” (these were the 
times of European revolution) and, in an aristocratic fashion, blamed increased student unrest on 
the expanded admission of students.
589
  A committee of regents agreed and argued “obedience on 
the part of students to the laws enacted by the Regents is as necessary to the existence of the 
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University as obedience to the laws enacted by the Legislature.”  That committee expressed 
concern that an absence of strong supervision would allow students of “ripened intellect and 
loose morals” to influence the “minds of those of tender age.”
590
  Essentially, it argued that the 
University sat in loco parentis to attending students (a position later revisited in discussions over 
admitting female applicants).  
 Nevertheless, the faculty, or at least Ten Brook, understood that as more students entered 
the world of higher education, calls for individual freedom would increase.
591
  The students 
posited such an argument in their petitions to the legislature.  Students had, they argued, natural 
rights to join together; rights that other universities respected through their unwillingness to 
enforce their similar anti-secret society rules.  The solution to the University’s intransigence was 
structural change.  A memorial drafted by students suggested that the regents, “and through them 
the faculty, be brought nearer to the people, and more immediately amenable to them.”  The 
memorial continued, “Let some distinguished man be placed at the head of the institution as 
chancellor who can give it character and standing.”
592
 Ann Arbor State Senator William Finley 
proposed legislation for an independent, directly elected board of regents, but the bill failed to 
pass.  With the legislature unwilling to act, the people, through their constitutional convention 
delegates did.  Soon University governance would change along the lines suggested by the 
students. 
 Ultimately, the university reinstated the fraternities, although many of the expelled 
students never returned.  Many of the faculty, like Ten Brook, held to their paternalistic and 
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authoritarian positions, while the students would continue to embrace the individualistic ideas 
that had animated their conflict with the faculty.
593
  As a postscript, three members of the faculty 
joined to force Ten Brook to resign, a capitulation Ten Brook later classified as “a great blunder 
and an act of injustice to the University.”
594
  Other faculty members would then force those three 
to resign.  Ten Brook would later return to the University as its librarian and historian.  The 
home from which he followed the students to the cabin eventually was leveled.  In its place 
resides the Phi Delta Theta fraternity.  
As the university students claimed liberty interests, those advocating common school 
development pressed equality principles.  To some extent, the development of those common 
schools was the responsibility of the University, pursuant to the Prussian educational principles 
advanced by Pierce and Crary and propounded in the 1835 constitution.
595
  In that capacity, the 
University was to help establish the common schools.
596
  Much of the day’s discussion 
concerned the inability of the University to thrive without strong basic education.  For example, 
the board of visitors commented, “In vain do you fill your Professors’ chairs with men of the 
highest eminence, if the youth who resort to them for instruction must be fed with milk instead of 
meat.”
597
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The Drive for Free Common School Education 
 
The central focus of common school education was how lower-level education facilitated 
the equity needs of democratic governance.  This equity concern did not start in Michigan nor 
was it one of recent vintage. William Manning, a Massachusetts farmer, tavern keeper, and 
political author during the early years of the republic, captured the equality principles underlying 
public education.  ‘“Larning is of the greatest importance to the seport of a free government,” he 
wrote, “& to prevent this the few are always crying up the advantages of costly collages, national 
acadimyes & grammer schools, in ordir to make places for men to live without work, & so 
strengthen their party.  But are always opposed to cheep schools & woman schools, the ondly or 
prinsaple means by which larning is spred amongue the Many.”’
598
  To Manning, education was 
the right of every citizen, not just the affluent.  Those same equity principles informed early 
Michigan education efforts.  Not surprisingly those principles drove other governmental 
objectives as well.  It is worth recalling Mason’s belief, and the legislature’s concurrence, that 
private capital could not be trusted with so important an effort as internal improvements.  It was 
incumbent on government to provide transport services to all state residents and to assure that 
those services were affordable to all.  Internal improvements, like education, would be a 
fundamental component of republican governance, driven by and for the interests of all citizens. 
As Pierce noted, to advance that equity principle, early education efforts “not only 
contemplate[d] but attempt[ed] to provide for the extension of education to every individual in 
the republic.”  He continued, “as the desire of improvement is universal, why not extend the 
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blessings of education to every individual in every class?”
599
  But ambitions and achievements 
diverge, and did so with respect to early Michigan education.  The new superintendent of public 
instruction, Franklin Sawyer, noted in his 1842 report to the legislature that public schools were 
not universally available across the state.
600
  Only 1486 of 2300 districts (about 65%) had those 
schools.  The reasons involved economic challenges.  Michigan government’s contribution for 
the common schools was the Primary School Fund, an insufficient fund that Sawyer 
characterized as a “doubtful reed to lean upon.”
601
  To make up the deficiencies, schools charged 
the parents of students according to the number of days they attended school.
602
  This charge, 
called a “rate bill,” could present a challenge particularly to non-affluent families.  In 1850, 
across the nation, these rate bills accounted for about twenty percent of public school funding.  
Given that economic burden and that school attendance was not required, the equalizing impact 
of education suffered as families failed to avail themselves of educational opportunities.
 603
   
Nevertheless, the aspiration was strong, and as the 1850 constitutional debates will demonstrate, 
was widely accepted across the state. 
Education and the 1850 Constitution 
 
Education issues occupied notable space during the 1850 constitutional convention.  
During their deliberations, the delegates debated over common school education’s impact on 
equality, democracy, taxes, and personal and economic advances.  The delegates agreed about 
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the need for free public education.
604
  E.S. Moore, a merchant from St. Joseph spoke eloquently 
not only of the equalizing possibilities of education, but also about education and democracy.  
Where on earth is there such a practical demonstration of the doctrine that ‘all 
men are born free and equal,’ as in the school house under a free school system 
– where every barefooted urchin may have the same teacher, the same books, 
and sit on the same seat with the most fortunate heir in the town – may stand at 
the head of his class and take the precedence over all that wealth and rank can 
array against him, if only God has given him the better mind, or the more 
diligent disposition?  
  
Moore continued, discussing how education promotes self-esteem and reflection.  “It ennobles 
and encourages the poor boy, and fires him with such thoughts of the dignity of a human soul 
that tyrants can never after oppress him with impunity.  It corrects, too, the thoughtlessness of 
the rich by the standard of mind, and teaches them to recokon rank by the Roman rule of 
merit.”
605
  Others weighed in, speaking about the advantages to society. “It is cheaper to provide 
schools than penitentiaries;” “the money spent on education will be saved by the less demand for 
penitentiaries, alms houses, and the expense of holding courts;” and  “Education . . . has opened 
every avenue to industry; suppressed crime; and expanded the energy of all.”
606
  
It was important that all, especially the unwilling, be educated.  As miller Joseph 
Williams urged:  “Now, if we need and want a free school system at all, we want it most for 
those districts that would meet its requisitions with the greatest reluctance.  The most backward, 
the most ignorant, the most indifferent, are the very portion of the population we wish to 
enlighten.”  He then spoke in a way that would later become anathema to state policy, “The State 
wishes to stretch its paternal arm around them.  It wishes to educate all, willing and 
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  In the end, it was the state’s responsibility to provide free and public common 
school education, not only to advance the individual and the cause of equality, but to support 
commerce, safety, wealth, and general social development.  The delegates agreed – the state’s 
youth must enjoy free public education. 
Thomas Cooley did not participate in the convention but, as Cooley scholar Alan Jones 
noted, he followed and accepted the equal rights views flowing through much of the convention 
debate.  Jones referenced Cooley’s speech in 1851 where he commented on the importance of 
public education: 
The first and the most important of these [reforms] is the establishment of a 
system of education of all classes of all the people – of a system which does 
not say to the people, “you shall be furnished with the means of education if 
you have the wealth to purchase them” – but which says, “The interest, the 
safety, the glory of the state demands that she furnish the means of instruction 
to all, and especially that in her institutions of learning, the distinctions of 





Jones gleaned from the above-stated equality argument that Cooley then held to principles 
requiring limited government that did not have the power to redistribute wealth.
609
 Here, he may 
have missed the mark.  In some measure, public education by its nature demands wealth 
redistribution.  It requires that a large pool of taxpayers pay regardless of their status as parents 
of schoolchildren.  That requires not only a redistribution of wealth, but also a fairly robust 
government structure.  As James McGregor Burns would not of public education, that was “pure 
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   Of course, “free” education meant that taxpayers must pay.  That burden fell 
mainly on property owners.  On this issue, delegate consensus ended as questions of educational 
equality clashed with property interests.  Some, like farmer Nathan Pierce, from Calhoun 
County, argued for a statewide property tax, allowing government to provide equal funding and 
equal education across the state.  He posited, “If there are one hundred children to be educated in 
Barry County, and if there are four times that number in Lenawee County, with no more means 
to be taxed, then I say that the country of Barry should contribute her part; and I think that a 
different course would be improper and unfair.”
611
  D. C. Walker, a lawyer from Romeo agreed, 
suggesting that education was a statewide burden to which all should contribute.  Otherwise, “It 
might be said that the man who had ten children should work ten times the highway tax as the 
man who has not children, He travels the road ten times as much.  So with poor house; so with 
courts; so with prisons; for the wealthy, honest man, with no children, might say, I don’t intend 
to commit crime; I want no poor house; I have no trials in the courts; let them support them that 
may use them.”  He believed education provided “a general benefit to the whole community,” 
and the whole community must pay based upon property ownership.
612
 
Others, particularly those representing large landholders in sparsely populated areas, did 
not wish to support lower contributing city dwellers.  J.W. T. Orr, a farmer from Barry, 
represented a township of few residents but valuable property.  He framed the issue as “rob[bing] 
the new and sparsely populated counties of this State of a portion of the money raised in such 
counties, for educational purposes, and giv[ing] it to the older and more densely settled portions 
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of the State.”  Orr classified that transfer as “unjust and oppressive.”
613
  Others agreed, pressing 
local funding and completely local school systems. Just as with pauper relief and criminal 
prosecutions, J. G. Cornell, a physician from Jackson argued, schools should be locally financed 
and controlled.  He was skeptical of the poor who were “universally in favor” of taking the 
property from the wealthy to benefit their schools.
614
 
If preferences can be gleaned from the number of words employed and speeches given, 
then delegates preferred a statewide tax with equal educational spending and opportunity for all 
students.  But another issue intervened and forestalled adoption of specific constitutional 
language on common school funding and control.  Underlying much of the debate, including on 
common schools, was the state legislature’s role in future governance.  As Justice Campbell 
noted, the belief that “the people could not trust their agents and representatives” animated many 
of the 1850 constitution’s provisions.
615
  John Pierce applied that distrust to the common school 
debate: “We have so much distrust of future legislators that we cannot adopt a system that will 
be satisfactory” for how to pay for the schools.
616
  Despite that distrust, he then suggested that 
the constitution require free schools and leave the financing mechanism to future legislatures.  
Unable to agree on funding, the delegates did just that.  They proposed, and the voters approved, 
that “The legislature shall, within five years from the adoption of this constitution, provide for 
and establish a system of common schools, whereby a school shall be kept without charge for 
tuition”
617
  The funding and control issues remained open. 
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Recognizing the leadership obligation to provide free education in five years, in his 1851 
Annual Message, Barry called the legislature to action.  Advocating education for all, Barry 
noted the challenges for the poor.  “Though hitherto the charge of tuition has always been 
remitted to those not able to pay, yet, for a sentiment of delicacy or pride, the poor have not, in 
all cases, sent their children to school.”  He then sought to shrug aside the biggest challenge --
taxation.  Barry argued that a “complaint of taxation, for the purpose of education, has scarcely 
ever been made,” claiming “all residents know that education protected property.” His proposal – 
a statewide tax.
618
   
The legislature responded by providing that common schools would be financed through 
1) income from the Primary School Fund (it held about $811,000 in 1852), 2) a two mill tax on 
the property in each township, and 3) an additional tax to raise one dollar per student, if 
approved by district voters.
619
  An 1852 law also provided for a rate bill to make up any 
deficiency and, in that sense, ignored the free-schooling intent of the constitution.  In that 
respect, the 1852 law would require change in the next three years to honor the constitutional 
requirements.
620
  The state set the obligation, but the locality set policy.  Equality interests for 
statewide equal education deferred to local property interests.  Tax money collected in a district 
stayed in that district, so education eventually was provided for all, but not equally.
621
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The debate over common school funding and control unveiled several mid-century 
tensions.  At the same time many called for government activism to create equal educational 
opportunities, a rising chorus sought to define “equality” within narrower geographic bounds.  
Those providing the wealth wished to employ that wealth to advance local interests. To be sure, 
their tax payments were higher, as the property taxes required that large property holders pay 
more.  The result of local use was that students in wealthy districts would enjoy greater resources 
– and by extension, educational opportunities – than students in the densely populated, less 
property-affluent areas.  The debates also suggest an older-urban, newer-rural split, with the 
newer-rural areas protesting against taxes that benefit the older-urban areas.  To the newer/rural 
residents, statewide educational equality interests were secondary to their liberty interest 
associated with private property.  To those newer affluent residents, group needs should not 
overwhelm individual rights, and equality principles should not subordinate liberty interests. 
Localized school financing especially affected poorer rural areas.  Those districts could afford 
only one-room schoolhouses, which limited educational opportunities in comparison with urban 
and/or affluent rural schools that enjoyed larger tax bases.
622
  It is not surprising that children in 
less populated and less affluent areas suffered the lack of common school education.  Soltow and 




Those delegates who wished to constitutionalize a statewide method of education funding 
and control were somewhat vindicated, although certainly disappointed, by the speed at which 
education would become “free.”  Michigan lagged other states when, in 1869, it finally 
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accomplished that end.  It was not until 1871 that the state compelled school attendance.  It was 
not until 1859, that the legislature authorized school districts to establish high schools.  
Financing for those schools came from taxes and, where insufficient, rate bills.  In 1873, three 
Kalamazoo residents brought suit arguing that the district’s high school curriculum taught 
subjects not promoting the public’s benefit and, therefore, public funding was inappropriate.  
While there is some indication that the case was brought as a test case by those favoring publicly 
funded high school education, the named plaintiff, former U.S. Senator Charles Stuart, believed 
that government’s right to tax for education ended with primary school.  To Stuart, primary 
school was all the preparation needed “to make a Congressman or President.”  Those wishing 
more education for their children should pay for it themselves.  To Stuart, this was a 
constitutional issue, as the legislature had no power to tax for non-public needs.  Since high 
school education, in his view, was generally unnecessary, legislation concerning it was beyond 
the legislature’s reach.
624
   
The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed.  Cooley, writing for the court in Stuart v School 
District, concluded that providing high school education was a proper role for government and 
ruled in favor of the school district.  Cooley’s opinion aligned with the public purpose standard 
he articulated in Constitutional Limitations (1868) and Salem (1870), discussed at length in 
Chapter VI.  Rather than quickly accepting that educational policy was the province of the 
legislature, Cooley started his analysis by setting forth his philosophy on judicial oversight over 
legislation that employed tax dollars.  Seeming to invite challenges to such legislation, he wrote, 
“It can never be unimportant to know that taxation, even for the most useful or indispensable 
purposes, is warranted by the strict letter of the law.”  Those objecting to government spending 
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“may well be justified by his doubts in asking a legal investigation.”  Consistently with his 
public purpose doctrine, Cooley focused on historic government spaces to determine whether 
taxes for high school spending were appropriate.  Finding that Michigan had historically 
supported secondary education, he found the Kalamazoo School District’s spending 
constitutional.  While Cooley did not specifically employ the term “public purpose,” its 
principles oozed in this opinion.
625
  Despite his close scrutiny of legislative space, Cooley’s 
opinion is marked as a pivotal point in the dramatic expansion of high school education in the 
later portion of the nineteenth century.
626
 
Struggles over Constitutional Separation – The University 
 
Despite differences over funding, wealth transfers, and control, almost all agreed that 
publicly funded common schools advanced the state’s interest and that education should be 
available to all the state’s children.  Delegates looked at the University differently.  Whereas 
common schools sat on the “popular side” and advanced the democratic cause, higher education 
sat on the “aristocratic side” and was not for all.
627
  Even though the governance of the state 
university directly affected few, that governance captured much of the delegates’ attention.  
Ultimately, that discussion incorporated many of the ideas earlier noted and elevated University 
governance to a fourth, independent branch of government – at least constitutionally speaking.
628
  
In accomplishing that, the delegates suggested, and the voters approved, creating a board of 
regents directly elected by the people and investing that board with control over operations and 
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educational policy of the University.  Doing so stripped the legislature’s legal authority over the 
school.  Cooley reflected, “This was felt to be a most valuable and important change: it secured 
steadiness in plan and conservatism in management, and it placed the university beyond the 
dangers that might spring from popular excitements and prejudices, and from political 
overturns.”
629
  This did not mean that the legislature remained remote.  To the contrary, the 
legislature seemed institutionally incapable of withdrawing from directing higher education 
policies and actions.  As it did so, constitutional conflict arose, resulting in a tense relationship 
over competing educational and social values.  That conflict nearly crippled the University of 
Michigan and raised deeper concerns about the viability of state universities generally. 
The 1840 Select Committee on the Condition of the University reported that “when 
legislatures have legislated directly for colleges, their measures have been as fluctuating as the 
changing materials of which the legislatures were composed.”
630
  That sentiment aligned with the 
convention’s general desire to restrict the legislature’s power and gave rise to the nation’s first 
constitutionally independent university.  Late in the convention delegate J. H. Bagg, a physician 
from Detroit referred to legislative control over the University as the only remaining “blot and 
blemish, savoring federalism,” to be addressed in the new constitution.  That blot could not “be 
permitted to reign.”
631
  The delegates agreed that political winds could not be allowed to affect 
the University but some questioned whether alternative forms of governance avoided those 
storms.  If the legislature suffered from political inconsistency, they asked, did not the general 
population also suffer that malady?  And if so, how is the popularly elected leadership of the 
University protected from the fluctuations of public sentiments?   
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There was no recorded discussion of granting regents life tenure as suggested by the 1840 
select committee report.  Instead, the delegates discussed two options.  Robert McClelland, a 
member of the state house of representatives and a University regent (he was also elected 
governor in 1851) believed the status quo worked best.  He criticized the efforts to marginalize 
the legislature and mocked the move to direct elections by moving “to make professors of the 
University elective by the people.”
632
 Bagg took exception, characterizing McClelland’s proposal 
as “like the embrace of the night-mare.”
633
  In response to McClelland’s underlying concern, 
Bagg and others proposed that regent elections take place at a less politically charged time than 
the general election.  Accordingly, regent elections were to be held at the same time as the 
election of Supreme Court judges.  Those elections were to be held every six years on the first 
Monday in April.
634
  By removing the election from the autumn political season, and by granting 
extended terms of office, the delegates hoped to shelter the regents and, with them, the 
University from shifting political winds.
635
 
Michigan was the first, but not the only state to seek to remove political interference from 
its public universities.  Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, and Oklahoma, 
at various times and to various degrees, have constitutionalized the governing boards of their 
universities.  They did so, according to Elliot and Chambers, with the intent of avoiding “the 
fluctuating political fortunes of parties and individuals,” and overcoming the challenges of “short 
and crowded sessions usually only at biennial intervals.”  The states’ constitutional framers 
concluded that legislatures could not “give the continuous study and whole-hearted devotion 
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which is requisite to the development of a wise educational policy for the state.”
636
  That was the 
case in 1850 Michigan.  As delegate Charles Whipple, a Michigan Supreme Court justice 
submitted, “There is no gentleman, I suppose, in this Convention disposed to put [the University] 
within the grasp of either political party of the state, or to bring it under any improper 
influence.”
637
  With the goal of avoiding political influences, the delegates and voters 
constitutionally sheltered the University from the legislature.  It was now up to the regents and 
legislature to honor those intentions. 
The 1850 constitutional changes took place in a time of peril for the University.  With the 
challenges presented by revolving-door chancellorships, state financial pressures to invade the 
University Fund, and the fraternity wars, students and faculty had started leaving.  By 1852, 
enrollment had dropped about 30% from its 1848 high.
638
  As it turned out, the new constitution 
provided the path to avoid the earlier challenges and to facilitate University health.  As part of 
the new constitution, the regents were to “elect a president of the university” who would “be the 
principle executive officer”
639
  Francis W. Shearman, the then superintendent of public 
instruction in 1852 wrote of the hope that change engendered.   
That [the University] has not accomplished all that could be desired, is beyond 
question; but with future good management, by the exercise of prudence, 
wisdom, and discretion on the part of the Regents in the appointment of a 
president, and the re-organization of the department of literature, science and 
the arts, there is no reason why it should not be filled with students, and fulfill 
the objects of its high mission with the most abundant and satisfactory 
success.
640
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The University could now look to one man – the university president – as its policy focal point 
and as a director of university operations. 
As the regents began their search, the legislature repealed the past acts concerning 
university governance and, in 1851, enacted legislation largely in line with existing university 
practice, including listing the schools the University should employ.
641
  Since the University 
already had the departments and plans the law required, no issue publicly was raised over the 
legislature’s right to command the academic areas the University would pursue.  All that 
changed in 1855, when the legislature amended the 1851 act to provide “That there shall always 
be at least one Professor of Homoeopathy in the department of medicine.”  Not satisfied to list 
that position within the list of schools in the 1851 act, the legislature placed the requirement as a 
modification of the language “granting” authority to the regents.  It then went a step further to 
assure the regents understood its intentions.  It repeated the requirement by stating, “so that the 
said section when amended shall read as follows: “The Regents shall have the power to enact 
ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the government of the University . . .  Provided, That 
there shall always be at least one Professor of Homoeopathy in the department of medicine.”
642
  
The legislature said what it meant, and then repeated it so that all understood.  The legislature 
required a homeopathic position as a condition of regent power.  The regents paid no heed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Previously, the regents annually rotated the University leadershipamong the four major religious groups 
represented in the faculty.  
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Even before the 1855 legislation, the issue had haunted the University, as homeopathic 
medicine had become increasing popular among the population and the legislators.  
Homeopathic medicine had curried favor during the cholera outbreaks of 1848 and 1852, as its 
treatments seemed more effective than those of allopathic (traditional) medicine.  In response to 
that and homeopaths’ lobbying for inclusion in the state’s medical school, the legislature 
unsuccessfully had pressed for homeopathic instruction at the University.
643
  Those efforts were 
ineffective.  Homeopathy was not popular with the medical faculty and they vocally expressed 
concerns over seating any faculty candidates in any departments who had any homeopathic 
sympathies.  In 1849, the regents considered hiring Henry Tappan as a faculty member.  (He 
later would become the University’s first president.)  Tappan was a noted scholar, with five 
degrees, two of which were doctorates.  He was considered among the finest intellects and 
innovative educators.  Unfortunately, he had once visited a homeopathic physician and members 
of the new medical department pressured the school to forego offering him a position.
644
  
Homeopathic advocates understood that homeopathic instruction required dedicated 
faculty positions to teach the materials.  Accordingly, starting in the 1840s they petitioned the 
legislature to add a homeopathic professor to the planned medical school.  At first, those 
petitions resulted only in legislative advocacy, but no laws passed.  Even the legislatively 
appointed regents were unresponsive.  Allopathic physicians populated the medical school 
faculty and allopaths considered homeopaths as charlatans.  Dr. Zina Pitcher, an outgoing regent, 
member of the medical faculty (and two times mayor of Detroit and future president of the 
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American Medical Association (AMA)) composed his thoughts for the incoming regents.  His 
comments instruct on the bitterness allopaths felt toward homeopaths: 
[S]hall the accumulated results of three thousand years of experience be laid 
aside, because there has arisen in the world a sect which, by engrafting a 
medical dogma upon a spurious theology, have built up a system (so-called) 
and baptized it Homeopathy?  Shall the High Priests of this spiritual school be 
specially commissioned by the Regents of the University of Michigan, to teach 
the grown up men of this age that the decillionth of a grain of sulphur will, if 
administered homœopathically, cure seven-tenths of their diseases, whilst in 
every mouthful of albuminous food they swallow, every hair upon their heads, 
and every drop of urine distilled from the kidneys, carries into or out of their 
system as much of that article as would make a body, if incorporated with the 




Many held the medical faculty in very high regard, and its vehemence in objecting to anything 
associated with homeopathy was taken very seriously.
646
  Accordingly, the regents again 
investigated Tappan’s homeopathic connection when, in 1852 they considered him for the first 
president of the University.  A letter from H.N. Walker to a University faculty member (and later 
chair of the chemistry department) advised against rejecting Tappan on the homeopathic 
grounds.  He warned of unintended consequences should Tappan be made a martyr of the 
homeopathic movement.
647
  Ultimately, the regents hired Tappan, but did so over the medical 
faculty’s objection (and because their first choice had turned the regents down).
 648
 
 Given the difficulties associated with hiring a person who had visited a homeopath, one 
can understand the challenges associated with the 1855 legislation requiring a homeopathic 
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position among the medical school faculty.  The issue, however, went beyond a disinclination of 
faculty.  The AMA placed extreme pressure on schools, treating homeopathic training as a 
contagion to scientific medicine.  It resolved,  
That any such unnatural union as the mingling of an exclusive system, such as 
homoeopathy, with scientific medicine in a school, setting aside all questions 
of its untruthfulness, cannot fail, by destruction of union and confidence, and 
the production of disunion and disorder, unsettling and distracting the mind of 
the learners, to so far impair the usefulness of teaching as to render every 
school adopting such a policy unworthy of the support of the profession.
649
   
 
Following the legislature’s requirements, therefore, would sentence students and faculty to 
professional ostracism.   
Forces were gathering on each side.  On one side, the allopathic faculty, the medical 
student body threatened with professional irrelevance, those concerned about the medical 
school’s standing among its sister schools and, in a subtle but real way, Tappan, fought against 
accepting a homeopath on the faculty.  Although having personally utilized a homeopath, 
Tappan certainly risked his standing among the University’s faculty if he capitulated to popular 
sentiments on this issue.  On the other side stood a legislature that had prodded and legislated for 
homeopathic instruction and a growing public chorus for professional training in what was then a 
very popular form of medicine.  (One cannot discount the ire of ignored legislators.)  
Homeopathic advocates argued that the University was a public institution, giving the public not 
only an interest in its programs, but a right to help professionalize an area of medicine they felt 
important.
650
  Leading that effort were the Michigan Institute of Homeopathy (founded in 1847) 
and its successor, Homeopathic Medical Society of the State of Michigan (1870). 
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 When the regents did not hire a professor of homeopathy as “required” by the legislation, 
Elijah Drake, a private citizen petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the regents to comply 
with the 1855 statute or to show cause for not doing so.  Among other defenses, the regents 
responded that the court could not enforce the statute as the legislature lacked the constitutional 
power to compel university action.  The court denied the petition but did so on procedural 
grounds.  Even thought it ruled that the citizen had no standing to bring the action, the court 
declared that it “thought it would be proper” to respond to the regents’ constitutional claim.  But 
it then waffled about, restating issues but never resolving them.  At first, the court drifted toward 
supporting the regents’ claim to constitutional separation, acknowledging that the board was 
responsible for the fiscal, operational, and educational aspects of the University.  It then hesitated 
and wrote with approval about the University’s efforts to determine whether it could add a 
homeopath to its medical faculty, as if doing so made the issue not yet ripe.  Instead of ruling on 
the constitutionality, the court chose to applaud the regents’ good faith efforts even in light of 
“much uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the law.”  Even that nod to the constitutional 
separation suffered when the court suggested it might employ its mandamus power if “it is made 
apparent that [the regents] seek to evade the law.”
651
  The regents had won the case, but given the 
court’s vacillation, the victory was narrow, and the core issues remaining unresolved. 
 The good faith investigation of the University went nowhere (even though top 
universities in Europe taught both allopathic and homeopathic medicine without challenge), and 
it placed no homeopathic physician on faculty.  In the meantime, homeopathic medicine gained 
increasing popularity and public pressure on the University grew.  In response, the AMA 
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intensified its efforts.  In addition to its undertakings to block homeopathic education at the 
nation’s medical colleges, the AMA would now require that allopaths refuse any contact with 
homeopaths and their patients.  Starting around 1855, branches of the AMA instituted policies 
threatening membership if physicians as much as consulted a homeopath or non-regular 
practitioners.  The message was clear, including:  
Have nothing at all to do with [quacks] professionally or socially, whatever be 
their name – whether followers of the more crude systems which have sprung 
up amongst ourselves, or dreamy stupid impostures of Europe.  . . . Do not 
argue and debate with homeopathic patients; let them distinctly understand that 




So serious was the loathing for homeopaths that the AMA’s Vice President William Mussey 
demanded that Surgeon-General Joseph K. Barnes be censured for attending to Secretary of State 
William Seward after he had been stabbed three times as part of the Lincoln assassination plot.  
Barnes had worked with Seward’s personal physician – a homeopath – in his successful effort to 
save the Secretary’s life.
653
   
 Despite this effort to shun homeopathic physicians, public support for homeopathic 
medicine increased.  Homeopaths rejected bloodletting, mercurial medicines, and other orthodox, 
but disfavored remedies.  Homeopathic procedures and philosophies seemed more patient-centric 
and appealed to the clergy, women, and the press.
654
  Despite the protests of traditional doctors, 
the homeopathic movement gained legitimacy and power. 
 During this time, the University administration and regents did little if anything to modify 
the medical school faculty’s singular adherence to allopathic medicine.  Tappan’s 
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correspondence during the time reveals no clues of any University inclination to hire 
homeopaths.  For reasons unrelated to the homeopathic challenge, the regents forced Tappan’s 
resignation in 1863 and named Erastus Otis Haven his successor.
655
  Notably, none of the 
multiple newspaper articles I reviewed concerning Tappan’s firing mentioned homeopathy or his 
failure to press its teaching.  In Haven’s first formal report to the regents, he advanced only, “Our 
greatest immediate necessity is a new, enlarged building for the Department of Medicine.”  
Haven continued, advocating for a Hebrew and Oriental language professor, a professor of 
political economy, and the establishment of a gymnasium, but he did not mention a homeopathic 
appointment.
656
  From a University standpoint, the legislature’s homeopathic law was dead letter. 
 The issue largely sat dormant through much of the 1860s, with the legislature 
ineffectively prodding and the regents and University president focusing elsewhere.  During 
those early years, the legislature lacked any real leverage with which to effectuate its 
homeopathic will.  That would begin to change, as University needs began to outstrip University-
controlled resources.  Haven first publicly mentioned the challenge in his 1864 address, when he 
declared that the University could not reach its potential “without additional public aid, and also 
donations from the friends of education, such as have been received by Harvard, Yale, Princeton 
and other of our ablest Universities.”
657
  As he tendered this request for enhanced public support, 
Haven was careful to remind his listeners that, for the University to remain “strong and 
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permanent, [and] not torn by political factions,” it must remain independent.
658
  Suggested was a 
concern that legislative dollars often came with legislative demands.   
In mentioning the need for funds without the insertion of political agendas, Haven was 
almost certainly referring to the homeopathic issue.  In his address to the graduating medical 
class of 1864, he boasted, “It is the glory of your profession that it is exclusively and strictly 
scientific.”  He continued, employing language that separated allopaths from other medical 
practitioners, particularly homeopaths.  “The mysterious nature and origin of disease is 
investigated with observation, experimentation and analysis, in the fond hope that some remedy 
may be discovered, and the constant abmition [sic] is to alleviate the sick and lengthen the life of 
man.”
659
 Whether this was Haven’s core belief, or he adjusted his remarks to his audience, 
Haven had planted his flag with the allopaths.
660
  Unfortunately, the legislature envisioned a 
different future for the medical school, and it would soon have the capacity to press its case. 
Prior to the Civil War, the University had lived within the means provided by the 
University Fund.
661
  Faculty salaries had been constant and inflation negligible.  With the rapid 
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inflation associated with the war, as well as a large influx of students at its conclusion, fiscal 
embarrassment threatened.
662
 To avoid that, Haven and the regents in 1867 requested that the 
state help finance the University.  Either it could do so with a block grant of $200,000 “or what 
would be better, grant a small annual income by tax.”
663
  The House unanimously tendered a 
vote of thanks to Haven for the report requesting assistance.
664
  It then promptly passed a one-
twentieth mill property tax to support the University; but it did so with one caveat: “Provided, 
That the Regents of the University shall carry into effect the law which provides that there shall 
always be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine . . .”  The law also 
required that the homeopath’s salary equal that of other faculty members and that “the State 
Treasurer shall not pay to the treasurer of the Board of Regents any part or all of the above tax 
until the Regents have carried into effect this provision.”
665
  In response, every member of the 
medical school faculty threatened to resign. 
To the public, the battle was more than the struggle between a university and the 
legislature.  It captured the discussion of the day, as to one side, the legislature threatened 
progress and the distinctiveness that the University brought to Michigan.  An editorial in the 
Detroit Free Press submitted: 
Now every man knows that the two systems of medicine, if the one can be 
called a system, are as diametrically opposed as fire and water.  It is 
unnecessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the two, for it is 
admitted by all candid and fair men that both cannot be right – both cannot 
stand.  So strong are the prejudices of regular bred physicians, that they will 
not even counsel or associate with homeopathists.  The introduction, therefore, 
of such a professor, forced upon the University by law, is the equivalent to 
striking out the existence of the entire medical department, and to that extent 
destroying the University. 
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The paper then called on the regents to reject the aid and to support a constitutional convention 
that would provide “permanent relief” to the school.  While in retrospect this may seem to be an 
interesting vignette, at the time it was anything but theatre.  To the Free Press, the legislature 
threatened a cherished asset of the people and did so in violation of reason.  Though many 
supported homeopathy, to others the legislature had become an intermeddling villain.  
 Haven would soon plead against such legislative conditions.  Given the “unparalleled 
prosperity” and high esteem of the medical school and its graduates, he warned it would be 
“inexcusable and suicidal to admit any radical changes” into the medical school.  His concern 
was that the homeopathic requirement was “of such a nature as to render it doubtful whether the 
University can consistently accept [the aid] – not withstanding its wants.”  He appealed to the 
purposes of independent regents and the fear that an intervening legislature “will peril and 
perhaps destroy the prosperity of this State Institution.”  He then suggested that the University 
would have “to decline most respectfully” to accept the funds given the conditions offered.
 666
   
Haven did float an alternative, which the regents would soon consider.  The University could 
create a separate homeopathic department, independent of the medical school.  This proposal 
satisfied few, angered many, and failed to dampen rising passions.
 
A regents’ letter to the 
legislature in 1873 explained the problem.  No professor could teach with a homeopath “without 
absolute professional ostracism” and graduating medical students would not be admitted to 
practice medicine.
667
  The legislature’s demands had placed the University in an untenable 
position.  If it accepted the legislature’s conditions, the medical school would close.  If it rejected 
them, the University would face financial ruin. 
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 In an effort to avoid a maelstrom, the board of regents on the evening of March 25, 1868 
attempted to compromise along the lines suggested by Haven.  They accepted the aid offered by 
the legislature and, hoping to honor the legislation’s requirements, the board provided that a 
“Michigan School of Homeopathy” be “located at such place (suitable in the opinion of the 
Board of Regents) other than Ann Arbor.”  They provided for two professors for that school and 
hired one, at a salary less than that that enjoyed by the medical faculty.
668
 They then requested 
that the state pay a portion of the tax revenues. 
 The state auditor general refused the University’s request for the millage funds, arguing 
that it had failed to meet the conditions of the legislation (a decision in which both the state 
treasurer and attorney concurred).  The regents then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the 
auditor general’s payment.  In essence, this mandamus request was cut of the same cloth as 
Drake’s 1856 demand that the University comply with the earlier homeopathic law.
669
  As 
before, the Supreme Court denied the writ request.  However, in one important practical aspect, 
the cases differed.  Here, the legislature offered funding, and the University needed those funds.  
In the earlier case, no funds were offered and none were needed.   
 In Regents v Auditor General, the justices published three separate opinions.
670
  (The 
fourth justice, Cooley, did not offer an opinion.)  Two of the three agreed that the regents had not 
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met the terms of the legislative condition and, therefore, the court could not issue the writ. To 
reach that conclusion, they needed to consider whether the legislature could place that condition 
on the regents.  Unfortunately, the justices discussed the issue without sufficient briefing, as the 
University failed to argue that constitutional issue and, instead, relied on a claimed compliance 
with the statute.  Notwithstanding that failure, each justice discussed whether the legislature 
could place restrictions on its funding, and thereby affect education policy.  Christiancy quickly 
declared that the legislature had given the regents a choice they could accept or reject, “thus 
avoiding all question of constitutional power.”
671
  Graves was more circumspect, mentioning that 
the regents had failed to argue the constitutional issue and, accordingly, the sole issue was 
whether the University had complied with the condition.
672
  Since the University did not comply, 
it deserved no writ.  Campbell quickly disposed of the constitutional issue, finding that “of 
course” the legislature could place conditions on its funding.  Unlike the other justices, he 
believed the University had complied but, lacking a majority on that issue, the court refused to 
issue the writ. 
 Campbell’s opinion is interesting in light of his advocacy on behalf of the University in 
the earlier 1856 case.  In his legal brief in that case he argued that 1) adding a homeopathic 
position to the medical school would “utterly destroy the harmony and usefulness, and probably 
the existence of the medical college,” and 2) the constitution left no room for “legislative 
interference” in the University.  He asked, “if their powers were to be left at the control of the 
legislature, and [the regents] to be its ministers merely, in carrying out legislative provisions, 
where was the propriety of saying anything about them in the constitution.”
673
  Yet, Campbell’s 
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opinion in Regents v Auditor General suggested that the regents were ministers to carry out 
legislative directions, and that the University deserved the funds because it had complied with 
legislative demands.  To be sure, Campbell acted in 1856 as an advocate, not as a judge, and he 
may have attempted to deflect the constitutional issue by holding that the University had 
complied with legislative demands.  But his opinion makes no effort to discuss the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s purported control of higher education policy.  Campbell had 
hidden behind contract principles to ignore, or perhaps to unravel, constitutional intentions. 
 Missing in all the discussions (although thought important by at least Graves) was the 
constitutional goal of an independent university.  In changing the constitutional structure from a 
university dependent on the legislature to one acting as a separate branch of government, the 
1850 constitutional delegates 1) wished to create a university separated from legislative political 
maneuvers, and 2) assumed the University Fund would finance the University.  When it enjoyed 
sufficient funding, the University was able to implement policy in ways that differed from the 
political and social winds of the day.  At that point the constitutional framework held.  When the 
presumed funding source proved inadequate, the legislature inserted itself and the constitutional 
edifice began to buckle.  The court chose not to tackle the issue or, as an alternative explanation, 
chose to address the events as contract issues.  If the University required funds beyond the 
constitutional delegation, it would receive them subject to the legislature’s conditions.  
Unfortunately, as framed, the choice was to accept the homeopathic offer and thereby undermine 
University educational independence or reject the offer and threaten the University’s survival. 
This funding went to the heart of university control and existence.  
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 Soon after the ruling, Haven expressed dissatisfaction with the legislature’s interference 
in hiring and educational issues.  After calling on the legislature to reconsider, Haven in 
September 1867 suggested that the University might consider capitulating.  He wrote, “I allow 
that the Regents ought to respect the will of the people and must in the end accept the aid 
tendered by the State on the conditions insisted upon.”
674
  They did not, and the state did not pay.  
By June 30, 1868, the Finance Committee of the Board of Regents declared the University 
“destitute” and recommended that all expenditures be “confined to matters absolutely 
necessary.”
675
   
With the University’s courtroom efforts to force payment frustrated, it was now the 
legislature’s turn to try to compel adherence.  In January 1868, it filed for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the University’s compliance with the 1867 and 1855 homeopathic laws.  It argued that 
the laws compelling a homeopathic faculty member were within the legislature’s constitutional 
prerogatives.  To the legislature, the constitution merely gave the regents general powers of 
supervision over the University and such a grant did not strip legislative power.  Instead, the 
regents were agents for the legislature, much the same as was the superintendent of public 
instruction.  As proof, it argued that a legislature heavily populated by members of the 1850 
convention passed the 1851 legislation setting forth regental responsibilities over the University.  
Significantly, the University had been acting under that law for eighteen years.  The legislature 
argued that the regents had even professed to be following the 1855 law with their claimed “good 
faith” efforts to install a homoeopathic chair.  Of course, the regents took exception to each 
point, raising the underlying issue – the framers’ intention to separate the University from the 
legislature and other political forces.  Graves, writing for the court, declared that there was an 
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even split among the justices but declined to elaborate beyond that.  Without a majority, this 
mandamus petition too failed.
676
 
While the legislators’ action was before the court, the winds of compromise began to 
blow.  In February 1869, the legislature amended the 1867 law to provide the University $15,000 
per year with no conditions on the funds.
677
  That legislation followed an appeal by Haven on the 
floor of the House and with members of both chambers.  With grace, Haven declared that this 
was “one of the noblest acts for higher education ever passed by the Legislature of an American 
State.”
678
 (And with the funds, the University put steam heat into the law school.)  He made this 
statement before the Board of Regents on August 19, 1869, his last formal message to the board.  
According to Michigan historian Kent Sagendorph, Haven had suddenly resigned, having tired of 
the conflict surrounding the homeopathic issue.
679
 
In a sense the legislature had capitulated, or at least wished to avoid the challenges of an 
underfinanced university.  However, the homeopathic issue did not go away.  In 1871, the 
regents issued a memorial in response to a house passed bill demanding a homeopathic 
professor.  It suggested that the regents or another board lead the construction of a homeopathic 
school anywhere in the state save Ann Arbor.  After receiving that memorial, the senate dropped 
the bill.  But passions remained over connecting it to the medical college.  On June 26, the 
regents reviewed two petitions – one from fifty-three representatives, the other from twelve 
senators – requesting that the medical school hire a homeopathic professor.  Regent Edward 
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Walker then proposed that the University open a homeopathic branch in Detroit.  Several private 
citizens were willing to fund that endeavor and the regents approved that action.   
Foregoing immediate hopes to attach homeopathic instruction with the University, in 
1872 homeopaths opened the Detroit Homeopathic College.  There is some evidence they did so 
with the regents’ blessing,
680
 and the regents had previously suggested this solution.
681
  
Nevertheless, the tone in Ann Arbor remained harsh, as the student newspaper reported that the 
homeopaths threatened “to endanger the very existence of [the University’s] most flourishing 
department, by the introduction of elements so incongruous and irreconcilable.”
682
  In 1873, the 
legislature passed another statute requiring homeopathic faculty in the medical school.  No 
funding accompanied the legislative command.
683
  The regents soon commented that the 
legislation would cost three thousand dollars to implement and that such funds were lacking.
684
  
They did not acquiesce.  The attorney general then petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel 
compliance.  Once again, the court could not arrive at a majority and, therefore, denied the 
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  With the court leaving the field, the various interests sought resolution in the 
political and social arenas.   
Perhaps in response to the deteriorating financial condition of its educational gem, the 
tone from the legislature began to moderate.  Soon the legislature started to support the school in 
ways it previously had not.  In 1873, it granted $25,000 for a university hall.
686
  This was an 
outright grant, with no conditions except that the funds be used for the designated purposes.  
Even with those earmarked funds, University finances were dire.  The 1873 Regent Finance 
Committee warned that, “For the next three years . . .  the University will barely keep running 




In March 1875, two non-medical faculty members – one in chemistry the other in 
anatomy – proposed to instruct homeopathic students to avoid forcing the medical school from 
compromising its position.  Kaufman suggested that they did so in response to their fear that “the 
state might withdraw financial support.  It was better to admit homeopaths, they argued, than to 
let their own intransigence destroy the school.”
688
  Soon the regents’ committee on the medical 
department would propose that the University establish a homeopathic school in Ann Arbor.  It 
did so, not only in response to fears about general university funding, but also in response to a 
senate bill appropriating funds to create a homeopathic college in Ann Arbor as a part of the 
University.  So why did the regents switch?  Why accept legislative instructions to place a 
homeopathic department in Ann Arbor in the face of its long-standing argument that doing so 
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would destroy the medical school?  The answer was money.  As the committee would offer in its 
next report, the “naked facts” were that the University required significant funds to build or 
upgrade a hospital.
689
  Underlying their concern was the fiscal inability to advance the medical 
school and hospital without state aid.  Accordingly, acting “in the interest of humanity,” the 
regents requested a $10,000 appropriation because the “cause of humanity imperatively 
demands” that they do so.
690
    
The legislature responded with a bill that “authorized” the regents to establish a 
homeopathic school in Ann Arbor.
691
  That language appealed to the regents.  Rather than 
commanding their compliance, the suggestive law allowed the regents to maintain their claim to 
constitutional independence.  The legislation promised a perpetual six-thousand dollars for the 
school and in doing so both paid for university expansion and created a cooperative atmosphere 
between the legislature and the regents.  It also did not threaten all university funding for one 
desired project.  Even though Abram Sager, a founder of the medical school and its first dean, 
resigned in protest, the University’s medical education system moved forward.  Soon, 
homeopathic students would receive instruction in the University’s homeopathic medical 
college.  Where curriculums allowed, homeopathic students would attend medical school 
classes.
692
  The legislature also responded favorably to the request for financing hospital 
construction and equipment.  It furnished $8,000 for that end, if the City of Ann Arbor 
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contributed an additional $4,000.  The regents did not stop there.  They determined to establish a 
dental school within the medical school and tied construction of a homeopathic lecture hall with 
the dental school.  The University also established a school of mines, something advocated by 
Upper Peninsula members of the legislature.  In a spurt of support, the 1875 legislature would 
appropriate $5,000 to bring water to the University, grant $13,000 to wipe out University 
indebtedness, appropriate $3,000 for two years for the dental school, appropriate $10,500 to 
support the school of mines, grant $6,000 for the homeopathic school, and $8,000 for the 
hospital.
693
  As part of some of its appropriations, the legislature required specific faculty 
positions, something the regents steadfastly had rejected in the past.  The University 
administration applauded those appropriations, with University President James Burrill Angell 
declaring the “Legislature at its last session treated us generously.”
694
 
Angell tried to justify this seeming change in policy from regent control to legislative 
direction or, perhaps, control.  He suggested that a separate homeopathic school was acceptable, 
whereas previous proposals that had the department as part of the medical school were not.
695
  
Missing from his discussion were the early concerns over placing the school in Ann Arbor or 
sharing faculty.  In exchange for their capitulation, the regents received funding and an expanded 
university curriculum.  To receive that, at least in part, they gave up an unblemished claim to 
constitutional independence.  Angell seemed to acknowledge that new constitutional order when 
he commented that, “The aid which the Legislature gave us last winter must be regarded as of 
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great importance, not only because it secures an immediate enlargement of the scope of our 
work, but because it seems to promise yet larger help in the future.”  He saw that aid as 
foundational.  “We trust that we are not over-sanguine when we say that we now start upon a 
new era in the history and work of the University.”
696
  That change was significant.  When 
Angell first arrived as the University’s president, the school’s income was $76,700.  By the time 
he left office in 1909, it was $1,200,000.
697
   
The need for funds had changed University governance in ways not foreseen by the 
framers of the 1850 constitution.  The story of homeopathic medicine at the University did not 
end with the 1875 compromise, nor did the issue of legislative overreaching into university 
affairs.  Former Medical School Dean Sager, who had resigned over the controversy, soon 
became the leader of a group condemning the regents and the faculty, classifying the homeopaths 
as the “arch-enemy of rational medicine.”   A group of students also protested the taint they 
would suffer from associating with homeopathic students.  “Our alma mater,” they said, “must 
be like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion.”  A struggle within the various medical communities 
ensued, with many allopaths believing that the medical faculty had violated their oaths and were 
subjecting the students to quackery.  They argued that the regents had allowed an 
unconstitutional intrusion into the University’s prerogative.  Tensions also arose between 
allopathic and homeopathic faculties, culminating in a brawl and choking incident between the 
dean of the homeopathic college and a faculty member of the allopaths.
698
  Soon, however, 
passions cooled, at least for a time. 
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The issue of legislative versus regental control of the University resurfaced outside the 
homeopathic crisis but, by coincidence, involved University hospital construction.  Julius 
Weinberg, a subcontracting provider of stone and gravel suffered financial injury when, in the 
early 1890s, the contractor failed to pay him for work and materials on the University hospital.  
Weinberg sued the University and its officers, claiming that they failed to obtain the surety bond 
required by statute of government actors contracting on behalf of the state.  The regents argued 
the University was not subject to that law due to its constitutional independence.  The Michigan 
Supreme Court’s opinion shed little light, and introduced much confusion.  Justice John 
McGrath’s opinion for the court stated that individuals and not the University were liable under 
the statute.  He reasoned that state funding, together with the understandings of “most residents 
of Michigan” meant that University building projects were state building projects.  Arguments of 
separation of the University from the state were “altogether too technical.”  Justice Claudius B. 
Grant in his concurring opinion argued that the regents were not subject to legislative 
requirements.  “Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action of the Regents.  It 
cannot add to or take away from its property without the consent of the Regents.”  Grant 
submitted, however, “In making appropriations for its support, the Legislature may attach any 
conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the appropriation 
without complying with the conditions.”  With the University now dependant on state financing, 




                                                 
699
 Weinberg v Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 Mich. 246 254 (1893).  In 1908, in State Board of 
Agriculture v Auditor General the court limited its Weinberg statement.  The case involved the Michigan 
Agricultural College (later Michigan State University), which inhabited the same constitutional space as the 
University.  Its governing board was the state board of agriculture just as the University’s was the board of regents.  
The court wrote of Weinberg: “It did not mean that a condition could be imposed that would be an invasion of the 
constitutional rights and powers of the governing board of the college.  It did not mean to say that, in order to avail 
itself of the money appropriated, the state board of agriculture must turn over to the legislature management and 
261 
 
Whether emboldened by the Weinberg dicta, or responding to public pressure or both, the 
legislature again waded into the homeopathic issue.  In response to proposals to merge the two 
medical schools and local pressures to place the school in Detroit, in 1895, the legislature 
required that the University move its homeopathic college from Ann Arbor to Detroit.  The 
regents declined to do so (even though that was their compromise position in 1867 and 1871).
700
  
Thereafter, a private citizen petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel University compliance 
with the statute.  As with the 1856 Drake v Regents matter, the court questioned the petitioner’s 
standing to bring the action.  Unlike that case, the University did not raise the standing issue, so 
the court in Sterling v Regents of University of Michigan, decided to consider the underlying 
issue – whether the University was bound to comply with legislation concerning university 
governance. 
Where the court had previously avoided the issue of constitutional intent, this court, 
through Grant, clarified his dicta in Weinberg and directly addressed the issue.  He noted that, “It 
is apparent to any reader of the debates . . . in regard to the constitutional provision for the 
University that they had in mind the idea of permanency of location, to place it beyond mere 
political influence, and to intrust it to those who should be directly responsible and amenable to 
the people.”  He was “unable to find a single utterance” that advocated legislative involvement, 
(there were a few), and that the regents for 46 years had “declined obedience to any and every 
act of the legislature” with which they disagreed.  The court took notice that the legislature 
probably never thought the University would require appropriations and that the framers never 
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intended to grant the legislature control over the University Fund.
  
But, the issue of leveraging 
appropriations to control university policy remained.  Court dicta suggested, “by no rule of 
construction can it be held that either [branch] can encroach upon or exercise the powers 
conferred upon the other.”
701
  Left open was the extent of legislative power to condition 
appropriations.  More specifically, if the legislature had that power, it was undecided whether it 
could assume control over university policy in this new world where greater percentages of 
university revenue came from tax dollars.  
Politics and practicalities ruled, with law setting a framing rather than deciding role.  
Financial needs played a heavy and pragmatic role.  The revenue from the University Fund 
remained relatively stagnant as the needs of the University grew.  The regents requested, and the 
legislature passed, increasing taxes to support the University so that by 1893, the one-twentieth 
mill had been increased to one-sixth mill (and in 1921 it became one-quarter mill).  It may be 
that the legislature could premise an appropriation on university adherence to a particular policy, 
and that the University could refuse to comply.  Even were the courts to rule a particular 
appropriation must be condition-free, legislatures could withhold future appropriations pending 
University acceptance of legislative desires.  Accordingly, when the University struggled to 
survive without appropriated funding, the barricade of constitutional separation seemed poor 
solace. 
Strict reliance on the framers’ intentions, even when as evident as here, was not enough.  
Social forces had pushed against the constitutional structure, with the Civil War both increasing 
the cost of and demand for education.  The intended funding source, which had supported 
constitutional separation, no longer was relevant or effective.  The framers’ assumed barriers 
against short-term political winds did not protect against economic realities created in the wake 
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of the Civil War.  And, as feared, legislative thirsts to advance popular interests drove politically 
inspired demands that would threaten the state’s educational plans.  The result was crisis.  In the 
end, legislatures could not be expected to appropriate without conditions and the University 
could not be expected to abandon its educational independence to a politically driven body.  The 
solution, however, was not found in the courts – which deals with one narrow subject at a time – 
but in compromise.  In that case, the constitution informed, it did not control.   
Cooley’s Exposure  
 
 Cooley enjoyed a nearly forty-year history with the University, as a law professor, legal 
advisor, and friend of University presidents.  So strong was his attachment that Cooley declined 
an 1880 Johns Hopkins University offer of a $5,000 salary to leave the University and teach 
there.  That salary amounted to more than Cooley’s combined judicial and University pay.  
Although Cooley sat as law faculty during much of the controversy, he wrote little about the 
homeopathic crisis.  There are, however, a couple of indications of his support for an 
independent University administration.  In People ex rel. Leroy v Hurlbut, a case dealing with 
state legislative power to appoint members of a municipal water board, Cooley associated state 
control over local administrators to the “despotism” of European “monarch or commune.”  After 
drawing that stark comparison, he wrote of the 1850 constitution’s effort to “confide more power 
to the people” by among other things providing for the election of regents of the university.
702
  
His interest was avoiding legislative centralization; a challenge he certainly felt as a result of the 
legislative demands that threatened university existence, or at least vitality.   
 Cooley also wrote with pride of Michigan’s education efforts and of the state’s status as a 
model for newer states.  “No commonwealth in the world makes provision more broad, 
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complete, or thorough for the general education of the people, and very few for that which is 
equal.”  He then applauded the use of public funds to accomplish educational aims.  Given his 
support for education, his belief that the University should be “beyond the dangers that might 
spring from popular excitements and prejudice, and from political overturns,”
703
 and his advisory 
role to the regents, one can safely surmise that the homeopathic crisis helped shape and 
strengthen Cooley’s legislative-limiting philosophy.  While there is no direct evidence of that, 
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Chapter V: Regulations, Spending, and a Search for Judicial Grounds to 
Limit Legislative Authority 
 
The Courts often find themselves unable to set aside Acts of the Assembly on 
Constitutional grounds, which they would be glad to repeal if they had a 
constitutional veto. 
Justice George Washington Woodward (1858) 





 From their inception, state governments supported internal improvements and continued 
to do so even after their constitutions sought to restrict such support.  Government support was 
so extensive throughout the 1830-1870 period that private rail companies received government 
financial assistance “so long as there was a mile of American railroad track to be laid.”
705
  That 
support increasingly came under attack as rising public debt and taxes caused legal and political 
reassessments of legislative largess.
706
  Despite that rising cacophony of complaints, legislators 
and the public continued to vote to publically support rail construction. Failing to convince the 
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majority about the challenges of public largess, disaffected taxpayers turned to the courts for 
relief.  In the antebellum period, those efforts uniformly failed, as courts deferred to legislative 
discretion.  At the same time, however, taxpayer and judicial discontent intensified with the 
courts and litigants developing legal doctrines that Cooley would employ to change judicial 
deference to judicial review and, with it, the acceptable to the prohibited. 
 Michigan’s experience during this period was much like that of other states.  As 
elsewhere, the framers of Michigan’s 1850 constitution worked to change the nature of 
government’s relation to commerce.  The Senate Special Committee on the General Revision of 
the State Constitution set the tone.  It declared that the practice of loaning state credit or dollars 
“should be terminated and entirely prohibited by constitutional law.”
707
  Gone were appetites for 
state-supported industrial and infrastructure development.  As Cooley reflected, “Having all their 
bitter experience with internal improvements fresh in mind, when they formed a new 
Constitution, in 1850, the people resolved to put it out of the power of the legislature again to 
involve them in extravagant projects.”
708
  To accomplish those goals, the new constitution 
limited state debt, prohibited the state from pledging its credit, made state support of local or 
private projects more difficult, prohibited state ownership of corporate stock, and prohibited 
financial involvement in internal-improvements projects.
709
  It also prohibited the creation of 
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special corporations, instead providing for the legislature to authorize general corporate entities 
that would owe no inherent duty to, and gain no favors from, the state.
710
 
 With the state now constitutionally out of the internal improvement business, private 
corporations would respond to the public demand for rail services and development.  However, 
this did not mean that government completely withdrew.  Notwithstanding the drafters’ intent, 
several forces coalesced to bring government back into the picture – but this time it would be 
local government.  Because municipalities required rail service to enhance their economic, 
social, and political relevance, railroads could leverage where they built in exchange for local 
financial support.  In response, municipalities sought to shape rail routes through financial grants 
for building within their borders.  Because their powers were limited, those municipalities 
required state legislative approval to tax for the funds needed to do that.  All the state 
legislatures, including Michigan’s, responded by enacting “nearly 2200 special laws” between 
1830 and 1889 to authorize government financial participation in local rail development.
711
  In 
the end, state legislatures were authorizing municipalities to grant aid to private corporations 
where the state itself was constitutionally barred from doing so. 
 As a general practice, taxpayers voted to approve the local rail grants and, by extension, 
the need for tax assessments to pay for them.  Despite numerous challenges, during the 
antebellum period courts unanimously affirmed both the early subscription regime and the later 
municipal grants.  Notwithstanding that unanimity, majorities and dissenters expressed concern 
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over the propriety of such transfers of wealth.  The dissenters linked their objections to vested 
rights, natural law, and republican-governance principles, as well as specific language in their 
states’ constitutions.  At its core, the issue concerned government’s power to transfer, and 
thereby destroy, property interests.  At the same time, residents increasingly complained about 
regulatory legislation that encumbered property and/or advanced governing power.  There too, 
court decisions almost without exception deferred to legislative power.  However, in both areas, 
court dicta suggested that there were limits on legislative power to tax, spend, and regulate.  But 
dicta do not decide cases – holdings do.  And, with only a few exceptions, court rulings affirmed 
legislative power . . . that is, until Thomas Cooley entered the picture.  He enters in 1868, as 
discussed in Chapter VI.  Before that entrance, however, this chapter focuses on pre-Cooley 
judicial concerns over legislative activism. 
A Changing but Determined Support 
 
Public desire and need for an enhanced transportation network did not end with the 
privatization of Michigan’s rail lines or with the erection of constitutional barriers.  
Notwithstanding that need, direct state subsidies, subscriptions, and other forms of aid took a 
decided rest in the mid 1840s, and rail development precipitously slowed as investors sought 
safer harbors for their capital.  Following the sale of the Central and Southern lines, until 1855, 
the Michigan legislature only chartered seven new railroad companies, and those only created 
extensions or branches off existing lines.  In a later assessment of Michigan rail development, the 
Michigan Public Utilities Commission in 1919 reported that, “During these years no active 
governmental financial support of railroads seems to have been given by the state, and evidently 
railroad enterprise was largely regarded as purely private enterprise.”  That was true, at least with 
respect to direct financial support.  However, government remained involved in other respects.  
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The federal and state governments granted extensive public domain lands to railroads, and that 
sort of aid “was a forerunner of the later policy of grants to corporations to accomplish the same 
purpose.”
712
  By 1863, those public domain grants largely ended.  To fill the gap, local financial 
grant would become major facilitators of rail development. In 1863, Michigan’s legislature 
passed three acts to allow municipal aid, in 1864 twelve acts, and in 1865 eight acts.  In 1869, 
the legislature passed a general authorization for municipalities to grant aid to rail, without 
specific approval from the state.  Where the state had left the field of direct financial aid, it 
continued its efforts by allowing municipalities to enter the game.  The goal was progress and 
railroads advanced industry, trade, and communication.  Rail was a key to the future and 
government found new ways to prod their development when previous avenues of support were 
rendered unavailable. 
 This was a national phenomenon as multiple states granted municipalities the right to act 
when the state could not directly do so.
713
  The drive primarily was economic.  Cities and towns 
recognized that rail access provided routes to market and, on the flipside, that lack of access 
threatened local decline.  New York, for example, a state that had constitutionally prohibited 
state involvement in 1847, had authorized its municipalities to grant $30 million to railroads by 
1879.  Before New York’s constitutional prohibition of state support, those municipal grants 
amounted to a relatively meager $9 million.
714
  Whereas before government subscribed to 
corporate stock, now municipal aid typically took the form of grants to rail lines, paid upon 
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completion of construction milestones – a less risky strategy.
715
  Generally, municipalities 
floated bonds to finance that aid and paid for those bonds by increasing tax obligations.  This 
created a considerable burden, as those obligations fell on landholders whose property values 
may (or may not) have increased, but who often lacked liquidity.  Unfortunately, those “who had 
no cash simply mortgaged their farms” in order to pay the rail-created taxes.  Accordingly, the 
move from state obligations to individual obligations made the financial transfer to the railroad 
seem more direct and the impact more immediate.  The taxpayer was no longer cushioned from 
tax liability by the wider assemblage of residents associated with state obligations, or by the 
possibility of a state default on its bond obligations.  In essence, local assessments moved the 
risk of bankruptcy from the state to the individual taxpayer.  Despite this risk and the general 
requirement of a taxpayer vote, this form of municipal financing became so pervasive that it soon 
dwarfed previous state and federal financial assistance to rail.
716
  
In the early stages, these municipal grants were widely accepted by the taxpayers.  Voters 
accepted that local rail advanced economic and social interests and facilitated population growth.  
As importantly, failure to promote local rail could economically devastate a municipality vis a 
vis its participating neighbors.
717
  This is not to suggest that these forms of government transfers 
of wealth met with near universal acclaim.  They did not, as many citizens expressed concern 
over government actions that encumbered property interests – most specifically by taxation and 
regulation.  An article in the 1843 American Law Magazine entitled “The Security of Private 
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Property” protested that property was at such risk that it was “in need of every parchment barrier 
which has or can be thrown around it.”  The problem was democracy.  “In an republic, where the 
legislature . . .  is annually elected, and where . . . the legislature . . . partakes . . . of the passions 
and impulses of the moment, it is important to inquire into the extent of the power possessed by 
the majority, to encroach upon the fruits of honest industry, or interfere with the proprietor in his 
free and undisturbed possession and enjoyment.”
718
  The author’s disquiet evinced a growing 
concern rising in some measure from the largest transfers of wealth of the day – rail subsidies.   
The unanimity of court rulings accepting the wealth-transfer legislation was part of the 
general-welfare supporting paradigm of the early and mid-nineteenth century.  Taney’s 1837 
Charles River Bridge opinion well reflected that underlying general-welfare theme: “While the 
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have 
rights; and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful 
preservation.”
719
  As discussed below, the cases considering rail subsidies argued that the 
legislature facilitated that happiness and well-being by transferring private property (tax revenue) 
to rail corporations.  And those courts that questioned the efficacy of such transfers unanimously 
deferred to the legislature’s right to advance community interests even as individual rights 
suffered. 
With temporary gaps when state direct finance slowed, from 1830 to the Civil War 
government infrastructure efforts accelerated as government pressed community interests.  Even 
as Corwin maintained that courts were actively protecting property rights through a budding 
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substantive due process jurisprudence, he acknowledged the period’s overarching government 
activism.  Corwin explained that, “with the revival of revolution abroad and the rise of 
transcendentalism at home, and last, but not least, the phenomenal success of the Erie Canal, the 
demand went forth for a large governmental programme: for the public construction of canals 
and railroads, for free schools, for laws regulating the professions, for anti-liquor legislation, for 
universal suffrage and for the abolition of slavery.”
720
  Government was increasingly aggressive 
in pursuing efforts to develop commerce, communication, and social and moral programs.  
As Michigan embarked on its early internal improvement projects, discussed in an earlier 
chapter, other states employed various mechanisms financially to drive their internal 
improvement goals.  To understand court responses to those activities, it is worth briefly 
reflecting on those efforts to advance infrastructure development.  Some measure of government 
involvement is in the dollars spent.  Of the $137 million nationally spent on railroads before 
1843, over a third was public money, much of it as stock purchases or direct subsidies.  By 1861, 
that public aid exceeded $150 million.
721
  But public expenditures tell only a portion of the 
government-involvement story.  State and federal land grants to the railroads equaled about 155 
million acres, about 242,000 miles.  By way of comparison, that area is larger than France, or 
more than double the combined area of Illinois and all the New England states.
722
  The goal was 
not just rail development, but also the economic energy that infrastructure development brings.  
Economic historian George Rogers Taylor reflected that “in no other period of American history 
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has the government been so active in financing and actually promoting, owning, and controlling 
banks and public works including turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railroads.”
723
  The reality was 
that American society employed government power to advance its economic and societal 
condition, and the courts stayed out of the way. 
Virtually every state participated to varying degrees in supporting rail, and each did so as 
part of a general enthusiasm over the benefits rail would bring (or perhaps with a fear of the 
consequences of non-participation).
724
 Henry Carter Adams noted the mob-like frenzy, as 
governments entered into their rail development programs with “unbounded enthusiasm, and 
projected schemes absolutely absurd in their magnificence.”
725
  Quoting a North American 
Review article of the day, the Handlins related the general attitude regarding government 
obligations.  ‘“Many things” it was acknowledged, “should no doubt be left to individual 
enterprise” but transportation “may and ought to receive a salutary stimulus from well timed 
public encouragement.”
726
  With respect to internal improvements, there was no hard line 
between public and private.  Internal improvements facilitated commerce, travel, and 
communication – core elements of government’s mission. 
Having repeatedly lost in the political sphere, objectors ultimately took their case to the 
courts.  They would claim that government had no power to take their property, in the form of 
taxes, and give that property to another private individual, namely corporations.  In so arguing, 
taxpayers drew upon the high value Americans placed on the sanctity of their property and their 
distaste for taxation.  The legal claims evolved over time, moving from early objections over tax 
fairness, municipal power, and government takings to later objections over individual property 
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rights and an advocacy of a separation between public and private spheres.  It is worth tracing 
that development, as evolving antebellum rights claims helped lay the foundation for later 
constitutional systems of thought. 
Judicial Deference but Percolating Dissatisfaction 
 
Early objectors to government business subsidies relied on takings law, claiming that 
government seized their property, in the form of taxes, without offsetting compensation.  At first, 
courts responded as if takings clauses did apply, but answered that public benefit fulfilled the 
compensation requirement.
727
  Eventually the decisions would reject the applicability of takings 
clauses as curbs against government taxing and spending.  Courts reasoned that takings related to 
a narrow, definable property interest as opposed to a broader tax concern.  Moreover, taking 
remedies were monetary damages and employing that remedy would require that courts 
micromanage taxing and spending activities.   
With takings clauses effectively unavailable, complainants challenged the government’s 
constitutional taxing authority.  This strategy too was ineffective, as courts construed 
government power to tax as virtually unlimited.  But a gap began to open as courts would 
address not only the means of taxation but also the ends of its use – spending.  Their decisions 
eventually set forth two standards.  The means of taxation needed to be applied fairly and the 
ends of taxation –expenditures – needed to pursue a public purpose.  While both standards were 
important, the real battle would concern whether expenditures fit an appropriate public purpose.  
The answer in every antebellum case, whether cheerfully or begrudgingly given, was they did.   
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After some early efforts to challenge directly the state’s taxing power, litigants focused 
on the public purpose requirement.  That standard flowed from constitutional provisions and 
commonly accepted understandings requiring that legislatures act to advance the community’s 
general welfare and safety.  The question soon became whether stock subscriptions, most notably 
in private railroad corporations, advanced that general welfare.  That issue also raised the 
question of who decides whether an expenditure enhances the general welfare – the legislature or 
the courts.
728
  Ultimately, the issue concerned the nature of republican governance: When do 
minority or individual interests (or rights) trump majority will? 
These were not esoteric, philosophical musings.  By the 1840s and 50s, states and 
municipalities were widely and “freely mortgag[ing] their sovereign credit for pushing public 
works.”
729
  States were taxing to fund stock subscriptions and municipalities were doing so to 
support local rail projects.  In response, disgruntled taxpayers looked to the courts for relief.  
And, contrary to the belief that courts were actively protecting property interests, in the 
antebellum period courts uniformly deferred to the legislatures’ judgment and affirmed wealth 
transfers from taxpayers to industry.
730
  Government support for internal improvements was the 
major form of wealth transfer in its day, and such transfers were far more substantial, 
widespread, and considered, than the few contrary and oft-celebrated cases that voiced – most 
often most often in dicta – other opinions.     
Little legalistic discussion of government’s role in private industry occurred prior to the 
1840s.  The discussion concerned the wisdom of those policies, as “the legitimacy of the mix 
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corporation was pervasively taken for granted.” 
731
  The earliest cases to take up the issue 
considered public support of railroad’s precursors – turnpike roads and canals.  In 1837, the 
Virginia Supreme Court in Goddin v Crump confirmed the constitutionality of Richmond’s 
subscription to the James River and Kanawha Company, a business incorporated to improve 
transportation on the Ohio River.
732
  John Goddin, a Richmond resident and taxpayer, objected 
that his taxes increased $3.90 to help fund a private corporation.  When he refused to pay the 
increased taxes, the tax collector took “Harry,” Goddin’s slave, to sell him to pay the tax 
deficiency.  Goodin sought to enjoin the tax collector, and lost.   
The case involved a number of issues, including municipal powers, expenditures outside 
of the city limits, and uneven tax burdens.
733
  For our purposes, the importance of the case lay in 
the judges’ competing legal philosophies concerning municipal contributions to private entities, 
most specifically whether those contributions violated the property rights of non-approving 
taxpayers (when a majority of taxpayers had voted to the contrary).  Acknowledging that taxes 
are collected to advance the public good, the court majority declared the legislature the best 
judge of the public good, and deferred.  In this, as with almost all other municipal grants to 
railroads, the legislature required an approving taxpayer vote, which furthered the court’s belief 
about general-welfare advancement.  The majority refused to enter what it considered legislative 
space, notwithstanding rights complaints.  To the judges, popular will prevailed and courts had 
no power to veto legislative or popular efforts to advance the general welfare. 
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Justice Francis T. Brooke
734
 disagreed with the court’s analysis, noting that the “great 
object [of civil government] is to protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the 
majority; a tyranny more inflexible and implacable than the tyranny of a single despot.”
735
  
Searching for a constitutional principle upon which to hang his objection, Brooke mentioned 
takings, liberty, natural justice, moderation, and temperance.  Those principles were to protect 
individuals from the loss of their property as a result of government involvement in the private 
sphere.  Beyond the challenges associated with reliance on extra-constitutional limitations, 
Brooke’s reasoning suffered with his suggestion that rail development was a state (not local) 
issue, given the wider geography of benefits that rail engendered.  Brooke did not discuss why a 
state tax was less intrusive on property rights, natural justice, temperance, or moderation than a 
local tax, but he did offer the germ of an argument that would later bloom.  Brooke submitted 
that Richmond could only tax its inhabitants if there was “common interest” between the benefit 
to the taxpayer and the proposed expenditures.  To grant funds to a private enterprise for a 
narrow purpose, Brooke suggested, would not support a “common interest.”  The fact that “the 
inhabitants might derive some benefit remote in prospect, though the object was a public object” 
did not establish that the required common interest existed.
736
  He did little to expand upon this 
thought and it would require an energetic stretch to read him as proposing a test requiring direct 
benefits for taxes employed.  However, his argument suggested a nexus between the tax and the 
benefit – or common interest – was required and, in the case of stock subscriptions, he believed 
that connection was missing. 
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The arguments voiced in Goddin continued in similar fashion for the next fifteen years.  
Court majorities would hold that the role of the legislature was to determine the appropriate use 
of taxes to support the general welfare and that courts were ill positioned to reconsider those 
determinations.  As that was the uniform position, no antebellum supreme court overturned 
government subscriptions or grants to transportation companies.  To be sure, courts recognized 
the risk of “onerous taxation” associated with legislative “indiscriminate prodigality,” in granting 
public funds to private corporations.
737
  Despite this possibility, and the extent of the 
questionable investments made, courts declared that the ballot box, and not the courtroom, was 
the appropriate place to voice objections to excess taxation and profligate spending.   
These courts were loath to step in where American government historically had 
“facilitated the social and business intercourse of its people.”
738
  Canal and rail support were 
mere extensions of that historic government/industry affiliation, and the courts agreed that 
legislatures were positioned to determine the appropriate means to facilitate trade and affect the 
will of the people.  Indeed, they had the constitutional obligation to do so.  As Chief Justice 
Chilton of the Alabama Supreme Court wrote, legislative power “extends to the employment of 
all those means and appliances ordinarily adopted, or which may be calculated, to develop the 
resources of the State, and add to the aggregate wealth and prosperity of the citizens.”  Part of the 
legislature’s responsibility included, “providing outlets for commerce; opening up channels of 
intercommunication between different parts of the state; improving the social, moral and 
physical condition of the people by wholesome police regulations, and by a judicious system of 
public instruction as also for the protection, security and perpetuity of our government and 
institutions.”  From this, the court concluded that the legislature had the “power to tax the owners 
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of real estate to aid in the construction of” a railroad.
739
  Antebellum courts uniformly adopted 
this same position.  The legislature had the power and the courts could not veto their decisions.
740
  
Where did Michigan courts stand during this period?  The antebellum Michigan Supreme 
Court did not address the use of tax dollars to support privately held rail development, perhaps 
because for much of this period the state owned the major lines.  Nonetheless, its views on the 
public’s interest in rail success were set forth in its 1852 decision in Swan v Williams.  As 
discussed earlier, in that case, the court considered whether Michigan’s earlier territorial 
government lawfully granted eminent domain powers to the privately held Pontiac Railroad 
Company.  In approving that grant of power, Chief Justice Martin classified railroads as a 
“public agent.”  Unlike most other corporations, even fully private railroads were “public in 
nature,” with their private profit motive only “incidentally promoted.”
741
  It is not surprising that 
the court found as it did, as rail significantly contributed to Michigan industry and citizenry.  
James Wheeler’s study of economic changes in Michigan found that areas serviced by rail 
enjoyed a “sudden decline in transport costs” and that industry located along rail lines grew at a 
greater pace than those ill- served by rail.
742
  Given the court’s focus on the effect of the 
transactions, it is safe to surmise that, had the court directly addressed the issue, the antebellum 
Michigan court would have affirmed legislative power financially to support industry.    
Majority deference to legislative power is not the same as agreeing with legislative 
judgment.  As Pennsylvania Justice Woodward backhandedly noted in 1858, “the constitutional 
powers of the legislature are not necessarily as limited as its wisdom.”  He bemoaned, but 
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accepted the limitation that, “The courts often find themselves unable to set aside Acts of 
Assembly on constitutional grounds which they would be glad to repeal if they had a 
constitutional veto.”
743
  The people spoke through their legislatures and, in the courts’ views, the 
courts lacked the wisdom and power to overturn society’s will.  In the end, in the antebellum 
period, court majorities were unwilling to expand judicial oversight by shaping constitutional 
language to fit their notions of appropriate governance.  Accordingly, state courts unanimously 
upheld legislative power to employ tax dollars to benefit private infrastructure programs, and 
even the dissenters recognized that uniformity.
744
  Justice Lowrie, one of the dissenters in the 
Sharpless v Mayor of Philadelphia (discussed below) later recognized that the “legislators and 
courts have everywhere” supported public rail assistance.
745
  But as they did so, dissenters 
pushed back and their objections began to seep into the majorities’ legal reasoning.   
It is important to recall that state legislative power was considered unlimited unless 
specifically limited by the constitution or, some would argue, accepted natural law limitations.  
(In this sense, American state constitutions serve a very different role than does the United States 
Constitution.)  Accordingly, dissenters’ arguments for legislative limitations required a more 
sophisticated and inventive analysis than did the majorities’.  To stop what they considered the 
economic and political ruin of the nation, the dissenters raised individual rights as a 
counterbalance to legislative efforts to enhance the general welfare.  That position increasingly 
resonated, particularly as tax-supported projects failed to return expected financial results, tax 
rates increased, and taxpayers suffered.  To tax was to take property.  Hence, the courts could 
check the legislature and protect property by limiting the purposes to which those taxes were put 
                                                 
743
 Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v Commissioners of Allegheny County, 232. 
744
 Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad v Commissioners of Clinton County, 97.   
745
 Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v Commissioners of Allegheny County, 233-34. 
281 
 
– spending.  In doing so, they relied on the underlying philosophy that government could not 
take from A and give to B.  Taxes taken from A had to benefit A.   
And so the dissents weighed in.  Railroads were of great value, but public dollars, they 
argued, could not lawfully be used to promote private ends when the public benefit was merely 
incidental. With that notion of the proper place for taxation, Justice Spaulding in Ohio’s Griffith 
v Commissioners of Crawford bemoaned his court’s 1851 refusal to hear the case because he 
believed the court should declare all municipal subscriptions in violation of “the essential 
principles of liberty and free government . . . and of personal property rights.”
746
  Iowa’s Justice 
Kinney, in his dissent in Dubuque Co v Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, argued that taxes could 
only be “based upon public necessity, and proceeds upon the ground that it is essential to the 
public welfare and safety.”  That court majority’s broad definition of general-welfare standards, 
he argued, ultimately would “invade and destroy the rights of the people.”  The focus should be 
on the individual’s property rights, not the general welfare.  “To allow a majority by their vote to 
tax a minority, to build railroads, is repugnant to every principle of civil liberty, and tends to 
despotism.”  Kinney raised the scepter of socialism, fearing that “a bare majority of voters, 
destitute of property . . . [would] saddle a tax upon a minority, the only property holders.”
747
  In 
some measure, the dissenters’ thoughts aligned with those voiced by Thoreau in his objection to 
taxation to support religious societies.  “I . . . do not wish to be regarded as a member of any 
incorporated society which I have not joined.”
748
  Taxpayers not wishing to invest in or grant 
gifts to private industry should not, and they argued could not, be forced to do so by those who 
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so wished.  Such government involvement in private affairs violated the dissenters’ freedom 
principles.  Community efforts were oppressive to the individual. 
Despite their disagreement over legislative and judicial power, both the majority and 
dissenting opinions evinced a shift in their approach to rights claims.  Increasingly, they 
proclaimed individual rights, particularly property rights, as interests against which the 
governmental incursions must be weighed.  While the shift was gradual and nuanced, courts 
increasingly considered rights as personal rather than as collective.  As Justice Ranney, speaking 
for an 1852 court approving rail subscriptions in Cincinnati, Wilmington, and Zanesville RR 
declared, constitutions not only served to define and guide legislative power, “but extend their 
protections to the rights and interests of every individual citizen; who has at all times a right to 
invoke that protection when these rights and interests are invaded.”  Invasion of those rights was 
“beyond the power of government.”
749
  The majorities began to profess these rights, but always 
ruled in favor of general-welfare efforts.  And, until 1853, did so with little written analysis. 
While the majorities deferred, and the dissenters promoted their version of a republican-
governance model, taxpayers clamored as tax burdens heightened.  Failing in the political sphere, 
those taxpayers increasingly voiced their objections in the courts and, as noted above, claimed 
property rights violations.  In this context, the Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court in 1849 observed 
the increasing “fashion to impeach the action of the legislative bodies, as unconstitutional, when 
it happens not to accord with the party’s notion of propriety and abstract right.”
750
  In that case, 
Dysart v M’Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers’ governance model 
and concluded that even if a legislative act “seems to trespass upon our ideas of natural justice 
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and right,” courts could not overturn the legislation without specific constitutional violations.
751
  
Since nothing in the Pennsylvania constitution prohibited subscriptions, taxing individuals to 
give the money to a rail corporation was a lawful exercise of state power.  Indeed, the court 




The Dysart ruling itself was typical in its day.  Soon, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would begin a shift from assumed deference to questioning whether legislative power 
extended to transfers of taxpayer wealth to private railroads.  In 1853, the court began to question 
whether property and abstract rights should check legislative power and, if so, how courts should 
insert those issues into its deliberations.  The court did so in a matter brought by William 
Sharpless, who claimed that Philadelphia’s plan to invest tax dollars in a private railroad violated 
his and his co-plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected property rights.  In what the court classified 
as “beyond all comparison, the most important cause that has ever been” heard by that court, the 
court in Sharpless v Mayor of Philadelphia set out a new legal framework upon which future 
courts would consider government use of tax dollars to support private industry.
753
  It is 
important to note that it did so with facts and arguments that were substantively identical to those 
it, and other jurisdictions, had uniformly ruled insufficient to raise constitutional concerns.  
The court’s characterization of the importance of the case was not hyperbole.  Growing 
tax burdens associated with municipal support of private rail, and the increasing sophistication 
and resonance of individual-rights claims, coalesced to prod at least the beginning of 
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constitutional change.  An author only referred to as “Cecil,” in the lead article of the 1853 
American Law Register, (the precursor to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) 
characterized the Sharpless issues as “nothing less than whether the legislature can confer on 
municipal authorities unlimited power over the property of every citizen.”
754
  His assertion that 
the case raised issues central to American democracy and individual liberty was well taken.  At 
the risk of offering a “spoiler,” the court’s opinion in allowing the rail support, in conjunction 
with growing public dissatisfaction, would incite a public outcry for constitutional reform.  Its 
holdings would reach beyond Pennsylvania as both the majority and dissenting opinions would 
provide a foundation for later constitutionally based restrictions on legislative power.  Because 
Sharpless was pivotal, it deserves a close look. 
A Deeper Reflection on Rights: The Sharpless Decision 
 
Prior to the plaintiffs’ suit, Pennsylvania’s significant government/industry partnership 
“failed notably to evoke legalistic discussion of the proper place of government in economic 
life.”
 755
  As mentioned, just four years before Sharpless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Dysart had asserted that without government subsidies to rail “a commercial community could 
scarcely exist.”
756
  Pennsylvania had employed multiple mechanisms to support industrial growth 
but, as a state, had been reticent financially to support rail development.  It had shied away from 
those investments in fear of the politics of intra-state rivalries and its failed history with other 
state-supported organizations.  But the need for rail development weighed heavily, as New 
York’s Erie Canal threatened to marginalize Philadelphia’s shipping and commercial interests.  
In an effort to minimize its losses, while still avoiding the political challenges of state legislative 
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Immediately upon getting such approval, in April 1853 Philadelphia’s common council 
proposed to subscribe to 10,000 shares of the Hempfield Rail Road Company paid for by issuing 
bonds secured with the city’s credit.
758
  The opponents of the subscription, “inspired now by a 
fervor that was religious in character,”
759
 voiced their concerns in the political sphere, arguing 
that government could not justly take their tax dollars and give those funds to the railroad.  An 
unmoved city council voted to subscribe four million dollars to the railroad.  Thereupon, 
Sharpless and three other landholders turned to the courts, seeking to enjoin the subscription as 
an unconstitutional redistribution of wealth.  To them, the government unlawfully was taking 
money from A, the taxpayers, and giving it to B, the railroad.  With the court seriously 
considering this assertion, Hartz argued, “the constitutionality of the entire mixed enterprise 




Business interests were vocal supporters of the subscription.  They had been losing trade 
to New York because of the state-sponsored Erie Canal.  To them, the rail investment would 
enhance the general business environment much as roads and canals did.  On the other side sat 
taxpayers who frequently suffered the displacement, and the certainty of higher taxes, that new 
rail lines occasioned.
761
  They argued that if businesses wanted the rail lines, businesses should 
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invest and risk their own capital.  To Sharpless and his objecting fellow real estate owners, the 
issue was not merely one of self-interest.  They claimed they were fighting European socialist 
principles, and berated government financial support of industry as the “popular despotism of 
Rousseau,” the “arbitrary tyranny vindicated by Hobbes,” and a form of Skidmorian socialism.  
Their cause was grounded in “Natural justice,” “public Liberty,” the “Magna Charta,”  “private 
right,” and “the law of lands.”
762
   
To move the claim to the legal sphere, Sharpless had to pin those concerns to 
constitutional limitations on legislative power.  Accordingly, his attorney, B. H. Brewster argued 
that the subscription violated taxpayer rights to acquire, possess, and protect property under 
Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
763
  In support of that argument, Brewster protested, 
“Men can no longer consider property their own if the majority can get authority from the 
legislature to tax, and mortgage without limitation.”  Voicing a concern that increasingly would 
be heard, Brewster charged that the subscription was “practical agrarianism – this is the doctrine 
which men call socialism; it is that which Skidmore and other such, once propagated to the terror 
and discredit of the country when they published their immoral and dishonest social and political 
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  His argument offered more than political philosophy.  Sharpless’ counsel argued 
that private capital, not public resources, appropriately determined and responded to economic 
need.  In so arguing, the plaintiffs proposed to limit legislative power when the exercise of that 
power violated economic principles.
765
  Those principles constitutionally required a free-market, 
rather than a mixed-corporate, approach to economic development.
766
   
Counsel for the railroad had historical practice and court rulings on their side.  They 
presented the long history of government support of industry and, along with counsel for the city, 
cited ninety-five Pennsylvania acts from 1796 to 1853 supporting municipal aid to internal 
improvements.
767
  Further, they argued that the state legislature was “entitled to exercise the 
whole power of the people, except when its limit is restricted by the express words of the 
Constitution.”
768
  In exercising their subscription power, the state and local legislature sought to 
advance the general welfare.  They helped address the city’s legitimate commercial need to 
facilitate the movement of goods from the Midwest through Philadelphia to American and 
European population centers.  One needs look no further than the Erie Canal to see the benefits 
of government/industry partnership.  In essence, the mixed corporate model was an economic 
necessity.  In a somewhat counterintuitive twist, taxpayers had argued for a version of laissez-
faire economics while business had advocated for government involvement in, and ownership of, 
industry. 
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The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Jeremiah Black, rejected the plaintiffs’ 
efforts to limit Pennsylvania’s legislative authority.  While acknowledging the thread of 
reasoning that natural law and vested rights limited legislative power, Black wrote that the court 
was “not aware that any State Court has ever held a law to be invalid except where it was clearly 
forbidden.”  In tandem with the long line of cases following Iredell’s reasoning in Calder, Black 
stated that, the courts could invalidate an act “only when it violates the constitution clearly, 
palpably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds.”  Black 
was “thoroughly convinced that the words of the constitution furnish the only test to determine 
the validity of a statute.”
 769
  Accordingly, philosophic arguments about government’s role were 
not sufficient grounds upon which to overturn statutes.  Courts required specifically enumerated 
constitutional limitations. 
 Black then searched for constititutional language that might limit legislative grants to 
privately held businesses.  Among other areas, he focused on the legislature’s taxing authority.  
Declaring that “a taking of private property for private use . . . is palpably unconstitutional,” 
Black observed that constitutional language, including the term “tax,” required interpretation.  
He wrote, “I do not mean to assert that every act which the legislature may choose to call a tax 
law is constitutional.  The whole of a public burden cannot be thrown on a single individual, 
under the pretence of taxing him, nor can one county be taxed to pay the debt of another, nor one 
portion of the state to pay the debts of the whole states.”  After offering that equity principle, 
Black advanced that an improper use of taxing authority may be “an attempt to pronounce a 
judicial sentence, order or decree,” in violation of the separation of powers.  In that sense, 
government-required private-to-private transfers were judicial in nature, and efforts by the 
legislature to enter the realm would exceed its authority.  Accordingly, Black noted that a “taking 
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of private property for private use,” would be “palpably unconstitutional” and was specifically 
prohibited.
 770
   
 Black’s most lasting argument was that the ends – the spending of tax dollars – must be 
for the public good and not for a private benefit.  Black reasoned that if the levy were for private 
benefit, the legislation “ceases to be taxation, and it becomes plunder.”
771
  In so arguing, Black 
attached to the constitutional power to tax the requirement of an appropriate spending 
component.  That reasoning infixed the “public purpose doctrine” into American jurisprudence.  
The question then became, what was a public purpose and who got to decide? 
With the legal standard set, the court in Sharpless now addressed whether it would 
challenge the legislature’s determination that the tax and subscription were in the public interest.  
If it did so, the court would have to rule that the legislature’s efforts to advance commerce 
through the support of private corporations were, by their nature, unconstitutional transfers 
without public purpose (which the court equated with public benefit.)  The court declined to do 
that.  Instead, it accepted broad legislative discretion.  “However clear [the court’s] convictions 
may be that the system is pernicious and dangerous,” Black argued, “we cannot put it down by 
usurping authority which does not belong to us.”  Deference would be given, perhaps because 
the majority held to the common belief that rail subscriptions enhanced the general welfare.  
Black indicated such when he suggested that the legislature was not just empowered, but was 
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required to advance commerce.  “To aid, encourage, and stimulate commerce, domestic and 
foreign, is a duty of the sovereign, as plain and universally recognized as any other.”
 772 
 
Black had advanced three positions regarding the “public purpose” requirement for 
constitutional taxation.  First, he rejected a negative-governance, night-watchman model in favor 
of a government actively contributing to, and shaping economic development.  Second, he 
submitted that government could employ and finance private actors to promote that economic 
development even though the public only indirectly benefited by the expenditure.
 773
   Third, he 
maintained the practice of deferring to legislative judgment even though the results might be 
“pernicious and dangerous.”  Given those standards, it was unlikely that courts would often 
overturn governmental financial support of industry.  With this broad definition of public 
purpose, the court found the subscription lawful. 
 One cannot discount the gravity Black afforded practical realities.  Aware that any other 
outcome would have upset the historic relation among government, business, and the general 
welfare, Black noted, “If the works erected by the Commonwealth for the promotion of her 
commerce, are not public improvements, then every law relating to them is void; every citizen 
may repudiate his share of the state debt, if he pleases, and defend his property by force against a 
collector of state taxes.”
774
  Given the breadth of government involvement in industry, the 
benefits that involvement could bring, and the consequences of court interference, the Sharpless 
majority granted expansive discretion to the legislature’s judgment.  To do otherwise, Black 
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suggested, risked rebellion and chaos.  The plaintiffs’ claims of right necessarily were 
subordinated to public purpose.  
The Sharpless majority had walked to the edge of elevating personal rights over general-
welfare concerns, but then halted.  Why?  Simply put, internal improvements were a major 
enterprise of mid-century America because society believed that they were required to advance 
the general welfare.  As Justice Lowrie noted in his Sharpless dissent, states had a total of about 
$60 million invested or proposed in rail-supporting enterprises.  That total was equal to one-half 
the assessed property value in the entire state of Pennsylvania.
775
  As significant as that was, 
Lowrie’s number was understated.  Goodrich’s partial study of rail investments shows that by 
1861 government had invested $150 million in private rail companies.  Communities put so 
many dollars at risk, Goodrich noted, because rail access “was literally a matter of survival.”
776
  
William Sharpless’s challenge therefore threatened a deep, widespread, and largely accepted 
public undertaking.
777
  It is no wonder that the court classified the case as the most important it 
had ever heard and that it ruled as it did. 
 While Black reflected the prevailing view, anti-subscription forces were gaining political 
traction.  As an indication of the rapidity and depth of shifting public sentiment, at the 1838 
Pennsylvania constitutional convention, the debt the state incurred to finance private business 
was considered a necessary and welcome investment in business and an effort to limit that debt 
to $30 million was defeated as “suicidal.”  By the 1857 constitutional convention, perceptions 
had changed.  That convention adopted a $750,000 cap on public debt, and did so with a 
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population and economic base considerably larger than when it rejected the $30 million limit.
778
  
By 1869, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would publicly question whether it had appropriately 
applied the public purpose doctrine in Sharpless.
779
 
Legal historians give scant attention to the dissents in Sharpless, with Hartz mistakenly 
believing that that the dissenters wrote no opinions and Waldron dedicating only one paragraph 
to their writings.
780
  This is unfortunate.  While Black carried the day by launching the public 
purpose doctrine, Justices Lowrie and Lewis, writing separately, carried the future by addressing 
the issues that would shape that doctrine.   
In short, the dissents introduced a shift in the presumptions.  Where Black’s opinion (and 
all previous opinions) focused first on the public’s need, Lowrie’s dissent focused first on 
individual rights – and it did so with an historical flourish.  To Lowrie, property rights were the 
foundation for stable and free governance and, accordingly, required court protection.  Lowrie 
sermonized, “it stands written in every age, in almost every year of the history of the Grecian and 
Italian cities, democratic, oligarchic, or monarchic . . . [a] disregard of individual rights, was 
more than anything else, the cause of their decay.”
781
  Juxtaposed against those ancient failed 
empires, Lowrie placed England whose “whole history . . . is one of continual protest against 
government invasion of private rights.”  Ultimately professing a laissez-faire model, Lowrie 
railed against the 1853 oppression against which individual rights must stand – “socialism” – 
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“the very worst form of government.”
782
  Accordingly, he promoted a system where government 
was to “protect individuals in the proper pursuit of their own lawful plans” but was not to 
otherwise shape economic decisions.
783
  Because individual rights and government power cannot 
coexist, Lowrie argued that several Pennsylvania constitutional provisions restricted legislative 
power to encumber property.  Indeed, he argued, “all our American Constitutions” protect 
property against legislative overreaching.
784
 
Lewis’s dissent similarly wrestled with concerns over socialism and “Fourier 
establishment,” which he declared, “no man can constitutionally be compelled to embark.”
785
  
His dissent called for the impossible, requiring the unanimous consent of the inhabitants paying 
taxes for the subscriptions.
786
  Despite the impossibility of that standard, this respected jurist and 
leader of the Democratic Party insisted the diminution of property rights through taxes to support 
private industry required specific consent.  As had dissenting justices in earlier cases, he 
reasoned that objecting taxpayers could not be forced to participate in a corporate society where 
they had no rights.  The necessary conclusion therefore was that government subscriptions and 
republican governance were fundamentally at odds.
787
  But to Lewis, it was not just about rights 
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protection: subscriptions were bad public policy.  Perhaps enjoying the luxury of a dissenting 
podium, Lewis lectured about his fears of a bankrupt nation. 
[W]hen credit shall be exhausted, and the day of payment shall come; when the 
bonds, (which are to be issued like other obligations of mere sureties without 
making any provision for payment,) shall come to maturity – when the rail-
road excitement shall subside and reason shall resume her dominion – when 
the exhilaration of profuse expenditure shall give place to the gloom to be 
produced by the grinding exactions of the tax gatherer, when the rich shall be 
impoverished, and the poor shall be cast into prison, – when all classes shall be 
involved in millions of debt beyond the means of payment – when individual 
industry and enterprise shall cease with the destruction of individual rights – 
when the freemen of this Commonwealth shall become the bondmen of 
corporations, I shall, if surviving, have the melancholy consolation of knowing 
that I have endeavored, to the extent of my feeble abilities, to avert these 
calamities from my fellow citizens, and to maintain their rights of property 




In voicing his concern over the financial decay threatened by public subscriptions, Lewis 
revealed a driving concern.  Growing public indebtedness and increased taxation were 
threatening economic, social, and political collapse.  Taxes were imposed on landholders and, 
while their land values may have increased with rail, their ability to pay the increased taxes 
without selling or mortgaging that land did not, placing a number of taxpayers into economic 
distress and bankruptcy.  To Lewis, those pragmatic burdens, as well as the continued violation 
of individual rights, required remedy.  Government practices and court acquiescence needed to 
change.  Courts had to step in to limit legislative largess, protect national solvency, and guard 
private property.  Assuring private property and social welfare required court activism. 
Black, Lowrie, and Lewis’ opinions were, in some measure, cut of the same dreary cloth.  
Laurie remarked on the staggering sums government had invested in private industry.  Black 
noted that these investments typically failed (although he applauded government support of 
commercial development), and Lewis predicted these investments would launch “grinding 
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exactions of the tax gatherer.”  A correlation between profligate government spending on the one 
hand and moral breakdown and economic ruin on the other ran through each opinion.  But the 
justices differed on the court’s ability to act.  Both Lowrie and Lewis in some measure advocated 
advancing individual rights as a means to prohibit government from leading society down an 
undesired path.  In doing so, they pinned their arguments to constitutional property-protecting 
doctrines, including due process, eminent domain, and contract protection.  Their objections, 
however, were not limited to constitutionally protected rights.  To them, public subscriptions 
were beyond government authority in some measure because they were unwise.   
Emerging Property Protections 
 
Notwithstanding the dissenters’ protests, Black’s argument was grounded in the historical 
practices of local governance, state of law, and court precedents in the antebellum era.  State and 
municipal governments had actively supported industrial development and had done so using 
their taxing authority.
789
  They did so in accord with majority community sentiment
790
 and, as 
Lowrie later noted, with unanimous court approval – or at least unanimous acquiescence.  In his 
1858 concurrence in Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v Commissioners of Allegheny Country, 
Lowrie reflected that while he still believed public subscriptions unconstitutional, he recognized 
“that legislators and courts have everywhere expressed contrary views . . . [and] therefore I ought 
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to adhere to my own [opinions] with great modesty, if at all.”
791
  In that same year, the New 
York high court declared railroad subscriptions to be in the public interest.  Focusing on the 
benefit to society, rather than on the aggrieved taxpayer’s property or the nature of the receiving 
entity, the court voiced that railroads, “add to the value of property, promote trade, and 
contribute to the convenience of the inhabitants of any place.”  Government support of railroads 
fell within the public purpose.
792
  On the eve of the Civil War, the rulings were unanimous and 
courts considered the matter settled.
 793
   As 1855 North Carolina Chief Justice Nash noted, “the 
power of the legislature to pass the Act [was] too strongly fortified, both by authority and reason, 
to be now doubted.”
794




Michigan had no reported cases where the court considered the constitutionality of 
government support of rail.
796
  The court, however, did consider the constitutionality of other 
legislative efforts to tax and spend in support of the general welfare.  In 1853, the Michigan 
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Supreme Court considered a Detroit landholder’s complaint that the city unconstitutionally 
assessed his property for road repairs.  He argued that roads were a general benefit and the city 
could not specially tax him for a general good.  In rejecting his claim, the court, through Justice 
Sanford Green, provided insight into the standards by which the legislature must exercise taxing 
authority.  The state compensates a taxpayer for his taxes with “the security which the 
government affords to his person and property.”  The court warned, “taxation, not based upon 
any idea of benefit to the person taxed, would be grossly unjust, tyrannical, and oppressive, and 
might be characterized as ‘public robbery.’”  Nevertheless, this landholder owed the street repair 
taxes because the basis for assessment, while not perfect, was reasonable.  The court noted that, 
“Every general law, however wisely and carefully perfected, will in its practical operation, work 
oppression and injustice to some.  Equality, like perfection, when applied to man or his works is 
a relative term.”
797
  The court, in an argument that may have resonated twenty years later, argued 
that taxpayers must be the primary beneficiaries of their tax dollars.  Any other result was 
tyrannical. 
At the same time, the Michigan court began to weigh the importance of individual rights 
in its adjudications.  The spark for that philosophy, the court declared, was the 1850 
constitutional change.  Justice Wing in 1856 referred to this new philosophy: “It manifestly was 
the intention of the constitutional convention of 1851 [sic] to surround the rights of individuals 
with additional guards, and to place them upon as sound a basis as was consistent with the rights 
and necessities of the public.”
798
  Nevertheless, in Swan v Williams, the court declared that “law 
of the land” provisions restricted executive power, not legislative or judicial.
799
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In the face of court acquiescence and/or silence, state legislatures across the country 
approved of municipal taxation in support of private rail ventures.  Goodrich’s study indicates 
that the Michigan legislature adopted 28 of its total 30 special acts authorizing local rail aid in 
the period 1860-1873 and that from 1860-1865 it authorized the second most (next to Wisconsin) 
in the nation.  Only two states would cease doing this before the 1860s – Pennsylvania, as a 
result of the constitutional amendment passed in the wake of Sharpless, and Iowa.  Iowa also 
stopped because of constitutional change but, this time, not by the ballots of the legislators or the 
people.  Iowa stopped by the votes of its Supreme Court justices. 
The Iowa court had its chance to affect constitutional change when, in 1862, it 
reconsidered (although not acknowledging so) the contentious issue of public subscriptions.  
Before that time the Iowa courts, like those of the other states, had affirmed the legal legitimacy 
of legislative support of private industry.  In Dubuque Co v Dubuque and Pacific Railroad, the 
Iowa Supreme Court in 1853, the same year as Sharpless, declared that the state constitution did 
not “make the slightest illusion” to prohibitions against state support of industry.
800
  So pervasive 
was the practice that by 1856 Iowa carried over $7 million of public debt in support of 
railroads.
801
  The government’s ability to pledge public credit changed with the court’s 1862 
unanimous ruling in State ex rel Burlington and Missouri River Railroad v County of Wapello.  
In that case, the court considered the legality of Wapello County’s subscription of $100,000 to 
purchase stock in the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad.  Refusing to rule narrowly on the 
issue of municipal authority, the court broadly assaulted the institution of government support of 
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private industry, declaring such support unconstitutional.  The court rejected the decisions of the 
“supreme tribunals of some fourteen or fifteen States” and the longstanding tradition of 
government support of industry.  Instead, it claimed to decide the case, “upon principle, rather 
than authority.”
802
  Instead of focusing on public welfare interests, as all other courts had, Justice 
Ralph Phillips Lowe, speaking for the court, focused on protecting “the great and fundamental 
reserved rights of the citizen,” from legislative overreaching, even when an approving vote of the 
taxed citizens accompanied that legislation.  The rail subscription merely transferred wealth from 
one citizen to another.   
To the court, the railroad had been incorporated under the state’s general incorporation 
law and, therefore, had no legal obligations to serve the public good.  Its aim was “the making of 
pecuniary profit.”  Accordingly, the subscription amounted to taking taxpayer private property 
and giving it to a private entity for private use.
803
  The court considered that a flagrant abuse of 
legislative authority.  The court based its decision, and sought to distinguish its opinion from the 
contrary weight of authority, on the Iowa Bill of Rights provision, which declared, “this 
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by the people.”  
That clause allowed the court to extrapolate its state’s taking clause to prohibit taking private 
property for private use.  Lowe suggested that Justice Black in Sharpless similarly might have 
invalidated the Philadelphia subscription had Pennsylvania such a constitutional clause.
804
  With 
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that vague constitutional language as its foundation, the court declared the bonds uncollectible, 
thereby protecting the people from “a step backward toward despotism.”
805
 
Many disagreed with the Iowa court, including the United States Supreme Court.  In an 
unusual turn, that court rejected the State Supreme Court decision.  After noting that Iowa’s 
opinion was contrary to those of courts in sixteen states, including an earlier Iowa opinion, the 
Supreme Court in Gelpcke v Dubuque dramatically limited the state opinion.  Recognizing that it 
should defer to Iowa’s interpretations of its own constitution, Justice Noah Swayne, writing for 
the court, disdainfully characterized the Wapello reasoning as “in unenviable solitude and 
notoriety.”  He then grandly proclaimed, “We shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, 
because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”  The court then decided 
that Iowa must honor all outstanding bonds and agreements, or violate the Contract Clause of the 
United States Constitution.
806
  In some measure, the Court’s disquiet stemmed from the 
bondholders’ reliance on recent Iowa court opinions upholding legislative power.  In that sense 
Gelpcke may have been an equitable decision protecting out-of-state investors against oscillating 
state-court positions.  Not bullied by the federal Supreme Court, the Iowa Supreme Court held to 
its position.  While the courts’ reliance on different constitutional provisions allows the holdings 
to be reconciled (the U.S. Supreme Court only limited the impact of the Iowa court’s ruling) the 
courts’ views of taxation to support private rail development were dramatically at odds.
807
 
The concerns voiced by the Iowa court, and the Pennsylvania voters who modified the 
state constitution to prohibit public aid to rail, were also voiced by residents across the nation 
Nevertheless, the lure of local rail service, and the threat to a local economy should rail bypass 
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its borders, continued as an effective call to action for local municipalities.  Accordingly, in 1863 
Michigan Governor Austin Blair received “a large number of petitions, memorials, and verbal 
applications” for legislation authorizing municipalities to pledge their credit in aid of local rail 
construction.”  Blair saw value in many of those petitions but cautioned against nonremunatarive 
projects, as those would result in oppressive taxation.
808
  In response to that, and the fervor of the 
day, Michigan’s legislature authorized grants of at first 5% and later 10% of municipalities’ 
assessed property valuation to railroads, subject to an approving vote of the local taxpayers.  In 
itself, Michigan was not unique, save for the actions of one small community and the writings of 
Thomas Cooley.  With a case created by the tenacious Salem Township Board, Cooley would 
write an opinion that would open the floodgates of judicial review of legislatively authorized 
spending to advance the general welfare.  
Regulatory Encumbrances and Judicial Deference 
 
Before turning to the Cooley’s combustible writings on taxes and spending, it is 
important to review antebellum developments in the related regulatory sphere.  Just as 
government efforts to support industry resulted in increased taxes, government efforts to regulate 
commercial and social activities resulted in burdens on residents’ use and enjoyment of property 
and their freedom to contract.
809
  Those efforts generated efforts to limit legislative regulatory – 
or police – powers.  The legal history in large measure mimics that of legislative taxing and 
spending power, as the underlying question was the same; what is the scope of legislative power? 
As mentioned, historians now agree that government regulated industry since colonial 
times.  Those regulations started early.  In 1641, the Massachusetts Bay Colony regulated against 
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“unwholesome” beer.  It regulated tavern and inn hours, the size and weight of nails, and the 
prices charged for public transportation.
 810
  Massachusetts was not alone; regulation during the 
colonial period was widespread.  In populated areas, municipalities focused on health and safety 
concerns.  Governments required chimney inspections and repairs.  They required that buildings 
be made of brick or stone and that flammables be restricted.  Regulations required that residents 
clean their streets and some cities, like New York, required residents to provide nighttime 
lighting.  In regulating business, government focused on prices, inspections, labor and quality 
controls, and wharf rules.  They regulated the price, size, and quality of breads, and bakers had to 
mark their names on each loaf to insure compliance.  Some cities confined nuisances, like 
slaughterhouses, to particular areas of the town.  The impact of the regulations did not mean 
residents were hamstrung.  While “colonial society often placed the interest of the community 
above the economic rights of the individual,” regulations were by no means stringently 
enforced.
811
  That loose enforcement was an attribute of small government and not a rejection of 
regulation. 
As the population moved west, so did the regulatory mindset.  An earlier chapter 
discusses regulation in Detroit.  As a territory and continuing through the antebellum period, 
Michigan’s government regulated the manufacture and sale of wheat and rye flours, buckwheat, 
pork, lard, beef, fish, and butter.  It set forth rules on packaging, the length of nails, and the 
correct placement of hoops on a barrel.  It regulated leather production for shoes, the hours that 
ferries operated and the rates they could charge.  It regulated the number and timing for mill 
                                                 
810
 Donald J. Pisani, "Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Economy," Journal of 
American History 74(1987): 757.  See also, "Law, Society and Economy in Colonial America," Hall, The Magic 
Mirror: 28-48. 
811
 James W.  Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 18-21.  
303 
 
owner meetings and it determined the rates mills could charge.
812
  In sum, regulations were part 
of the American psyche of a well-ordered society.   
State and local governments enacted most of those regulations.  While the Federal 
Commerce and Contract Clauses somewhat limited their authority, states enjoyed “police 
powers” to advance the health, welfare, and safety of the public.  By their nature, those 
regulations encumbered property.  As Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw noted in 
Commonwealth v Alger (1851):  
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well 
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and 
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it 
may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of 
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to 
the rights of the community.  All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived 
directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those general 




To Shaw, there was no demarcation between public and private.  Instead, liberties and rights 
were organically connected with the common good and general welfare.  Government was a 
vehicle to social advancement, not a regulator or impediment.  Every state accepted this 
interwoven relationship and both courts and the society embraced wide restrictions on property if 
those restrictions advanced the community’s health and welfare.  All states and municipalities 
regulated in an effort to that end.   
While society accepted regulation as part of its norms, property remained a potent liberty 
interest – it was a foundation of American liberty.  Accordingly, protecting private property and 
the right to acquire it was a major emphasis of the Revolution and early American government.  
Arthur Lee, a revolutionary era diplomat to Spain, Prussia, and France, declared: “The right of 
property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive 
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them of their liberty.”
814
  From the beginning, control of property was a bulwark against 
government intrusion.  It not only guaranteed citizens freedom, it was the means to self and 
community improvement.  James Ely, Jr. wrote, “historically, property ownership was viewed as 
establishing the economic basis for freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of 
liberty.”
815
   
Notwithstanding that importance, early American government struck a balance on the 
side of regulation over property interests.  Gordon Wood reflected that, “the sacrifice of the 
individual interest to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism.”
816
  The 
Declaration of Rights in Vermont’s first state constitution declared, “private property ought to be 
subservient to public uses, when necessity required it.”
817
  To be sure, early American 
government balanced the individual’s right to enjoy property with the need to regulate in support 
of the common welfare.  Marc Kruman related that members of Pennsylvania state constitutional 
convention discussed limiting the legislature’s taxing authority to require that “the purpose for 
which any tax is to be raised ought to appear clearly . . . to be of more service to the community 
than the money would be if not collected.”
 818
  But that balance fell on the side of supporting the 
common welfare.  In the public economy of early America, Novak commented, “the buying and 
selling of goods was intimately bound up with community identity and social order.”  He 
continued, noting that, “Nothing so important could be left to the invisible laws of a marketplace 
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or a public stricture that the buyer should beware.”
819
  The legislature determined whether 
community needs exceeded individual interests and, when it did so, legislated accordingly.  
While regulations might seem pervasive, they must be considered with an early-
American mindset.  Gautham Rao, in discussing antebellum acceptance of state compulsion to 
join posses, explained that citizens freely and willingly sacrificed their time and efforts in 
support of state law enforcement in pursuit of the common welfare.  Citizens considered their 
uncompensated efforts as an attribute of good citizenship.
820
  Just as citizens embraced 
supporting the common welfare by their participation as law enforcement officers, so too did 
they accept limitations on their economic freedoms in pursuit of community benefit.  In the first 
half of the century, most tradesmen did not consider it a burden to apply for a license to trade.  
At that time, in many locations, an individual had no “right” to engage in trade.  Selling for profit 
was a privilege.  As such, government could extend or not extend the privilege as it determined 
appropriate.  Novak noted that in 1827 Maryland it was unlawful for anyone to set up shop  
for the purpose of selling by wholesale or retail, or bartering any dry goods, 
groceries, spirituous or fermented liquor, imported dried fruit, glass, crockery, 
hardware, drugs or medicines, paints, printed books, stationary, saddlery, gold, 
silver or plated ware, jewelry, toys, wearing apparel, salted provisions, grain, 
meal, flour, timber, tobacco, cotton, leather, hides, lime, wrought or cast iron, 
copper or tin, or any other kind of goods, wares or merchandise, foreign or 
domestic, without first obtaining a license.   
 
That the law was extended in 1832, and prohibited anyone from selling “with a view to profit” 
without a license.  Soon other states, including Tennessee, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and 
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Accompanying their general agreement that government was to facilitate trade and 
legislate for the general welfare, Americans retained a fear of legislative overreaching.  Kruman 
argued that state constitutional conventions, around revolutionary times, frequently considered 
and enacted limitations on legislative authority, in addition to the well-recognized restrictions on 
executive authority.  He proposed that the declarations of rights and bill of rights attached to 
most state constitutions “infused . . . government with the idea of limitation.”  Included in the 
stated rights was the oft-followed Virginia declaration that all man had “inherent rights” that 
government could not take away, including “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of 
acquiring and possessing property.”  Kruman submitted that these liberty rights against 
government intrusions applied to all aspects of governance, including the legislature.
822
  
Even if the declarations and bills of rights intended limits on legislative prerogatives, 
most courts and litigants seemed unable to particularize the basis upon which courts could void 
overreaching legislation.  Throughout the early nineteenth century, supporters of limited 
legislative power over property rights pinned their arguments on Justice Samuel Chase’s 1798 
dicta in Calder v Bull.  While that case concerned a legislative effort to require a rehearing of a 
judicial decree in a probate matter, it also involved serious issues of legislative power.   
The opposing arguments in Calder presaged the property/general-welfare debates of the 
next century.  Justice James Iredell’s dissent declared courts could employ only specifically 
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delineated constitutional limitations to check state legislative power.
823
  He wrote, “It is true, that 
some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be 
void; but I cannot think that, under such a government, any Court of Justice would possess a 
power to declare it so.”  Iredell also suggested that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not restrict 
government regulations that affect property.  Finding that “some of the most necessary and 
important acts of Legislation are, on the contrary, founded upon the principle, that private rights 
must yield to public exigencies,” Iredell argued that “without the possession of this power the 
operations of Government would often be obstructed, and society itself would be endangered.”
824
    
Chase took a different approach.  Writing for the court, he claimed that courts required no 
specific constitutional provision to find legislation unconstitutional.  “I cannot subscribe,” Chase 
wrote, “to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul; 
although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, 
of the State.”  He continued:  “There are certain vital principles in our free Republican 
governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative 
power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for 
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government is established.”  
As an example of such an extra constitutional limit on legislative prerogatives, Chase positions, 
“a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.  It is against all reason and justice, for a 
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that 
they have done it.”
825
  Chase premised his argument on seventeenth and eighteenth century 
theories of a “social compact” wherein government held its power in moral trust and forfeited 
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that power when it violated that trust.  Chase’s reasoning, while grounded on concerns over 
legislative overreaching, suggested that courts have the authority to overturn legislation if a court 
determines that the people could not have intended the legislature to act as it did. 
826
 
Chase and Iredell’s dicta portended long-term controversy over the limits on legislative 
power.  Iredell wrote of the need to legislate for the common welfare, and how such legislation 
necessarily encumbers property rights, but that doing so was an appropriate incident of 
democratic governance.  Chase professed different beliefs.  Freedom required individual 
property rights and legislative tinkering with those rights undercut that freedom.  While state 
constitutions might not specifically prohibit legislative acts in violation of fundamental law, 
basic republican principles demanded those restrictions.  Iredell’s position largely held sway 
through the middle portions of the nineteenth century as Chase’s concerns prowled in the 
background.  
Chief Justice John Marshall would soon revisit the issue of non-enumerated limits on 
legislative authority in the 1810 case, Fletcher v Peck.  In that case, the court considered the 
Georgia legislature’s effort to reverse the bribe-induced land sale of a previous legislature.  
Relying in part on the Contract Clause, the court unanimously declared unconstitutional the 
efforts to repeal the earlier legislature’s sale.  In dicta, Marshall questioned, but never answered, 
whether there might be extra-constitutional limitations on legislative power.  At first, he 
recognized that lacking specific constitutional restrictions, state legislative authority was 
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unlimited.  He then floated a question that would resonate for many decades:  “It may well be 
doubted whether the nature of society and government does not prescribe some limits to the 
legislative power; and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an 
individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation.”  He reflected that 
the legislature’s power to make property-affecting laws “where the constitution is silent, never 
has been, and perhaps never can be, defined strictly.”
827
  Since the court determined that 
Georgia’s effort to rescind the land sale violated constitutional restrictions against ex post facto 
laws, impairments of contracts, and bills of attainder, it did not need to discuss further the extra-
constitutional concerns.  The question remained unanswered but, as with Calder, became dicta 
used by property-protecting advocates of legislative limitations. 
Calder and Fletcher touched on, but did not address regulatory concerns.  Because 
regulation was a state issue, state courts would be the primary forums in which American courts 
considered the nature and extent of limitations on legislatures.  An early challenge to property-
encumbering laws considered an 1826 Mobile, Alabama assize of bread.  As in Detroit, that 
regulation required that bakers be licensed, that they use wholesome flour, that their bread be of 
a government-directed weight, and that it sell at a specified price.  Moreover, Mobile required 
that bakers mark their initials and the price on each loaf.  The city fined Yuille, a Mobile baker, 
twenty dollars and had his product condemned for being underweight.  Yuille sued, claiming that 
the city did not have the right to regulate the sale of bread because those regulations interfered 
with his right to pursue a lawful trade.  Since the right to trade was a property right, Yuille 
argued that the legislation unconstitutionally encumbered his property and that the regulations 
were void under the common law.  The court found otherwise, stating that the restraints were 
appropriate “if such restraint be for the good of the inhabitants.”  The regulation fit that goal, as 
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society could not rely on the market to provide sufficient quantities or qualities of bread without 
government oversight.  
By 1826, economists were beginning to challenge the wisdom of such encumbrances on 
trade and property and the court took notice of them.  Nevertheless, the court deferred to the 
legislature’s judgment.  “The legislature having full power to pass such laws as deemed 
necessary for public good, their acts cannot be impeached on the ground, that they are unwise, or 
not in accordance with just and enlightened views of political economy, as understood at the 
present day.”  Given that deference, and finding that Yuille had a fair trial, the court affirmed the 
conviction.
828
  Yuille was not unusual for its day: the courts routinely affirmed legislatures’ 
power to act in support of a well-ordered society.
 829
    
Notwithstanding that general acceptance, not all early attacks on property-divesting 
legislation were unsuccessful.  One notable and representative case came out of North Carolina’s 
efforts to democratize its court personnel selection process.  The matter started in 1807, when 
North Carolina appointed Lawson Henderson as a court clerk who was to hold his office during 
good behavior, a right that Henderson intended to retain.  Twenty-five years later, in 1832, the 
North Carolina legislature enacted a law calling for elections of court clerks.  John D. Hoke won 
that election and sought to take Henderson’s job.  Henderson objected, claiming that he had a 
property right in the clerk’s position.  He protested that the legislature was taking his property 
without due process of law, and the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed. 
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With the issue of slavery smoldering in the background, the court spoke out on the limits 
of legislative power.  Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin, writing for the court in Hoke v Henderson, 
asserted that property was a linchpin of democratic society.  “The great object of society” Ruffin 
declared, “is to enable men to appropriate among themselves the things which in their natural 
state, were common.”  He claimed that laws were designed to protect that property from the 
wrongful acts of others, even if those acts were done on behalf of a majority of citizens as 
represented by the legislature.  “In other words, public liberty requires that private property 
should be protected even from the government itself.”   
He then looked for a constitutional hook upon which to hang his property-protecting 
beliefs and found it in several areas.  The North Carolina constitution provided that the state 
could not deprive an individual of his property “but by the law of the land.”  Since Henderson 
had a property right in his clerk position, the legislature could not transfer that right from him to 
another individual without a judicial hearing.  Because there was no hearing to determine if 
Henderson had violated the good conduct provision of his tenure, the legislation was improper.  
In essence, Ruffin argued that the proposed taking was procedurally inadequate.  By taking 
without a trial, the legislature violated separation of power principles.  In an argument that would 
resonate in later decisions, the Hoke court found that the legislature improperly acted as a court 
by passing judgment on Henderson’s conduct in office.
830
  The court may have considered an 
interest wider than that of Lawson Henderson himself.  On several occasions, the court likened 
Henderson’s loss of property rights to those slave owners would suffer were the legislature to 
enact laws limiting their rights.  While the Hoke court argued procedural concerns, its unease 
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over slavery was manifest.  The words spoke procedure but the focus was substantive.  Two 
decades later Justice Taney voiced similar concerns in Dred Scott. 
The oft-cited Taylor v Porter & Ford evidenced a judicial concern over government-
compelled transfers of property between individuals.  In that case, the court considered 
legislation that granted eminent domain powers to an individual to build a private access road 
over another individual’s land.  Acknowledging that “private interests must yield to public 
necessity,” the court questioned whether government had the power to compel private-to-private 
transfers.  Both searching for a grant of legislative power and a specific withholding of power, 
the 1843 court concluded that New York’s due process and law of the land clauses prohibited 
legislative property transfers without a judicial hearing.  Because this was a naked transfer of 




A series of challenges to property-affecting legislation also arose out of New York’s 
efforts to modify marriage rights and obligations.  In 1848, New York passed legislation granting 
women ownership of the property they brought into a marriage or that they acquired during the 
marriage.  Common-law principles held that property vested in the husband, “as governor of the 
family.”  In seeking to protect the woman’s rights, the statute divested the husband of that 
property.  Two cases concerning that law disclose the issues with which courts struggled when 
reviewing this legislatively demanded transfer of property from one individual to another. 
Shortly after the statute’s enactment, Mary White sued her husband, the ne’er-do-well 
Lyman White, to divest him of his use and enjoyment of property bequeathed to her.  Mr. White 
defended by challenging the constitutionality of the statute.  In White v White, the court, through 
Justice Mason, ruled in the husband's favor.  Since the legislation stripped property rights from 
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the husband without a judicial procedure, the law was invalid.  The court reasoned that: “If the 
legislature can take the property of A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself and either 
shut him up in prison or put him to death.  But none of these things can be done by mere 
legislation.  There must be due process of law.”
832
  Few cite the case, perhaps because the court 
relied largely on natural law to define due process.  Justice Mason argued for extra-constitutional 
limitations on the legislature and that courts were not required to rely on specific constitutional 
“negatives upon the legislative power.”  To Mason, courts could invalidate legislation where the 
“exercise of [legislative] power is incompatible with the nature and object of all government, and 
is destructive of the great end and aim for which government is instituted, and is subversive of 
the fundamental principles upon which all free governments are organized.”
833
  It is easy to put 
too much emphasis on this lightly considered, infrequently cited case.  Notwithstanding that 
caution, Mason seemed to be suggesting that natural law required that courts review legislation 
in light of the underlying purposes of (republican?) governance.  Hence, if courts considered 
legislation inconsistent with governing structures, those laws were invalid, notwithstanding the 
absence of legislative-limiting constitutional language.  To Mason and his brethren, the court 
was responsible to define the extent and nature of those extra-constitutional limitations.  In the 
end, the Mason recognized that the court’s decision was anti-democratic and unpopular.  The 
husband was a “man of idle habits,” was frequently intoxicated, and was an improvident 
scoundrel.  The common-law was unfair and archaic.  Nevertheless, natural law limited 
legislative prerogatives, and the legislature could not take property rights from husbands and 
give them to wives.  The New York Court of Appeals, in Westervelt v Gregg ruled similarly, 
finding as Cooley noted that “rights once vested, . . . could not be divested by any subsequent 
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change in the law.”
834
  In other words, laws that divested property rights were beyond the power 
of the legislature.   
Those cases, and the several like them, are oft cited but too narrow to be representative of 
the nature of antebellum regulatory law.  That is because in those cases the legislative action 
affected person-to-person transfers.  The North Carolina law directly transferred Henderson’s 
property (good-behavior employment position) to Hoke, and New York’s laws, in one case, 
directly transferred land between adjoining landholders and, in another two, a husband’s property 
(acquired under common-law coverture rules) to their wives.  While the courts’ expansive 
language eloquently spoke of natural law, due process, and law of the land, the practical 
consequences of the rulings were limited.
835
  When employed with respect to general regulatory 
legislation (or the largest transfers of wealth of the day – railroads), due process and other 
constitutional claims met significantly greater obstacles.    
 As Cooley noted, early nineteenth century government was “present at all times, touching 
the citizens for his advantage and direction in all his relations: by his fireside as much as in his 
business.”
836
  Up until 1845, most of that government was local and “took seriously the historical 
sensibility of the common law and the aspirations of an ordered commonwealth.”
837
  In that 
sense, early nineteenth-century government regulations largely harmonized with general 
sensibilities.  That local harmony began to dissipate as state legislatures in the mid 1840s began 
to enact statewide alcohol regulations or outright prohibitions.  “During the decade of 1846 to 
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1856 no fewer than sixteen states passed anti-liquor laws of a more or less drastic character.”
838
  
Those laws resulted in a flurry of litigation and what Novak characterized as the “earliest . . . 
definitive statements of both substantive due process and the inalienable police power.”
839
  In 
considering the propriety of the temperance legislation, courts would now address legislative 
power, particularly as it affected the individual rights of citizens. 
Temperance and Broadening Discontent 
 
 As Detroit’s experiences attest, regulating alcohol was an incident of American 
government from its earliest days.  This stemmed not just from moral concerns, but also from 
public health and safety concerns.  Between “1790 and 1830 [Americans] drank more alcoholic 
beverages per capita than ever before or since.”  By 1830, “estimated annual consumption of 
hard liquor [was] 9.5 gallons for every American over 14 – plus 30.3 gallons of hard cider and 
other in toxicants to total 7.1 gallons of absolute alcohol.”
 840
  That heavy consumption conflicted 
with the magnified morality of the Second Great Awakening and with the health and safety 
concerns associated with industrialization, family violence, and pauperism.
841
  While some may 
view the temperance movement as harking back to a purer era, it was quite the opposite.  “The 
organized temperance movement which emerged in the 1820s, marked by the formation of the 
American Temperance Society in 1826, had its roots in the process of industrialization and 
commercialization of agriculture; more important, the men and women who fashioned the 
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temperance crusade sought to hasten the processes of social and economic change."
842
  Ronald 
Walters and Eric Foner argued that the temperance advocates “had a sense of progress and the 
nation’s potential.  As they saw it, prosperity, godliness, and political freedom were the fruits of 
sobriety.  Poverty, damnation, and tyranny were the consequences of intemperance.”
843
 
 An indication of the public’s engagement with temperance issues can be gleaned from 
theater attendance at plays featuring the challenges of drink.  In the 1850s, along with Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, plays promoting temperance “were crowd pleasers with the ability to draw a wider 
spectrum of the public than had ever before frequented the theatre.”  During that time, wildly 
successful temperance plays moved across the country.  According to Judith MacArthur’s study, 
the plot of one of those plays, The Drunkard, typified the temperance message.  In it,  
Grasping lawyer Cribbs, the dastardly villain, schemes to have the poor but 
beautiful and virtuous Mary Wilson and her widowed mother evicted from 
their rose-covered cottage . . .  The Noble young heir, Edward, weds Mary and 
chases off Cribbs, who revenges himself by luring Edward into an addiction to 
drink.  Ruined and degraded, the hero flees to the miserable alleys of New 
York City, where his ragged and heartbroken but ever-devoted wife and child 
follow in search of him.  Edward is about to take poison when he is saved by a 
reformed drunkard turned philanthropist who administers the pledge of 
sobriety.  Cribbs’s last-minute attempt to abscond with Edward’s grandfather’s 
will is foiled, and the young family is reunited.  The final scene is set in their 
picturesque cottage, where Edward plays “Home, Sweet Home” on the flute 




 The Drunkard was one of several very popular plays used to display the evils of drink and the 
redemptive value of family and community, in a dry, sober environment.  
 To control alcohol consumption, municipalities and, increasingly, states would regulate 
the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcohol.  Along with political complaints that those 
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laws were too onerous, dissenting residents began to petition courts for relief (most likely as part 
of the previously mentioned trend to claim constitutional rights violations).  That occasioned a 
deeper judicial analysis of the limits of legislative power to regulate and the rights of private 
property.  At first, efforts to judicially limit legislative power were unavailing.  Early courts 
referenced natural law and vested rights as counterbalances to legislative authority.  In New York 
v Morris, the 1835 New York Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Village of 
Ogdensburgh’s requirement that grocers have licenses to allow patrons to imbibe on their 
premises.  Writing for the court, Justice Samuel Nelson began by recognizing that citizens had 
“vested rights” that were “sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of the Legislative 
Department.”  After asserting that formidable standard, the court then questioned whether it had 
any authority to relieve parties from legislative overreaching.  Claiming that it would be 
“indelicate and presumptuous” to assume that the legislature would ever overreach, Nelson 
softened his earlier promised protection of vested rights.  “Vested rights are indefinite terms, and 
of extensive signification; not infrequently resorted to when no better argument exists.”  The 
dictum suggested limits: the ruling found otherwise.  After promising robust protection of 
property, the court fully retreated from its rhetoric.  Nelson declared: “Government was 
instituted for the purpose of modifying and regulating these rights with a view to the general 
good; and under the Constitution, the mode by which it was thought this great object must be 
attained, was left to the wisdom and discretion of the people themselves, acting through the 
medium of their representatives.”
845
  The law was valid.  General-welfare needs trumped 
property rights and the statute was constitutional. 
 The Morris court, however, may have been sending a signal.  Because of the facts of the 
case, the court did not have to take the bold step of invalidating legislation on extra-
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constitutional grounds.  The regulation at issue limited but did not substantially destroy property.  
That fact allowed the court to float a concern, without truly opening Pandora’s Box.  The court 
was able warn against laws that violated “inherent or inalienable” rights, while still deferring to 
the legislature’s judgment.    
 A few years before Morris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court faced the same issue, but 
analyzed it quite differently. In Commonwealth v Blackington, the court faced a claim that a 
county’s failure to license a liquor establishment divested the previously licensed individual of 
his property interests.  Oliver Blackington claimed that the loss of his license was a violation of 
his “unalienable rights.”  Chief Justice Shaw was surprised by this rights argument as it had not 
been raised in the nearly sixty years of state and municipal liquor regulations.  He responded by 
noting the expansive police powers “to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable orders, laws, statutes and ordinances” to advance the general welfare.  Of course 
those laws had to be consistent with constitutional restraints.  But the police power by its nature 
effected property interests, and to invalidate laws on that basis “would be a departure from the 
whole policy of the government, from the first settlement of the country.”
846
  Notwithstanding 
constitutional provisions that signaled the importance of property, government regulations to 
advance the public’s health, safety, morals, and general welfare were both constitutionally 
acceptable and appropriate.  
 That same term, Shaw wrote the court’s opinion in Commonwealth v Kimbell.  In that 
case, the petitioner argued that Massachusetts’s regulation of liquor violated Congress’ authority 
under the Commerce Clause.  Shaw rejected that argument, again stating that government power 
necessarily included the authority to regulate “for the peace, safety, health, morals and general 
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welfare of the community.”
847
  That same issue regarding state power in the face of the 
Commerce Clause would arise before the United States Supreme Court in 1847 in a series of 
matters collectively called the License Cases.  In a confusing and disjointed manner, six justices 
wrote opinions, with no court opinion issued.  The question came down to whether federal space 
under the Commerce Clause was so complete as to leave no room for state regulations that, 
necessarily, affected interstate commerce.  In addressing that issue, the justices reflected on the 
nature of state police powers and the historical role of alcohol regulations.  Chief Justice Roger 
Taney’s oft-cited opinion found that states had the power to regulate, or prohibit altogether, 
ardent spirits and could do so even though interstate commerce might be affected.  Justice John 
McLean “acknowledged [that the] police power of a State extends often to the destruction of 
property.”  Hence, once the legislature found alcohol was an impediment to the public’s health or 
morals, it could regulate or destroy that property.
848
  Given the rather tepid regulations of the 
day, the law seemed clear.  Government could regulate alcohol property – to the point of 
destroying it – in order to advance general-welfare interests. 
 Local licensing restrictions marked 1830 and 1840s efforts to limit alcohol sales and 
consumption.  For each effort, however, enterprising businesses found a response.  In his 
groundbreaking studies of early American liquor consumption and regulation, William 
Rorabaugh related stories of avoidance of those statutes.  For example, to avoid Massachusetts’ 
1838 regulations against the retail sales of spirits “an enterprising liquor dealer painted stripes on 
his pig and advertised that for 6¢ a person could see this decorated beast.  The viewer also got a 
free glass of whiskey.”
849
  Rorabaugh explained that such easy avoidance led to the repeal of the 
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statute, but also to new social and legal efforts to restrict that which many desired – alcohol.  
Those restrictions would move from local initiatives (one hundred Massachusetts towns were 
legally dry in 1845
850
) to statewide mandates.  With them, the courts would move from 
unanimous acceptance of the legislature’s right to regulate, to questions concerning the power to 
legislate the destruction of property. 
 Although the temperance movement had been very successful in reducing the nation’s 
alcohol consumption through local laws and social and moral persuasion (consumption had 
declined from 7.1 gallons of absolute alcohol to 1.85 by 1845
851
), by 1850 temperance advocates 
pressed for statewide legal changes that would prohibit, or dramatically reduce, alcohol 
manufacture and sale.
852
  They first found success in Maine, driven by temperance advocate and 
Portland Mayor, Neal Dow.
853
  Believing that “the traffic in intoxicating drink tends more to 
degradation and impoverishment of the people than all other causes of evil combined,” Dow 
advocated, and won, legislative acceptance of the first state prohibition statute in the United 
States.
854
  In the next five years over a dozen states, including Michigan, would pass “Maine 
Laws” to restrict or prohibit alcohol consumption.  Novak noted that these statutes “marked a 
stunning departure in the legal and legislative history of morals and liquor regulation.”  He noted 
that with these laws, “Power and discretion were summarily taken out of the hands of 
communities and local officials and replaced with blanket state-wide legislative bans on a 
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remarkably profitable activity . . . that previously enjoyed the sanction of law.”
855
  Court 
challenges to those laws would occasion the first truly substantive due process cases.  Courts 
would consider whether state legislatures had the authority to make unlawful that which had 
always been legal and to make criminals those who had been productive business people and 
community leaders and, in doing so, destroy significant property value and rights.   
 The 1852 Massachusetts legislature limited the manufacture, sale, and use of all 
intoxicating liquors.  In Fisher v McGirr, the court through Chief Justice Shaw upheld the 
legislature’s right, under its police-power authority, to regulate liquor as a nuisance.
856
  Since 
banning nuisances was within the legislature’s authority, alcohol could be completely banned as 
an injurious and dangerous object.  But there were limits.  With the substance of the law in the 
legislature’s purview, Shaw looked to the summary procedures through which the law was 
enforced.  He concluded that the procedures used to regulate must be consistent with due process 
guarantees.  He asked,  
whether the measures, directed and authorized by the statute in question, are so 
far inconsistent with the principles of justice, and the established maxims of 
jurisprudence, intended for the security of public and private rights, and so 
repugnant to the provisions of the Declaration of Rights and constitution of the 
Commonwealth, that it was not within the power of the legislature to give them 
the force of law, and that they must therefore be held unconstitutional and 
void.  
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Using that due process standard, the court adjudged inadequate the statute’s delineated 
procedures.
857
  The properties’ value could be legislated away, but only if appropriate procedural 
guarantees protected against inappropriate takings and prosecution.
858
  The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court for the first time had invalidated a substantial portion of its state’s legislation. 
 In the end, the legislature cured the offensive provision and re-enacted the law.  In that 
case, one can ask why Fisher is so important.  Courts had almost without exception accepted 
summary actions to remove nuisances and had done so with procedures much like those 
invalidated in that case.  As Novak pointed out, the situation in Fisher was different because 
those regulations were statewide and had rendered valueless (and, perhaps criminal) property 
that was previously well accepted.  “It was a comprehensive statutory revocation of preexisting 
liberties, properties, and rights.  It replaced local, discretionary liquor licensing with a formal, 
centralized, and uniform system of rules guiding the administrative and judicial conduct of law 
enforcement officials throughout the state.”
859
  While well taken, Novak may not have gone far 
enough.  One might expect that summary proceedings would still be acceptable where a 
previously lawful product now faced uniform acceptance of its danger – like cyclamates, opium, 
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or virus-carrying poultry – even if those regulations were harsh and statewide.  It appears that the 
court took notice of two additional factors.  First, there was a strong undercurrent of 
dissatisfaction with prohibition laws and, second, the danger in Fisher was not immediate and, 
therefore, summary action was not needed.  Recent immigrants and a sizeable portion of the 
native population accepted alcohol as a cultural norm and took umbrage at what seemed class-
focused legislation.  Further, unlike other nuisance cases, alcohol violations did not threaten 
immediate danger and accordingly did not require immediate remedy.  Deeper due process 
proceedings had time to work, just as they did in Welch v Stowell, the Michigan case dealing 
with destruction of an alleged brothel.  Whatever the distinction in Fisher, Shaw’s opinion 
offered an additional dynamic.  It fenced in legislative discretion on enforcement of state laws.  
In doing so, it made enforcement of the prohibition law cumbersome and, for the values 
involved, expensive.  Hence, while the substance of the law remained intact, the court had 
significantly muted its application. 
 While Massachusetts focused on procedure, a few other jurisdictions addressed more 
substantive concerns.  To them, the issue was whether the legislature could strip citizens of their 
property value by legislating away the worth of heretofore valuable (and lawful) assets.  A 
number of courts took up the issue, with most finding that state police powers allowed for 
property-destroying restrictions.  In one of the earlier cases, the Illinois Supreme Court, with 
Justice Walter Scates speaking, waxed philosophical about the surrendering of natural rights 
upon entering the social state.  In that social state, when “private right[s] become injurious, 
noxious or offensive to the public good, communities have a right to protection from it; and the 
private right becomes subordinate to the public right.”  In response to the claim that the 
legislation both took property without compensation and impaired contract rights, Scates 
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answered, “No property has, in this instance, been entered upon or taken.  None are benefited by 
the destruction, or rather the suspension, of the rights in question in any other way than citizens 
always are when one of their number is forbidden to continue a nuisance.” 
860
  The legislature 
had determined the property created a nuisance; it had legislated to remove the nuisance, and had 
been justified in doing so by the needs of the well-ordered society.   
 Only two courts disagreed with the weight of judicial decisions, with one arguing the 
legislature lacked the power and the other determined that the legislature could only act 
prospectively.
861
  In 1855, the Indiana Supreme Court in Beebe v Indiana declared the state’s 
recently enacted prohibition on the manufacture and sale of alcohol unconstitutional.  Focusing 
on limits to legislative power associated with “reserved natural rights,” Justice Samuel Perkins 
rejected the propriety of regulations to advance the general welfare and took particular exception 
to efforts to limit the consumption of alcohol.  He suggested that courts use natural law to limit 
regulations advocated by “latitudinarians” who use “the general welfare doctrine” to enact such 
destructive legislation as the alien and sedition acts and national bank charters.  The notion that 
government should advance the general welfare “has been fraught with oppression, and has not 
produced, permanently, promised results.”  Accordingly, constitutions must be read to limit 
legislative prerogatives, and courts had the duty of “securing to the people safety from legislative 
aggression.”  They should do so irrespective of specific constitutional limitations.  To 
accomplish that, Perkins proclaimed, courts should employ clauses protecting inalienable rights.  
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Those clauses established that citizens did not give up their natural property rights when entering 
society.   
 After setting out the governing philosophy, Perkins turned to the alcohol regulations at 
issue.  Giving judicial notice to the fact that beer is no more hurtful than “the use of lemonade or 
ice cream,” the court honored its obligation to “secure [property] from the invasion of a despotic 
legislature” and ruled the liquor restriction unconstitutional.
862
  In the related Herman v State, 
Perkins continued the argument.  To the court, the issue was personal freedom.  “We lay down 
this proposition, then, as applicable to the present case; that the right of liberty and pursuing 
happiness secured by the constitution, embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual, of 
selecting what he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages . . .  If the constitution does not 
secure this right to the people, it secures nothing of value.”
863
  The issue, therefore, was not 
about public needs and regulation of commerce.  It was about regulating private behavior, which 
by its letter the statute did not do, but certainly was the intended result.  By flipping the analysis 
from regulation of commerce to regulation of individuals, Beebe and Herman had challenged the 
long-standing practice and acceptance of legislation to advance general-welfare interest.  To 
Perkins, freedom, as against majoritarian governance, was paramount.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court had declared individual rights as paramount, whereas previous courts had declared group 
rights as such.  In that way, the Indiana court challenged government’s right to legislate to 
advance the general welfare and replaced it with a new, individual-rights model.  To accomplish 
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Very soon after Illinois and Indiana had ruled, the New York Court of Appeals in the 
groundbreaking case Wynehamer v New York, invalidated the retrospective aspects of New 
York’s 1855 act for “the prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime.”  Unlike most 
similar cases, the court directly took on the question whether the legislature has the power to 
destroy the value of property (liquor) consistently with the state constitution’s “due process” and 
“law of the land” clauses.  With Justice George Comstock writing for the court, the court 
reasoned that liquor was entitled to the same property protections as “land, houses or chattels.”  
The state had the authority to regulate alcohol property under its police powers.  But, the court 
argued, the legislation destroyed existing property and that the legislature could not do under the 
New York constitution.  Perhaps following the logic of New York’s marriage property cases, 
Comstock wrote that property “cannot be pronounced worthless or pernicious, and so destroyed 
or deprived of its essential attributes.”  In a statement signaling the shift to a more individual-
rights focused jurisprudence, Comstock decried allowing “theories of public good and public 
necessity” to be used by “popular majorities” to take property from others.  Regardless of 
democratic leanings, Comstock argued, “there are some absolute private rights beyond their 
reach, and among these the constitution places the right of property.
865
 
Unlike Beebe and Herman, Wynehamer focused on constitutional language, but with a 
substantive spin.  Comstock wrote, “the true interpretation of the ‘law of the land’ and ‘due 
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process of law’ is that where the rights are acquired by the citizen under the existing law, there is 
no power in any branch of government to take them away.”  With that broad declaration, the 
Wynehamer decision invalidated a retroactive application of law – in essence, rejecting Iredell’s 
warning that “society itself would be endangered” were legislatures prohibited from restricting 
pre-existing property rights.
866
  Comstock wrote, “Where rights of property are admitted to exist, 
the legislature cannot say they shall exist no longer; nor will it make any difference, although a 
process and tribunal are appointed to execute the sentence.”  What was lawful property yesterday 
cannot be made unlawful today.  The court let the discussion rest on one question: “Does the 
statute under consideration simply regulate, or does it destroy an admitted species of property, in 
which millions of value are invested?  As this question is answered, the act must stand or fall.”  
While remote or consequential diminution of property’s value was constitutionally appropriate, 
outright destruction was not.  Such destruction “transcends the constitutional limits of the 
legislative power.”
867
  In ruling that destroying property value was by its nature a denial of due 
process, the Wynehamer court shifted the discussion from public welfare to private rights.  And 
if the courts language were taken as literal, the existing private right would always win.  
Wynehamer had changed New York’s definition of “due process.”  It was no longer just about 
process.    
In New York’s Morris opinion, the court raised the issue of whether legislation that 
destroyed property rights was constitutional.  In White and Westervelt, the court determined it 
was not, at least insofar as that legislation took property rights from a husband and gave it to his 
wife.  With Wynehamer, New York had again overturned legislation because it had destroyed a 
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property interest.  But Wynehamer was more significant.  In it, the court relied on the state’s due 
process clause, not on amorphous doctrines of natural law or vested rights. 
Scholars consider Wynehamer as the first case to rule that courts could employ the due 
process clause to invalidate legislation that dispossessed significant property value.  In redefining 
a constitutional provision to limit legislative authority, the court rejected natural law as grounds 
for limiting that authority.  Comstock classified as dangerous other courts’ use of “natural rights” 
and “high authority” to restrict the legislatures, and believed that employing natural law as a 
limit on the legislature could imperil government.
868
  In doing so, he sought to deny any 
connection between due process and natural law.  Almost certainly, Comstock was concerned 
about the abolitionist arguments that natural law abhorred slavery and that because it was a 
higher law, natural law superseded the legislatures’ rights to pass law in support of slavery.   
Comstock’s fears were well founded.  As mentioned, natural rights beliefs were endemic 
in the American psyche.  Abolitionists repeatedly argued that those rights prohibited the 
enslavement of Africans.  As, Howard Graham argued, abolitionists used the terms “due 
process” and “natural law” interchangeably in anti-slavery speeches:  “For every black letter 
usage in the court there were perhaps hundreds of thousands in the press, red school house and 
on the stump.”  He continued: “Zealots, reformers, and politicians – not jurists – blazed the paths 
of substantive due process.”
869
  The abolitionist argued that state legislatures could not 
promulgate slave laws because they lacked the power to pass legislation in violation of natural 
rights and due process guarantees.  Among the audience of these 1840-1860 reformers sat those 
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of the Cooley generation.  They would revolutionize due process in the later decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
Over the next few years, all the states that considered the constitutionality of prohibition 
legislation rejected the Wynehamer arguments.  One example is indicative of the whole.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court in State v Allmond considered the constitutionality of a nearly 
complete prohibition on alcohol sales.  The court, through Chief Justice Samuel Harrington, 
ruled that the legislature had nearly unfettered rights to regulate the use of property. Putting 
regulation in its historical context of general-welfare enhancement, Harrington wrote: 
The Legislature of this State has [regulated property] from the beginning, by 
prescribing the modes of acquiring and using, the transfer and disposition of 
property of all kinds; and the restriction or prohibition not merely of certain 
kinds of property, but of trades, professions and callings; thus regulating not 
only property itself but the personal industry and enterprise through which 
property is acquired.  I refer to the statutes, among the first enacted for the 
conveyance of property; the statutes of wills; the intestate laws; all license 
laws; laws regulating physicians, surgeons, attornies, millers, ferries and 
fisheries; laws regulating the weight and price of breadstuff, and laws 
regulating inn-keepers and venders of liquor generally. 
 
With regulation came the risks of unfair burdens.  While recognizing that legislatures might be 
wrong or corrupt, the court maintained the importance of deference and refused to give the 
judiciary veto power over the legislature.  “When [legislators] are supposed in any act of 
legislation unwisely, or improperly, to restrain what are assumed to be the rights of the people, it 
is for the people themselves to correct the evil through legislative repeal, and not by Judicial 
usurpation.”   
A well-regulated society required limitations on property use, Harrington argued, because 
“the subjection of private property in the mode of its enjoyment to the public good, and its 
subordination to the general rights liable to be injured by its unrestricted use, is a principle lying 
at the foundations of government.”  In stating what was then the prevailing social opinion, 
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Harrington continued that property encumbrances are “a condition of the social state; the price of 
its enjoyment, entering into the very structure of organized society; existing by necessity for its 
preservation.”  Only after setting forth the historic goals and means of a well-regulated society 
did the court address Wynehamer.  Almost scoffing, the court asserted that Wynehamer’s 
reasoning would require that the court overrule multiple precedents, gut the state’s ability to 
employ its police powers, and ignore well-settled practices.  The court declined to do that, but 
called on the democratic process to remedy any legislative over-reaching.
870
 
Michigan’s Temperance Experience 
 
 As discussed in Chapter II, alcohol regulation had been a project of Michigan governance 
from its earliest days.  Believing that restrictions on access to ardent spirits would moderate the 
challenges of drunkenness, pauperism, crime, and family violence and abandonment, local and 
state government regulated the alcohol trade.  Those efforts were to temper alcohol consumption 
(hence the term “temperance”) but not to prohibit consumption.  In Michigan, as in the rest of 
that nation, most of those regulations concerned licensing alcohol sales.  As morals shifted, and 
despite a significant drop in consumption, alcohol use took on an increasingly darker hue, with 
calls for prohibition rising.  As in most of the northern states, religious forces associated with 
revivalism helped move Michigan to respond to calls for deeper governmental restrictions.  The 
story of Augustus Littlejohn and his mid-1840s travels through Michigan, demonstrates the 
increasing fervor for an end to alcohol consumption.  After his sermons on the evils of drink, 
Littlejohn would travel from town to town, putting “King Alcohol” on trial for its crimes against 
mankind.  In one story,  
                                                 
870
 State v Allmond, 7 Del. 612, 633, 634, 637-38, 645 (1858).  The court also relied upon the Pennsylvania public 
purpose case, Sharpless v Mayor of Philadelphia, for its analysis and conclusion granting deference to legislative 
judgments,  640. 
331 
 
At the close of his lectures in Climax, King Alcohol was arraigned before a 
proper tribunal, and tried for his crimes.  Littlejohn acting as counsel for the 
prosecution, some one for the defense.  The charges of murder and other 
heinous crimes were brought against the old king, and clearly proven.  He was 
found guilty, and sentenced to be burnt at the stake.  The sentence was carried 
out.  A spot was selected for the place of execution, and a pile of logs reared on 
it.  The procession was formed at the church, led by Billy Harrison and Jonas 
Bailey as executioners, who walked to the music of the death march carrying 
between them the “old brown jug,” filled with whisky, representing the 
condemned criminal.  Reaching the place of execution, a stake was struck into 
the pile of logs, the criminal was bound to it, the death sentence was read, the 




This type of proselytizing occasioned a morality shift from an acceptance that “anyone, even 
clergymen, could take an occasional glass and still be considered an exemplar of temperance,” to 
one where the Regents of the University of Michigan could justify firing University President 
Tappan because he “is accused of having used wine as a beverage.  Other Members of the 
Faculty merely used it as a tonic.”
872
  Because of that shift, popular opinion began to see 
regulation of alcohol as enabling, rather than regulating, a social evil. 
 This then was the alcohol debate during Michigan’s 1850 constitutional convention.  
Early in the convention, delegates received petitions to prohibit state alcohol licensing.
873
  Those 
petitions, as well as most of the debates, centered on state involvement through licensing rather 
than on calls for state prohibition of the alcohol trade.  Some argued the state should not sanction 
the vice by licensing, some wanted to employ licenses to restrict sales, and a few suggested the 
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state should prohibit alcohol altogether.  For example, delegate J. Van Vakenburgh passionately 
argued, “the welfare of the community demands that something be done by us, to stay the tide of 
misery consequent upon this unhallowed traffic.”  His answer was to “cut loose our State from 
this cruel traffic.”  He provided the constitutional language: “The legislature shall have no power 
to grant licenses for the sale of ardent spirits or intoxicating drinks, except for mechanical or 
medicinal purposes.”  His ultimate goal seemed to be limitations on the alcohol trade – he 
wished to “avert the progress of a destroyer who has strewn our land with the blood of the dead” 
– but his proposal (which largely is the text of the 1850 Constitution) promised no such solution: 
it only provided that the state could not license the alcohol sales.  Because licensing was used not 
just for revenue but as a means of restricting trade, Van Vakenburgh’s proposal lifted all the 
state-government restrictions on the manufacture and sales of ardent spirits.
874
  Perhaps because 
of an inability to build consensus on alcohol policy, or because of a lay-convention’s equating 
licensing with approval,
875
 the delegates approved language that accomplished little and, 
contrary to their intent, allowed unrestricted alcohol manufacture and sale.  It only forbad the 
legislature from passing “any act authorizing the grant of a license for the sale of argent spirits or 
other intoxicating liquors.”
876
  The constitution did not speak to the legislature’s power to 
prohibit alcohol manufacture or sale.  To some of the delegates, however, that silence meant that 
the legislature could completely prohibit the trade in alcoholic beverages. 
 Joseph H. Bagg, a physician and politician from Detroit, was one who believed that 
government should withdraw from licensing but should not prohibit alcohol sales.  He believed 
that moral suasion should and effectively would cull alcoholic excesses.  To him, the 
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constitutional language supported those who “did not wish the State to give a moral tone to the 
traffic.”  Perhaps prescient or insightful of the human condition, delegate Bagg warned of 
extending temperance efforts to state-coerced prohibition:  “You may just as well attempt, in this 
Wolverine State, to stop the use of Java and Laguya coffee, of green and black tea – to stem the 
Falls of Niagara in a bark canoe – as to put a stop to the use of liquor.”
877
  Notwithstanding the 
warning, and the convention’s disinclination to legislative activism, as part of its move to address 
social issues, the legislature would soon turn its attention to the alcohol trade.  
 In 1851, the legislature abolished its earlier license system but required that sellers of 
intoxicating beverages hold bonds to insure payments for liquor related damages.  The question 
whether that law ran afoul of the constitution soon was litigated.  That occurred when, in 1852, 
Mrs. Langley sought damages for her alcohol-injured husband, Albert Langley.  Mrs. Langley 
won her case against John Ergensinger for $68 plus costs of $4.16, for damages Ergensinger 
caused by selling liquor to her husband.  Ergensinger appealed arguing the 1851 bond 
requirement (and the associated liability for alcohol-induced behavior), was constitutionally 
impermissible.  Consistent with the tenor of the times, the law gave a married woman the power 
to recover damages she or her children suffered because of her husband’s alcohol purchases.  
Classifying those who sold liquor as “wrongdoers,” the Supreme Court determined that the 
legislature had expansive general-welfare powers.  “It is the incident of every government, 
whether a state or a city, that they have the right to impose restrictions on natural rights when the 
exercise of them on a particular mode is found destructive of the morals of all who are subjected 
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  With that broad power, legislatures could subordinate individual interests 
(or here, natural rights) in order to accomplish ends advancing morals and safety. 
 The 1851 statute only set liabilities; it did not restrict alcohol sales.  Governor Robert 
McClelland continued that debate in 1853 by noting, “every good citizen is in favor of promoting 
the cause of temperance by all fair and legitimate means.”  Perhaps unwilling to take a position 
on an issue that divided the state, he called on the legislature to consult public opinion and 
legislate according to the “condition of the State.”
879
  The legislature similarly was tentative.  In 
response to continued public pressure in the wake of the Maine laws, the Michigan Legislature in 
February 1853 prohibited the manufacture and traffic of intoxicating liquor, but made the law 
subject to an approving vote of the people.  After that affirmative vote, the Supreme Court 
considered two constitutional issues.  First, it reviewed whether the legislature could outsource 
its legislative powers to a popular vote and second whether the legislature had the power to 
regulate away the value of alcohol related properties.  The court, in People v Collins, overturned 
the law on the first grounds: The legislature could not delegate to the voters legislative power to 
enact laws.  A number of justices wrote opinions.  Justice Abner Pratt found that the delegation 
of legislative power to the people undermined representative governance and created “collective 
democracy, the most uncertain and dangerous of all governments.”  Pratt, and his concurring 
brothers, feared a majoritarian juggernaut.  To Pratt, the courts must assure representative 
governance and avoid majoritarian democracy.  Justice Samuel Douglass agreed, arguing that the 
legislation could not constitutionally be submitted for a popular vote.  His fear, too, was 
majoritarian democracy.  Stating that governance would be “subjected to the dominion of the 
popular majority of the hour,” Douglass argued for the advantages and constitutional necessity of 
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representative governance.  It protected against “hasty and inconsiderate legislation.”
880
  The 
justices split over whether the legislature had the power to pass the alcohol prohibitions 
consistently with constitutional protections of property and prohibitions against state licensing.
881
  
 Governor Andrew Parson responded to the court’s decision by acknowledging that “the 
people sincerely disagree” about the wisdom of temperance legislation, and also about “the 
power, of the Legislature to prohibit the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors.”  His 
comments on legislative powers may have been little more than casual, but those concerns 
resonated in Michigan (and national) legal circles.  In the end, the legislature sided with those 
who believed its power expansive.  Shortly, Michigan’s legislators would overwhelmingly 
approve a new statute to overcome the challenges to which the Collins court objected. Alcohol 
manufacture and sale were again illegal in Michigan. 
 In 1856, the Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Gallagher, considered the 
constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the sale and manufacture of liquor.  The court, through 
Justice David Johnson reviewed Thomas Gallagher’s conviction for the illegal sale of alcohol.  
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Gallagher’s counsel argued that natural law prohibited the legislature from enacting property-
destroying legislation.  It is worth noting the court’s language, as Gallagher reflected Michigan’s 
judicial position prior to Cooley’s ascension to the bench.  In framing the dispute as a 
Chase/Iredell conflict, the court took pains to approve authorities holding that only express 
constitutional provisions limited legislative authority, and that judicial statements to the contrary 
were mere dicta.  In a decision Andrew McLaughlin stated “admirably presented” the case for 
antebellum deference to legislation
882
, the Gallagher court noted, “It will be observed, as 
something peculiar, that in almost all [cases claiming extra-constitutional limitations] . . . the 
courts have upheld the particular legislative enactments under consideration.”  Because of that, 
the court noted, it was “unable to find any case” where a court invalidated a statute on extra-
constitutional grounds.  Johnson continued by suggesting that courts grandly writing of natural 
rights did so only as warnings against future legislatures.  He wrote,  
They seem to be impressed with the necessity of fortifying themselves in their 
conclusions, and that, although they were compelled to give force and effect to 
these acts, there might be such a perpetration of legislative wrong, conflicting 
with these natural rights, as to challenge the exercise of their judicial power; a 
power carefully kept in abeyance to meet any future contingency that might 
possibly happen.   
 
Johnson then noted, “the language of” those cases “is subject to some well grounded 
criticism.”
883
     
 After reviewing the state of the law, and criticizing those courts that espoused grand 
natural rights doctrines only to shrink from them in deciding the case, the court tackled a 
fundamental question of constitutional jurisprudence: The balance between majoritarian 
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governance and restrictions for personal space.  The 1855 Michigan court would reject 
arguments that courts were actively to check majoritarian excess.  Acknowledging, “it may be 
true that legislative bodies, acting from temporary impulses, without sufficient time for 
discussion and deliberation are more likely to be influenced by the highly excited condition of 
the public mind than courts of law,” the court steadfastly rejected judicial interference in the 
process.  Although “great wrongs may undoubtedly be perpetrated by legislative power,” 
Johnson wrote, government required that that power be invested in the people’s representatives, 
not the courts.
884
  Cooley would look at things quite differently.  Under his theories, 
majoritarianism posed a too severe a threat to republican governance, and therefore required 
judicially imposed limits.  Where the Gallagher court would look to the democratic process to 
check improper legislation, Cooley would look to the courts.  
 With its standard of review established, the Gallagher court addressed legislative power 
to regulate and destroy alcohol property.  In short order it rejected arguments that courts were to 
“compare the value of this [community] right with the injury which the exercise of it would 
inflict upon the public, and strike the balance.”  That was the legislature’s role.  Because of that, 




 Whether liquor was no different from lemonade or ice cream, as the Beebe court had 
suggested, restrictions on its use resulted in a flurry of litigation and, with it, judicial reflection 
on the place of property in a well ordered society. That reflection affected other issues as well.  
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Perhaps as a precursor to the Slaughter-House litigation, merchants began to question 
municipalities’ rights to regulate the location of markets within a city.  Cities historically had set 
up zones of commerce, consistent with the early American belief that trade was a privilege and 
should be controlled and enhanced by government involvement.  As part of that effort, 
Philadelphia’s city assembly in 1854 sought to purchase land for a city-operated market and to 
demolish an older central-market area.  Several taxpayers and farmers protested and brought an 
action that would end up before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1859, Wartman v 
Philadelphia.  Chief Justice Jeremiah Black (who also authored the Sharpless opinion), speaking 
for the court, voiced the long-standing proposition that government should be intimately 
involved in trade, particularly in the creation and regulation of central markets.  To do otherwise 
“would be an anomaly which at present has no existence among us.”  Should the state fail to 
allow municipalities to control a central market, it would be an “act of mere tyranny.”  Black 
went so far as to declare that Pennsylvania nearly required municipalities to regulate citywide 
trade and a central market.
886
  Failure to do so was an abdication of governing responsibility.  
 Notwithstanding Pennsylvania’s philosophy, other jurisdictions were beginning to follow 
a different piper.  While Pennsylvania embraced government involvement, Georgia found such 
involvement offensive.  In the same year as Wartman, and considering nearly identical facts, the 
Georgia Supreme Court in Bethune v Hughes voiced near repugnance to central market 
regulations.
887
  James Bethune of Columbus, Georgia, took exception to his conviction for 
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selling products outside a legislatively established central market.  In reviewing the case, one can 
imagine Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin turning red as he proclaimed for the court that, “let 
anything and everything be done, rather than restrict commerce, rather than force and imprison 
tradespeople, to coerce them to submit to all kinds of discomfort and inconvenience, not to say 
loss, to gratify the selfishness, or avarice, or convenience of a favored few; to be taxed to support 
the pomp and parade of a few municipal lords.”  Citing the increased irritation of the citizens 
over legislated restrictions, Lumpkin determined that the city had overstepped the authority 
granted to it by the state legislature and, therefore, the central-market statute was void and the 
conviction overturned.  But Lumpkin had not finished.  He now appealed for a “convention of 
the people,” that was “imperiously needed to impose additional restraints upon the powers of the 
Legislature.”  Shouting “a Bill of Rights is demanded,” the justice proclaimed, “let the sovereign 
people convene, and say to the law-making power; thus far shalt thou go and no further.”
888
 
 In passionate prose, Black of Pennsylvania and Lumpkin of Georgia expressed 
dramatically divergent views of government’s place in advancing a well-ordered society.  
Interestingly, in the industrial north, Black advocated active government.  In the Deep South, 
Lumpkin claimed that “something should be done to arrest this evil.”  In between, courts 
struggled to determine if there were limitations on the power of government to significantly alter 
or destroy property rights.   
The United States Supreme Court weighed in, albeit tangentially and in a case seldom 
citied for its wisdom or precedential value.  Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the 1857 Dred Scott v 
                                                                                                                                                             
who bring in poultry and eggs on their load of wood to wait for hours before they can return to their labors, 
remaining around the market exposed to the weather; or, indeed, before they will restrict any person, in this land of 
liberty, from selling his cotton, corn, wheat, beef, pork, chickens, or anything else, when he pleases, where he 
pleases, and to whomsoever he pleases.”  He then urged that the legislature’s power in this area “is exceedingly 
questionable.”  Bethune v Hughes, 28 Ga. 560, 562-63 (1859 ). 
888
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Sanford decision gave passing reference to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as 
limiting Congress’s right to deprive citizens of property.  Speaking of enslaved persons as 
property, Taney wrote: “And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of 
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular 
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly 
be dignified with the name of due process of law.”
889
  He did not elaborate on what the court 
intended nor did he discuss the Supreme Court’s only other reference to due process limitations 
on the legislature.  That reference had appeared only a few years earlier in Murray v Hoboken 
Land and Improvement where the court had defined due process as requiring procedural 
guarantees.
890
  Unlike the few recent state cases that were arguing for a due-process limitation on 
legislation hostile to property rights, Taney had few liberty-based arguments to offer.  Perhaps 
that is why his tendered due process argument lacked elaboration.
891
    
Michigan Justice Johnson in Gallagher, in the regulatory sphere, and Pennsylvania 
Justice Lowery in Commonwealth ex re Thomas in the tax and spending sphere, recognized that 
antebellum courts almost without exception accepted legislative power extensively to legislate to 
advance general-welfare interests.  To be sure, opposing voices, either in dissent or in majority 
dicta, rumbled as regulations and spending became more onerous.  Their oft-mentioned natural 
and vested rights offered insecure grounds, as they were ill-defined and threatened unintended 
results.  Without legal foundations to the contrary, the law settled on supporting legislative action 
unless specific constitutional language checked legislative power.  Finding legislatures rarely 
exceeded those specific limitations, court rulings affirmed legislative actions and judicial review, 
while often discussed, rarely resulted in judicial activism.  Then again, Cooley had not yet 
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spoken.  When he did, courts would hasten to assert newfound authority to check perceived 
majoritarian excesses.  That is the subject to which we now turn.    
342 
 




The most rigid institutions must, from year to year, yield something to [change]; 
the most inflexible Constitution, in the light of new and unexpected conditions, 
must present new phases and suggest new possibilities.  Occasionally, no doubt, 
we shall modify the Constitution here and there by formal amendment, but if the 
general tendency of the political society shall be the development of a higher 
and better national life, the Constitution, the outer framework, cannot possibly 
remain altogether stationary. 
Thomas M. Cooley  




A Judicial Shield 
 
  In 1870, Michigan’s municipal efforts to finance rail development came to a virtual halt 
when the Michigan Supreme Court, with Cooley writing, declared unconstitutional public 
financial aid to private rail corporations.  Such aid, Cooley reasoned, undermined state 
governance and would ultimately result in unjust tax burdens on the weak “taxed to enhance the 
profits of the stronger.”
893
  Instead of narrowly tailoring his opinion, Cooley and his brethren 
chose to rule broadly, and did so understanding the opinion would shock the judicial community 
that had almost without exception ruled to the contrary.  He did so in order to limit the 
legislature’s historic discretion over taxing and spending issues.  Cooley advanced that courts 
were constitutionally responsible to bind legislative tax and spending powers to a court-defined 
“public purpose” boundary.  Across the nation, courts adopted and expanded on Cooley’s 
reasoning.  With those courts now reviewing spending purposes, individuals would be able more 
effectively to challenge majoritarian and special interest efforts to tax and spend for the general 
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welfare.  Issues that heretofore had been resolved in the political sphere would now enjoy a 
rehearing in the judicial, and a measure of governing power would flow from the legislative to 
the judiciary – and from the majority to the individual.   
 Cooley’s decision analyzed constitutional language that was unchanged from the state’s 
and, indeed, nation’s founding.  Yet, his interpretation fundamentally challenged, for the first 
time, governing activities that similarly harked back to that founding.  In doing so, Cooley 
rejected historical judicial deference to legislative judgments and classified adherence to those 
precedents as “blindly follow[ing] where others have blindly led.”
894
  Given that the 
constitutional language upon which he relied had not changed, and that previous courts had 
defined legislative power more broadly than he, one might ask how this great constitutional 
scholar could justify narrowing legislative prerogatives and upending established and time-
honored constitutional meanings.  As discussed below, Cooley embraced that task believing that 
courts must refresh constitutional understandings to protect the core principle of American 
constitutional structure – republican self-governance.  Both the passions of the masses and the 
power of the wealthy threatened to subvert the legislative process, and courts must diligently 
exercise judicial review to assure that government adhered to the principles of republican 
governance, the rule of law, and individual freedoms that were the foundations of American 
constitutional government. 
 Cooley believed that laws and constitutional language were not the emanations of 
Olympian ruminations.  Instead, they reflected human efforts to address community-faced 
challenges.  As community needs changed, so too did the application of law in order to respond 
to the law’s underlying purposes.  For example, due process – originally an assurance of 
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individual protections against executive action through legal proceedings – could change to 
incorporate protections against legislative actions that encumbered individual rights.  Similarly, 
public spending to support community development could become constitutionally suspect when 
it advanced private interest and power to the detriment of that community.  Although Cooley 
furnished citations for each of these propositions, he certainly recognized that he was ploughing 
new judicial ground and offering new constitutional interpretations.  He did so relying on 
historical experience – not philosophic musings – and that experience informed his 
understanding and shaped his constitutional philosophy. 
 To Cooley, American state government was at its core not democratic but republican.  
Accordingly, he believed that state constitutions limited legislative power in order to check 
majoritarian impulses and support the rule of law over popular passions and the coercive 
influences of aggregated power.
895
  His experiences and understanding of Michigan’s 
governance taught him the necessity of doing just that.  Cooley had witnessed the humbling 
results of majoritarian exuberance in building infrastructure; he saw industry exerting its 
influence over legislatures and voters to exact public largess in order to advance private gains; he 
sat as counsel for a university that, while constitutionally separate, had faced enormous pressures 
from a legislature intent on impressing its will; and he watched as the legislature criminalized 
previously legal alcohol sales and rendered lawful property contraband.  With those disquieting 
experiences, Cooley developed a fear of unfettered democracy that would animate much of his 
legal thinking. 
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 Since his early tenure at the University of Michigan Law School, Cooley wrote of the 
threat of majoritarian excesses and lauded the virtues of republican governance.  In 1868, he 
published his most complete advocacy of those beliefs in the aptly named Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American 
Union.  Most of the limits he addressed in the treatise already were well accepted, including 
separations of power, ex post facto laws, and Commerce and Contract Clause limitations.  His 
impact however concerned two doctrines that, while not completely new, were modified and 
argued with a vibrancy and constitutional connectedness that emboldened courts across the 
nation to actively limit legislative plenary powers.  Those doctrines advanced limits on spending 
powers associated with legislative taxing authority and limits on regulatory – or police powers – 
associated with “law of the land” and “due process” provisions.  To check the legislature, courts 
would insert themselves in ways that they rarely had heretofore.  They would now determine 
which expenditures and which regulations were appropriate and which were beyond legislative 
purview.  A once seldom-used weapon, courts would now employ judicial review to strike down 
legislation they believed went beyond the scope of representative government.  His ideas were 
combustible and in short order swept the nation.  And, to a degree, Cooley would come to regret 
the fires he had lit. 
A Short Roadmap 
 
 Historians now agree that early local and state American governments were characterized 
by heavy involvement in and support of commerce.  Municipalities granted licenses permitting 
individuals to engage in trade.  They set up zones where commerce was permitted, established 
price structures, and set working rules.  Governments subsidized industrial development, 
developed transportation infrastructures, and became shareholders in private corporations.  As 
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importantly, they reframed the common law to encourage business risk taking.  The courts 
interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to ensure confidence in commercial 
transaction and to allow government to create and support monopolies in exchange for capital 
investments.  While constitutional interpretations later loosened the hold of monopolies, local 
governments accelerated their efforts to develop industry.  In short, the antebellum period was 
one characterized by a symbiosis between government and industry.  The goal was progress and 
general-welfare improvement, not one of legislative limitation and exclusionary individualism.   
This support and regulation of business required a legal and social system that favored 
calls for a well-regulated society against those advocating protecting unencumbered use of 
property.  While early nineteenth-century governance tended to sacrifice property interests to 
general-welfare needs, calls to protect property advanced as industry developed.  When 
government attempted to regulate industries like liquor, many grew wary of the effects those 
regulations would have on personal, property-based freedoms.  Further, as government taxed to 
support economic development, many questioned government’s right to transfer the people’s 
wealth to industry.  Despite a rising cacophony of concern, until Constitutional Limitations’ 
publication, courts set aside those property-protecting arguments in deference to legislatively 
supported efforts to regulate society, subsidize industry, and to overcome the burdens of scarce 
capital.   
The Cooley-inspired revolution would involve two related but distinct governmental 
actions: Government promotion and support of industry and government regulation of 
commerce.  The line between support and regulation is thin and, as Gabriel Kolko noted, 
regulation often was disguised as promotion.
896
  Early government support and regulation of 
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industry sprang from a belief that government must legislate to advance the common welfare.  
Government was to advance economic development while checking industry’s tendencies to 
monopolize and exert undue influence and control.  Whereas regulation and support of industry 
were born of a common purpose, legislative and judicial treatment of those efforts differed.  That 
difference was clarified by their constitutional treatment.  In supporting industry, government 
used its taxing power to subsidize private industrial development.  Litigation over those issues 
questioned whether the legislature has the power to take from A (the taxpayer) and give to B (the 
private business).  In the case of regulation, the state sought to create a more orderly society by 
controlling social and economic excesses.  In challenging regulations, litigants called upon the 
courts to determine if the regulation unduly burdened private-property interests.  To challenge 
those regulations, litigants first employed eminent-domain principles and later due process and 
law of the land clauses.  Law in those areas developed separately (although courts at times 
mingled the logic) and until Cooley (and perhaps after) the courts’ rulings did not fit within a 
consistent constitutional framework.  While courts frequently confused the niceties, this work 
addresses tax and spending separately from regulatory restrictions.  
 Starting within months of Constitutional Limitation’s publication, courts began to modify 
previous standards of due process, taxation, and public purpose to press a more limited 
government model.  Some courts pushed for an almost laissez-faire approach, giving rise to 
arguments that Cooley elevated the individual over the collective, and rights over order.  
Cooley’s approach was more subtle.  He did not reject all regulation, all property encumbrances, 
or all class legislation.  Instead, he sought to limit majoritarian impulses and undue influences by 
employing constitutional language or inferences to limit government – particularly, but not 
exclusively, the legislative branch.  At times, individual rights were the principles limiting 
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government.  Even so, those rights were not hard stops on government action.  Rather, courts 
now were to insert individual rights into their review of the propriety of legislative action.  With 
Cooley, courts began the shift from an almost per se acceptance of general-welfare regulation 
and spending, to questioning whether laws too significantly intruded in the increasingly 
protected private sphere.  That trend evidenced a reshaping of American expectations of 
government and how the nation’s citizens could best be served in the rapidly industrializing 
world.  At a minimum, it suggested a more earnest discussion of the place of government in a 
liberal democracy.  
Cooley, the Courts, and Constitutional Change 
 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley was born on January 6, 1824 as the tenth child of Thomas and 
Rachel (Hubbard) Cooley.  Theirs was a farming family residing in Attica, New York, not far 
from the Erie Canal and within the Burned Over District of the Second Great Awakening.  His 
parents raised him in a strong Jeffersonian and, later, Jacksonian household.  Cooley rejected the 
revivalism of the Awakening in favor of what Cooley-scholar Alan Jones called, “moral 
individualism” and a faith that the mind “‘correctly cultivated’ could choose the right.”  Shortly 
after reading law with a former Democratic Party congressman, in 1843 Cooley travelled west to 
settle in Chicago but, having run out of funds, settled in Adrian, Michigan.  He embraced the 
Jacksonian faith in advocating for free speech, trade, labor, and schools.  In 1848, he helped 
organize the Free Soil Party in Michigan, thereby alienating Democratic Party regulars.  In tune 
with shifting party affiliations of the day, he edited Democratic newspapers, worked to support 
the Wilmot Proviso, and pushed progressive Democratic Party ideas.  “His poems expressed 
democratic hopes and attacked war and slavery,” and “his editorials defended free trade and free 
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public schools as well as attacked monopolies and special incorporation laws.”
 897
  His public 
talks evinced distaste for the challenges associated with railroad, banking, and monopoly power, 
as well as advocacy for class legislation.  Jones posited that Cooley, in the 1840s and 50s, 
supported constitutional limitations on legislative power as a means to avoid favoritism to 
acquisitive capitalists.
898
   
The legislature recognized Cooley’s intellect when it appointed him to compile the state’s 
statutes in 1857.  His success there helped lead to his 1859 appointment as one of the first three 
law professors at the University of Michigan Law School.  That appointment occasioned his 
move from Adrian to Ann Arbor.  Because he was the only one moving to Ann Arbor, he 
became the law school’s dean.  As a law professor, Cooley’s interests focused on legal change 
and the underlying purpose of law.  “In all that he taught, Cooley emphasized the historical and 
cultural origins of law and the social and political aims it is shaped to serve.”  In that respect his 
position was the antithesis of the later Harvard Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, who 
taught that law was an internally consistent discipline, without regard to the environment in 
which it was developed or operated.
899
  
At the 1863 opening exercises at the University of Michigan, Cooley offered a hint of his 
constitutional philosophy and its reliance on an active judiciary.  In speaking of the legal 
profession he commented, “While constitutional and other restraints could be thrown around the 
legislative power, there could be none upon the expounders of law save the learning and virtue of 
the profession to which they belonged.”  The judiciary was to enforce those constitutional 
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limitations but, because of the structure of government, the judiciary was not itself subject to 
such limitations.  Also telling was Cooley’s preference for slow change, as opposed to the rapid 
legal changes associated with legislative action.  In espousing an affinity for the common law, 
Cooley urged, “The lawyer is and should be conservative.  However radical the changes he may 
desire to make, the lessons of our judicial history admonish him that they can only be brought 
about in the slow processes of time.”
900
  Wearing his academic hat, Cooley had made clear his 
preferences: The common law, slow change, and judicial checks on the legislature. 
Cooley’s voice was amplified in 1864, when he was elected as a Republican to the State 
Supreme Court, a position he would hold for twenty years.
901
  During his court tenure, Cooley 
continued to sit as a faculty member of the law school and, in 1868 at the age of forty-four, 
published the first edition of Constitutional Limitations.
902
  He now sat as dean of his law school, 
a state Supreme Court justice, and as the author of the most read legal treatise of its time. 
It is no coincidence that Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations during the era of 
Michigan’s second massive public effort to support rail and during the debate and passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  To Cooley, constitutions limited the power of overzealous legislatures 
and courts were empowered and obligated to enforce those limitations.  Accordingly, as his 
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preface to his first edition suggested, his treatise targeted a wider purpose than a restatement of 
the law.  It advocated that courts limit legislative overreaching.  Speaking of himself in the third 
person, Cooley wrote:  
he will not attempt to deny – what will probably be sufficiently apparent – that 
he has written in full sympathy with all those restraints which the caution of 
the fathers has imposed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and 
with greater faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in 
correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, than in a judicious, 
prudent, and just exercise of unbridled authority by any one man or body of 
men, whether sitting as a legislature or as a court.
903
   
 
In the guise of a treatise on the current state of the law, Cooley was an admitted advocate.  As his 
later writings would reveal, Cooley’s greatest constitutional objective was the protection of 
republican governance from the forces of excessive political power, whether emanating from the 
wealthy few or the populist mass.  He believed that specific constitutional language and implied 
constitutional meanings protected against the forces subversive to republican governance.  The 
threats to republican governance changed as society changed.  To address that, Cooley submitted 
that courts should seek new constitutional understandings when considering current realities.  
Those new understandings were informed by constitutional histories and judicial precedent, but 
were controlled by the underlying constitutional purpose – republican governance.  In that sense, 
he advocated an almost common-law-like process of constitutional change.  Constitutional 
change was to be slow and deliberate; true to constitutional language (as newly understood), but 
adjusting to changing realities. 
It is difficult to give credence to Cooley’s protest that he “faithfully endeavored to state 
the law as it has been settled by the authorities, rather than to present his own views.”
904
  His 
advocacy interest clearly trumped his restatement goals, as would soon become clear through his 
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scholarly writings and opinions.  Cooley published perhaps the clearest statement of his 
intentions ten years after first publishing Constitutional Limitations.  In challenging the principle 
of stare decisis, Cooley commented, “that it is a very dangerous thing to make by a precedent an 
inroad upon one of the fundamental principles of liberty, because precedents tend to beget a habit 
of thought and action which leads insensibly in the direction in which they point.”  Instead of 
using the collective wisdom of previous decisions, Cooley set forth his true standard of 
constitutional review.  “Every doubtful precedent should therefore be carefully considered, and 
never accepted when it will not stand the test of settled rules of right.”
905
   
In rejecting precedent, Cooley necessarily relied on constitutional understandings that 
differed from his judicial forbearers.  Two possibilities arise.  Either previous courts had 
misinterpreted the constitution or changing needs required different (often, opposite) applications 
of constitutional standards.  The difference between these possibilities is fundamental.  The first 
argues for a static constitution, unmovable from original intents – but merely interpreted wrongly 
by a prior court.  The second calls for a living constitution, where overarching intentions are 
honored but whose meanings shift to accommodate changing needs.  Reading him on the face of 
his writings, Cooley did not pick one or the other – he picked both.  This should not surprise, as 
Cooley rejected those who gleaned understandings from philosophic reflections on legal 
reasoning or notions of justice.  Instead, he advocated reading constitutions with the light cast by 
historical understandings of law and experiences of governance.  In doing so, he argued for 
adherence to constitutional language while advocating for a reconsideration of that language to 
respond to historical and current realities.   
Attempts to pigeonhole Cooley, therefore, prove difficult (and why opposing counsel 
would often both cite Cooley to support their arguments), and explain why a scholarly search for 
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a consistent Cooley may be quixotic.  Cooley often mouthed adherence to a fixed constitution 
and deference to the legislature, but then found new meanings in the constitution to support his 
republican-governance agenda.  As such, Cooley’s jurisprudence presents a rich, complex, and 
often conflicting account.  In the end however, despite his sometime protests that constitutions 
did not change, Cooley believed that constitutional understandings did change, and that lines 
drawn between government and individuals changed as society developed.  In other words, the 
constitutional edifice evolved with society.  And, in response to Cooley’s advocacy, the courts 
stood in the center of that evolution. 
Scholars Consider Cooley 
 
 Because of their focus on federal laws and courts, many historians miss a significant 
dynamic of the Cooley-inspired shift toward judicial activism.  Cooley’s impact rose from state 
courts and only later was it picked up by the federal courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court.
906
  The revolution did not emanate from the reflections of doctrine-driven Supreme Court 
justices.  Instead, Cooley’s doctrines gained purchase in state courts reviewing government 
efforts to address local economic, social, and political issues.  Because he was steeped in those 
immediate challenges, Cooley was able to seize relatively obscure earlier legislative-limiting 
arguments, and frame them into a legal standard that would resonate with similarly situated 
courts.  Cooley provided the constitutional arguments that allowed courts to address the 
pervasive concerns about governing power, economic change, and social displacement in the 
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years following the Civil War.  It was this grounding that allowed Cooley’s standards to 
dominate American jurisprudence and governance for the next sixty years.   
While most historians give passing tribute to Cooley as a participant in the shift from a 
general-welfare approach to what they commonly classify as laissez-faire governance, few have 
considered Cooley’s central role in introducing individual rights concerns into judicial 
considerations of the limits of legislative and governing power.  Though not focusing on Cooley 
in his 1940 article, Andrew McLaughlin came closest to capturing Cooley’s importance to the 
changing nineteenth-century dynamic.  In characterizing Constitutional Limitations, McLaughlin 
asserted, “it is doubtful if any other book in our history had an equal influence on the 
development of constitutional law, with the exception, perhaps of The Federalists during the first 
fifty years after its publication.”
907
  Phillip Paludan cast Cooley in a similar light, arguing, 
Constitutional Limitations would become “America’s second constitution.”
908
  Cooley provided 
the guidebook for a legal and social revolution wherein courts curbed legislative power and 
granted individual rights and liberties – particularly property and contract – a central place in 
judicial deliberations.   
Scholars reviewing Cooley’s work and impact roughly fall into three camps: those who 
claimed he advocated laissez-faire jurisprudence and governance, those who defined him as a 
conservative, later-day Jacksonian, who feared legislative power when it encumbered personal 
rights and liberties, and those who argued Cooley advocated a binary anti-class legislation 
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standard.  All are grounded in fact and explain an aspect of Cooley’s thinking and his impact.  
None, however, explains the rich dynamic of this scholar who eschewed philosophical 
jurisprudence in favor of uncovering new constitutional meanings to respond to changing social 
and economic needs.  Efforts to pigeonhole Cooley into a particular judicial philosophy fail, as 
Cooley believed law and constitutionalism must maintain flexibility in the face of changing 
needs.  His beliefs were well considered, but adaptable, and in an effort to understand the man, 
scholars have mistakenly attempted to philosophically plant this experiential thinker. 
Clyde Jacobs and Benjamin Twiss led the first school.  Both wrote from a post-Great 
Depression perch and their works were influenced by the struggles between Cooley-inspired, 
limited-government models and the expansive government model of the New Deal.
909
   Both 
painted an almost conspiratorial picture, with Twiss arguing that Cooley “made up many of the 
principles out of his own head,” in order to advance monied interests.
910
  That central argument 
fails in two respects.  Cooley adapted the arguments of antebellum dicta and dissenting opinions 
that argued for limits on legislative power.  He did not “make up” his standards.  Further, Cooley 
was not an advocate for monied interests.  To the contrary, he feared that the wealthy class 
would co-opt representative governance and his standards were designed to mute their 
disproportionate influence on legislators.   
Jacobs and Twiss’ works appear to be the result of gleaning Cooley’s intent and meaning 
from the limited perspective of his followers’ court opinions.  Both works were written without 
significant analysis of Cooley’s experiences and the environment in which he wrote his works.  
Nevertheless, Jacobs and Twiss held sway over other members of the academy, who similarly 
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position Cooley as a laissez-faire advocate.  Included in that group are Sidney Fine, Kermit Hall, 
Melvin Urofsky and, to an extent, Paul Kens.
911
  Their characterization of Cooley as a laissez-
faire advocate captured Cooley’s concerns over majoritarian excesses (although his larger 
concern was legislative favoritism to capital).  Those concerns held that majority passions would 
drive legislation that dispossessed individual property and undermined the rule of law.  The 
statutory-law process allowed for such excesses.  Because of that, Cooley preferred the results of 
the time-tempered reasoning associated with the common law to legislative enactments that were 
so often the results of passions, influences, and insufficient thought.  However, contrary to the 
laissez-faire historians’ positions, Cooley neither espoused nor did other jurists accept a 
wholesale shift to laissez-faire governance.  As Hurst has noted, “After seventy-five years of 
living from day to day amid the surge of an opening continent, we did not suddenly after 1870 
become a nation of social philosophers.”
912
  Contrary to the laissez-faire school, Cooley was not 
part of an imagined conspiracy of capitalists intent on molding law to the advantage of the 
wealthy and powerful.   
Alan Jones rejected the laissez faire explanation of Cooley in favor of arguments that 
Cooley advocated a conservative approach to constitutional thinking – the second of the three 
schools of thought on Cooley.
913
  Unlike most historians, Jones appropriately gives credit to 
Cooley’s doctrinal roots in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian political thought (although he over 
employs this.  Cooley was a student of history, but he used that history to inform in opinions, not 
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to control them.)  Unfortunately, Jones seemed as concerned with restoring Cooley’s reputation 
as he was with addressing the intellectual underpinnings of Cooley’s thoughts or the uses to 
which those thoughts would be put.  Almost apologizing for Cooley’s impact, Jones overstates 
Cooley’s proclaimed deference to the legislature.  Jones’ argument concerning Cooley’s 
conservatism was based in some measure on Jones’ assessment that Cooley adhered to “a 
doctrine that history should be the interpreter of constitutional provisions.”
914
  While Cooley at 
times professed such a position, his doctrines responded more to current needs than historical 
interpretations.  Cooley only held to an historical approach when it fit his desire for legislative 
limitations in light of current needs and his beliefs about evolving liberties (discussed below). 
Cooley’s public purpose and due process doctrines, while found in earlier legal writings, 
almost never prevailed in the antebellum period.  His admission that he would not be limited by 
precedent with which he took issue (even if it was overwhelming) in itself shows that a 
significant portion of Cooley’s principles were neither historically grounded nor conservatively 
deferential to legislative power.  When he wished to limit the legislature, Cooley tipped his hat to 
stare decisis, historical uses of governing power, and deference to the legislatures, but then 
decided according to his governing principles.  Cooley’s logic called for a judicial veto over the 
legislature; a logic that future courts employed with some vigor.   
In focusing on Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideologies, Jones’ work missed the more 
immediate and pressing historical influences on Cooley.  Cooley’s thoughts were not merely 
philosophic or theoretical reflections on early-century politics.  They were premised on beliefs in 
republican governance and property-protecting principles that increasingly held sway as America 
moved through the nineteenth century.  Accordingly, any full understanding of the Cooley 
revolution requires an analysis of the legal, economic, and political firmament that molded and 
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surrounded Cooley.  Constitutional Limitations rose to the level of a nineteenth century 
Federalist Papers because it resonated with judges and opinion makers steeped in the challenges 
suffered during a period of legislative activism, not because he harked back to a more distant era.  
 Cooley made a conscious effort to look forward, not back, and warned his law students 
about focusing on the past rather than looking to the future.  In 1863, he urged, “instead of 
opposing all change, and living as much as possible in the past” the students “must be awake to 
the living present and hopeful of the future.”  With his next breath, he challenged those who 
clung to a foolish conservativism.  “For better or worst must the world be ever changing; and he 
who is forever looking backwards and hugging the past to his soul, will find himself insensibly 
moving backwards until the darkness of the past is upon him.”
915
  It was not that the past was 
inconsequential:  It informed understandings of the present, but did not suggest a conservative 
rigidity.  Cooley was not a mid-century Jacksonian advocating stagnant constitutionalism or the 
resurgence of a bygone era. 
Howard Gillman led the third school of thought – offering that Cooley’s concern over 
class-legislation was the core of his constitutional thinking.  Gillman distilled Cooley’s position 
to, “liberty in the private economy and rights to property had to be protected not from 
government interference but specifically from class interference attempts by special groups to 
use public power to advance private interests.”
 916
  Gillman’s focus was substantive due process 
and the regulatory regime, but his point also applied to Cooley’s tax jurisprudence and his 
associated public purpose doctrine.
 
Gillman’s point is well taken, if a bit overbroad.  Cooley 
adhered to strong equality principles and those principles animated his reasoning.  But 
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regulations and government spending, by their nature, disparately affect individuals and classes 
(however defined), and Cooley recognized that the legislature may pass laws with disparate 
impacts.  He wrote, “The power that legislates for the State at large must determine whether 
particular rules shall extend to the whole state and all its citizens or to a part of the State or a 
class of its citizens only.”  Cooley continued, “The legislature may also deem it desirable to 
establish particular rules for the several occupations, and distinctions in the rights, obligations, 
and legal capacities of different classes of citizens only.”
917
  Indeed, in his contribution to the 
fourth edition of Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Cooley noted 
that due process clauses went far beyond issues of class legislation.  Due process clauses, he 
argued, protected against “oppressive and tyrannical laws” even though they evenly fell upon 
all.
918
   
Because of his concern with oppressive legislation, Cooley specifically rejected 
formulaic applications of due process principles.  In an article discussing the application of due 
process provisions to state regulations, Cooley opined, “And what is due process of law can 
never be settled as an abstract question: it has a new phase with every new case, and judicial 
history shows that judges differ concerning it at the present day when particular cases arise.”
919
  
Because Cooley cannot be narrowly confined to a formulaic approach, Gillman’s school’s efforts 
to squeeze Cooley into a class-legislation corral miss the mark.  Cooley’s principles are too 
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complex, or perhaps too undefined, to allow such categorization.  Indeed, one might argue given 
his disinclination to employ abstract principles, that Cooley preferred the malleability of a 
common-law approach to developing due process understandings.  He certainly avoided binaries, 
like “class legislation – invalid, general legislation – valid.”  This is not to say that Cooley lacked 
a constitutional philosophy or that he reviewed each issue de novo.  As discussed below, Cooley 
advocated adjusting constitutional applications to protect the core principle of constitutional 
governance – republican self-governance and the rule of law.  As part of that belief, Cooley 
argued that courts should limit governmental space as society developed and individual rights 
expanded.  Before addressing his theory of changing constitutional meanings, we move to the 
dispute that most significantly allowed Cooley to voice his philosophy from his judicial bench. 
A Common Occurrence and Seedbed for Change: The Detroit & Howell 
Railroad 
 
On February 4, 1864, the Michigan legislature passed Special Act 49, the cumbersomely 
labeled, An Act to Authorize the Several Townships in the Counties of Livingston, Oakland, 
Washtenaw and Wayne to Pledge their Credit, and the County of Livingston to Raise by Tax or 
Borrow Money, to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad from Some Point Near the City of 
Detroit, to Howell, in the County of Livingston (the Detroit & Howell Act).  The act was not 
unusual.  Of the seventy-one acts passed by the legislature during that session, twelve authorized 
municipal aid to railroads and one authorized aid for canal construction and improvements.
920
  
Each of those statutes took taxpayer wealth and redistributed it to private corporations in order to 
advance the legislature’s conception of the public welfare.   
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During that period, the capital for local rail construction came from three sources, 
although the relative amounts differed with each project.  Typically, most came from speculating 
investors.  The second most significant contributions came from wealthy nearby landholders.  
The driving motivation for those subscribers was community development, with short-term 
direct financial return a problematic hope.
921
  Promoters heavily focused on wealthy local 
residents who would most benefit from the rail’s placement.  The last source was public funding.  
For example, the Detroit & Howell Act authorized the affected municipalities to pledge up to 5% 
of the assessed value of their communities’ real and personal property in aid of local rail 
construction.  That public funding effort required the authorization of the legislature and then 
local taxpayer approval.  Local approval was triggered by a written request signed by at least 30 
taxpaying electors to the township supervisor. Upon receiving that request, the supervisor would 
hold a special election after a 10-day notice period.  Municipalities would pay the pledged 
amount upon completion of agreed construction and, unlike subscription programs, would not 
receive stock in exchange.
922
   
Michigan’s use of local taxes to supplement private ownership was part of a common 
national practice.  Taxation was justified because the gains from rail development were general 
community benefits.
923
  Government and industry argued that without taxation to spread the 
financial burden, non-investing individuals would thrive by allowing investing neighbors to carry 
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the financial burden.  A purely private regime would allow non-investors to enjoy the benefits of 
enhanced property values while their generous neighbors carried the financial load.  
Notwithstanding the possibility of sizeable tax increases, nationally this public financing 
mechanism’s “substantial victory margins testified to firm convictions that property values 
would increase, freight charges decrease, and that the investments would prove, at the least in the 
long run, to be profitable for the community.”
924
 But, as Cooley would mockingly note, “Nothing 
is so easy as to build railroads if it can be accomplished by dropping votes in a box.”
925
 
Shortly after passage of the Detroit & Howell Act, advocates of the railroad began to 
campaign for financial support.  Within a month of the law’s passage, the Livingston Democrat 
praised the proposed railroad as an economic boon to the area, particularly to the western farmers 
ill-served by rail.  After presenting a lengthy economic analysis of future increases in property 
values and decreases in transportation costs, the writer stated that he was “morally sure that all 
the capital we invest in such an improvement would return to us the first year after the 
completion of the road."  This was not just his opinion.  The Detroit Free Press republished the 
article, adding “[t]here can be no doubt it is desirable to build this road.”
926
  Several other papers 
would join in the applause.       
While the marketing of the Detroit & Howell continued, unseen storm clouds appeared 
on the horizon.  In 1864, the Michigan Republican Party nominated Cooley to serve on the 
state’s Supreme Court.  His qualifications were well accepted.  Even the Democratic leaning 
Michigan Argus believed that “the Republican Committee has made a fortunate selection.”
927
  
Cooley’s opponents did not comment on or seem concerned about his conservative approach to 
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law making or his noted advocacy for a restrained legislature.  A year earlier, in opening 
exercises at the University of Michigan, Cooley had proposed that judicial power “is perhaps 
even greater” than the legislature’s because there were “numerous restraints” on the legislature 
and no such structural restraints encumbered the courts. Perhaps advocating a common-law (and 
court-focused) approach, Cooley offered that changes in government “can only be safely brought 
about in the slow processes of time.”
928
  With slow change and restrained government his goal, 
Cooley won the seat and began his tenure on the bench in 1865. 
At the same time, Henry Crapo became Michigan’s governor.  Crapo disapproved of 
municipal support for rail and believed that aid violated the spirit of the 1850 constitutional 
restrictions on state involvement in internal improvements.  Accordingly, Crapo vetoed 
legislation authorizing municipal aid and, in all likelihood, would have vetoed the Detroit & 
Howell Act had he been governor when it passed.
929
  (In 1869, the legislature passed, and the 
next governor, Henry P. Baldwin, signed a General Railroad Aid law authorizing municipal 
support of rail without specific legislative approval.)   
As Cooley donned his judicial robes, and Crapo argued against government debt, 
advocates of the Detroit & Howell pressed their case.  In 1865, the Livingston Democrat and 
Detroit Free Press again advanced an economic analysis in favor of the project.  The papers 
compared land values and commercial development in unserved areas to those well served by 
rail.  That comparison demonstrated that, despite the cost, rail presented a significant boon to 
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  At first, that argument carried the day, as most communities 
supported the rail project.   
The first signs of trouble arose when Detroit, the area’s largest community, began to balk. 
The railroad had started its Detroit efforts with a campaign for private subscriptions.  A 
committee of the Board of Trade, appointed to solicit those subscriptions, reported in January 
1866 that, despite “a very general willingness to acknowledge the importance of the enterprise” 
there existed not one private commitment.  It seemed that private investments, while good for the 
city generally, were not advantageous to private investors.  The committee’s requests “were met 
with a recital of past experiences in similar investments in rail road or plank road stocks,” all of 
which were negative.  Targeted investors argued that, instead of appealing to the wealthy, the 
committee should solicit those who most benefit – the real estate owners along the proposed 
line.
931
   
Those responses raised a challenging issue.  At least early on, most rail investors lost 
money on their investments, yet the railroads relied on those investments as significant sources 
of capital.  With direct financial returns often absent, promoters would pitch that enhanced 
property values and the secondary benefit of transportation improvements justified local 
investments.  Those efforts often proved successful.  As Taylor noted the “merchants, small 
manufacturers, farmers, and professional men living along the proposed route of the new railroad 
. . . bought stock in the hope that land values would rise and general business prosperity result 
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from improved transportation, not for the most part because they sought safe or profitable 
investments for their small savings.”
932
   
As the responses of Detroit’s wealthy demonstrated, pitches to those not along the lines 
were less attractive.  Few anticipated that private investors in the Detroit & Howell would enjoy 
a direct financial return on their investments.  The Detroit Free Press acknowledged that,  
Not one of these [private investors] will probably ever derive any direct return 
from their subscription as an investment, but in the increased prosperity of our 
city, in the additional population, in the enlarged sphere of business facilities, 
and in the opening up of an important section of our State, and making it 
tributary to Detroit, they will all indirectly reap a reward for their enterprise, to 
which, perhaps the only drawback will be the feeling that those who would be 
more benefited, and who refused to contribute, will derive also the benefit 




Neighboring individuals and companies who refused to subscribe were those most benefited by 
the rail line’s development; they would bear no expense but garner all the benefits. 
 In October 1867, Detroit Mayor Merrill Mills asked the committee to submit a progress 
report on its efforts to gain local subscriptions.  They were still $75,000 short of their $200,000 
goal.  Despite the “interests of Detroit [that] positively demand that the road” be built, the 
committee reported that among “many of our wealthy citizens who are most benefitted by such 
improvements, [hold an] entire indifference to the matter, and an unwillingness to contribute to 
its success in any manner.”  Notwithstanding its financial shortfall, (and the arguably poor 
financial opportunity suggested by private hesitancy to invest) the committee recommended a tax 
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The mayor and committee had real concerns that the $75,000 shortfall would sink the 
project.  So important was this rail line, that acting Detroit controller and town notable 
Alexander Hamilton Redfield remarked that if the committee could not obtain the remaining 
subscription commitments, “he would, rather than see the fair name of Detroit disgraced, depart 
from a good old Democratic principle, and put on the screws.”
935
  Redfield’s concerns went well 
beyond Detroit’s image.  Failure fully to finance the line could result in moving the line’s 
terminus, and its economic benefits, to a different port city, quite possibly the still despised 
Toledo, Ohio.
936
  Toledo had excellent port facilities and some believed the Michigan Southern 
line suffered financially because the Erie and Kalamazoo line diverted southern traffic to 
Toledo.
937
  This could happen with the Detroit & Howell.  Rail placements were flexible and rail 
promoters were known to move their lines when a community refused to subscribe.  Frank Elliot 
related one such story when he reported that the “piratical promoter” of the Ann Arbor Railroad 
Company started building his rail line in an arch around the Forest Hills, Michigan community 
until it reversed its refusal to fund his rail line.
938
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Being the terminus to the Great Lakes would especially benefit Detroit, as nearly all 
Michigan-related products coming from or moving to the east coast and Europe would move 
through that location.  That benefit, however, required active promotion.  As the Detroit Tribune 
related, cities like Chicago and Toledo grew because progressive men and government created an 
atmosphere for commercial growth.  In admonishing Detroit to do likewise, the newspaper 
argued, “Let us make good our fair reputation, and remember that it is not location alone, but 
energy and farseeing wisdom anticipating the currents of trade and directing them to our profit, 
which shall at last determine the future importance of our city.”
939
  Detroit needed the line not 
only in its own right but also to avoid strengthening its southern port-city competitors.  If that 
required putting the screws to hesitant investors, so be it.  Those efforts worked and, by 
November 27, the Detroit & Howell had obtained the private subscriptions needed. 
   Detroit then went to its taxpayers for additional support.  The effort promised to be 
difficult, with one paper having classified it as “suicidal.”
940
  A July 1869 vote failed, according 
to the Free Press, for want of the railroad’s effort to convince voters of the depth and breadth of 
investor support.  The paper maintained that taxpayers would assent, but only upon knowing that 
those most benefited – the commercial interests and nearby landholders – appropriately paid 
their share.  “When this is done it will be time enough to talk about help from the citizens of 
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  On November 23, 1869, Detroit’s Common Council directed the city clerk to give 
notice of a second effort.  This proposal sought a $300,000 loan, rather than a grant.  If the 
railroad failed to pay the underlying bonds, taxpayers would be liable for $210,000.  The clerk 
gave notice in early December for a January 10, 1870 election.
942
  This time the measure passed, 
but the celebration was muted.  A now subdued Detroit Free Press cautioned that the vote could 
not be taken as an affirmation of “the principle of granting aid to railways by direct taxation.”  
Instead, the proposal passed because the Detroit & Howell was an “exceptional” project.  
Warning that public support could result in unwise rail construction, the newspaper cautioned 
against overbuilding, particularly in low population areas.
943
  The bloom was falling off the 
railroad rose. 
As the Detroit efforts were moving forward, the railroad promoters continued to press for 
private investments and public grants along the rest of the line.  There is some suggestion that 
powerful, entrenched rail interests made this difficult.  In September 1869, the Detroit Advertiser 
and Tribune argued that the Detroit, Howell & Lansing
944
 were “not the creations of any great 
capitalist or railroad kings.”  Instead, it reported, “They owe their existence to the determination 
of some of Michigan’s citizens of comparatively moderate means” and that the “work thus far 
done upon the line has been accomplished in the face of innumerable embarrassments, of which 
the organized resistance of powerful railroad corporations has not been the slightest.”
945
  The 
reviewed record reveals no other statement concerning the forces against the Detroit & Howell, 
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and the Detroit Advertiser’s protests may have been mere advocacy.  However, there is some 
evidence that established railroads begrudged the public support granted to newer lines.  In an 
ironic twist, the Michigan Central Railroad reported in its 1870 Annual Report that a “multitude 
of projected roads, some meritorious, but probably the greater number of but little value” were 
being “stimulated . . .  by aid from municipalities” as well as by easy money.  The Michigan 
Central bemoaned this development, claiming that, “the want of merit is by no means the reason 
a railroad may not be constructed.”
946
  Why would the government-created Michigan Central 
publish this in its annual report?  Those new rail lines, including the Detroit & Howell, 
threatened to reduce ridership and freight, thereby undermining the Michigan Central’s 
profitability: certainly adequate cause for a campaign against those lines.   
Salem, a small, affluent farming community about half way between Detroit and Howell, 
was (and is) a township along the Detroit & Howell line.  In accordance with the Detroit & 
Howell Act, on May 23, 1866, thirty-one taxpaying voters submitted a written request to 
Township Supervisor Calvin Wheeler asking for a special meeting of electors to vote on their 
proposed 5% of assessed property-value grant to the railroad.  The request provided that the aid 
only be given should the railroad locate four miles of track and a depot in the township.
947
  On 
June 21, the township posted a notice of a vote on an “unconditional donation” to be held on 
June 30, 1866.  That notice was only nine days before the vote, not the statutorily required ten 
days.  On June 30, the voters met in Township Clerk William Mead’s barn and, after some 
discussion, cast 257 votes on issuing a “conditional loan.”  78 ballots read “Against Aid for the 
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Railroad in Salem Township”, 56 read “For Aid for the Railroad in Salem Township”, 42 read 
“The Loan – No,” and 81 read “The Loan – Yes.”  The township supervisor tabulated the vote as 
137 in favor and 120 against.  Thereafter, Mead published two resolutions committing township 
aid to the rail line, payable upon timely completion of required construction.
948
 
A committee of dissenters formed to continue the struggle against the grant.  In answer to 
the legal complaints concerning the flawed notice, Washtenaw County Circuit Court Judge 
Edwin Lawrence issued a July 4, 1868, injunction prohibiting the township board from issuing 
the bonds.  In March 1869, the Michigan Legislature responded by sweeping aside the election 
improprieties concerning aid to the Detroit & Howell.
949
  With this, legislatures had twice 
approved the project and the voters had approved it once. 
After the legislature voted to validate the election, on April 30, 1869, the railroad 
petitioned the township supervisor to pay the promised funds.  To the railroad’s displeasure, the 
township board’s membership recently had changed, with dissenters now in numerical control.
950
  
The new board refused to pay, arguing the election was flawed because of the way the votes 
were cast and that the outcome was uncertain.  Moreover, it claimed that the railroad had not 
completed its work and that the legislature could not legitimize the improper notice.  The board 
also argued that public grants were unconstitutional.  Not satisfied with the board’s explanation, 
the railroad applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Salem to 
pay its obligations. 
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As the proceedings moved forward, the railroad’s management threatened to slow or stop 
work on the rail line.  After discussing the challenges it had faced with Detroit’s grant, company 
president T. T. Lyon, of Plymouth Michigan, complained because of “the refusal to deliver the 
bonds pledged by the Town of Saline [sic], the company was compelled to check and finally stop 
all work upon the line, for the reason that, during the pendency of the suit to compel such 
delivery, violating, as it does, the validity of all municipal aid, no use, by anticipation or 
otherwise, can be made of the aid pledged by towns.”
951
  The railroad recognized that Salem had 
parented a legal challenge that threatened a widely employed system of rail finance.
952
  
Reports differ over the amount in controversy.  It was somewhere between $15,000 and 
$18,000, although its potential impact was significantly greater.  In response to the railroad’s 
petition for a writ of mandamus, Salem would argue that the entire practice of government 
financial support of private industry violated taxpayers’ individual constitutional rights.  As of 
November 30, 1869 (the end of the state’s fiscal year), Michigan municipalities had contributed 
$3,567,678 to private rail development.
953
  The Michigan Supreme Court would now seek 
arguments on whether any of those funds were lawfully collected and spent.  
Newspapers pressed for a broad decision on public aid.
954
  Some, like the Michigan 
Argus proposed that the court should invalidate public aid “before the towns and cities of the 
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State go to their bottom dollar on some wild goose railroad scheme.”
955
  Others counseled for 
continued public efforts.  In February 1870, the Ypsilanti Commercial Supplement called on 
Salem residents to donate to yet another railroad and to drop the objections to the Detroit & 
Howell.  It argued, “The fact is that Salem needs both roads.  If we lived in the town we should 
say, Stop Litigation – do all we reasonably can for the Detroit & Howell road.  It is going to be a 
good thing for Salem.”
956
  With the case, the issue would move from the political to the judicial 
sphere of government.  Availing himself of that opportunity, Cooley would employ the 
legislative limiting arguments he published two years earlier in Constitutional Limitations, to 
fundamentally alter the balance between the judiciary and the legislature.  In doing so, Cooley 
would give voice to individual rights claims that had heretofore only been given a cursory 
hearing.  In time, courts would employ those rights claims to check and challenge what they 
construed as legislative activism. 
Precedents for a New Doctrine 
 
   In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley suggested that each of his legislative limiting 
doctrines was grounded on both constitutional language and on court opinions.  In many 
respects, he stood on solid ground.  Constitutions imply and specifically require, for example, 
separations of power as well as territorial, Contract Clause, and ex post facto limitations on the 
legislature.  In those respects, Cooley adhered to, and followed his jurisprudential forbearers.  In 
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two other areas, Cooley advanced doctrines that had little precedents upon which he could rely: 
the first advocated constitutional limitations on both the legislative powers to tax and spend and 
the second advanced scrutinizing regulatory laws that encumbered private interest or went 
beyond the courts’ understanding of appropriate governance.   
Some disagree that Cooley broke with judicial precedent.  Corwin and his followers list a 
number of cases where courts addressed limits on legislatures, and Cooley employed many of 
those decisions.  Those cases, however, were slim reeds upon which Cooley (and the Corwinites) 
could base doctrines of legislative limitations.  Most of those citations contained limits that were 
only suggested in dicta. Even then, most of the rulings to which those dicta attached affirmed 
legislative power.  In the few cases where the court found no legislative authority, those courts 
often applied extra-constitutional limitations like natural law and vested rights.  As importantly, 
with the exception of Wynehamer, those courts denying legislative power faced narrow issues of 
private-to-private transfers.  And, even in Wynehamer, the court found that the legislature had 
the power to regulate prospectively but could not destroy already existing property interests.  
Even then, Wynehamer was an outlier – all states but one rejected its reasoning.  So, the authority 
upon which Cooley could draw in relation to significant property-effecting regulations almost all 
line up against judicial restraints on legislative power.  In the tax and spending arena, Cooley had 
one case out of dozens upon which to rely and the Supreme Court had mocked that court’s 
opinion.
957
  In sum, Cooley had few rulings upon which he could comfortably draw.
 958
 
As discussed in Chapter V, while court rulings significantly favored an expansive 
understanding of legislative power to spend and regulate, courts increasingly sought to limit 
activist legislative agendas.  Cooley could rely on majority opinions in New York’s White v 
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White and Holmes v Holmes,
959
 he could parse Black’s language in Sharpless, and perhaps could 
rely on North Carolina’s Hoke v Henderson decision.
960
  He could rely on the dicta of numerous 
majorities, while ignoring their legislative-power-affirming decisions.  He could also look to 
Chase’s dicta in Calder,
961
 Story’s dicta in Wilkinson v Leland,
962
 and the dissents of those 
arguing for constitutional or extra-constitutional limitations.  Or, as he often did, he could look to 
holdings whose dicta spoke in grand language but where the holdings affirmed government 
power.
963
  Cooley drew much, and extrapolated expansively on cases challenging private-to-
private transfers.  In doing so, he mischaracterized the state of the law, and government’s 
antebellum relationship to citizens and commerce.  Rather than Cooley’s world of limitations, as 
Hartog stated, “in antebellum America formal judicial deference to the legislature remained 
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constitutional dogma.”  Indeed, Hartog noted, “State constitutions in fact were never interpreted 
as restricting public initiative that happened incidentally to harm private property.”
964
   
The bottom line was that nearly every court had deferred to the legislative judgment, 
even when the result was transferring wealth from A to B.  That does not mean, as some like 
Daniel Rogers argued, that late-nineteenth century courts engaged in a “wholesale construction 
of new property and entrepreneurial rights,” in order to advance a legislative-limiting regime.
965
  
Instead, they relied on earlier pronouncements, and public understanding concerning the 
importance of property and property-related rights.  In doing so, they corralled the rights-speech 
of earlier courts and ignored those courts’ legislative-affirming decisions.  Because Cooley did 
not hold true to his stated goal of capturing settled law, he was able to advance his interest in 
writing in “full sympathy” with enforcing restraints upon the legislature.  He did so by 
discounting “every doubtful precedent” as he defined them, and advancing positions that would 
stand his test of “settled rules of right.”
966
  He gave courts the constitutional peg for which they 
had so long searched.  This made Cooley’s philosophy combustible and, along with his notions 
of enhanced judicial review, over the next sixty-five years that philosophy would allow courts to 
moderate, and at times hinder, community-welfare legislation. 
Targeted Constitutionalism 
 
Despite his willingness to cast aside precedents, Cooley was not intent on understanding 
or developing law in the vacuum of enlightened reason and philosophical reflection.  He felt that 
doing so “would only be casting overboard the wisdom of experience, and giving ourselves to 
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the winds of mere speculative abstractions.”  Instead, he considered law in its historical context.  
When history reflected the folly of prior actions, or changed circumstances rendered precedents 
inapplicable, Cooley advocated legal change.  That change was evolutionary.  Cooley reflected 
“we ourselves with our families and friends and the whole social circle of which we are a part are 
and are to be an active and formative element in our legal and political institutions, which we 
believe to be perennial, but which are never precisely the same as they come to and are 
transmitted by us.”
967
  Change was constant, and law and government necessarily adjusted to that 
change. 
Cooley’s recognition of the need to change and to consider the constitution and law in 
new lights required a bit of legal conjuring.  By popular understanding, a judge’s role was to 
apply established law to fact.  The suggestion that courts adjusted laws – or constitutions – to 
changing circumstances was politically troubling.  Perhaps wishing to avoid a political minefield, 
Cooley would often voice that constitutional meanings remained constant since their drafting.  
For example, his 1885 Michigan, A History of Governments, put forth the general proposition 
that written constitutions come “into existence with the understanding and purpose that its 
several paragraphs and provisions shall mean forever exactly what they mean when adopted.”  
While he allowed for that customary thinking, he admitted to a more complex, realistic and, 
perhaps, common-law like approach.  He offered that the theory of a set constitution could “only 
be true in the general sense.”  Constitutions required interpretation and adjustment.  This was 
because, “No instrument can be the same in meaning to-day and forever, and in all men’s minds.  
Its interpretation must take place in light of the facts which preceded and led to it; in the light of 
contemporaneous history, and of what was said by the actors and the ends they had in view.”
968
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Hence, the key to constitutional interpretation was understanding and holding true to the 
document’s overarching intent.  He believed that the constitution sought to achieve particular 
ends, and adherence to those ends was the obligation of legislatures and courts.   
Because the ends were the paramount concern, constitutional language had to be read in 
light of changing needs and circumstances.  Cooley urged,  “as the people change, so does their 
written constitution change also: they see it in new lights and with different eyes; events may 
have given unexpected illumination to some of its provisions, and what they read one way before 
they read a very different way now.”
969
  To Cooley, this was not a ploy to replace disfavored 
interpretations with newly preferred doctrines.  Change was a necessary condition of 
constitutional governance.  In 1886, he submitted:   
The most rigid institutions must, from year to year, yield something to 
[change]; the most inflexible Constitution, in the light of new and unexpected 
conditions, must present new phases and suggest new possibilities.  
Occasionally, no doubt, we shall modify the Constitution here and there by 
formal amendment, but if the general tendency of the political society shall be 
the development of a higher and better national life, the Constitution, the outer 




In that speech, Cooley was commenting on the national constitution, but his point directly 
extended to state constitutions.  Needs change, meanings change, and constitutional edifices 
must similarly change or risk irrelevance or dangerous inflexibility.  Despite his seeming 
acceptance of a changing constitution, in the same speech, Cooley voiced the opposite approach.  
Waxing poetic, he suggested that “When changes are voluntarily suffered to creep in by ways 
[other than amendment], we cultivate a habit of mind which saps the foundation of our 
institutions and sets us afloat upon a sea of uncertainty without definite landmarks, where the 
most reckless and pushing is likely to be most influential and the most presumptuous.”  
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Nevertheless, he argued that constitutions must change to adapt to changing conditions.  For 
example, in discussing federalism, Cooley stated, “the Federal Constitution though it is the same 
in words, is not, as a living and effective instrument, the same today as when it was made.”  He 
continued, “Indeed, there has never been in the history of the world such a thing as a stationary 
constitution.”
971
  One might ask, therefore, if all constitutions changed, which forces and entities 
could change them? 
 One cannot strictly adhere to the language and original intent of a constitution and 
simultaneously redefine its meaning to address changed realities.  Yet that is what Cooley 
suggested, at least at first blush.  He reconciled those positions by focusing on the overarching 
goals of the constitution, which he defined as assuring republican governance.  In that sense, his 
statement that “the outer framework cannot possibly remain stationary” is telling.  The 
constitutional core remained solid but the mechanisms to protect that core – “the outer 
framework” – necessarily changed.  This allowed for both constitutional consistency and change.  
Cooley warned, “What emergencies may require or demand cannot in advance be foreseen, but 
the general obligation to do whatever may be possible to preserve Republican intuitions in their 
integrity is plain, and if kept steadily in view will lead to safe results.”
972
  With that statement, 
Cooley disclosed the original intent to which he expected courts to hold true – republican self-
governance.  Since the oppressive forces to which government must respond would change, 
judicial review should hold the protection of republican governance as its constitutional lodestar, 
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even if that required changes in specific constitutional understandings.  In short, constitutional 
provisions must be read to affect the target of American government – republican self-
governance and the rule of law. 
 This conformed to his historical understanding of governance.  As he wrote in 1886, 
“Whatever the people, whatever their circumstances, whatever the nature of their institutions, the 
one law always present, always making itself felt and acknowledged in history, has been the law 
of change.”
973
  The change which was most evident to Cooley were his Michigan experiences of 
legislative missteps in a world that Jones described as “filled with political corruption, 
speculative prosperity, privilege seeking special interests and hustling mismanaged cities.”
974
  As 
those forces pressured government, Cooley witnessed little confidence in legislative resistance.  
That corrupt world was made all the more dangerous given an ill-considered legislature.  In 1876 
he wrote,  
The average legislator, who can levy taxes, create and fill offices, and then 
abolish them, impose restrictions on trade, even to the extent of destroying it – 
if he shall please to do so – is slow to believe that there is any law of political 
economy operating among those over whom he is set as ruler, which he can 
not, or should not, compel to bend and conform to such enactments as the good 
of his constituents may demand, and as he may devise for their welfare.
975
    
 
Because ever more active legislatures were unable to resist corrupting influences, Cooley 
accepted the need for more vigilant judicial oversight.  In that sense, he may not have been 
troubled by the weight of contrary precedent or by arguing that prior constitutional 
interpretations were no longer valid.  Circumstances modify constitutional meaning, and 
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To Cooley, the best constitutions were written to adjust to the changing societies they 
governed.  By having a “hold on the past, but which, with a foreseeing eye, prepares the way for 
appropriating the lessons of a progressive future,” Cooley offered that written constitutions can 
“harmonize the conservative and progressive principles.”
977
  This did not mean that 
constitutional meaning should change with a fluctuating majoritarian will.  Cooley believed that 
American constitutional interpretation required a consideration of changing circumstances but 
not a bending to shifting political and social winds.  That was accomplished through judicial 
review.  American courts both maintained and adjusted constitutional meanings, not the 
legislature and not the public.  It is important to note that Cooley was not arguing for stagnant 
governance.  Instead, he sought to harmonize the conservative with the progressive, and would 
do so by empowering judiciaries to counterbalance legislative activism.  The courts, Cooley 




Cooley felt comfortable promoting judicial fencing of legislative activity in part because 
he believed those who would limit the legislators – the judges – were cut of richer cloth than 
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  He said, “a higher degree of virtue is required to hold the scales of justice 
even in the courts than is expected of those who fill our legislative halls.”  In part, that was 
because of their role as guardians of republican governance and protectors against majoritarian 
politics.  Cooley offered that the courts were to check enactments responsive to “those temporary 
excitements which sometimes sweep over the people.”  As the more reflective body, the courts 
were to “sit in judgment upon legislative action, and annul whatever is done in excess of rightful 
jurisdiction.”  And who was to check the courts?  Cooley advanced that “no similar restraints 
upon the judicial power are practicable. . . .  [T]he judiciary must decide upon its own authority, 
and the judge must find within his own breast those restraints against hasty and unjust action 
which the legislator has in the constitution and the courts.”
980
  Underlying his confidence was a 
belief that judges were not subject to the pressures exerted by the wealthy or the masses in the 
same way as legislators were.  Later in life, Cooley would come to understand that judges were 
subject to different pressures and judicial self-policing held its own challenges.  With that 
realization, he would come to lament judicial tendencies to substitute their own judgments for 
that of the legislature. 
Cooley understood that limits on legislative power “were incapable of being precisely 
indicated so to preclude mistake or controversy.”  This was especially so given that those limits 
changed as society changed.  Underlying that change was a “steady growth” of “free principles.”  
To Cooley, America was moving from a restrictive society to a freer one and, in doing so, 
                                                 
979
 This does not mean to suggest that Cooley held a general hostility to the legislature.  He did not.  He embraced a 
suitable legislative function (as he defined it) and bristled when the legislature did not appropriately function.  For 
example, in 1893, Cooley publically objected to Senate procedures that undermined votes on a silver bill.  In an 
argument that might today resonate, Cooley argued “If it is true that the majority cannot force a vote, a revolution 
has in some manner been effected in the Government – it is no longer the Government our fathers created, but one 
so changed by one legislative body that a minority in that body may at pleasure defeat any legislative measure.”  
Arguing that he felt “robbed of liberties” Cooley argued that filibusters violated the Constitution and undermined  
republican governance. "Judge Cooley on the Deadlock," Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1893, 1. 
980
 ———, 1863 Address on Dedication of Law Hall: 7-8. 
382 
 
legislatures would lose their “obnoxious and despotic powers.”  That withdrawal of legislative 
power effected “permanent modifications of the constitutional systems.”  When the reasons for 
exercising a particular power were no longer valid, that “questionable” “power should be 
considered recalled when the necessity has ceased.”  (Here, Cooley used employing tax dollars to 
aid mills as his example.)  Ultimately, it was the judiciary’s role to determine when a power was 
“questionable” or when “necessity has ceased.”  In this way, courts could assure the “gradual 
expansion” of free principles “with the general advance in intelligence and independent thought 
and action among the people.”
981
  Hence, a legislature once empowered to spend or regulate 
could lose that power through the forces of disuse, changed societal needs, or the elevation of 
free principles.  This then was the force of history speaking.  To Cooley, the common law and 
constitutional principles consistently were evolving to demand greater freedom and equal rights.  
Overzealous legislative regulation and commercial aid violated the expanding command for 
freedom, equality, and progress and should be judicially overruled. 
A Call to Action: Constitutional Limitations 
 
It may be that no book title better describes its author’s intent than A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Powers of the States of the American 
Union.  Cooley set forth to interpret, or perhaps redesign, free government as requiring checks on 
the legislature and its advancement of majoritarian and special interests.  Those checks came 
from several sources but did not necessarily require specific delineation in constitutional 
documents.  Cooley believed that free government required legislative restraint and the 
constitution had “but a few positive restraints upon the legislative power contained in the 
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instrument.”  Hence, he needed either to find the restraints elsewhere or to draw inferences from 
the document.  Included in those non-specific restraints were “the ancient limitations” that had 
always been on popular and monarchical governments – the common law.  Further, limits 
“sprang from the very nature of free government.”  Accordingly, for example, the legislature 
could not encroach on judicial or executive space,
982
 it could not change any court ruling by 
retrospectively defining statutory meaning, and it could not adjust marital or other vested 
property rights.  The legislature’s efforts could only advance public gain as, “the legislature is to 
make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals.  It has control of the public 
money, and should provide for disbursing them only for a public purpose.”
983
  His concern that 
majorities or wealth interests might press to advance one group over another led to Cooley’s 
concern that liberties required judicial protection from improperly activist legislatures. 
In Constitutional Limitations and his other writings, Cooley set forth several basic 
principles of American republican governance.  Most basically, the sovereign people, through 
their constitutions, set forth the powers of governments, both national and state.  Thereafter, both 
the leaders and those they governed must act within those limitations, even if immediate popular 
will is frustrated.  In this sense, American legislatures were not like the British Parliament 
(wherein sovereignty resided) but were limited to exercising the grants of authority given by the 
sovereign people.  In the case of the federal legislature, the sovereign people granted only those 
enumerated powers found in the federal constitution.  State legislatures had no restraints to 
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legislative powers save for those withheld by the people as enumerated in the constitutions.  
“Without constitutional limitations,” Cooley wrote, “the power [of state legislatures] to make 
laws would be absolute.”
984
  But state legislatures held no such powers as such a prospect was 
inimical to republican governance.  In 1888, he wrote that legislative power “unless carefully 
restrained and limited, is quite likely to prove ‘a power to frame mischief by a law’” and 
accordingly constitutions “give special and careful attention to the necessary restraints.”  To 
Cooley, “There is no legislative omnipotence in America, nor ever likely to be.”
985
  In creating 
government, the sovereign people protected themselves against legislative overreaching by 
retaining their rights under various constitutional clauses including the tax, due process, and law 
of the land provisions. 
Cooley rejected the argument that natural law transcended constitutions or that courts 
could invalidate laws because they were unjust or oppressive.  Instead, they could invalidate 
those improper laws only if it could “be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights 
guaranteed or protected by the constitution.”  However, Cooley allowed for significant judicial 
space by suggesting that in the event the constitution contained no specific limits, courts could 
find implied limitations.  For example, even without a specific provision, it would be 
unconstitutional to pass a law requiring a person to give his property to another.  Such a law 
would not fit within the power to tax because taxation, by definition requires “apportionment” 
and that the tax be for a “public purpose.”
986
  Legislation that went beyond that taxing authority 
was outside the constitutional grant to the legislature; and those limitations emanated from the 
common law and accepted precedent created by the courts.  Cooley considered the common law 
to be the embodiment of reason as shaped by the wisdom of time and, connectedly, feared that 
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statutory law often suffered from the majoritarian passions of the moment.
987
  That disposition 
was laid bare in his 1887 speech before the Georgia Bar Association, where he voiced the 
proverb “With customs we do well, but statutes may undo us.”
988
 
 So strong was his faith in the common law that Cooley urged, “constitutions are to be 
construed in light of the common law, and of the fact that its rules are still left in force.”  This 
did not mean that constitutional provisions, or statutes, that claimed to depart from the common 
law were to be invalidated.  In the event that happened, the drafters’ intent prevailed.  Where the 
constitution or statute did not directly conflict with the common-law, the courts were to employ 
common-law principles to interpret language.  To Cooley, this maxim of constitutional 
interpretation derived from the common law’s respect for those “maxims of freedom” that 
undergirded public and private affairs and the uses of property “from time immemorial.”  He 
argued that constitutionally guaranteed rights in essence were reiterating common-law 
protections.  In his 1887 speech before the Georgia Bar Association, Cooley also explained that 
the frameworks of American government were based on historical experience and that the 
“maxims of liberty” developed under the common law were “embodied in their constitutions as a 
protecting armor.”
989
  In his 1874 opinion in Weimer v Bunbury, Cooley elaborated on the 
connection.  
The truth is the bill of rights in the American constitutions have not been 
drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old principles against 
abrogation or violation.  They are conservatory instruments rather than 
reformatory; and they assume that the existing principles of the common law 
are ample for the protection of individual rights, when once incorporated in the 
fundamental law, and secured against violation.
990
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In Constitutional Limitations, he urged that the common law achieved two interrelated ends.  It 
“protect[ed] the rights and privileges of the individual man,” and checked “arbitrary and 
uncontrolled authority.”
991
   
 Cooley’s concern was that legislatures were subjected to “those temporary excitements 
which sometimes sweep over the people and from which no body of men can at all times be 
free.”
992
  In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley responded to that concern by offering the tools 
for lawyers and courts to limit that majoritarian activism.  Although the courts could not 
invalidate legislation that violated the “spirit” of the constitution, “it does not follow, however, 
that in every case the courts . .  . must be able to find in the constitution some specific inhibition 
which has been disrespected, or some express command which has been disobeyed.”
993
  While 
Cooley did not use the terms “penumbra” or “unwritten constitution” he certainly suggested that 
jurists look to the meaning of the document in its entirety.  In doing so, they should refer to 
declarations of rights and due process clauses as protectors of republican governance and as 
limitations (both express and implied) on legislative power.  Legislatures were required to 
operate within the constitutional guidelines or their legislation would be void.   
Cooley’s last general principle was that the constitutions vest the judiciary with the 
responsibility to assure that the popular will, as reflected in legislative acts, was consistent with 
constitutional principles.  In that sense, the court had authority and responsibility to “finally 
determine the question of constitutional law.”  While courts should exercise this power “with 
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 they must employ it to honor their judicial role.  The court is a 
coequal branch that is neither superior to the executive or the legislature, nor subordinate.   
It would be a mistake, to suggest Cooley disdained the legislature.  He did not, and 
throughout Constitutional Limitations, his articles, speeches, and opinions, Cooley repeatedly 
affirmed the role of, and the required deference to, the legislature.  For example, after 
questioning the Maine prohibition laws, Cooley ended his discussion: “A statute which can do 
this must be justified upon the highest reasons of public benefit; but, whether satisfactory or not, 
they rest exclusively in the legislative wisdom.”
995
  Cooley seemed of two minds.  First, the 
legislature spoke for the people and its decisions required respect but, second, republican 
governance required judicially enforced limits on majoritarian impulses.  His respect for 
(reasoned) popular will and his beliefs concerning the need to check that will to protect 
individual rights and republican governance resulted in a complex and dynamic approach to 
constitutional law.  To Cooley, experience and changing public needs required an evolving legal 
and constitutional structure.   
It makes sense to pause here to consider the context in which Cooley wrote 
Constitutional Limitations.  Cooley wrote while the definition of “property” was undergoing 
dramatic change.  Two cases with very similar facts demonstrate the changing nature of 
American property law.  In 1843, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Monongahela Navigation v 
Coons, evinced the then prevailing notion that property was analogous to an iron bar – either it 
existed or it did not.  In that case, the plaintiff sought compensation for damage he sustained as a 
result of a government-sponsored flooding of his land.  The court expressed regret that it was 
unable to provide relief despite the wrong suffered by the landholder.  It said that the court was 
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constrained to accept legislative determinations absent “constitutional restraints on legislative 
power.”  The plaintiff still owned the land and, accordingly, no taking had occurred and no 
compensation was due.  While suffering a loss, the court condoled, “the plaintiffs have at least 
the miserable good luck to know that they have companions in misfortune.”
 996
  Because the 
court only reflected on the ownership aspect of property, it did not consider the diminished value 
of the land, or the forfeited gains that the owner might later enjoy from the use of the land.
997
 
 By 1872, that notion of property rights had changed as the courts now recognized the 
intangible aspects of ownership.  The United States Supreme Court in Pumpelly v Green Bay 
Company found that a taking occurred when plaintiff’s land was flooded because the water had 
“effectively destroyed or impaired [the land’s] usefulness.”  Justice Miller wrote, “There may be 
such serious interruptions to the common and necessary use of property as will be equivalent to a 
taking within the meaning of the constitution.”
998
  Because the complainant lost considerable 
value, even though no physical taking had occurred, the court ruled that the uncompensated, 
publicly authorized, flooding violated due-process principles.   
This contemporaneous shift is important, as Cooley advocated that individual rights, most 
specifically property rights, limited legislative latitude.  They did so not merely because takings 
were specifically prohibited or because individual rights limited legislative space.  To Cooley, 
republican governance, by its nature, respected property and government destruction of that 
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property struck at the heart of time-honored principles.  It follows, therefore, that as property 
notions expanded, legislative power contracted.  In the temperance context, under the 
Monongahela Navigation standard, there was no taking because alcohol manufacturers retained 
ownership of their manufacturing property.  Under Pumpelly, there probably was a grievous 
property loss, as value was greatly diminished:  hence, Cooley’s warning that temperance 
legislation “must be justified” with the highest level of public benefit.  With the move from the 
iron bar to the bundle of straw analogy came questions concerning property’s components and 
the allowable level of government interference with that property’s value.  As the issues 
marinated, and courts explored the consequences of the changed property notion, individuals 
questioned whether new government regulations and taxes inappropriately took too many stalks 
from their property bundle.  This would particularly be the case with respect to one’s ownership 
– or property – in one’s own labor.
999
   
Protecting Republican Governance 
 
In reflecting back ways in which courts employed Cooley’s due process standards, one 
might conclude that Cooley’s class legislation concerns primarily arose from a fear that the 
impoverished masses would legislate to deprive the affluent of their property.  While that 
certainly was a concern, Cooley’s strongest concern over class legislation derived from his fear 
of the coercive influence of wealth – not poverty – on legislative judgments.  He grounded his 
objection to class legislation on his Jacksonian-based egalitarian fears of corporate power and the 
propensity of that power to taint representative government.  Within that context, Cooley 
understood class legislation largely to mean “legislation on behalf of already privileged 
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  His Michigan experiences and understandings grounded that concern.  Cooley knew 
that the wealthy leveraged the political process to exact favors contrary to the general welfare.  It 
was not just that the affluent enjoyed undue influence that granted them favors; that influence 
also kindled an opposition to governance.  In his 1879 lectures at Johns Hopkins, Cooley 
disclosed his underlying fear: social upheaval.  He warned, “poverty is never so much in danger 
of becoming the master as when capital unjustly manipulates the legislation of the Country.”  
Jones pointed out that this concern was not anti-corporate.  Rather, Cooley sought to assure an 
equal application of laws where the wealthy could not employ financially derived power to abuse 
the public interests.
1001
  The law was to provide no special privilege, particularly if that law 
enhanced concentrated power that would subvert republican governance, liberty interests, or the 
general welfare.  
Notwithstanding his focus on the coercive nature of wealth, Cooley did not limit his 
equality concerns to the machinations of the powerful.  At times, Cooley took his equity 
principles, and his disinclination for one group to benefit at the cost of another, to an unusual 
extreme.  That occurred in 1877, when the University of Michigan threatened to increase law 
school tuition to help pay for increased medical school expenses.  In response, Cooley threatened 
to resign from the university, as the actions constituted an inappropriate tax on one group for the 
benefit of another, and “violate[d] the spirit of our Constitution and laws.”
1002
  Justice Campbell 
reported that Cooley was so incensed that he became physically ill over the issue.  It seems that 
the university’s disparate treatment of students created significant anxiety; the taxing of one for 
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the benefit of another, and treating similarly situated individuals differently, offended Cooley’s 
notions of fairness and propriety.
1003
  That incident was a microcosm of the revolution Cooley 
had unleashed with Constitutional Limitations.  That is not to say, however, that Cooley intended 
a class-based test or that his target was class legislation.  Cooley’s goal was limiting the 
legislature and strengthening republican governance.  Class legislation may have been a result of 
majoritarian excesses – and excess might be an incident of class legislation – but it was not, in 
itself, a mark of unconstitutionality.  There was no such binary formula, and no line of 
demarcation between general and class legislation. 
Continuing his argument that legislative limits spring from the nature of free governance, 
Cooley turned to limits respecting individual rights.  He argued that those rights would limit 
legislative action even if constitutions had not specifically withheld power from the legislature.  
Arguing that the sovereign people had no legal need “to exact pledges for a due observance of 
individual rights from anyone,” Cooley wrote that they nevertheless did so because “the 
aggressive tendency of power is such” that the people “deemed it important to repeat the 
guaranty” in their constitutions.  To Cooley’s understanding, those guarantees were in the “law 
of the land” and “due process” clauses.
1004
 But, unlike the Magna Charta’s focus on the 
executive and courts (from which the law of the land language came) Cooley applied law of the 
land and due process principles to the legislature.  He argued that due process guarantees 
protected individuals from unreasonable majoritarian incursions into private interests.  Citing 
Daniel Webster in his argument before the Supreme Court in Dartmouth College, Cooley wrote 
of due process, “The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, and immunities 
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under the protection of general rules which govern society.”  Cautioning against legislative 
overreaching, he warned that, “everything which may pass under the form of an enactment is not 
the law of the land.”
1005
   
While very few earlier courts had accepted Webster’s argument, Cooley did, and did so 
in a more significant sense than Webster had argued.  Cooley expanded due process to direct that 
courts overturn laws that were “arbitrary” and of an “unusual nature,” especially as they applied 
to taking individual rights.  Those rights, Cooley explained when writing the fourth edition of 
Story’s Commentaries, were contained in the words “life, liberty, and property.”  Those were 
“representative terms, and are intended and must be understood to cover every right to which a 
member of the body politic is entitled under the law.”  The individual’s body was assumed in the 
term life.  Liberty included the pursuit of happiness, including the right to any legitimate 
employment, and incorporated “the negation of arbitrary power in every form which results in a 
deprivation of right.”
1006
  For property, Cooley only cited Justice Story’s language in Wilkinson v 
Leland, proclaiming that government could not transfer property from A to B. 
Cooley recognized that courts historically had associated due process guarantees with 
judicial proceedings associated with executive actions. He understood, however, that active 
legislatures could encumber individual interests generally, as executive actions could do so 
specifically.  Hence, due process guarantees appropriately protected against improper 
government actions, from whatever source.  His fourth edition of Story’s Commentaries, 
advanced that “due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers 
of government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for 
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the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the 
one being dealt belongs.”  Cooley then cited Constitutional Limitations as authority for moving 
due process from a right against executive to one against the legislative branch, and government 
generally.
1007
   
In Constitutional Limitations, he had extrapolated from the procedural protections 
afforded to the individual a need to protect the community with more than procedural guarantees.  
“While every man,” he wrote, “has a right to require that his own controversies shall be judged 
by the same rules which settle those of his neighbors, the whole community is also entitled at all 
times to demand the protection of the ancient principles which shield private rights against 
arbitrary interference, even though such interference may be under a rule impartial in its 
application.”  In doing so, Cooley expanded the terms “due process” and “law of the land” to 
create limitations that nearly all courts had rejected just a few years earlier, and he did so arguing 
that the protection came not just from constitutional language but also as incidents of free 
government.
1008
  Employing settled maxims of the common law and historic traditions, Cooley 
molded a constitutional standard for rejecting “arbitrary” government action, and he did so by 
defining constitutional language in ways that fit his limited-government ideals. 
In applying that notion, Cooley advocated courts employ due process to protect against 
legislative interference with property rights.  To his mind, protecting property was tantamount to 
protecting freedom.  “Government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of 
property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body.”  He continued, laying the 
foundation for his activist court agenda.  “The fundamental maxims of a free government seem 
to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred.”  In 
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constitutionalizing his standard, Cooley offered that the people, in granting authority to 
government, did not authorize legislative encumbrances on private property.  To Cooley, the 
people would never grant, “a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil 
liberty” as would allow legislative authority over property rights.  It was up to the courts 
vigilantly to protect those rights.
1009
  In a few sentences, Cooley had set the standard.  Property is 
the preeminent right and the courts should vigilantly protect that right from legislative 
overreaching. 
But legislation, by its nature, affects the individual and his/her property.  So where may 
the legislature act and where may it not?  Cooley responded that legislatures had full power to 
regulate pursuant to granted police powers.  Cooley then cited Shaw’s language in 
Commonwealth v Alger and Redfield’s in Thorpe v Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co.
1010
  In Alger, 
Shaw submitted “All property in this Commonwealth is . . .  held subject to those general 
regulations which are necessary to the common good and welfare.”  In Thorpe, Redfield urged 
that the regulations could secure “the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the States.”
1011
  
In citing these cases and this language, Cooley accepted that government power could do more 
than merely assure that individuals enjoy their property so as not to injure others.  Government, 
within limits, could regulate to advance social interests.  However, legislatures could not use 
their police powers to deny “essential rights and privileges.”
1012
 
Cooley furnished no demarcation line between regulations that sat inside or outside of the 
legislative sphere.  Instead, he relied on judicial discretion.  Should government interfere with 
property, the courts were to balance “those principles of civil liberty and constitutional deference 
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which have become established in our system of law, and not by any rules that pertain to forms 
of procedure merely.”  No longer were courts limited to procedural review.  Cooley, while 
voicing deference to legislative judgments and authority, argued for an energized judiciary to act 
as the protector of property.
 1013
  In essence, he inserted the judiciary into the political arena, 
granting it the power to determine whether the legislation was so objectionable or arbitrary that 
the court should intervene to protect individual rights and liberties.  Because, in passing the law 
or regulation, the legislature had already determined the act to be reasonable, the court in essence 
exercised a veto power over the legislature.  Unlike the one exercised by the executive, the 
judicial veto could only be overturned by a constitutional amendment or a change of court 
doctrine. 
Just as government could not undermine an individual’s property rights through 
regulation, so too it could not take property in the form of taxes and redistribute it elsewhere.
1014
  
Cooley addressed that concern with his public purpose doctrine.  Under that doctrine, any use of 
tax dollars not consistent with a “public purpose” was unconstitutional because “taxation having 
for its only legitimate object the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs of 
government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for other purposes is not a proper exercise 
of this power, and must therefore be unauthorized.”  Taxation for any other purpose “would not 
be legislation;” expenditures not connected to a public purpose change the associated 
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support of home industries.  Cooley would allow for tariffs that provided incidental protection to American industry, 
as the purpose of the legislation then would be to enhance “the prosperity of the people and welfare of the country.”  
He struggled with legislative patronage, which was the essence of protective tariffs.  Legislatures constitutionally 
could not become the fiefdom of private interests.  It was at that point, the courts must intervene.  Thomas McIntyre 
Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America  (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1880). 57. 
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assessments from taxes to “plunder.”
1015
  Here again, Cooley professed deference by claiming 
that the legislature was “vested with a large discretion which cannot be controlled by the courts,” 
and that “the moment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature . . 
. that moment enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority.”
1016
  
 Cooley’s public purpose discussions in Constitutional Limitations suggested a general 
application of his public purpose doctrine – expenditures not for a public purpose were 
unconstitutional.  In practice, Cooley applied that doctrine only when those expenditures were 
tied to a specific tax.  In those cases, the challenged tax effected a transfer from the taxpayers 
nearly directly to the corporations and did not involve transfers from general revenue funds.  One 
could, therefore, conclude that Cooley intended to apply his public purpose doctrine narrowly to 
near-direct A to B transfers.  As explained below, it is unlikely that Cooley so narrowly 
construed his doctrine and, certainly, many of his followers adopted no such narrow an 
interpretation.  Tax dollars necessarily could be spent only to advance a public purpose, or the 
legislation was invalid. 
 By inserting the courts into the tax and spending area by defining “taxes” to 
require spending on a “public purpose,”  Cooley created his constitutional hook. Claiming 
precedent, he employed Sharpless’s requirement that taxes be spent in the public interest.  
However, he went much further.  Whereas Sharpless looked to the impact of the expenditure, 
Cooley looked to the nature of the recipient.  The issue was not whether the public enjoyed any 
benefit from the entity’s activities.  Instead, it was whether there was a direct benefit to the 
taxpayers as the result of an exchange of value between the government and the subsidized 
industry.  If there was not specific value exchanged, then the subsidy was a gift from the 
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taxpayers.  Since the legislature could not, under its taxing authority, take property from A and 
grant it to B, gifts were unconstitutional and “despotic.”
1017
  Cooley’s later writings would hone 
that message.  Unless the entity performed specific services for the direct benefit of the 




Cooley recognized that his position on municipal aid was in the distinct minority.  In an 
effort to distinguish opposing law, he parsed language from some cases suggesting limits where, 
frankly, there seemed none.  Quoting Talbot v Dent,
1019
 he advanced that municipalities could 
only provide aid when ‘the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the 
[municipality] and its interests as to conduce obviously and in a special manner to their propriety 
and advancement.’”  But Talbot affirmed legislative power to aid private rail corporations, as did 
the court in Hasbrouck v Milwaukee, a case Cooley similarly employed to question public 
support for private rail.
1020
  Cooley then cited Theodore Sedgwick, intimating that he objected to 
taxpayer support of private internal improvement projects.  Sedgwick’s challenge was altogether 
different.  He believed that the responsibility for such support lay with the state, not the 
municipality, as the benefits were not limited to municipal boundaries.
1021
  Recognizing perhaps 
that he was being somewhat selective, Cooley mentioned that the recent cases had cast doubt on 
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earlier judicial acceptance of legislative power in this area.  He then cites Iowa’s Wapello 
decision – a case that would shortly be overruled.  When speaking of government support of 
private industry, Cooley was certainly more concerned with writing “in full sympathy with all 
those restraints which the caution of the fathers has imposed upon the exercise of the powers of 
government,” than “to state the law as it has been settled by the authorities.”  At least in this area, 
Cooley the advocate emerged while Cooley the legal repository withdrew. 
Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations as the nation considered the energetic 
governance created during the Civil War and reflected on the recent European upheavals.  To 
Cooley, the power of large government and emerging European socialist philosophies threatened 
to undermine American limited government and, with it, individual property rights.  Since their 
first days, American courts had expressed an eagerness to limit what they construed as ill-
advised, property-encumbering legislation, but could find no grounds upon which to do so.  With 
Constitutional Limitations, Cooley provided that hook.  In the end, the first edition of 
Constitutional Limitations moved governance from a majoritarian to a republican model, and did 
so by addressing concerns that had troubled courts since the 1790s but had remained transient 
and indefinite until Cooley give them constitutional weight.    
From Theory to Practice – Tax and Spending Limits 
 
Cooley’s most immediate impact on American jurisprudence and thinking revolved 
around the use of tax dollars to support private industry.  Before the ink had dried on 
Constitutional Limitations, Chief Justice John Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court, in Hanson v 
Vernon, addressed the constitutionality of an Iowa statute authorizing municipal support of rail 
construction.  As discussed earlier, the court met in the atmosphere of federal/state divergence 
over the meaning of Iowa’s constitution.  Like the Pennsylvania Sharpless court, the Iowa court 
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recognized the importance of its decision, stating that “with possibly one exception, no question 
in the judicial history of the State has arisen which rivals the present in importance.”  The court 
considered the split in earlier Iowa cases and sided with those that found that government 
financial support of rail unconstitutional and beyond the legislature’s taxing authority.  
Repeatedly citing Constitutional Limitations, the court found that: “the money demanded of the 
citizen is called a tax, it is not such, but is, in fact, a coercive contribution in favor of private 
railway corporations, and violative, not only of the general spirit of the Constitution as to the 
sacredness of private property, but of that specific provision which declares that no man shall be 
deprived of his property without due process of law.”  Mimicking Cooley, Dillon explained that 
taxes were only to “raise money for public purposes.”  Because the public did not own the 
railroad, a tax for the railroad’s benefit was not within the legislature’s authority.    
Dillon looked at the recipient of government support as either public and “subject to the 
unlimited control of the legislature” or as private and not entitled to government largess.  
Railroads were private corporations.  Dillon accepted Cooley’s public purpose standard, which 
required direct benefits in exchange for the subsidy (and thereby rejected Sharpless and the 
dominant line of cases).  In flourishing style, he wrote: “This opening once made in the barriers 
which the Constitution has erected to protect private property, who is so wise as to foretell what 
troops of foes may not hereafter enter at the same breach?”  To Dillon and the majority, the 
courts were vanguards to protect the citizens’ property against a rapacious legislature.  In dissent, 
Justice Chester Cole cited the opinions of twenty-one state Supreme Courts that disagreed.
1022
  
His opinion carried no weight with his brethren.  The Cooley revolution had begun. 
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Soon Wisconsin joined in, first in Curtis v Whipple in 1869 and then in Whiting v 
Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad in 1870.  In Curtis the city sought to subsidize a private 
educational facility, but the court invalidated its efforts because the city retained no management 
rights over the school.  Without that direct connection, the educational benefits to the city were 
too tangential to adhere to the public purpose standard.
1023
  While the Wisconsin court did not 
cite Constitutional Limitations in Curtis, it did in Whiting.  That case was nearly identical to the 
one faced in Pennsylvania in Sharpless and in Iowa in Hanson.  Citing Constitutional 
Limitations as authority, the court invalidated the public grant to a railroad almost solely because 
the railroad was privately held and motivated.  The court took pains to distinguish its findings 
from earlier approved government expenditures by arguing that earlier cases addressed entities in 
part publicly owned.
1024
  To the Wisconsin and Iowa courts, public purpose turned on ownership, 
not public need or benefit – aligning with Cooley’s focus on the recipient of funds. 
As Iowa and Wisconsin were hearing Hanson, Curtis, and Whiting, Cooley prepared to 
judicially elaborate on his public purpose doctrine.  He had his chance in the matter involving 
Salem’s refusal to pay the Detroit & Howell Railroad for its work completed pursuant to the 
voters’ approval of rail-support bonds.  Invoking his public-policy beliefs that government 
support for railroads were “diseases in the body politic” that needed to be “arrested by a decision 
of the State Supreme Court,”
1025
 Cooley sought to gain his brethren’s support in the Detroit & 
Howell mandamus matter.  In a letter to Justice Benjamin Graves, Cooley justified sacrificing his 
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position and vote in one case before the court in order to win in the upcoming Detroit & Howell 
versus Salem dispute. 
In the Detroit paving case I received an opinion from Judge 
Christiancy, in which, while waiving the question of proper construction of the 
city charter, he holds the assessment void on some grounds which seems to me 
entirely untenable.  Under the circumstances I have deemed it polite in order to 
avoid an equal division of the court to yield on the main question of the 
construction of the charter & treat that as settled by the case of Woodbridge vs. 
Detroit.  If we have got to face that question of railroad bonds we have no 




Cooley was looking to change the relationship between government and industry.
1027
  
Interestingly, Cooley wrote this letter before any briefs had been filed or any arguments tendered 




 The Detroit & Howell Railroad and the Board of Trustees of Salem would soon write 
their briefs and offer their arguments.  Those pleadings furnished a litany of grounds upon which 
the justices could respond to the railroad’s petition for a writ of mandamus.  Hiram J. Beakes, 
employing arguments from Constitutional Limitations, provided the key argument on Salem’s 
behalf.  He wrote: “The Act of 1864 is not an exercise of ‘legislative power,’ and is therefore, 
void, whether it comes within any of the express prohibitions [in the constitution] or not.  It is 
not a law, but an attempt to license an act of spoliation.”  Beakes continued, “To compel A. to 
donate or loan his money to B. or to authorize a majority to compel the other citizens to donate 
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or loan their property to private corporations or individuals, is not legislation.”  Drawing on 
Cooley’s underlying concern over the limits on legislative power, Beakes painted an arrestingly 
vivid picture: “It is an imperial edict or ukase, inconsistent with the idea of a limited government 
– and a fortiori inconsistent with the idea of legislative power in a government whose 
sovereignty is divided into independent departments, executive, legislative, and judicial.”
1029
  
 Ashley Pond, as counsel for the railroad, responded that the legislature had the power and 
wisdom to decide whether an act is for a public purpose – and courts historically had, and 
should, defer to those judgments.  He then referred to the tradition of government financial 
support, citing the state’s salt bounty laws, agricultural societies, educational establishments, 
charitable grants, and government supported meetinghouse and church facilities.
 1030
 Pond had 
legal precedent and long-standing government practices on his side.  Beakes had Cooley’s ear, 
mind, and heart, as Cooley believed that at least some of those government practices and 
precedent were either in error or had been delegitimized by experience.  Cooley had hinted at his 
limitation philosophy in the 1863 University Law School Opening Exercises, developed them in 
Constitutional Limitations, and now would implement them in the Salem case. 
 Although the court could have decided the case on narrow grounds, Cooley embraced the 
opportunity judicially to implement his doctrines concerning limited government and the 
restrictions on legislative power.
1031
  Much as he had professed in Constitutional Limitations, 
Cooley began by noting it was the legislature’s role to “subserve the general well-being of 
society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.”  He 
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then set out to limit that power.  Granting almost judicial notice to the wisdom and sanctity of the 
marketplace, Cooley pronounced, “a large portion of the most urgent needs of society are 
relegated exclusively to the law of demand and supply.”  He continued, intimating that the 
market and not the government maximized the general welfare.  “It is this in its natural 
operation, and without the interference of the government, that gives us the proper proportion of 
tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and professional men, and that determines 
when and where they shall give to society the benefit of their particular services.”  Ignoring the 
history of government practice, Cooley offered what reads as a very personal opinion about the 
role of government.  He denied government’s historical place in the market by claiming separate 
spaces between public and private spheres.  “However great the need in the direction of any 
particular calling, the interference of the government is not tolerated, because, though it might be 
supplying a public want, it is considered as invading the domain that belongs exclusively to 
private inclination and enterprise.”  In so arguing, Cooley assumed a wall between public and 
private that never existed.  He ignored Michigan government’s role in financially supporting 
agriculture, silk, salt, sugar, mining, private education, banking, steam mills, religious 
institutions, water pumping, public accommodations, and to some degree, internal 
improvements.  With respect to internal improvements, Cooley explained that Michigan’s policy 
had changed, and that the entities involved were now private.  His statement did not clarify 
whether it was the shift in ownership that precluded state financial support of rail or a rising wall 
between government and private spaces.  Claiming that it was “no longer recognized as proper or 
politic that the State should supply the means of locomotion,” the state privatized the business 
and now was constitutionally prohibited from involvement.
1032
  However, his sentiment went 
beyond the 1850 constitutional ban on state government financial support of industry.  Cooley 
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believed that powers once enjoyed by government could be lost by disuse or changed 
circumstances, even in the absence of formal constitutional amendment.  This was because 
constitutional language required reinterpretation in light of new realities and among those 
realities was the steady growth of rights.  Accordingly, constitutional meanings, including the 
powers granted to government, changed even as constitutional language remained the same.  
New insights concerning the place of government and private industry drove constitutional 
understandings more than did the interpretations of earlier judicial eras.  With Salem, those new 
realities occasioned a new understanding of the term “tax” in order to assure that public revenues 
were employed for a public purpose.  What had once legitimately been government space was no 
longer. 
 Cooley offered equality principles as a core basis of his thinking, as discriminations in 
favor of one occupation “is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim 
in State government.”  Speaking generally, Cooley offered that all must be treated the same or 
the state would subject itself to undue economic influences from the wealthy.  Drawing upon his 
Jacksonian principles, Cooley offered: “When the State once enters upon the business of 
subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that strong and powerful interests are most likely to 
control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.”  By 
arguing that “equality of right and privilege” was a “maxim in State government,” Cooley 
suggested that the state could show no favorites.
 1033
  That language in Salem was significantly 
more restrictive than Cooley had offered in Constitutional Limitations.  In Constitutional 
Limitations he had rejected the notion that all unequal legislation was unlawful.  Instead, equality 
was an aspiration of republican governance.  There he had written, “Equality of rights, 
privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law, and if special privileges 





are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the 
legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of 
government.”
1034
  In discussing rail finance, Cooley in Salem exclaimed that favoring “farming 
or banking, merchandising or milling, printing or railroading is not legitimate legislation.”
1035
  
 Cooley’s Salem opinion was long on aspirational law and short on precedent or firm 
maxims.  His goal was to advance those limitations that are inherent in the notion of free 
government – a restricted, representative legislature with limited powers to undermine individual 
rights and liberties.  Those principles, however, were not set forth in constitutional text and 
Cooley required constitutionally based limitations on legislative power.  Here then, Cooley 
played the constitutional sleight of hand he offered in Constitutional Limitations.  He suggested 
that the nature of representative governance itself assumed limitations on legislative power and 
that he would read constitutional limitations within that context.  He offered that there were 
“certain limitations upon [legislative] power, not prescribed in express terms by any 
constitutional provision, but inherent in the subject itself, which attend its exercise under all 
circumstances, and which are as inflexible and absolute in their restraints as if directly imposed 
in the most positive form of words.”  The legislature had no absolute authority over taxation and 
citizens should contest the exercise of legislative power whenever they believed their rights were 
invaded.  In determining the propriety of the legislation, courts must consider the government’s 
obligation “to advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the people.”  In 
so arguing, he held true to his philosophy that constitutional meanings shift in order to hold to 
American states’ underlying representative-governance foundations.  Hence, the multitude of 
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cases affirming the previous sixty-five years of government practice were mistaken only in the 
context of 1870 constitutional meanings.    
 In Salem, Cooley set forth to define constitutional language to limit legislative power and 
to respect individual rights.  He did this by employing the constitution’s tax language.  Here, as 
the court did in Sharpless, Cooley read into the word “taxes” a requirement that government 
collect moneys only for “public purposes.”  Collections for any other purpose were not taxes but 
rather plunder (taking from A and giving to B), and plunder was unconstitutional.
1036
  In doing 
so, Cooley captured the long-term property rights concerns and gave them constitutional 
grounding.  But, while property rights were important, Cooley’s underlying focus was legislative 
power.  Accordingly, in explaining his term “public purpose,” Cooley focused on government’s 
space.  After explaining that public purpose (and the power to tax) “Has no relation to the 
urgency of the public need or to . . .  the public benefit which is to follow,” Cooley set down his 
limited government objectives by leaning on an historical definition: Public purpose was “a term 
of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage are left to private 
inclination, interest or liberality.”
1037
  
 Cooley’s “settled usage” dealt with more advancing republican notions than with 
historical practice.  Accordingly, powers enjoyed in one era could be “recalled when the 
necessity has ceased” to use them.
1038
  The burdens that Michigan and other states suffered in 
consequence of financing rail likely resulted in that “recall” of that governing power.  The 
changing world of mid and late nineteenth century America, and in particular Michigan, had 
forced new understandings of what was “private” and what was “public.”  By coupling a narrow 
definition of “public purpose” with constitutional “tax” language, Cooley sought to assure that 
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which was truly public was addressed, while anything within private space was safe from public 
meddling.
1039




 Despite what some scholars characterized as Cooley’s pro-business grounding, Cooley 
was no advocate of corporate power, and in Salem he was driven to deny corporations public 
largess.  Student notes from Cooley’s lectures on corporations reveal a concern over the 
corrosive influence of rail corporations.  One student’s notes read, “The source of danger is a few 
men having so much moneyed power. . . .  They are able to exercise more influence over the 
state legislatures than both political parties.”
1041
  In that sense, the concern over legislative 
activism was not so much with majoritarianism as corporate cronyism.  That concern was 
manifest when Cooley wrote in Salem, “When the State once enters upon the business of 
subsidies, we shall not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those most likely 
to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.”
1042
 
His concern over disproportionate political power suggested a need to limit the legislature in 
order to limit the excesses attendant with corporate wealth.  In this respect, individual rights were 
not the primary concern; the political system was. 
 Cooley’s concerns over corporate power were made manifest in later editions of 
Constitutional Limitations.  By his fourth edition, Cooley had added a critique of Dartmouth 
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College.  “It is under the protection of [that] decision . . .  that the most enormous and 
threatening powers in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations 
actually have greater influence in the country at large, and upon the legislation of the country, 
than the States to which they owe their existence.”  He feared corporate power would undermine 
government by demanding, and receiving, “unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation.”
1043
 Whereas 
he seemed to have great trust in the judiciary (as evidenced in his 1863 talk to incoming law 
students), he had little confidence in the legislature.  It too easily succumbed to the power of 
money. 
Cooley had accepted Sharpless’ public purpose language but had ruled quite differently.  
In a significant deviation from that earlier standard, (but aligning with the recent Iowa and 
Wisconsin cases) Cooley looked to the nature of the payee rather than the purpose of the 
payment to determine the validity of the transfer.  Cooley found that payments to corporations 
without direct reciprocal benefits to taxpayers were mere gifts.  Gifts, by their nature, were 
transfers from A to B. “No principle was older, and none seemed better understood or more 
inflexible, than that one man’s property could not be taken under the power of the government 
and transferred to another against the will of the owner.”
1044
  In essence, Cooley required direct 
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consideration, or value, from the corporation in exchange for the use of tax dollars on its 
behalf.
1045




 At the end of his Salem opinion, Cooley recognized that states routinely supported 
industry and that the courts affirmed that support.  Nevertheless, he argued that there was an 
ever-present undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the legislation.  Accordingly, Cooley looked to 
the dissents as precedent for his groundbreaking limitations.  “The best judgment of the legal 
profession, so far as I have been able to judge, has always been against the lawfulness of this 
species of railroad aid, and there has been a steady and persistent protest which no popular 
clamor could silence, against the decisions which support it.”  Contrary to his claims in 
Constitutional Limitations that he sought to follow the established law, Cooley continued, “This 
protest has of late been growing stronger instead of fainter, and if the recent decisions alone are 
regarded, the authority is clearly with the protest.”  Those recent cases, Hanson, Curtis, and 
Whiting, relied upon Constitutional Limitations as the basis for their decisions.  As if in an 
Escher drawing, Cooley now relied upon those cases as precedent to support his Salem opinion 
and for the shift occasioned by Constitutional Limitations.  In the end, Cooley accepted that he 
was breaking new ground by refusing to have the court “shut our eyes to the principle and 
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newly located rail.  In both cases, he left frustrated over the lack of benefits, although his exit from Toledo may have 
also been connected to political losses he suffered. 
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blindly follow where others have blindly led.”
1047
  The long-standing practice of government 
financial aid to railroads was now invalid, based on constitutional tax language that had been in 
place during the entirety of the government-support regime.
1048
 
  Why did Cooley take what had previously been an argument in the political field and 
constitutionalize it in the legal realm?  His 1885 Michigan, A History of Governments, suggests 
that Cooley employed constitutional doctrine to achieve ends unattainable in the political sphere.  
Cooley wrote Constitutional Limitations, Salem, and his other legislative-limiting writings in a 
time of great government expansion.  In 1885, he reflected on the national government’s growing 
involvement in spheres Cooley believed should be private or within the states’ purview.  After 
bemoaning how the Civil War had resulted in changed constitutional understandings that allowed 
the destruction of state banks, the federal imposition of authority during Reconstruction, and 
protective tariffs favoring industries, Cooley focused on government spending.  He wrote of 
“liberal pensions,” creating a class of people who would exercise power at the expense of the 
state.  He warned against the gifts of land and funds to railroads, and the expansion of federal 
postal operations.  He warned against the “mighty army” of federal office holders, “an army 
greater in number than that which Wellington at Waterloo changed the history the world, greater 
than that which Mead won the decisive victory at Gettysburg.”  Cooley’s challenge was that the 
constitution as written allowed for such “evils.”  In his last sentence of this reflective book, 
Cooley concluded that “only time and the patient and persevering labors of the statesmen and 
patriots will suffice to eradicate,” those engrafted evils of government excesses.
1049
  It is not 
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 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations: 493-94.   
1048
 After the Salem opinion, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to allow municipal aid to railroads.  
The effort failed but the vote suggests an interesting perspective on public/private enterprises. With a few 
exceptions, communities already served by rail, many of them with the support of local public funding, voted 
against further public aid.  Unserved communities voted to amend the constitution and allow taxpayer support of rail 
development.  Elliott, When the Railroad was King: 32-33. 
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clear whether Cooley included courts in his call to statesmen and patriots.  Whether he did or 
not, he expected that judges would labor to limit legislatures in an effort to assure republican 
governance and the associated respect for individual rights.  In order to accomplish that, his work 
proposed that the judiciary find new constitutional meanings to address changing societal and 
governance needs.  By doing so, the courts could protect the state and nation against the excesses 
of legislative power that had undermined Michigan and were undermining the nation. 
The Response to Salem 
 
 It had been the practice in Michigan to grant support to rail, and Salem occasioned broad 
discussion.  Public reaction was mixed with some applauding the court’s actions and some 
critiquing it.  On July 27, 1870, Governor Baldwin called the legislature to extraordinary session 
to deal with the economic and legal challenges created by Salem.  He maintained that bonds “for 
the larger part [were] held by persons of moderate or small means,” notably the aged, women 
and orphan children.  While the court may have invalidated the law, he argued moral obligations 
compelled bond payment.  To fulfill that requirement, Baldwin called for a constitutional 
amendment to allow municipal ratification of the bonds.
1050
  The legislature passed that 
amendment but the voters did not.   
In March 1871, Detroit’s mayor and common council petitioned the state treasurer to 
return the $300,000s of bonds the city had sent the state pursuant to the now unconstitutional 
law.  The treasurer refused, claiming it would not release the bonds back until three years had 
passed.  To defuse the situation, William Wesson, the president of the Detroit, Howell & 
Lansing, wrote in the Detroit Tribune that the railroad would not claim the bonds and, 
accordingly, the city faced no risk.  Notwithstanding the loss of public financing, construction 
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continued.  Wesson reported that the railroad was “engaged in rapidly constructing the road in 
accordance with the condition under which the bonds were voted.”
1051 
Although the law now 
precluded government support of rail, the Detroit, Howell & Lansing continued to collect on the 
bonds that had been sold.  As noted below, it could collect on those bonds pursuant to the United 
States Constitution’s Contract Clause as enforced by the federal courts.  As the 1919 Michigan 
Railroad Commission Report noted, the Salem and Bay City opinions marked “the end of active 
campaigns for local municipal aid and donations to railroads, although for many years thereafter 
it is found that occasional public aids were given, sometimes under circumstances designed to 
evade the limitations of the law.”
1052
   
Almost immediately after Cooley handed down the Salem opinion, fellow University of 
Michigan Law faculty member, Charles Kent, cautioned against the adoption of Cooley’s 
standard.  Basing much of his critique on the principle that courts must uphold state legislation 
unless it violates a specific constitutional restriction, Kent accused Cooley of elevating his 
“unsupported philosophical theories as to the proper limits of government power against the 
popular will.”  After noting the ahistorical nature of Cooley’s public purpose doctrine, Kent 
focused on the disruption that the doctrine and its associated judicial activism would cause.  “If 
money cannot be raised by taxation in favor of private corporations, of course public property 
cannot be given to such corporations.”  He continued, “All laws giving bounties to any particular 
industries, are void.  All tariffs for the sake of protection come under the same head.  All gifts by 
the state to churches or private schools are void.  The homesteads given to actual settlers are still 
the property of the United States.”  This academic colleague of Cooley continued, noting the 
revolutionary results that would logically extend from Cooley’s public purpose doctrine.  
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10, 1871, reprinted on March 12, 1871 ibid., 1. 
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“Neither do we see how, consistently with this principle, it is possible to justify the exemption 
from taxation of churches, libraries, and private school property.  The principle carried out fully 
would destroy a considerable portion of the legislation of almost every state in the Union, as well 
as a large share of that of the United States.”
1053
  Kent was right; were one to extrapolate 
Cooley’s doctrine to a laissez-faire governance approach then, by and large, that would have 
happened.  While some courts moved in that direction, more employed Cooley’s philosophy to 
limit but not totally restrict legislative activism, and mostly when the government or regulatory 
activity significantly encumbered individual rights or liberties. 
Cooley advanced his arguments, writing in Bay City v State Treasurer that due process 
guarantees invalidated state support of rail development.  “To take a man’s property from him 
under pretense of taxation, for a purpose for which taxation is not admissible, is not due process 
of law, but is an unlawful confiscation.”
1054
  While Cooley attached the public purpose doctrine 
to due process, most other courts did not.  They premised their invalidation of legislation on the 
implied definition of tax as requiring a public purpose.  
Bay City was significant in one other respect.  In it, Cooley used the state’s disastrous rail 
history as grounds for constitutionally prohibiting improvident legislation.  Noting the state’s 
“bitter experience of the evils of” government internal improvements, Cooley argued, “a settled 
conviction fastened itself upon the minds of our people that works of internal improvement 
should be private enterprises.”  Although the 1850 constitution only prohibited state aid, and all 
other jurisdictions had ruled that such state prohibitions did not preclude municipal aid, Cooley 
suggested otherwise.  He would read the 1850 constitution not by its specific limits, but rather 
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“from the public history of the times.”
1055
  Circumstances both before and after the constitution’s 
drafting influenced Cooley’s constitutional interpretation.  The overarching constitutional goal 
drove the momentary interpretation of constitutional language. 
With Constitutional Limitations and Salem as its foundation, a legislative-limiting, 
property-protecting undercurrent became prevalent.  In nearly every state, courts increasingly 
protected property and invalidated state expenditures in support of the general welfare.  At first, 
litigants focused on challenging business subsidies.  For example, in 1872, the Maine Supreme 
Court in Allan v Inhabitants of Jay invalidated legislation granting tax abatements and financial 
support to construct a sawmill and a grinding mill in the town.  The court, fearing the tyranny of 
legislative majorities, protested that the state should not interfere in the market.  Instead, 
investors should determine the best use of capital.  “Those who by industry and economy have 
become capitalist are more likely to invest it well than those who, having gained none, have none 
to lose.”  It then classified government support of industry “communism incipient, if not 
perfected.”
1056
  In 1873, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that Boston could not issue 
bonds to assist downtown businesses to rebuild after a sizeable portion burned down, finding the 




While rapid, the move to limit legislatures was not uniform, especially in those cases 
considering rail subscriptions or donations.  Because of the historic support given by 
government, courts struggled with invalidating those time-honored activities.  Early on, the 
Kansas Supreme Court took exception to Cooley’s public purpose doctrine as defined in Iowa’s 
Hanson and Michigan’s Salem opinions.  In an opinion almost mocking those recent cases, the 
court offered in Commissioners of Leavenworth County v Miller (a rail-aid case) that historically 
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“The power of governments and governmental organizations to make donations, has been 
exercised ever since governments were instituted, and, we presume, always will be.”  It then 
went on to list federal, state, and local donations to advance the general welfare or to reward 
individual behavior.  In chastening the Hanson and Salem courts, the court offered the Wisconsin 
and Michigan courts were “forgetting of course that such donations as are everywhere admitted 
to be legal, are nearly always given to private corporations or to private individuals.”  The court 
then suggested that Cooley and his followers wished to “startle the world” with “new truth,” but 
such action should await constitutional amendment, and not be subject to new constitutional 
constructions.
1058
   
Though the Kansas justices, and most other courts, did not accept Cooley’s doctrine as it 
applied to rail support, they took note in ways unusual for a distinctly minority position.  In 
1873, through the case of Harcourt v Good, Justice Moses B. Walker of the Texas Supreme 
Court weighed in.  Recognizing that “the profound learning and ability of Judge Cooley” did “for 
a time shake the confidence both of the bench and bar in the correctness of the doctrine 
previously maintained with such unanimity,” Walker looked for a counter opinion to “restore the 
equilibrium of the judicial mind.”  He found it in a federal circuit court opinion in Talcott v City 
of Pinegrove (discussed below).  So pleased was he that standard government practices were 
constitutionally upheld by the federal court, that he asked his brethren on the court whether he 
could “have a copy of the [Talcott] opinion published in a forthcoming volume” of the court’s 
reports.  He then listed the cases affirming legislative power financially to aid private industry 
and the courts’ obligation to defer to legislative judgments concerning that aid.  Walker listed 
ninety-five rulings from twenty-four states, each finding government support of private industry 
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constitutionally permissible.  It is footnoted below in its entirety.
1059
  After citing the authority 




                                                 
1059
 The following cases were listed in Harcourt v Good, 39 Tex. 455, 472-75 (1873)., to establish the weight of 
cases supporting government’s power to subsidize private industry. 
 “Alabama, 3 cases. --1854, Stein v. Mayor of Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; 1857, Mayor of Wetumpka v. Winter, 
29 Ala. 651 (plank road case); 1860, Gibbons v. Mobile, etc. R. R. Co. 36 Ala. 410. 
 California, 7 cases. --1859, Pattison v. Supervisors of Yuba County, 13 Cal. 175; 1860, Hobart v. 
Supervisors of Butler County, 17 Cal. 23; [26] 1863, Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; 1864, French v. Techmaker, 
24 Cal. 518; People v. Coon, 25 Cal. 635; 1865, People v. Supervisors of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 655; Stockton and 
V. R. R. v. Stockton. 
 Connecticut, 2 cases. --1843, Bridgeport v. Housatonic Railroad Company, 15 Conn. 475; 1860, Society of 
Savings v. New London, 29 Conn. 174. 
 Delaware, 1 case. --1847, Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479. 
 Florida, 1 case. --1852, Cotton v. County Commissioner of Leon, 6 Fla. 610. 
 Georgia, 2 cases. --1857, Winn v. Macon, 21 Ga. 275; 1857, Powers v. Inferior Court of Dougherty 
County, 23 Ga. 65. 
 Illinois, 10 cases. --1851, Ryder v. Alton, etc. R. R. Co. 13 Ill. 516; 1858, Prettyman v. Supervisors of 
Tazewell Co. 19 Ill. 406; 1859, Robertson v. City of Rockford et al. 21 Ill. 451; 1860, Johnson v. Stark Co. 24 Ill. 
75; 1860, Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill. 208; 1861, Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474; 1862, Clarke v. Supervisors, etc. 27 Ill. 
305;  1862, Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54; King v. Wilson, 3 Chic. L. N.; 1872, Chicago, etc. R. W. Co. v. Smith, 
decision just rendered in Supreme Court for northern division of Illinois, not yet reported. 
 Indiana, 5 cases. --1857, City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74; 1860, Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 
15 Ind. 395; 1862, The Commissioners, etc. v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93; 1864, City of Aurora v. West, 22 Ind. 88; S. M. 
and B. R. R. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 
 Iowa, 8 cases. --1853, Dubuque and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dubuque, 4 Greene 1; 1854, State v. Bissell, 4 G. 
Greene, 328; 1857, Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 Clarke (Iowa) 15; 1858, Ring v. Johnson Co. 6 Iowa 265; 1858, McMillen 
v. Boyles, 6 Iowa 304; 1858, McMillen v. Lee Co. 6 Iowa 391; 1859, Whitaker v. Johnson Co. 10 Iowa 161; Stewart 
v. Supervisors of Polk County, late case reported in pamphlet. 
 Kansas, 1 case. --1871, County Commissioners v. Miller. 
 Kentucky, 4 cases. --1849, Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526; 1850, Justices, etc. v. Turnpike Co. 11 B. Mon. 
143; [28] 1852, Slack et al. v. Maysville, etc. [474] R. R. Co. 13 B. Mon. 1; 1859, Maddox v. Graham, 2 Metc. 56. 
 Louisiana, 4 cases. --1853, New Orleans, etc. Co. v. McDonough, 8 La. Ann. 341; 1856, Parker v. Scogin, 
11 La. Ann. 649; 1856, Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ouachita, 11 La. Ann. 629; 1854, New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La. 
Ann. 561. 
 Maine, 1 case. --1860, Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507. 
 Mississippi, 1 case. --Strickland v. Mississippi, etc. R. R. Co. cited as of 21 (or 27) Miss. 209, and as 1849. 
 Missouri, 2 cases. --1856, City of St. Louis v. Alexandria, 23 Mo. 483; 1867, St. Joseph Railroad v. 
Buchanan Co. Ct. 39 Mo. 485. 
 New York, 9 cases. --1857, Grant v. Carter, 24 Barb. 232; 1857, Benson v. Mayor of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; 
1857, Clark v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; 1858, Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N.Y. 38; 1859, Gould 
v. Town of Venice, 29 Barb. 442; 1861, Starin v. Genoa, 23 N.Y. 439; 1864, Clarke v. City of Rochester, 28 N.Y. 
605; [29] 1865, People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; 1866, People v. Mitchell, 35 N.Y. 551. 
 North Carolina, 2 cases. --1855, Taylor v. Newberne (a navigation case), 2 Jones Eq. 141; 1858, Caldwell 
v. The Justices, etc. 4 Jones Eq. 323. 
 Ohio, 12 cases. --1852, Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77; 1852, R. W. v. 
Township Treasurer of Christian Township, 1 Ohio St. 105; 1853, Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; 1853, Thompson 
v. Kelly, 2 Ohio St. 647; 1857, State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio St. 327; 1858, State v. Union Township, 8 Ohio St. 394; 
1861, State, etc. v. Commissioners Hancock Co. 12 Ohio St. 596; 1863, Knox v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260; 1863, 
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Classifying Cooley’s Salem opinion as exhibiting “a boldness which is really sublime,” 
Nebraska Justice Lorenzo Crunse warned in Hallenbeck v Hann, that Cooley’s uncovering 
unenumerated and novel limitations on legislative power was “most dangerous.”  Cooley’s 
notion of “inherent” limits associated with free governments inappropriately allowed judges “to 
destroy legislation which does not square with their views.”
1061
  Soon Iowa would reverse its 
earlier opinions and join those courts affirming legislative power to support private rail 
development.  In Stewart v Supervisors of Polk County, the Iowa court would revisit its post-
Hanson’s trail of cases in the wake of an 1870 effort of the legislature to “re-assert[] the power 
denied them.”  Classifying Hanson’s language concerning legislative power to authorize public 
aid as “only dictum,” the court relied on the “overwhelming weight of authority” to affirm 
legislative power to aid rail development.
1062
  By the end of the 1870’s, only Wisconsin and 
Michigan held public support of private rail unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472; 1863, State v. Goshen, 14 Ohio St. 569; Griffith v. Co. Commissioners, 20 
Ohio App. 1; [475] Bloomington R. R. v. Gaiger (April, 1871, vol. 4 of Law Times, State Reps. p. 98). 
 Pennsylvania, 7 cases. --1846, Harvey v. Lord, 3 Pa. 331; 1849, Commonwealth v. M'Williams (turnpike 
case), 11 Pa. 61; [30] 1853, Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147; 1853, Moers v. The City of Reading, 21 
Pa. 188; 1858, Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 32 Pa. 218; 1861, Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 41 Pa. 
278; 1862, Commonwealth v. Perkins et al. 43 Pa. 400. 
 South Carolina, 1 case. --1857, State v. Charleston, 10 Rich. 491. 
 Tennessee, 2 cases. --1848, Nichols v. Nashville, 9 Humph. 572; 1854, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Davidson 
County, 1 Sneed 637. 
 Texas, 1 case. -- San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19. 
 Vermont, 3 cases. --1837, Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120; 1846, Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Gratt. 247; 
Cadis et al. v. Town of Swanton, late case not reported. 
 Wisconsin, 3 cases. --1859, Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; 1860, Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; 
1860, Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. 
 Only one of our own cases is referred to by Judge Emmons, but this is by no means the only time that the 
question has been before this court. San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19; [31] San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 405; and 
San Antonio v. Gould, 34 Tex. 49, are all cases which uphold the power of municipal corporations, when properly 
authorized by the legislature, to loan their credit and subscribe to the capital stock of railroad corporations.” 
 Notably, there were no Michigan cases in the extensive list. 
1060
 Ibid., 471-72, 77. 
1061
 Hallenbeck v Hann, 406. 
1062
The court said that Hanson’s issue concerned the lack of state legislative approval of municipal actions.  The 
dissent took great exception, quoting the language of Hanson and the seven subsequent Iowa cases to establish that 
the court specifically had ruled government financial support of private rail corporations unconstitutional.    Stewart 
v Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9, 11, 29, 31-37 (1870). (Emphasis in original.) 
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Federal Consideration of Cooley 
 
Soon, federal courts would become involved in the fallout of Cooley’s invalidation of 
bond obligations, specifically in response to Bay City v State Treasurer.  That was the matter 
where Cooley tied his public-purpose doctrine to due process guarantees.  Circuit Court Judge 
Halmer H. Emmons scornfully attacked the  Salem and Bay City decisions in 1872 in Talcott v 
City of Pinegrove, classifying Cooley’s opinions and positions as “a deliberate and conscientious 
disregard of the most learned, numerous and persuasive body of opinions ever before given upon 
any one subject in the whole history of our constitutional law.”
1063
  Painting Cooley as a legal 
scoundrel, Emmons declined to believe Cooley suffered from a mere misconception of the law.  
On a point-by-point basis, he attacked Cooley’s recast of law to fit his political philosophies.  
Cooley’s notion of a clear line between government and private entities (particularly in transport 
and communication) had no legal or historical basis and was contrary to established law in every 
jurisdiction, including Michigan.  Emmons declared that Cooley’s position was “intentionally 
revolutionary in doctrine.”  Perhaps referring to Cooley’s claim in Constitutional Limitations that 
he was merely restating the law, Emmons continued his attack, claiming that Cooley’s writing, 
“asserts independence of precedents, and expressly condemns the old conservative idea of stare 
decisis.”
1064
   
                                                                                                                                                             
 Interestingly, the Stewart court at length cited Michigan’s s v Williams (see footnotes 458 and 753, supra) 
to establish  that railroads were public utilities and that the work of the corporation defines its public or private 
nature. Ibid., 22-23. 
1063
 Emmons listed 90 cases from 25 states, “all sustaining the doctrines overlooked or overruled by the Supreme 
Court of Michigan.” Later in the opinion, Emmons declared of Cooley’s opinions:  “it seems to us but a mockery of 
precedent - -  a rejection of all the sources from which alone a lawyer can learn the law - -  it is rendering worse than 
useless, all our libraries and professional diligence, which can only mislead by their teachings, if, in these 
conditions, a majority of a court will assume to say that it has no doubt whatever that all this practical action is a 
mistake and a blunder, and that all this judicial decision is ignorance and misapprehension.” Talcott v Township of 
Pine Grove, 2 F. Cas. 652, 658-59, 67-68 (1872).   
1064
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Before the United States Supreme Court could review Talcott, it addressed the 1869 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Whiting v Sheboygan and Fond du Lac Railroad, which 
invalidated legislation authorizing municipal support of private rail corporations.  Once again, 
the Supreme Court would shrug aside a state court interpretation of its constitution and laws.  
Justice William Strong, for the majority, offered that the use of tax dollars for rail was a “matter 
of public concern.”  Accordingly, the Supreme Court could set standards different from the state 
courts, as the issue was a question of “general law.”  Strong continued, “The nature of taxation, 
what uses are public and what are private, and the extent of unrestricted legislative power, are 
matters which, like questions of commercial law, no State court can conclusively determine for 
us.”  Rejecting ownership as the starting point in its public/private considerations, the court 
boldly asserted, “It is not seriously denied that a railroad, though constructed and owned by a 
private corporation, is a matter of public concern,” and reflected on the historical government 
responsibility to support highways, including rail.  While the court accepted that “the taxing 
power of the State extends no further than to raise money for a public use,” and favorably cited 
Constitutional Limitations in doing so, it refused to go as far as Cooley had in Salem.  Instead, 
the court specifically rejected Cooley’s ownership test for public purpose.  “While, then, it might 
be true that ownership of property may sometimes bear upon the question whether the uses of 
property are public, it is not the test.”
1065
   
With its review of Emmons’ Talcott opinion, the Supreme Court would consider a matter 
directly related to Cooley’s application of state tax and due process constitutional language as 
limitations on legislative power.  Again, the Supreme Court failed to defer to state court 
judgments about its own laws.  Instead, it critiqued Cooley’s logic and noted that the due process 
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language upon which Cooley relied involved criminal actors “confined to judicial proceedings.”  
It addressed Michigan’s (and the nation’s) historic public support of rail development and the 
fact that the constitution did not forbid municipalities from supporting rail until they were 
“judicially denied” from doing so in 1870.  After setting forth the history of government activity 
in the transportation sphere, the court addressed the core issue – Cooley’s public purpose 
doctrine.  On a basic level, the court agreed that taxes must be for a public purpose but then it 
looked to the public gain, rather than the nature of the entity receiving public funding.  With that 
change of focus, the court stated, “the public character of such works cannot be doubted.”  
Poetically, the court mused, “Where [railroads] go they animate the sources of prosperity, and 
minister to the growth of cities and towns within the sphere of their influence.”  Classifying the 
Bay City and Salem opinions as “not satisfactory” and in the distinct minority, the court 
employed the Contract Clause to compel payment of the bonds.
1066
  
All of the cases that rejected Salem’s reasoning as it applied to railroads did so by looking 
at the public benefits derived through rail transportation.  In doing so, they viewed public 
purpose in a fundamentally different fashion than did Cooley.  Cooley looked to both the nature 
of the receiving entity and whether the public benefit derived from the expenditure was direct or 
incidental.  If the entity was private, and it provided no direct exchange of value, the expenditure 
unlawfully favored that recipient over others.  Hence, he wrote, “the money, when raised, is to 
benefit a private corporation; to add to its funds to improve its property; and the benefit to the 
public is to be secondary or incidental,” then the grant is not a public purpose and the tax is 
unconstitutional.
1067
 In considering one of the most important industries of the day – railroads – 
all jurisdictions save Michigan and Wisconsin maintained their historic deference to legislative 
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judgments concerning general-welfare spending.  As Goodrich noted of the 1870s, “Whatever 
general views were held on the role of government intervention, the local authorities in many 
parts of the country found no compelling doctrinal arguments to deter them from investing in the 
railroads which they considered necessary for the development of their areas.”
1068
  Simply, 
community self interest muted theoretical arguments that would advance public/private 
separation.  In the area then predominating the economy – rail transportation – government was 
the most useful (if some felt inappropriate) tool toward general-welfare advancement.  And 
courts demurred.  However, that deference would not hold in other areas of government financial 
aid. 
A safe conclusion from the Supreme Court’s Talcott and Olcott opinions would be that 
courts sought to protect bona fide note holders from judicial oscillation.  Having purchased 
public bonds under a legal regime allowing those bonds, courts could no more invalidate the 
bonds by a challenge to constitutional standards than a legislature could through post-issuance 
legislation.  That interpretation would prove incorrect or at least no longer compelling with the 
Court’s 1875 opinion in Loan Association v Topeka.  With that case, the Supreme Court largely 
embraced Cooley’s public purpose doctrine, at least in the non-rail sphere, when it invalidated a 
law funding the relocation of an iron works company.  Miller wrote,  
To lay with one hand the power of government on the property of the citizen, 
and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private 
enterprises, and build up private fortunes, is none the less robbery because it is 
done under the forms of law and is called taxation.  This is not legislation.  It is 
a decree under legislative forms.   
 
Contrary to much of the logic of Talcott and Olcott, Miller offered that, “the right to contract 
must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case no tax can lawfully be levied to pay 
the debt, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it.”  With that, the Contract 
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Clause related argument failed, bona-fide holders lost their constitutional protection, and 
Gelpcke became ineffective.
1069
  Although lacking focus, Miller’s opinion advocated limited 
government and, by extension, the need to limit majority power.  He argued that the “theory of 
our governments, State and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.”  
Since “taxation is the most liable to abuse,” courts must review the purpose for which taxing 
power is employed.
1070
  In doing so, the Court expanded judicial power while contracting 
legislative power.  Arguably, however, Loan Association was narrowly decided.  Like Salem, it 
dealt with a specific tax designed to transfer funds from one individual to another.   
Underlying much of the early post-Salem public-purpose decisions was a concern over 
rights but, in large measure, those rights were viewed in the context of republican governance 
concerns.  In Loan Association, Miller wrote of free government and rights in the same breath:  
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential 
nature of all free governments.  Implied reservations of individual rights, 
without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by 
all governments entitled to the name.  No court, for instance, would hesitate to 
declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who were husband and wife 
to each other should be so no longer, but that A. should thereafter be the 
husband of C., and B. the wife of D.  Or which should enact that the homestead 





This Loan Association section cited three pages of Constitutional Limitations.  The first dealt 
with limitations that “spring from the very nature of free government”; the second dealt with 
restriction on legislative incursions into the judicial sphere; the third dealt with taxation and the 
proper role of government.  Each example involved individual rights, but none relied on rights as 
its exclusive basis for limiting legislative power.  This is not to suggest that property rights were 
unimportant.  They were a central focus of the court’s concern.  Nevertheless, property rights 
                                                 
1069
 Notably, Miller dissented in Gelpcke. 
1070
 Loan Association v Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 660-63 (1875). 
1071
 Ibid., 663.   
423 
 
were not the reason a legislature, for example, could not change marriage relations.  That 
incapacity issued from inherent limits on republican-legislative power.  Violations of property 
rights were an aspect of impermissible government action, not a cause; a reading of the cases 
suggests many courts construed commercially related legislative activism as constitutionally 
impermissible without reference to its property-intruding consequences.  To Cooley and these 
courts, a dominant issue was limitations on legislative power notwithstanding rights impairment. 
The constitutional basis of Loan Association was the legislative taxing authority.  Almost 
ruefully, Miller acknowledged that most jurisdictions held that aid to private railroads fit a public 
purpose.
1072
  He then addressed the doctrine as it applied to other areas of government assistance 
to private industry.  At first blush, he did not go as far as Cooley in demanding direct, 
consideration-like benefits for grants to private industry.  Instead, Miller listed a series of factors 
for courts to determine if legislative spending adhered to the public purpose requirement.  Those 
focused on customary practice and actions required to support government operations.  After that 
seemingly wide berth, however, the court began to narrow its standard.  Custom was gleaned 
from court approvals rather than historical state activities.  That allowed the court to frame its 
custom to disallow financial support of a bridge company.  In declaring the legislation 
unconstitutional, Miller declared that such support was no different from governmental 
assistance to “the merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, [or] the 
steamboat operator.”  But each of those industries historically had received government largess. 
This suggests one of three possibilities.  Miller may have not known of the historic role of 
government in financially supporting industry – an unlikely prospect.  He may have considered 
the volumes of cases supporting legislative power to spend as wrongly decided.  Or, most likely, 
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he accepted a notion of constitutional change, the steady growth of “free principles,” and 
“recalled” power that Cooley advanced.  What was previously acceptable became illegitimate 
when the necessity of government action ceased.  Miller did not specifically embrace that idea, 
but new constitutional meanings underlie much of his argument.    
The changed philosophy evidenced in Loan Association demonstrated an increasing 
judicial willingness to impose its governing vision over the legislative.  In doing so, the court 
ruled that the historic practice of public support for rail development was constitutionally 
appropriate, whereas the historic practice of supporting bridge construction and operation was 
not.  Whatever one’s belief concerning the wisdom of those policies, it is hard to find 
constitutional language that distinguishes legislative authority between the two.  Instead, as 
Lucas Powe, Jr., argued, the cases “seem governed by no higher principle than the 
implementation of the Court’s perception of sound public policy.”
1073
  In at least one respect, the 
Cooley doctrines had permeated; courts would now review legislation to determine if spending 
fit the court’s notion of limited government and legislative power. 
Although outwardly not adopting Cooley’s direct benefit test, Miller offered that courts 
should read Loan Association in light of two recent cases: Allen v Inhabitants of Jay and Lowell 
v Boston.  Those cases “adjudicated by courts of the highest character” provided the judicial 
basis for judging what constituted a public purpose.
1074
  (Miller could not cite Salem without 
overruling Talcott).  If those cases proved the basis for understanding public purpose, then the 
Supreme Court adopted the Cooley standard, as both state courts had looked to the nature of the 
beneficiary of the funds to determine if the legislation was valid rather than the public benefit 
from their services.  
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In Allen, the Maine Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Jay Township loan 
to a steam sawmill to locate in the town.
1075
  The residents approved a $10,000 loan in aid of the 
mill pursuant to authority granted by the Maine legislature.  The court ruled that the legislature 
lacked the power to authorize that municipal action.  While not specifically delineating the 
nature of its public-purpose test, the court’s reasoning suggests adherence to the Cooley direct 
benefit standard.  As Cooley did, the court focused on the nature of the recipient and not the 
societal gain from the expenditure.  In that sense, it had moved away from the Sharpless and 
Talcott standards to Cooley’s more stringent standard. 
The Allen case is interesting in another respect.  In it, the Maine court moved from the 
previous judicial concern with the power of accumulated wealth to a concern that the masses 
would strip the wealthy of property.  The court suggested that because capitalists demonstrated 
greater wisdom, they were entitled to constitutional protections against majoritarian impulses.  
“Capital naturally seeks the best investment, or its owners do.  Those who by industry and 
economy have become capitalist are more likely to invest it than those who, having gained 
nothing, have nothing to lose.”  Immediately after offering that capitalists knew better where to 
invest than did legislators or the public, the court elevated successful capitalists in the eyes of the 
law.  “The sagacity shown in the acquisition of capital is best fitted to control its disposition.”  In 
dignifying the successful entrepreneur in this way, the court effectively claimed that these 
property owners should not be subject to the will of “an irresponsible majority.”
1076
  After 
celebrating the wisdom of the successful capitalist, the court revealed its concern.  “It is 
communism incipient, if not perfected.”  With that fear in mind, the court ruled that the 
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legislature lacked the power to promote private development with tax dollars.  It employed the 
Cooley standard when it ruled that those actions necessarily offered only indirect benefits and 
were therefore unconstitutional.  The court thereupon took the additional step of tying tax 
financing of private projects to violations of individual property rights.  It proclaimed, “All 
security of private rights, all protection of private property is at an end, when one is compelled to 
raise money to loan at the will of others.”
1077
  With the court touting the wisdom of the capitalist, 
and fearing the rapacious majority, the court ruled the popular vote and state legislation 
unconstitutional.  To this, Supreme Court Justice Miller tacitly agreed in Loan Association when 
he advanced the Maine court as “of the highest character.”
1078
 
The second case Miller touted is interesting in light of the limits it employed.  In 1873, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court considered whether bonds issued to help rebuild Boston’s 
downtown in the aftermath of a devastating fire were within the legislature’s taxing authority.  
With Cooley in the background, the court voiced Massachusetts’ new standard: “The promotion 
of the interests of the individuals, either in respect of property or business, although it may result 
incidentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and 
not public object.”  Sounding as Cooley had, the court offered, “It is the essential character of the 
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity.”  Public funds must work, “to 
purposes and objects alone which the government was established to promote, to wit, public uses 
and public service.”
1079
  Ignored by the court was Massachusetts’ historic support for multiple 
facets of industry, agriculture, and social development.
1080
  The 1873 court held to this new 




 Loan Association v Topeka, 665. 
1079
 Lowell v Boston, 461-62. 
1080
 As the Handlins noted, from its earliest days, Massachusetts government financially supported commercial 
development. “Well-established colonial usage and post-revolutionary theory had exalted the notion of aid through 
an immediate outlay from the state treasury.  Many considered the bounty the best technique and cheapest for 
society as a whole because it did not lead to a rise in prices or in cost of production, because it encouraged the 
427 
 
standard however “certain and great the resulting good to the public” the funds would be to 
rebuilding downtown Boston.  That good was only an “incidental advantage to the public” and 
therefore constitutionally impermissible.  Clearly, the Cooley standard prevailed.
1081
  
Underlying the referenced state court decisions, and that of Loan Association, was the 
notion that courts must now intervene to check legislation that redistributed wealth.  Whether 
Loan Association be read as employing an amorphous standard of historic public benefit, or 
Cooley’s direct benefit standard, the United States Supreme Court in 1875 accepted limitations 
on historical legislative space, and did so by imposing limits on the legislature that all antebellum 
courts had rejected.  Judicial activism would now seek to check what it considered majoritarian, 
legislative activism.  In doing so, courts pressed against legislation that redistributed income.  As 
an intrinsic offshoot, the public-purpose cases helped lay a foundation for the substantive due 
process jurisprudence that would soon follow.  Powe correctly noted this when he argued that the 
“attitudes displayed in municipal bond cases were far more likely to assist the development of 
substantive due process than the dicta so often relied upon by commentators as demonstrating a 
convincing progression toward the ultimate concept.”
1082
 
Sweeping the Nation 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
introduction of new processes, gave enterprisers advantages in foreign as well as in domestic markets, and tended to 
reduce the export of specie.”  Among those supported included agriculture, hemp production, sailcloth, duck and 
twine production, glass manufacture, cotton good trade, beer and alcohol processing, and salt and sugar works. 
When the legislature avoided these direct outlays, it did so not out of a philosophical concern over government 
versus private space, but out of a lack of finances.  Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: 78-80. 
1081
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With Constitutional Limitations and Salem as their foundation, the legislative limiting 
and its associated property-protecting undercurrents became judicially dominant.
1083
  In nearly 
every state, courts became increasingly active in reviewing and limiting legislative efforts to 
advance general-welfare concerns.  Those concerns transcended their support of private 
businesses.  Any public funds given without consideration – or direct public benefit – were 
constitutionally suspect.  With the legislature’s historical spending role now under assault, courts 
would employ Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine to test the propriety of aid to schools, public 
employees, cultural institutions, and private persons.  It is worth reviewing several cases for a 
flavor of how courts responded, and then to consider how Cooley viewed judicial application of 
his public purpose doctrine. 
In response to a request from the Maine legislature for a legal opinion on its power to 
enable “towns by gifts of money or loans or bonds, to assist individuals or corporations to 
establish or carry on manufacturing,” the Maine Supreme Court in 1871 in multiple opinions 
offered that such transfers were constitutionally barred.  Employing taking, due process, law of 
the land, and public purpose language, the justices largely agreed that wealth transfers through 
taxation would destroy individual security and property rights.  This was so whether the transfer 
was to a corporation or to a farmer or to a tradesman.
1084
  The court followed that opinion in 
1872 with Allen v Inhabitants of Jay, mentioned above. 
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in 1889, in John Clee v. William Sanders, that the 
city of Fenton’s efforts to support a stave mill by donating funds to drain a marsh and to 
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construct docks and harbors unconstitutionally appropriated public funds for a private purpose. 
The court rejected as obfuscation “too plain for discussion” the city’s argument that government 
assistance to drain marshes was an appropriate government activity.
1085
 Similarly, in 1900 the 
court found in Michigan Sugar v. Auditor General that legislative efforts to facilitate sugar-beet 
manufacturing in Michigan were unconstitutional. The state legislature lacked the power “to 
authorize a tax for private purposes” and sugar refining was neither a legitimate “government 
end” nor a business “the State itself” could carry on. The court ruled that, even though the 
industry had taken action and expended funds in good-faith reliance on this legislation, Michigan 
Sugar could not be paid because the legislation was unconstitutional.  The court declared that it 
could hold the sugar subsidy “void whether it comes within any of the express provisions of the 
Constitution or not,” but continued that the law violated the court’s definition of the takings 
clause and the tax provisions under the public purpose doctrine.  Relying on Salem, the court 
asserted that to find otherwise would ultimately result in “strong and powerful interests” 
controlling legislation to the detriment of the weaker and unconnected.
1086
  Cooley’s historical 
views had helped create an overarching constitutional principle—government assistance to 
industry threatened democratic governance and was unconstitutional unless there was a direct 
benefit to the taxpayers. 
In 1875, the Kansas Supreme Court moved out of the purely commercial realm in State 
ex re James Griffith v Osawkee Township.  In the wake of an 1874 severe drought and crop 
failure, Osawkee Township voters approved a $6,000 bond to provide loans to farmers, which 
James Griffith and William Armistead sought to enjoin.  Recognizing government’s role in 
supporting the indigent, the court undertook to determine how much farmers must suffer before 
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they could receive public aid.  Not satisfied with both the legislature’s and citizens’ popular vote, 
and despite a judicial recognition that farmers suffered from dire conditions, the court 
determined that the farmers’ poverty was insufficiently deep to allow public support.  “It is 
strictly speaking, the pauper, and not the poor man, who has a claim on public charity.  It is not 
one who is in want merely, but one who being in want is unable to prevent or remove such want.  
There is an idea of helplessness as well as destitution.”  In ruling the relief unconstitutional, the 
court inserted itself as the arbiter of the historic legislative decision over a community’s 
responsibility to mitigate suffering.  The court went a step further, claiming review power over 
the legislature’s judgment over the best means of support.  In response to the claim that a small 
amount of current relief would avoid significant future obligations, the court argued, “though this 
calamity is great and though by reason thereof it may seem wise to appropriate out of the public 
funds a little now to guard against the risk of future want, yet the principle is dangerous and 
unsound.”  In a remarkable way, the court had removed the discretion from the legislature and 
the voting public to determine how to resolve a future problem.  Instead, the court cautioned, 
“Let the doorways to taxation be opened, not merely to the relief of the present and actual 
distress, but in anticipation of and to guard against future want, and who can declare the result.”  




Concerns over class legislation seemed to permeate the decision.  The court declared its 
distaste for legislation that “taxes the whole community to assist one class” – in this case, 
destitute farmers.  That explanation is troublesome, as any beneficiaries of legislation not 
addressing the whole are by their nature a class.  Provide schools, you benefit the class of 
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schoolchildren; help the truly destitute, you support the poor.
1088
  Therefore, class was a method 
of distinction, not an underlying principle.  That underlying principle was one of republican 
governance where a majority could not transfer to themselves the property of a minority.  Steps 
in that direction proved troubling and, therefore, justified judicial intervention. 
Soon Cooley’s public purpose doctrine moved to prohibiting other forms of government 
support.  A few examples are illustrative.  In 1898, a Missouri statute providing funding for 
need-based scholarships was challenged as an unconstitutional taking.  Quoting Cooley’s 
Constitutional Limitations and a number of its progeny, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled the 
scholarship program unconstitutional.  Citing Salem, the court found irrelevant the recognized 
benefit of education to the public welfare.  Instead, the court considered the nature of the 
recipients – in this case private persons with no obligation to the state – and historic 
governmental obligations.  Because the scholarship program had no historical roots, the court 
found the program beyond legislative authority.  The state could support universities as a whole, 
but it could not target individuals for special aid.  To do so smacked of “paternalism,” and 
paternalism was antagonistic to self-government and “pernicious in its tendencies.”  The court 
further found that Missouri’s 1875 constitution was designed “to curb the power of those clothed 
with authority to legislate in behalf of favored classes.” The court claimed that use of tax dollars 
to support scholarships was not in “the character of our government.”
 1089
  In an almost Alice-in-
Wonderland fashion, the court defined poor students as favored because the legislature had 
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determined to support their education.  Because they were now favored, state aid was 
unconstitutional. 
Three more cases are worth noting, as they show how far Cooley’s public-purpose 
doctrine extended to limit government efforts to assist indigent people and to support the public 
welfare.  The South Carolina Supreme Court in 1907 in Aetna Fire Insurance Co. v. Jones 
considered a statute that taxed insurance premiums to provide for injured firefighters and the 
widows of firefighters as well as, in some cases, to offer pensions to retired firefighters.  The 
court found that the state lacked the authority to tax for these benefits.  The payments were gifts 
and without consideration.  While the legislation advanced a benevolent purpose, the court found 
that the constitutionally required “public purpose seems to be lacking.”
 1090
   The firefighters’ 
value to society was unquestioned, and the court acknowledged that such a program of taxation 
could help to create a professional firefighting force.  However, those gains were tangential to 
the pensions and benefits and, therefore, unconstitutional.  
In 1906, the Ohio Supreme Court in Auditor of Lucas County v. State nullified legislation 
designed to “provide relief for the worthy blind.”  The court was reviewing a legislative grant to 
blind individuals who had no property or means of support.  In finding an “inherent limitation” 
on the legislature’s power to tax for other than a public purpose, the court determined that the aid 
provided only incidental public benefit.  Invalidating the legislation, the court ruled that it would 
not be “wise or constitutional to select out a class, having some particular physical infirmity, and 
then confer a bounty upon individuals of that class.”  Relying on Constitutional Limitations and a 
line of cases relying on the public purpose doctrine, the court found that while supporting 
institutions for the blind was appropriate as a historically sanctioned form of aid to the poor, 
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novel methods of support, like direct subsidies, were “without precedent” and 
unconstitutional.
1091
  Because there was no direct benefit to taxpayers, and no historical 
precedent, aid to the indigent blind was unacceptable.  In following Cooley, the Ohio court 
limited general-welfare legislation to existing programs, proscribing novel efforts as 
unconstitutional gifts to the needy.  
By considering the nature of the recipient, Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine also blocked 
legislative efforts to provide effectively for the general welfare.  In 1885 a group of Detroit 
residents organized the Detroit Museum of Art, pursuant to legislation encouraging the 
cultivation of art.  Although the museum corporation was private, the museum’s obligations to 
the city were extensive.  The corporation granted its real estate to Detroit and the city enjoyed 
minority representation on the corporation’s board of directors, whose express statutory object 
was to “open its building and art collection to the general public.”
1092
  Nevertheless, in 1915 the 
Michigan Supreme Court in Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel ruled that public efforts to promote 
art through a private corporation were unconstitutional.  Basing its decision almost exclusively 
on the private nature of the corporation, the court revealed its purpose, to protect “the people 
against reckless and extravagant use of public funds.”
1093
  Although admission to the museum 
was free, and the city’s common council declared the museum within the public interest, the 
court, fearing a lavish legislature, struck down the ordinance as beyond the constitutional 
                                                 
1091
 Auditor of Lucas Country v State, 75 Ohio St. 114, 132-36 (1906). The court recognized the wisdom of the 
legislation when it stated that its object was to “enable many blind persons, aided by their own efforts or those of 
their friends, to support themselves, and thus to escape becoming a public charge.” However, because the grant 
lacked direct benefit to the taxpayer, the grant was unconstitutional.  
1092
 “An Act for the Formation of Corporations for the Cultivation of Art,” in Public Acts of the Legislature of the 
State of Michigan Passed at the Regular Session (Lansing: R. Smith, 1885). 
1093
 Detroit Museum of Art v Engle, 187 Mich. 432, 442-43 (1915).  Based upon a constitutional provision stating 
“No city or village shall have the power . . .  to loan its credit, nor assess, levy or collect any tax or assessment for 
other than a public purpose (Art. 8, Sec. 25), the court employed Cooley’s definition of public purpose to invalidate 
Detroit’s efforts to support the arts.  The court found, “It is of no importance how public the aims and purposes of 
the corporation may be, unless it takes on the form of a municipal agency.”  In sum, the “public purpose within the 
meaning of the tax laws” required that the art museum be “managed and controlled by the public.”   
434 
 
prerogatives of government.  Seeing itself as the protector of the public purse, the Michigan 
Supreme Court stopped the city from legislating for what the court recognized as an obvious 
public interest.
1094
  It furthered Cooley’s constitutional principle with a stated desire to protect 
against majority extravagance at taxpayer expense.  Courts, in their efforts to protect property, 
now acted as shields against popularly supported social-welfare legislation.
1095
 
Cooley’s public-purpose doctrine had been significantly born out of a concern that 
government support of industry resulted in “careless and corrupt” legislation on behalf of the 
wealthy.  But Cooley’s principles had quickly mutated to include a good deal more, and indeed 
to undermine Cooley’s original focus on corporate power.  Using the public-purpose doctrine, 
courts would routinely challenge legislative efforts to support the common good.  These 
challenges increasingly had little to do with fears of undue corporate influence.  Rather, courts 
sought to protect the wealthy from the “irresponsible majority.”  The effect was to relieve 
corporations of tax burdens in support of the common welfare within the historical meaning of 
the “public purpose.”   
Cooley had delivered the constitutional pretext the courts needed to protect property and 
to act as a super legislature where judges could determine level of need and acceptability of 
general-welfare legislation.  Individual property, in the form of tax dollars, could not be given to 
another without a direct exchange of value.  Justice Chase’s view in Calder v Bull had gained 
greater purchase, and his anti-majoritarian philosophy had gained judicial adherents.  Courts had 
found a constitutional basis upon which to limit the legislatures’ right to take property from A 
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and give it to B.  They found that the people did not “entrust a Legislature with SUCH power,” 
and that the limitation was found in the constitutions.
1096
 
So, what did Cooley think of the application of his public purpose doctrine.  He seemed 
torn, accepting some rulings as appropriately invalidating transfers of wealth to private purposes.  
Reviewing a number of cases quickly, he wrote in 1880, that some of the properly struck down 
laws included, 
A tax levied to aid private parties or corporations to establish themselves in 
business as manufacturers; a tax the proceeds of which are to be loaned out to 
individuals who have suffered from a great fire; a tax to supply with provisions 
and seed such farmers as have lost their crops; a tax to build a dam which at 
discretion is to be devoted to private purposes; a tax to refund moneys to 
individuals which they have paid to relieve themselves from an impending 
military draft; and so on.  
 
Because the public benefit for these expenditures were the same as the public would receive 
from any industry or individual efforts, each tax was unconstitutional.  On the other hand, he 
seemed to disagree with cases that invalidated pay bounties and pensions.  Accordingly, he 
suggested that cases invalidating widowers’ pensions, or compensated firefighters, were wrongly 
decided.  Notwithstanding earlier language that broadly applied his public purpose doctrine to 
government transfers of wealth to private parties, in 1880 Cooley suggested that if the favored 
treatment was given with no associated direct tax (the funds come from general revenues), then 
the spending is constitutional, even if ill advised.  “The remedies for such cases,” he offered, 
“can only be administered through the elections.”
1097
  One explanation for this seeming shift may 
have been the broadened application his principles endured as courts substituted judicial 
judgment for that of the legislature.  As discussed below, Cooley’s concern may not have been as 
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much with the specific application of his standard as with the substitution of judicial judgment 
for that of the legislature.  That concern would manifest itself with the substantive due process 
revolution he helped generate and to which we now turn. 
Inserting Private Rights to Limit Regulatory Power 
 
While Cooley’s impact in changing the public spending paradigm was considerable, his 
impact on government’s ability to regulate industry was perhaps more significant.  Cooley wrote 
Constitutional Limitations as the states were ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and his first 
edition only touches on the Amendment, but he did address it as the editor of the fourth edition 
of Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.  Cooley wrote of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses that they “must have the same end as the others 
already existing” in state constitutions.  In that sense, Cooley did not believe that the amendment 
changed the federal structure or that it modified state police powers.  Instead, he felt the 
Fourteenth’s due process and equal protection language restated existing safeguards covered by 
state constitutions.  To him, they offered a welcome repetition.  Cooley noted that protections of 
individual rights “cannot be too frequently declared nor too many forms of words; nor is it 
possible to guard too vigilantly against encroachments of power, nor to watch with too lively a 
suspicion the propensity of persons in authority to break through the ‘cobweb chains of paper 
constitutions.’”
1098
  Time-honored common-law and republican protections were now restated in 
the federal constitution just as they were explicitly or implicitly contained in state constitutions. 
Given his limited-government focus, Cooley rejected the argument that the Fourteenth 
advanced an activist federal government or that it granted federal authority to regulate.  Instead, 
it reiterated existing restrictions.  Cooley would reflect that limited governance belief in a later 
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letter to Christopher Tiedeman where he stated that he “cannot recognize any necessity of 
twisting and turning Constitutional clauses away from their plain meaning in order to bring 
doubtful power within the grant of the powers to the federal government.”
 1099
  The Fourteenth 
Amendment did not authorize activist government.  It was to support limited government – just 
as the identical language did at the state level. 
Others would similarly accept that the state and federal due process provisions restricted 
legislative space.  Jurists and scholars soon employed Constitutional Limitations’ principles to 
define the Fourteenth Amendment as demanding restrictions on state police powers and the 
governments’ rights to regulate.  Employing that clause, corporate “counsel turned to 
Constitutional Limitations to argue that their clients might not be deprived of liberty or property 
without due process of law” . . . and “the bench cited the same book to agree with them to strike 
down state regulative laws.”
1100
  Because state and local governments enacted the vast majority 
of regulations, litigants argued that those laws violated state due process and law of the land 
clauses.  At the same time, they would raise Fourteenth Amendment challenges, allowing for 
federal court review.  Cooley’s argument that federal and state due process language must be 
read consistently gained purchase.  Due process was to limit government, primarily legislative, 
excesses.   
Referencing Wynehamer, Cooley employed his oft-quoted “Due process of law in each 
particular case means, such an exertion of powers of government as settled maxims of law 
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as the maxims 
prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs.”  However, Wynehamer did 
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not offer a “settled maxim of law” – it was an outlier, with nearly all state higher courts rejecting 
its reasoning.  And Cooley knew that, but consistently with his notion of modified constitutional 
meanings, Wynehamer held true to a deeper constitutional imperative – limited republican 
government.  In proclaiming that such limits were a settled maxim of law, Cooley added a 
substantive perch to an accepted procedural podium.  Consistently with his notion of a steady 
growth of free principles, Cooley believed that legislative regulatory power was at its weakest as 
legislative actions increasingly burdened private rights.  When burdens on individual rights 
intensified, it was the duty of the court to consider whether the legislature had exceeded its 
authority.  The courts were to assert judicial authority over rights encumbered by the legislature 
just as they had historically done so concerning rights encumbered by the executive.  Hence his 
advocacy that,  
While every man has a right to require that his own controversies shall be 
judged by the same rules which settle those of his neighbors, the whole 
community is also entitled at all times to demand the protection of the ancient 
principles which shield private rights against arbitrary interference, even 




To accomplish that, Cooley would read due process and law of the land clauses as shields against 
what he and other jurists considered the later-nineteenth century threats to republican 
governance, the rule of law, and individual rights.  Those threats came from a legislature too 
pliable to monied interests and majoritarian will.  That expansion of constitutional meaning and 
judicial space would ignite a governing tempest.  Referencing Cooley and his associates’ impact, 
Twiss contended that they “contributed to a constitutional revolution paralleling the industrial 
revolution which was then taking place.”
1102
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Much has been written about later nineteenth century judicial activism and this work will 
only touch the surface of those rulings.  Notwithstanding that, it is worth highlighting some of 
those matters, especially as some led to a regretful Cooley.  Cooley’s due process influence was 
first felt in the developing “liberty of contract” jurisprudence.  Under this standard, individuals 
and corporations had a property right to contract without government interference.
1103
  The 
liberty of contract principle furthered the push towards a negative-governance, laissez-faire 
governance by giving businesses and individuals the right to contract concerning their property 
interests – for example wages, hours, and collective-bargaining rights – without government 
interference.  That constitutionalization began in earnest with Cooley, although earlier jurists had 
foreshadowed the ideas.  For example, in 1859, Michigan Chief Justice George Martin, writing 
in Michigan Central Railroad v Hale, ruled that individuals had the right to contract away rights 
even if deep public-policy interest weighed to the contrary.  When considering the parties’ power 
to contract away common-carrier liability standards, the court ruled, “paramount considerations 
of public policy” allowed “every man the right to regulate his own affairs, in his own way, and to 
make such contracts respecting his property as he may regard to be advantageous.”  Personal 
contract rights could now trump common-law standards.  There was a limitation, however.  The 




Of course, the legislature could only tie hands when it had the constitutional power to do 
so.  Cooley’s due process standards would limit that legislative hand-tying authority, particularly 
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where legislation impacted individual liberties and rights.  In one of his most frequently quoted 
and most significant passages, he wrote,  “The doubt might also arise whether a regulation made 
for any one class of citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, 
privileges, or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could be sustained, 
notwithstanding its generality.”  He then framed the substantive due process revolution that 
would soon follow:  
if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some 
specified lawful trade or employment should not have capacity to make 
contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to build such houses as others were 
allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property as was 
permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend 
the due bounds of legislative power, even if it did not come in conflict with 
express constitutional provisions.  The man or the class forbidden the 
acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the community 
at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his 




With the ahistorical “it can scarcely be doubted,” Cooley declared that property, liberty, and 
pursuit of happiness interests limit legislative power.  Before that declaration, courts almost 
never found that such legislation had “transcend[ed] the due bounds of legislative power.”  With 
Cooley, the rules changed. 
 Cooley did allow that the states had police powers to regulate the health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare of the community.  The question was how far a legislature could go within 
that context as, theoretically, all regulation would be under some definition of police powers. 
After discussing the need to regulate dangerous activities, unsafe conditions, and nuisances, 
Cooley in Constitutional Limitations turned to the subject that had so recently vexed legislatures 
and courts – alcohol prohibitions.  And he did so in irresolute fashion.  While nineteen of twenty-
one state courts approved the legislatures’ severe restrictions on alcohol, Cooley at first focused 
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on limiting such authority.  He expressed concern over such legislative attempts, saying, 
“Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such regulations as 
may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the owner, appears in a more 
striking light than in the case of these statutes.”  Troubled over the value destruction of 
previously lawful property, Cooley offered, “The trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and the 
capital employed in it being fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and, by an 
enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether 
the employment, and reduces to a nominal value of the property on hand.”  After bemoaning 
criminalizing behavior that was recently lawful and destroying previously valued property, 
Cooley set the standard of review:  the legislation “must be justified upon the highest reasons of 
public benefit.”  Having offered his standard, Cooley demurred by claiming that the validity of 
such laws rested “exclusively in the legislative wisdom.”
1106
  Cooley never ruled on temperance 
legislation and his likely decision is subject to debate.  He might have deferred to the legislature 
or might have sided with parties claiming the law unconstitutionally encumbered their property 
rights. 
Whether he really would have deferred to the legislature or not, those courts following 
his lead frequently refused to do so.  Instead, they exerted their independent judgment over the 
wisdom of property-destroying legislation, and that did not take long after Constitutional 
Limitation’s publication.  In 1872, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in affirming the right to 
regulate slaughterhouses, cautioned that it would step in if the legislature went too far in its 
regulations.  Mimicking Cooley, the court offered: “The law will not allow rights of property to 
be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of health or the protection 
against a threatened nuisance; and when it appears that such is not the real object and purpose of 
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the regulation, courts will interfere to protect the rights of the citizen.”
1107
  The court started 
down this path of questioning legislative motivation notwithstanding Massachusetts’s historic 
practice of government regulation of tanneries and slaughterhouses.
1108
  
The next year, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on Constitutional Limitations as the basis 
for overturning legislation that limited a cemetery’s use of its land for burial purposes.  In Lake 
View v Rose Hill Cemetery, the court considered whether the legislature had the constitutional 
authority to impose restrictions on property uses that were authorized in the cemetery’s corporate 
charter.  Citing Cooley’s newly published work, the majority stated that it was unwilling “to 
concede the existence of an indefinable power, superior to the constitution, that may be invoked 
whenever the legislature may deem the public exigency may require it, by which a party may be 
capriciously deprived of his property or its use, without compensation, whether such property 
consists of franchises or tangible forms of property.”  The court continued: “under the power to 
regulate, the State cannot deprive the citizen of the lawful use of his property, if it does not 
injuriously affect or damage others.”
 1109
  In essence, the court found that police powers only 
allow for correcting abuses and by extension could only be employed when an “overruling 
necessity” or danger threatened.  Invoking Cooley, the court subordinated concerns over the 
general welfare to the nether regions, or at least to the complete discretion of the court.  
Although the legislature could determine when and how to abate nuisances, without explanation, 
the court found “there must necessarily be constitutional limits on that power.”  Hence, it was up 
to the courts to determine if the legislation improperly encumbered essential rights and 
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   Without using the term “due process,” the Illinois court was the first post-
Constitutional Limitations court to declare a regulation unconstitutional because the legislature 
encumbered property rights.   
Although the court relied on Cooley, Cooley may not have gone as far as did the Illinois 
court.  In Constitutional Limitations, Cooley acknowledged that under legislative police powers 
“churchyards which, found by the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public 
health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery 
purposes.”  Cooley was advocating a more nuanced approach than that employed by the Illinois 
court.  He would balance the legislative judgment concerning the public’s health and safety 
against the property and contract interests (or rights) of the individual.  Hence, he approvingly 
discussed cemetery restrictions along with flammable building and gunpowder laws, beach and 
waterway restriction, and poisonous drug and dangerous animal limits.
1111
  Legislatures would 
not stop regulating despite rulings like Rose Hill Cemetery, but would do so within increasingly 
unclear limits.  The courts would not offer identifiable limits and Cooley suggested there could 
be no firm boundary delineating public and private spaces.  Rather, he believed that legislative 
power waned as private interests advanced.  And that balance changed as society developed, with 
private space advancing over the public, particularly as economies advanced and history 
disclosed the foibles of government intervention.    
At about the same time that the Illinois court struck down the cemetery legislation, the 
United States Supreme Court opened the due process floodgates with its rulings in the Slaughter-
House Cases.  In 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed a law requiring New Orleans 
slaughterhouses to locate in an area of the city owned and controlled by the Crescent City Live-
                                                 
1110
 Ibid., 195. 
1111
 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations: 593-94. 
444 
 
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company.  They could not continue operations outside that 
zone.  A number of butchers and associations sued, in part claiming that the legislature did not 
have the constitutional authority to create a monopoly or dispossess them of their property.  The 
case ultimately landed in the United States Supreme Court.  The court now had occasion to issue 
its first ruling on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The decision addressed a number of legal issues but, for the purposes of this paper, only 
those portions devoted to constitutional limitations on legislative power will be addressed.  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Samuel Miller, rejected the argument that due process rights 
restricted state property regulation.  Noting that virtually all state constitutions and the Federal 
Fifth Amendment contained due process clauses nearly identical to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s, Miller relied on precedent to limit due process to its historical procedural place.  
“It is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or in 
any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the 
exercise of their trade . . . be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of this 
provision.”  State police powers allowed for “all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to 
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.”
1112
  While the court overstated 
the case when it claimed there was no authority for limiting state action under due process 
clauses, it certainly followed the vast weight of authority. 
The dissent, however, saw the Fourteenth as more than a restatement of procedurally 
defined state due process provisions. In doing so, they would adopt many of the arguments of 
plaintiffs’ counsel.   John Campbell, a former member of the court, who had resigned his seat 
when his home state of Alabama left the Union, argued that the newly enacted due process 
clause, along with the privilege and immunities and equal protection clauses, protected persons 
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from legislative interference with their property rights.  In 1869, at the district court level, he 
proclaimed in oral argument,  
On our part we assert that it is against the common right, that it is contrary to 
the common law, which gives to every man a property in his person and a right 
to employ that in every lawful trade.  We say that those great inherent and 
natural rights which are proclaimed in all our constitutions and lie at the 
foundation of all our liberties, that they have had a constitutional sanction; that 
they are engrafted in the bills of rights in this State, and that they are written in 




Thereafter, Campbell incorporated Cooley repeatedly in his arguments.  In his briefs before the 
United States Supreme Court, Campbell premised most of his argument on the impropriety of 
government-created monopoly.  Erroneously citing Cooley as support, he argued that all 
American legislatures only have as much authority as specifically delegated to them.  Campbell 
then focused on the express and implied limitations found in the federal and Louisiana 
constitutions.  Again quoting Constitutional Limitations, Campbell argued that constitutions 
should be interpreted to protect individual rights, including the right to property.
1114
  The 
dissenters in Slaughter-House listened intently. 
Although never citing Constitutional Limitations, Justice Field’s dissent followed much 
of Cooley’s reasoning.
1115
  Like Cooley, he argued that state-created monopolies “encroach upon 
the liberty of citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness.”  Picking up on Cooley’s class 
legislation argument, Field continued, stating that laws that limit avocations must burden 
“equally upon all others of the same age, sex and condition.”
1116
  Like Cooley, Field also 
incorporated common-law principles into his constitutional edifice.  To him, the common law 
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prohibited government from granting monopolies and enacting unequal legislation, like the 
Louisiana law.  Field argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities 
language gave constitutional effect to the common law and the inalienable rights of the 
Declaration.    
Field concluded his opinion by stressing the importance of protecting property and in 
particular labor.  In a frequently cited footnote quoting Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations, 
Field wrote: 
‘The property which every man has in his own labor,’ says Adam Smith, ‘as it 
is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and 
inviolable.  The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of 
his own hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in 
what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain 
violation of this most sacred property.  It is a manifest encroachment upon the 
just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to 
employ him.  As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it 




Coming out of the Civil War, and fresh on the ending of slavery, Field and his dissenting 
brethren focused on equality and labor freedoms.  In doing so, they incorporated arguments 
employed by Cooley including concerns over class legislation, excess regulation, and court 
power.  Whether Field premised his argument on Constitutional Limitations or independently 
developed a similar line of reasoning, he pushed Cooley’s arguments forward as the due process 
revolution developed.  While Field focused on privileges and immunities, future courts would 
blend Field’s words with Cooley’s due process arguments to limit legislative power to regulate. 
With Cooley’s ideas now bolstered by the Slaughterhouse dissents, courts would accelerate their 
efforts to limit legislatures, just as legislatures were accelerating their efforts to involve 
government in the commercial sphere. 
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Ronald Labbe and Jonathan Lurie in their work The Slaughterhouse Cases implied that 
Cooley supported the majority opinion, which rejected the use of due process as a check on 
legislative authority.  Instead, they posited that Cooley would have approved of Louisiana’s 
legislation because its goal was consistent with public health and good order.
1118
  Unfortunately, 
like Alan Jones, Labbe and Lurie rely on Cooley’s general statements rather than considering his 
deeper antipathy to active governance.  Cooley demonstrated that, and his distaste for the 
Slaughterhouse majority opinion, when in 1878, he published “Limits to State Control of Private 
Business.”  In that article, Cooley expressed his aversion to any connection between government 
and monopolies, wages, or prices and, in particular, the Slaughterhouse legislation.   
In the troublous days immediately following the war, when the passions of the 
people were so inflamed on questions growing out of the civil conflict as to 
preclude any careful supervision of legislation by the general public, the 
Legislature of Louisiana granted to a corporate body the exclusive privilege for 
twenty-five years of slaughtering cattle in New Orleans and its immediate 
vicinity, limiting their charges it is true but making them sufficiently liberal.  
  
Suggesting a litany of horrors, Cooley opined that, “If the legislature could lawfully create this 
monopoly, why not create a similar monopoly of warehousing?”  “And if they did create one,” 
he continued, “what should prevent their fixing the rates as high as they have ever been fixed by 
individual warehousemen?”  From there, Cooley turned to his targeted-constitutionalism 
argument: If historically, government endeavors failed or were no longer justified by 
circumstance, then the legislature’s power to engage in those activities was withdrawn.  It was 
here he offered that a power to “assist in the establishment and support of mills” required in 
earlier days “should be considered recalled when the necessity has ceased.”  Along with that 
recall, was a further recall of the power to regulate.  Cooley offered, “When the power to aid 
mills by taxation is gone, such exceptional power to regulate as must have sprung from it should 
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be considered recalled also.”  Further, although earlier government regulated wages (Cooley 
incorrectly suggests this ended in the colonial period) those powers were “abandoned or 
recalled” by disuse.  Cooley then offered that the due process clauses “should be understood as 
protecting the liberty of employment with the same jealous care with which they protect against 
unlawful confinement behind bolts and bars.”
 1119
  Accordingly, changed circumstances changed 
constitutional meanings.  What was once within legislative purview was no longer.  The question 
of whether a power was still constitutional, however, only arose when the legislature sought to 
employ that power.  Therefore, Cooley’s argument about disuse of the power really meant 
something quite different.  It meant that, notwithstanding the legislature’s belief to the contrary, 
the custodian of constitutional limits had decided that circumstances no longer allowed use of 
previously exerted powers.  That custodian was the courts.   
 In basing his standard on the effectiveness of government programs and their impact on 
private spaces, Cooley advanced a fluid due process test.  By doing so, he necessarily rejected 
doctrinaire laissez-faire and class-legislation approaches.  The constitutionality of a government 
program, like Cooley’s proffered mills, was based on whether those projects made sense in 
relation to the burdens imposed at the time they were proposed.  Given that fluid test, the mill 
taxes of the early nineteenth century would constitutionally become too burdensome later in the 
century as a result of expanded capital availability and/or the historical lessons of the 
government overspending.  Social and economic changes demanded such modifications.  The 
“steady growth of free principles” required an adjustment of legislative space through a 
“permanent modification of the constitutional system.”  Price regulations, for example could be 
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undertaken if government power could be “harmonized with the general principles of free 
government,” so they were not absolutely forbidden but, rather, were allowable at times and 
unconstitutional at others.  While Cooley believed those regulations would rarely pass muster he 
noted that they might be acceptable according to the conditions of the time.
1120
 In other words, 
legislative authority adjusted to circumstance.  That fluidity required judicial balancing of the 
need to defer to the legislature’s judgment concerning general welfare needs, the historical 
effectiveness of government action, and the impact government activity had on individual 
interests.  Accordingly, no set formula defined Cooley, as constitutional interpretation must 
change to assure the protection of limited, republican governance.  
State courts moved more quickly to accept the Cooley standards than did the federal 
courts.
1121
  Using the Slaughterhouse dissents and Constitutional Limitations as foundations, 
they began to reverse regulations where they found those acts unreasonable.  Among the first 
was New York.  Disregarding an 1884, New York City regulation prohibiting the manufacture of 
cigars in tenement houses, Peter Jacobs worked with tobacco in a four-floor tenement house that 
he shared with his wife and two children, and three other families.  After being convicted for 
violating the ordinance, Jacobs sued, claiming that the statute deprived him of property in 
violation of due process.  The court unanimously agreed with him in In the Matter of the 
Application of Peter Jacobs.  In doing so, the court accepted an expansive definition of property 
and determined that restrictions on “the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live 
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any lawful 
trade or avocation” were liberty interests protected by due process guarantees.  Relying on 
Cooley, the court determined it was the judiciary’s place to review legislation to assure that it did 
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not encumber property or liberty interests beyond the narrow bounds of the state’s police power.  
The court’s language is telling, as it suggests an activist judiciary and a subordinate, or at least 
tame, legislature.   
Immediately after it had suggested the legislature had the authority to determine which 
regulations would support health, welfare, safety, and general-welfare concerns, Justice Earl 
offered, “the determination of the legislature is not final or conclusive.  If it passes an act 
ostensibly for the public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of a citizen, or 
interferes with his personal liberty, then it is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it 
really relates to and is convenient and appropriate to promote the public health.”  Accordingly, 
the court was not only to decide whether the legislature really intended to promote a policing 
purpose but it was also to decide if the regulation effectively accomplished that end.  It was to 
balance the infringement against the gain.  After asking, “What possible relation can 
cigarmaking in any building have to the health of the general public?” the court declared the law 
in violation of due process guarantees, unconstitutional, and void.
1122
   
In Jacobs, a court for the first time grouped Cooley’s concerns over economic liberty, 
class legislation, and restrictions on police power together to declare a law in violation with 
substantive due process guarantees.  That a New York court would lead is not surprising.  
Cooley’s work had constitutionalized New York’s early property-protecting jurisprudence.  The 
concern expressed in White, Wynehamer, and Morris now had a constitutional doctrine on which 
to grow. 
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Soon the substantive due process revolution moved to Pennsylvania, a state that, in 
Sharpless and Wartman, had embraced government involvement in commerce or, at a minimum, 
had affirmed broad legislative powers.  The controversy involved Pennsylvania’s steel industry.  
Steel and iron mill owners often paid mill workers according to the weight of the product they 
produced.  Pennsylvania had legislated that a “ton” equaled 2000 pounds, but the mill owner, in 
the case of Godcharles v Wigeman (1886), had set work rules defining a ton as 2240 pounds.  An 
employee claimed that the higher weight definition resulted in a loss of wages and litigation 
ensued.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employer, finding that the state 
could not enforce weights and measure regulations in the face of contracts to the contrary.  In an 
extremely short opinion, the court determined that the legislation was “utterly unconstitutional 
and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what, in this 
country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own 
contracts.”  Despite the employee’s concern he was being swindled, the court sought to protect 
his right to be free of legislative protection.  “The Act is an infringement alike of the right of the 
employer and the employee; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a 
legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a 
citizen of the United States.”
1123
  In an eight-sentence opinion, and without discussing any 
constitutional provision or the historic role of government in setting weights and measure 
standards, the Pennsylvania court ruled that those state laws could be disregarded by employers 
and employees.   
Soon the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidated a statute requiring mine owners to 
pay their employees in United States currency.  The court, in State v Goodwill (1889) based its 
decision on two Cooley inspired principles:  First, the act constituted class legislation where “the 
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rights and privileges of certain specified employers are abridged while others of the same class 
are left free.”  Second, the legislation violated the due process and privileges and immunities 
clauses by taking private property.  Citing Justice Field’s dissent in Slaughterhouse, the court 
determined that requiring payment in currency violated contract rights and “the enjoyment or 
deprivation of these rights and privileges, constitutes the essential distinction between freedom 
and slavery; between liberty and oppression.”  Accordingly, employees and employers had a 
constitutional right to set pay in any format they chose.
1124
  In a nearly identical 1893 Missouri 
case, State v Loomis, the court revealed its concern over pay legislation.  After relying heavily on 
Constitutional Limitations, the court raised the specter of socialism.  It declared the requirement 
that employees be paid in United States currency unlawful because it “introduce[d] a system of 
state paternalism which is at war with the fundamental principles of our government, and, as we 
have before said, are not due process of law.”
1125
 
In 1891, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v Perry considered a state 
law that prohibited employers from withholding garment workers’ wages for imperfect weaving.  
Although the statute provided for alternative means to charge employees for unacceptable work, 
the court found that the parties could contract to avoid the state mandated procedures.  The court 
declared the wage and process legislation unconstitutional because it constituted class legislation 
in violation of state constitutional property rights and contract guarantees.  The case is of 
particular interest because of the dissent by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  Holmes questioned the 
majority’s seeming willingness to bend the constitution to fit their economic model. 
What words of the United States or State Constitution are relied on?  . . .  So 
far as has been pointed out to me, I do not see that it interferes with the right of 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property any more than the laws against 
usury or gaming.  In truth, I do not think that that clause of the Bill of Rights 
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has any application.  It might be urged, perhaps, that the power to make 
reasonable laws impliedly prohibits the making of unreasonable ones, and that 
this law is unreasonable.  If I assume that this construction of the Constitution 
is correct, and that, speaking as a political economist, I should agree in 
condemning the law, still I should not be willing or think myself authorized to 
overturn legislation on that ground, unless I thought that an honest difference 




Holmes was raising a concern he would later voice while on the United States Supreme Court; 
the constitution did not presume that the courts would void legislation with which they had 
substantive disagreement.  Holmes’ dissent sobered neither the Massachusetts court nor, 
apparently, other courts.  State courts would increasingly void legislation as violating due 
process guarantees, claiming that they constituted class legislation, inhibited the rights to 
contract, took property, or were in some way unjust.
1127
 
 For example, in response to an 1891 state act requiring the weekly payment of wages, the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1893 elevated contract rights over state interest to assure payment to 
wage earners.  The legislation addressed the practice of several industries, including coal mines, 
to withhold a portion of employee pay until corporate economic conditions improved.  The 
Braceville Coal Company claimed that the law violated the state’s due process guarantees by 
depriving the company and its employees of their contract rights.  Moreover, the company 
claimed that the act was improper class legislation and an interference with laissez-faire 
economic rights.  In Braceville Coal v Illinois, the court sided with the corporation.  As in 
previous cases, the court defined labor as property but it went a step further, perhaps stating what 
others had implied.  The court declared, “the privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a 
property right.”  Citing Constitutional Limitations at length, Justice Shope scolded the legislature 
over its class legislation and listed the industries to which the legislation did not apply.  He then 
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offered, “The right to contract necessarily includes the right to fix the price at which labor will be 
performed and the mode and time of payment.  Each is an essential element of the right to 
contract, and whosoever is restricted in either as the same is enjoyed by the community at large, 
is deprived of liberty and property.”
1128
  Liberty, contract rights, and property were fused and 
protected by due process principles.  Constitutional Limitations had lit the intellectual fuse and 
undermined legislative prerogatives to act in support of the common welfare.  Notions of 
negative governance and legislative limitations had trumped majority will. 
 The Godcharles, Goodwill, Loomis, and Braceville Coal decisions evidenced a move 
from a concern about the undue influence of the wealthy on the legislative process, to a concern 
that majoritarian impulses would undermine wealth.  Public concerns over weights and 
measures, currency regulations, and pay guarantees melted in the face of individualistic notions 
of contract – even though those notions were contrary to long-standing public policies.  In a 
relatively short time, state courts had applied Cooley’s reasoning to limit legislation in support of 
the general welfare.  State courts embraced Cooley’s call to action and they sacrificed time-
honored principles respecting stare decisis and deference to the legislature at the altar of property 
and contract rights.  With Cooley’s declaration that “government can scarcely be deemed to be 
free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of the legislative body,”
 
as their clarion call,
1129
 state courts elevated property rights and contract liberties to a preeminent 
position.  In doing so, they almost certainly believed their rulings were consistent with “the 
general advance in intelligence and independent thought and action among the people” that 
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Cooley spoke of as an historical force.
1130
  Those courts accepted Cooley’s notion that free 
principles could only expand if courts could shrink legislative prerogatives. 
 While most litigation arose in state courts, plaintiffs increasingly complained that 
regulations also violated federal due process guarantees.  When they lost at the state level, 
litigants could then appeal to the federal courts.  The U. S. Supreme Court’s frustration over 
those actions revealed itself in the 1878 case of Davidson v New Orleans.  In that case, the 
plaintiffs objected that a property assessment to drain swamps constituted a deprivation of 
property in violation of due process.  Both parties cited Cooley to support their arguments 
concerning legislative power.  Justice Miller, writing for the court, seemed perplexed by the 
sudden rush of litigation concerning due process rights.  After stating that the “prohibition 
against depriving the citizen or subject of his life, liberty or property without due process of law, 
is not new in the constitutional history,” Miller declared “the docket of this court is crowded with 
cases in which we are asked to hold that the State courts and State legislatures have deprived 
their own citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”  He classified as a 
“strange misconception” the efforts of “every unsuccessful litigant” in state courts to challenge 
the merits of state legislation. 
 After scratching his judicial head, Miller wrote that the court was disinclined to set forth 
the specific scope of the federal due process guarantees.  Instead, he suggested that the courts 
come to that definition gradually.
1131
  Justice Bradley concurred in the result, but was dissatisfied 
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with the court’s hesitation to define due process.  He declared that a law violated those 
constitutional principles if it were “arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.”
1132
  To him, courts were to 
sit in judgment over laws to assure they met the judges’ standard of fairness.  The court was 
moving from a procedural definition to a substantive one.     
 The federal courts would accept Bradley’s principles, albeit a bit more slowly.  As in 
Slaughterhouse, until the closing days of the nineteenth century, dissents drove the substantive 
due-process discussion.  Three years after Slaughterhouse the court had the opportunity to 
consider whether due process limited legislative prerogatives.  In Munn v Illinois, the court again 
approved regulation of trade, this time the regulation of rail and grain elevator rates.
1133
  Counsel 
for both sides relied on Constitutional Limitations in their arguments and, consistent with 
Cooley’s underlying balance of public and private interests, Chief Justice Waite’s majority 
opinion held that grain elevators were a “business in which the whole public had a direct and 
positive interest,” and accordingly the regulations were appropriate.  State legislatures could 
issue pricing regulations for those entities pursuant to their police powers.  According to the 
majority, those powers included regulating for “the public good.”  By noting a distinction 
between public and private corporations, the court may have been signaling that it would have 
ruled differently if the industry had operated in the private sphere.  Once the elevator and rail 
industries were adjudged to be “public,” the majority rejected any notion of judicial oversight 
regarding the reasonableness of regulations.  That oversight was left to the democratic process 
and the ballot box.   
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 Justice Fields again dissented, but this time with only one justice joining.  He found, in 
part, that the regulations deprived the businesses of property in the form of potential profits in 
violation of due process.  In doing so, Field acknowledged a widened consideration of 
“property.”  Arguing, “All that is beneficial in property arises from its use and, the fruits of that 
use,” Field offered that the due process clause necessarily protected property beyond mere 
“deprivation of title and possession.”  Field went as far as to argue for a nearly complete 
rejection of regulations that restrict property use.  “If the legislature of a State, under pretense of 
providing for the public good, or for any other reason, can determine, against the consent of the 
owner, the uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices which the owner shall 
receive for its uses, it can deprive him of the property as completely as by a special act for its 
confiscation or destruction.”
1134
  Field relied on Pumpelly as support for including intangible 
interests as part of property.  The property bundle of straw was expanding, and government 
power, under Field’s equation, was contracting. 
 Whereas previous courts had employed the term “police powers” to define government 
actions, specifically those of the legislature, Field treated the term as a limitation on legislative 
power.  In employing the term, Field argued that police power was limited to advancing the 
“peace, good order, morals, and health of the community.”  As in his Slaughterhouse dissent, 
Field did not include concerns over the general welfare in his calculation and derisively referred 
to the broad definition of police power as “an undefined and irresponsible element of 
government.”  Accordingly, Field limited the legislative regulatory sphere essentially to sic utere 
tuo ut alenum non laedas (use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of 
another), and price regulations had no place in that (and presumably, neither did general-welfare 
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  Field’s position, therefore, either rejected the mass of antebellum rulings that 
broadly construed legislative power or, as Cooley might have argued, found that changed 
circumstances demanded new constitutional meanings in order to protect core republican-
governance principles. 
 It should not surprise that Cooley expressed concern over the Munn majority’s 
characterization that grain elevators were “affected with the public interest.”  In his 1878 fourth 
edition of Constitutional Limitations, Cooley noted, much as he had in Salem, “The public have 
an interest in every business in which an individual offers his wares, his merchandise, his 
services, or his accommodations to the public; but his offer does not place him at the mercy of 
the public in respect to charges and prices.”  Recognizing that government historically had 
regulated some prices, Cooley offered that a business was affected with the public interest only if 
1) it required a state license or franchise for the privilege of operating, 2) the state rendered 
business assistance to the entity, 3) the public granted public property or easements for the 
business’ use, or 4) the government granted exclusive privileges in exchange for business 
obligations to the public.
1136
  Cooley suggested licenses only were limiting where they had been 
historically part of governance – like taverns, lotteries, and entertainment.  The legislature 
enacted the grain elevator licensing requirement only as part of its challenged pricing limits, and 
that did not meet Cooley’s test.
1137
  Although in portions of his fourth edition of Constitutional 
Limitations Cooley favorably cited Munn, in other portions he objected to the wide berth given in 
that case to legislative power to advance general-welfare interests.  That being said, Cooley did 
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not adopt Field’s almost per se rejection of any pricing regulations or, extrapolating a bit, any 
regulation not specifically tied to public safety health or morals.   
 Munn dealt with pricing regulations, something Cooley suggested was “commonly 
supposed” to be “inconsistent with constitutional liberty.”  What then of legislative power over 
other regulations?  Here Cooley added little in his fourth edition, despite the increasing struggle 
over the issue.  Almost identically with his first edition, Cooley offered that regulations 
advancing public safety, health, and morals were well within the historic and constitutional 
purview of legislatures.  Market regulations were acceptable as they were “deemed important for 
the public convenience and protection.”
1138
  As to the extent of legislative power to regulate for 
the general welfare – Cooley offered nothing new.  Instead, as in the first edition, he avoided the 
issue by stating that his general list of appropriate regulations was “more than sufficient to 
illustrate the pervading nature of this power, and we need not weary the reader with further 
enumeration.”
1139
   
 Why the evasiveness and why the failure to elaborate on the specific limits assumed in 
the due process clauses?  It may have been that Cooley was satisfied deferring to the growing 
body of judicial decisions on matter.  It may have been that, as a chronicler of decisions, he was 
leery of offering more than general statements of law.  He may also have been loath to tacitly 
critique his judicial brethren by offering differing standards than they were contemporaneously 
pressing.  While all of those reasons may have some validity, underlying much of Cooley’s 
reticence was a notion that the due process restrictions of his day might become inappropriate or 
insufficient for future courts.  This “law of change” required that later courts retain the flexibility 
to respond to threats to republican governance and, with it, to allow for the “steady growth” of 
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free principles.  As Cooley noted in 1886,  “What emergencies may require or demand cannot in 
advance be foreseen, but the general obligation to do whatever may be possible to preserve 
Republican intuitions in their integrity is plain, and if kept steadily in view will lead to safe 
results.”
1140
  As threats to republican institutions changed, so too did the limitations required by 
and allowed for under the due process banner.  Accordingly, due process language could not 
stand as defined, unalterable barriers.  Instead, due process clauses were flexible instruments to 
achieve Cooley’s target – republican governance. 
Briefly, an Aftermath 
   
 Just as Miller suggested in Davidson, the federal courts would gradually consider the 
scope of due process.  That effort would eventually elevate the minority position to the majority. 
In 1897, the United States Supreme Court fully embraced the substantive due process concept in 
Allgeyer v Louisiana.  Using reasoning that mimicked Constitutional Limitations, the court 
combined the notions of liberty of contract, laissez-faire economics, and class legislation to 
arrive at its due process definition.  Justice Rufus Peckham wrote for the court that due process 
“is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to 
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by 
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful 
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.”  Peckham softened that powerful language, however, 
when he clarified late in the opinion that “it may be conceded that this right to contract in 
relation to persons or property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the State may be 
regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the 
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State.”  In that sense, the court allowed some level of intrusion into individual rights.  In essence, 
therefore, Peckham offered a balancing test, and the facts in Allgeyer argued for a balance on the 
side of individual contract rights.
 1141
   In the end, the court was on board, using due process as 
the sword with which to strike down undesired legislation.   
Using due process guarantees contained in state constitutions, the Fifth Amendment and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts turned Jacksonian principles on their head.  The 
Jacksonian scourges of a free society – corporations – were now the liberty protectors of the new 
age.  Ironically, Cooley considered those Jacksonian principles as central to his property-
protecting beliefs.  Now, however, Cooley and those who followed him considered limitations on 
corporate power as encumbrances on freedom and in violation of life, liberty, property, and due 
process. 
As has been discussed, the Cooley inspired revolution propelled property to the 
preeminent liberty-protecting interest of late-nineteenth century America.  Laissez-faire 
constitutionalism replaced the previous general-welfare paradigm and the individual’s interest 
became primary over that of groups.  As part of that shift, Americans increasingly feared that 
European social doctrines would undermine American liberties.  John F. Dillon, the former Chief 
Justice of the Iowa Supreme court, and one of the first champions of constitutional limitations on 
legislative power, reflected that concern in a January 1895 speech before the New York Bar 
Association.  He related that property rights formed the very foundation of American society.  
He feared that the general-welfare legislation, unions, and various “communists, socialists, [and] 
anarchists” were engaging in “combined attacks” on America’s “social fabric” and “fundamental 
principles.”  His strongest concern was the “socialistic” attacks on property through legislated 
taxation, and he classified “the States’ power of taxation” as “the most insidious, specious and 
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therefore, dangerous” attacks on America.  Dillon continued, protesting progressive income taxes 
that may be “designed as a forced contribution from the rich to benefit the poor and as a means 
of distributing the rich man’s property among the rest of the community.
1142
  It should be 
recalled that Dillon was the first judicially to embrace Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and 
its public purpose doctrines.  Democracy seemed to offer grave threats, as the masses could 
divest the wealthy of their property.  Missing in Dillon’s analysis was a concern that the wealthy 
would exert undue influence on legislatures to further their acquisitive aims.  The concern that 
had most significantly animated Cooley seemed inconsequential to a Dillon concerned about 
protecting property from the ravenous masses. 
Dillon was no malcontent nor was he alone in his concern.  Respected attorneys and 
scholars were speaking and writing against government “paternalism” and the efforts to restrict 
individual free action.  Sidney Fine, in Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare, provided 
numerous examples of the prevailing concerns.
1143
  For example, John Randolph Tucker in a 
speech before the 1892 American Bar Association meeting warned that, “The evils which infest 
and menace our country will be crushed by the free and unbound and independent manhood of 
the American people, unhelped and unhindered by paternal care of their governments.  This must 
be done or liberty will perish.”  Others raised the alarm of paternal government, each expressing 
concerns that government legislation would undermine liberty and property rights.
1144
  While 
their position did not rely specifically on Cooley, their ideas emerged from Constitutional 
Limitations and its resultant elevation of property interests and law – but, in a very significant 
way, they had ignored Cooley’s central point. 
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A Hint of Regret? 
 
Cooley maintained that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in order to 
facilitate republican governance.  At its core, the issue was not about individual rights.  As Jones 
noted, Cooley’s “dominant concern was the republic, not property rights.”
1145
  It was about 
protecting the governing structure from undue influences and inappropriate pressures.  Rights 
were a part of that, but they were not immutable or unchanging forces.  Rather, they expanded 
with the steady advance of free principles.  Where Dillon and his intellectual brethren suggested 
firmer limits on activities encumbering property and contract, Cooley held to no such stringent 
standard. 
So what did Cooley think about the developments in the due process and public purpose 
revolutions he had fathered?  As mentioned, Cooley respected the legislative role and called for 
the courts to protect republican governance by assuring that legislatures did not inappropriately 
respond to undue pressures.  In Constitutional Limitations and in a number of opinions, Cooley 
voiced the need for courts to defer to legislative judgments and to avoid replacing factual 
judgments of the court for those of the legislature.  Yet his standards called for a strong court 
presence.  He could do that because, at least early on, he believed judges were more 
contemplative and less subject to popular passions than were legislators.  Because of that, courts 
did not require the oversight that the legislature did.   
As courts became more active, and increasingly invalidated legislation, Cooley began to 
question his earlier thoughts.  In 1884, he bemoaned Michigan’s and other courts’ recent 
tendency to usurp legislative power by improperly substituting judicial judgments for that of the 
legislature.  In State v Iron Cliffs Company, a case considering the constitutionality of a statute 
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dealing with the sale of tax-delinquent property, Cooley reminded his brethren that courts “have 
no supervisory power in respect of legislation,” and that the courts could not invalidate 
legislation “however unwise or impolitic” it might be.  This admonition was necessary not only 
because court rulings offered the final word but because the courts had been overstepping their 
bounds.  Cooley offered, “There is ground for the belief that sometimes statutes have been 
annulled by courts on objections that purported to be ground in the constitution, but which, if 
plainly stated, would resolve themselves into this: that the judges did not like the legislation.”  
Cooley then called on the courts to “assign reasons” that were “sound and substantial” when 
overturning legislation.
1146
  Notwithstanding that call, in 1868 Cooley had invited such judicial 
activism when he urged judges to invalidate legislation in order to “shield private rights against 
arbitrary interference.”  By doing so, he had helped open the door for courts to mold 
constitutional clauses – most particularly due process and tax – in ways earlier courts had been 
loath to adopt.  By advocating a search for new constitutional meanings, Cooley invited the 
result he now feared.   
 The court in Iron Cliffs evenly split.  The lower court then sided with Justices Campbell 
and Sherwood, who voted to invalidate the tax measure as contrary to due process guarantees.  
On appeal from that decision, Cooley continued his protest against what had become a regular 
practice of invalidating unfavorable legislation under due process clauses.  Throwing up his 
judicial hands, Cooley offered, “Personally I have little care how this case shall be decided; but it 
seems to me that that on the constitutional question the Court is drifting to this position:  That 
those statutes are constitutional which suit us, and those are void which do not.”
1147
  Ironically, 
Sherwood’s opinion claiming the law violated due process sounded much like Constitutional 
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Limitations.  He offered that fundamental (and natural) laws protected private property through 
due process clauses.  Those protections existed in the common law and were made express in the 
written constitution.    
 The case was primarily procedural, as the court debated over the judicial process required 
concerning administrative findings.  But the justices’ dispute concerned the legislature’s power 
to change property rights, with Cooley’s brethren arguing that as a constitutional right, property 
was protected against legislative encumbrance.  Cooley had unleashed a judicial torrent – in 
some measure satisfying his legislative-limiting, republican governance objective.  In some 
measure, they were overreaching.  One wonders what Cooley thought of his earlier faith in 
judicial temperament and discretion.
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Chapter VII:  Historical Forces and Constitutional Change 
As our institutions expand the citizen will be subjected to new restraints for the 
protection of new rights which were either not clearly perceived before, or 
which have sprung from new conditions. 
Thomas M. Cooley 




 To Cooley, Michigan’s history provided essential lessons for the entire nation.  Given its 
experiences under foreign flags, and then under various territorial and state governing structures, 
Cooley believed that his state was both a significant contributor to and was influenced by the 
“remarkable changes” that had “so greatly affected [the] constitutional questions and political 
habits of mind and tendencies of the American people.”  To chronicle that contribution to 
national development, Cooley published his Michigan, A History of Governments while a 
member of the history department at the University of Michigan.   In it, Cooley explored how 
Michigan’s social, economic, and political developments had driven changes in thinking about 
the place of government in the evolving American nation.  While interesting in their own right, 
Cooley reflected that those changes altered constitutional understandings and governing 
structures.  He wrote, “But as the people change, so does their written constitution change also: 
they see it in new lights and with different eyes; events may have given unexpected illumination 
to some of its provisions and what they read one way before they read a very different way 
now.”
1149
  If, as Cooley argued, constitutional interpretations could change with changing 
circumstances, then government actions that were valid earlier may be invalid later and, 
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conversely, what was earlier forbidden could later be allowed.  It is not enough, therefore, only 
to study the changing jurisprudential landscape.  Instead, an understanding of changed 
constitutional principles requires an appreciation of the circumstances that drove courts to revise 
constitutional meanings and governing space.  Only then can one appreciate why Cooley argued 
that early governments could financially support private mills but later governments could not. 
 There can be little doubt that Cooley was particularly knowledgeable about, and shaped 
by, Michigan’s history.  His opinions evidence great respect for historical lessons, his articles 
spoke of historical events that shaped law and constitutional interpretations, and he was a 
member of the history faculty at the University of Michigan.  He knew of and understood the 
struggles of Michigan’s pioneers and settlers, the harsh environment they inhabited, and 
challenges presented by the absence of a protecting government.  He considered government 
planning and intervention providential in the wake of the 1805 fire, even as that intervention 
demanded changed property rights.  While believing the early colonial-like government was 
necessary, Cooley noted that the Northwest Ordinance imposed a government “neither derived 
from the people governed nor responsible to them.”
1150
  Particularly under the Hull and 
Woodward administration, that government was unresponsive to community needs.  Instead, its 
leaders answered to distant rulers in the nation’s capital.  Only when Cass became governor, and 
the people could elect at least some of their representatives, did Michigan accelerate its 
advancement to statehood and national relevance.  Throughout his discussion of Territorial 
Michigan, Cooley focused on the need for governance responsible to the people.  He bristled at 
the Jacksonian spoils system that undermined self-governance and he celebrated active 
governance that redesigned cities, relieved hunger, and educated the young.  Those scholars who 
suggest Cooley advocated laissez-faire governance or a handcuffed legislature ignore his 
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historical writings and understandings.  By relying on the uses others later made of his doctrines, 
they miss that Cooley was neither an advocate for the wealthy nor an adversary of the common 
man.  In an 1889 speech to the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, Cooley advocated for 
legislative power to meet “all evils” that could be reached by “proper legislation” under 
American constitutional governance.
1151
  He was a forward thinking jurist, who advanced 
governance responsive to changed circumstances. 
 At the same time, Cooley was not a proponent of unchecked democratic governance.  
Michigan’s failed efforts to develop internal improvements and the associated fiscal 
embarrassments seared their way into his political and legal thinking.  In his opinions and other 
writings, Cooley lamented the “debris of our airy castles” created when democratic impulses 
foolishly ignored economic realities.  To Cooley, however, such failure did more than send a 
cautionary note to future generations.  In his landmark Salem opinion, Cooley suggested that 
such failures resulted in the withdrawal of legislative powers once enjoyed.  In other words, 
experience demanded a changed constitutional structure.  He drew that adjusted governing 
structure from new meanings found in constitutional text.  To Cooley, it was “no longer 
recognized as proper or politic” that government should supply rail services.  Instead, those 
services were “remitted to the care of private industry,” and could no longer be publically 
funded.
1152
  Significantly, the democratic process did not make that decision and, indeed, the 
legislature and voters repeatedly disagreed with those urging caution or withdrawing power; the 
state legislature had twice approved Salem’s grant, the people of Salem had once authorized it, 
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and communities across the state and nation had routinely authorized rail subsidies.  In 
Michigan, only Cooley’s court majority and those losing in the political arena believed that it 
was “no longer recognized as proper or politic” to financially support private industry.  
Nevertheless, courts enjoy the final constitutional word (short of a formal amendment).  
Employing that power, Cooley imposed his notion of flexibly interpreting constitutional clauses 
to protect his constitutional target – limited republican governance.  With Salem, he found new 
meaning implied in the constitution’s tax language and in Bay City, he judicially found new 
meaning in the due process language.  In the end, previously misused power (perhaps along with 
chanced economic conditions) changed governing prerogatives.  Governing space retreated as 
the forces of history pressed for expanded private space.   
 Cooley’s primary republican concern was that the wealthy and influential would drive 
legislation to enhance their position at the expense of the less powerful and that doing so 
undermined the ideals of republican governance.  He witnessed firsthand as homeopathic special 
interests advanced the unauthorized expansion of legislative power to promote their own 
commercial interests.  He sat as a legal advisor to the University as the legislature responded to 
those special interests (and those of the public generally) by shunning constitutional barriers in 
order to commandeer a sister branch’s constitutional space.  Cooley believed that the framers had 
erected those barriers to assure a “steadiness in plan and conservatism in management, and place 
the university beyond the dangers that might spring from popular excitements and prejudices, 
and from political overturns.”
1153
  Fiscal challenges suffered in the wake of the Civil War 
undermined the University’s ability to parry legislative efforts to exert control.  In the end, the 
school’s administration capitulated, or at least compromised its independence, fearing that failure 
to do so risked the University’s continued vitality and perhaps existence. While Cooley’s beliefs 
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concerning homeopathic medicine are unknown, he certainly was concerned about the 
University’s struggles as it sought to maintain academic control in the face of powerful 
legislative impulses.  The legislature was overstepping regardless of the wisdom of its policy 
preferences, and it was doing so in response to pressures that constitutional structures were 
intended to mute.    
 As the legislature began to flex its muscles vis a vis the University, Cooley witnessed 
another significant legislative effort to expand its reach.  Multiple states, including Michigan, 
were enacting temperance legislation, which effectively rendered valueless property that had 
previously been of substantial value and commercial importance.  In response to these “Maine 
laws,” state courts across the nation considered whether legislatures could divest citizens of their 
previously lawful property.  Most significantly, the New York court found that such destruction 
of property violated that state’s due process clause.  In so ruling, New York expanded due 
process protections beyond their previous focus on procedural guarantees.  The court extended 
the clause to protect against legislative actions that significantly encumbered rights – most 
particularly, property rights.  
 Multiple jurisdictions, including Michigan, disagreed with the New York court, and 
continued their long-term expansive definition of legislative space.  Even as they affirmed 
legislative power, several courts, and multiple dissenters, expressed concern that the legislature’s 
efforts so deeply to regulate were unwise and distressing.  While declaring this was a political 
issue best left to the legislature and voters, many seemingly yearned for a constitutional peg upon 
which they could review significant rights-affecting legislation.  To Cooley, the Maine laws 
presented yet another example of distressing legislative activism. 
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 The 1850 Michigan Constitution stripped the state legislature of its power to finance rail, 
but it could not strip the state of its need for an expanded and effective transportation and 
communication network.  In response to that need, the legislature once again searched for, and 
found, a way to respond to public and private pressures.  In Michigan, as in other states, the 
legislature authorized municipalities to grant funds to private rail corporations where the state 
could not.  The practice of supporting private internal improvement corporations was 
widespread.  Since 1830, in one form or another, governments had been investing in rail and, 
since that time, disgruntled residents had sought judicial relief from the taxes associated with 
such government spending.  At its core, their argument was that the legislature lacked the power 
to take their property, in the form of taxes, and give that property to other private parties.  Unable 
to find clear and concise limits on such legislative action, all antebellum courts affirmed their 
legislature’s power financially to support private industry, particularly rail.   
 A reading of scholarly works suggests a different judicial dynamic.  Perhaps in an effort 
to cull an inevitable timeline to later legislative limitations, scholars have sought to find 
significance in court dicta and the relative few that challenged legislative plenary power.  When 
employing dicta, courts would denounce legislative overreaching but then affirm the legislature’s 
actions.  In those few cases where they invalidated property transfers, the courts were either 
protecting court power – pursuant to separation principles – or responding to private, person-to-
person transfers.  Unlike the later Cooley-inspired rulings, those cases largely were not about 
government power.  Rather, they were about which governing branch had jurisdiction. Notably, 
in the most significant wealth-transfer cases of the era – rail subsidies – courts uniformly 
affirmed legislative power.  The bottom line is that prior to Cooley, courts deferred to legislative 
judgments concerning taxing, spending, and wealth transfers. 
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 With one exception, those transfers remained valid until 1868 and the publication of 
Cooley’s, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power 
of the States of the American Union.  In it, Cooley offered that state constitutions expressly or 
implicitly limited legislative power to tax, spend, and regulate.  Through Constitutional 
Limitations and his further writings, speeches, and judicial opinions, Cooley unveiled his 
underlying premise that American constitutions were at their core, dedicated to the maintenance 
of republican, limited-government.  In order to achieve that goal, courts were to search for new 
constitutional understandings and limit legislative activities when laws unduly encumbered 
advancing individual liberty interests.  To be sure rights, particularly property rights, were 
always considered limitations on government overreaching.  But, prior to Cooley, courts almost 
always deferred to legislative judgments, even when individual rights were encumbered.  Cooley 
would encourage courts to protect and advance individual rights, largely in order to assure the 
promise of republican governance.   
 To Cooley, legislatures veered off their allowed constitutional course when, typically 
responding to undue pressures, they enacted unwise, uneven, or oppressive legislation.  Unlike 
many who would follow his lead, Cooley believed that the wealthy elite most threatened 
legislative wisdom.  Although a supporter of rail development, Cooley disapproved of the 
common practice of municipal financial support of private industry.  To Cooley, those practices 
had been proven dangerous and subversive to republican governance and therefore were not 
valid exercises of legislative power.  This was especially so as corporations influenced 
legislatures to coerce wealth transfers from objecting taxpayers to those corporate, private hands.  
As Cooley noted, once the state “enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall not fail to 
discover that strong and powerful interests are most likely to control legislation, and that the 
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weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger.”
1154
  Because of a history of 
government failures, and because the wealthy were subverting the legislative process for their 
own ends, Cooley demanded that courts review those enactments to assure legislatures honored 
republican values and systems.   
 As an historian, Cooley believed that society’s need for government changed with social, 
economic, and political developments.  Accordingly, republican values not only demanded 
legislation free from undue influences, but also required a respect for the natural growth of free 
principles.  Because of that, a court response to the same question could be different in 1870 than 
it was in 1850.  Hence, earlier acceptable public support of a mill would no longer be acceptable 
when the need or wisdom for doing so was absent.  Governing power shifts with need, 
experience, and circumstance – and when the legislatures erred in their assessments, the courts 
were there to set them on the appropriate path. 
 Surely, Cooley knew that his doctrine invested considerable authority in the judiciary.  At 
first, he seemed unconcerned.  To him, courts were immune from the coercive influences of 
wealth and popular passions.  Hence, judges could act as dispassionate referees, involving 
themselves in those cases where the legislature had ignored historical experience or had acted in 
ways that unduly encumbered free principles.  When that happened, the courts were flexibly to 
seek new constitutional meanings to guard the core principles of republican governance.  
Because of his respect for the legislature and belief that they were well suited to their 
constitutional role as problem solvers, and his faith in a well-trained and neutral judiciary, 
Cooley believed his theories would cautiously be employed.  Unfortunately, he found that his 
judicial followers became activist in their efforts to limit the legislature.  Instead of allowing 
progressive, considered legislation, a number of courts sought to enforce doctrinaire laissez-faire 
                                                 
1154
 People ex rel. The Detroit and Howell Railroad Co v Township Board of Salem, 486-87. 
474 
 
or anti-class legislation policies.  In doing so, they undermined the very republican principles 
Cooley held dear.  By suggesting the means to check legislative overreaching, Cooley had 
created the means to handcuff legitimate legislative action.  Late in his judicial career, in 1884 
and again in 1885, Cooley publically bemoaned that practice of substituting judicial views for 
those of the legislature.  While his critiques were rare, Cooley understood that courts were 
undermining much of his intentions.  In checking legislative power, Cooley had opened the door 
to enhanced judicial power that, unfortunately, lacked the dispassionate, agenda-free reflection 
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